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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF  
WORLD COMMUNISM

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REPORT

SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 5

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

HON. FRANCES P. BOLTON, Chairman

WITH

SUPPLEMENT I

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF COMMUNISM, 1848-1948

AND

SUPPLEMENT II

OFFICIAL PROTESTS OF THE UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT AGAINST COMMUNIST POLICIES  
OR ACTIONS, AND RELATED CORRESPONDENCE



UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1948

**SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 5—NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL  
MOVEMENTS**

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## PREFACE

No subject has been of deeper concern to the Government and the people of the United States for the last few years than that of communism. The question "What does Communist Russia want?" has been asked and asked again, and has received many answers. During the war we had accepted, perforce, that Russia was fighting on our side, and was even bearing the brunt of the fight. We had gone beyond this and believed that the Soviet state was allied to us in objectives beyond the defeat of Hitler; that it was altogether friendly. Promptly after the war a transition began, as Soviet and Communist actions contrary to our ideals or expectations began to disturb us.

Since the war Communist tactics in the countries of eastern Europe have appeared to us to violate agreements made concerning freedom and democracy in those countries. Revelations in Canada and Britain as well as in the United States have illustrated the Communist practice of espionage in a scarcely friendly fashion. Labor troubles under Communist stimulation have increased the difficulties of many countries in facing postwar problems of economic recovery. The Soviet has used its veto in the Security Council of the United Nations to block all action by the Council which might prejudice the cause of communism. The Soviet has used its position in Germany under Potsdam to interfere with any method of rehabilitation that we can understand.

Both the Soviet and the Communist Parties have formally announced their opposition to the project for European recovery, and have given notice that they will resort to all means to interfere with its success. And Communist propaganda, both from Soviet sources such as the Moscow radio and from Communist sources in all countries, has resorted to a standard line of attack upon the objectives of the United States, of contempt for American culture, and of uninhibited abuse.

All this has meant that the foreign policy of the United States has increasingly found that communism is a factor in every problem or situation. Communism, in its objectives, its strategy, and its practical working methods or tactics thereby assumes top priority for the attention of all concerned with the foreign affairs of the United States.

Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on Foreign Affairs was established in May 1947, with the assignment, among other matters, of studying such political movements as communism, fascism, and nationalism. Its first major study project was naturally concerned with the international impacts of Communist activities. This report is the first result of this study.

In preparing this report, and the supplements that accompany it the resources and aid of the Legislative Reference Service have been heavily drawn upon and generously given. Other agencies of the

Government have also contributed information and materials requested by the subcommittee.

Other reports prepared under the auspices of the Congress have both lightened the task and have been of great value in the study. Among these, particular mention should be made of House Document No. 754 of the Seventy-ninth Congress, *Communism in Action*, which offers a documented study of communism within the Soviet Union, and of the study of *Trends in Russian Foreign Policy Since World War I*, issued as a committee print by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Both of these documents were prepared by the Legislative Reference Service.

The report of Subcommittee No. 5 is issued in several parts, including a summary report and several supplements. Those parts now ready, or in an advanced stage of preparation are listed below:

Report: *The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism*.

Supplement I. *One Hundred Years of Communism* (basic documents on Communist theory and practice).

Supplement II. *Official Protests of the United States Government against Communist Policies or Actions*.

Supplement III. *Country and Regional Studies* (to be issued as separate studies for a number of regions or countries where Communist activity is important).

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# THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

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## PART I—A SPECTER IS HAUNTING EUROPE

"A specter is haunting Europe." This announcement was made a hundred years ago. It was made by the Communist League, in the Manifesto written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. That specter is still haunting Europe. It has changed in character, it has gathered force, and it has won victories. Yet today as a hundred years ago it still is an unfulfilled dream. The fact that it is a hundred years old, and that its expectations are not yet fulfilled invites doubt concerning its prophecies.

But we are not living in an easy age when to doubt that others have the truth is sufficient. We are driven to affirmation, in acts if not in words or thoughts. So far as our affirmations differ from theirs, as expressed in action most of all, we need to know the differences.

If we and the Communists are working at cross-purposes in the same world it is well to look at where and how our purposes cross theirs. And when the purposes meet and cross, we must look to see whether it is their purpose or ours that is frustrated. If it is ours, we must decide what is to be done.

We have turned our backs to these problems sometimes in the past. There have been times, as at the bottom of the depression in 1932, when it was not easy to be sure that communism would fail, that we had the better case. There have been other times when the faults and weaknesses of communism, and its archaic goals, have not been apparent, and we forgot them. As a result of this we have not always been as conscious of the difference between communism and our own democracy as is necessary for clear-headed action. Today we know that 100 years have not brought the fulfillment of Communist prognostications. But they have brought a time, now, when communism cannot be disregarded.

Seventy-seven years ago Communists led a revolt that succeeded in controlling the city of Paris for several months. The strength of communism, or of elements closely allied to it, has been substantial at least since then.

Forty-four years ago Lenin split the Social-Democratic Party of Russia into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, with the Bolsheviks accepting that rule of iron discipline that the Communists call democracy.

Thirty years ago Lenin engineered the seizure of power in Russia known as the October Revolution. After 4 years of civil wars Russia became consolidated as the stronghold of communism. Twenty-seven years ago Communist Russia went through the depths of famine and economic collapse. Seventeen years ago again there was famine induced by the drive for collectivization. Six and a half years ago



invasion brought once more a test close to the breaking point. That they passed the last test only with our aid should not make us underestimate what they did themselves.

The last test, with its climax at Stalingrad just 5 years ago, brought an alliance between us. The might and resourcefulness and the excesses of the Nazi threat cemented that alliance for the time. It was called at one time a "grand alliance" and later "The strange alliance." We know now it was an overrated "alliance."

Five years ago we were told the specter had been laid, that the Soviet and the Communists were friends of democracy. Cordell Hull, addressing Congress on November 18, 1943, declared:

As the provisions of the four-nation declaration are carried into effect there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests.

Four years ago Franklin Roosevelt, addressing the Foreign Policy Association on October 21, 1944, expressed the same hope.

The very fact that we are now at work on the organization of the peace proves that the great nations are committed to trust in each other.

Three years ago the Yalta Declaration on February 17, 1945, over the signatures of President Roosevelt, Marshall Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill, said:

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and general well-being of all mankind.

Since then it has become clear, first, that Soviet tactics are not free and peaceful as we understand those terms. The reasons for this have been explored and discussed by hundreds of authors, most notably by the author who signed himself as "X" in Foreign Affairs, July 1947. These writers have reached a great variety of tentative conclusions, and have not yet brought any clear agreement concerning Communist motives and Communist action. But we need the greatest possible precision in understanding their motives, for the issue is no less than whether or not war may be necessary. Therefore, it must be accepted as a target for the American mind, to understand with the greatest exactness the motives and the directions of Soviet and Communist action. We must evaluate and measure their effect against our own flexibility and tolerance and against the minimum requirements of strategic security for our Nation and our way of life. We must judge, at risk, whether it really is possible to avoid war, and also to avoid regrettable appeasement.

Today it is clear that the leaders of the Soviet Union believe that they have a great opportunity. They hope, as they hoped at the close of the First World War, that some or all of the weakened institutions of Western Europe can be broken. They know how to increase the strains, and they have announced that they will use all means to do so. Neither they nor we know just how much they can gain by their drive for power. As long as this is so the scope of ordinary diplomacy is limited. Treaties can be made only when certain premises have been established. But the premises on which treaties can be made do not exist today, for both sides now expect great changes in the very near future.

When Vishinski in September 1947 at the United Nations Assembly said that—

war psychosis, instigated by the efforts of the militarist and expansionist circles of certain countries, the United States of America occupying the foremost place among them, is continually spreading and assuming all the more menacing character—

and when the Cominform Manifesto said that appeasement of America would be as dangerous as appeasement of Hitler, the basic antagonism had become clear if not before.<sup>1</sup> This justified Secretary Marshall, in his Chicago speech on November 18, 1947, in saying as he did:

At that time I think it was a fact that the people of the United States had as high a regard, or I might better put it, appreciation, for the Soviet people and their sacrifices, and for the Soviet Army and its leaders, as they held for any other people in the world. But today, only 2 years later, we are charged with a definite hostility toward the Soviet Union and its people, which constitutes a complete change in our attitude since the summer of 1945.

I recognize this effect. I would not characterize it as hostile. But the important question is, what produced this tremendous change in our national feeling and attitude? The truth as I see it is that from the termination of hostilities down to the present time the Soviet Government has consistently followed a course which was bound to arouse the resentment of our people.

In the interval between that hopeful time when we considered Russia freedom loving and peace loving, and this time when we are concerned and resentful, there were many efforts to explain the Russian past. Some tried to justify the hope and faith of good behavior. There were many other efforts to explain and to qualify the developing contrast between that hope and harsh realities. Some writers pointed out that Russia had always sought expansion in certain directions, and suggested that for the Soviet Government to seek the same goals was only a continuation of older Russian motives. This would have implied that they had goals of expansion indeed, but that these were only the familiar goals of national interest. Other writers explored the historical relations between the United States and Russia in order to exhibit the absence of any fundamental conflict of interest in the past. Some took note of the learned theoretical discussions of Marxism in Moscow to explore the possibility that Russian leaders were no longer Marxist.

The abolition of the Comintern in 1943 was hailed by some as meaning the repudiation of world revolution. This was answered by others, Michael Florinsky<sup>2</sup> outstanding among them, with arguments that the Comintern had only become unnecessary, and that its abolition was but a smoke screen. The first signs that Russia might be an obdurate and difficult partner in the making of peace led some to explore the idea that Russia was "isolationist," and to compare the reasons for Russian isolationism with those for American isolationism at an earlier time. The difficulties in negotiation were attributed by some observers to the simple difficulties of language, and to the fact that such terms as "democracy" or "agreement in principle" do not mean exactly the same things for different peoples. Arthur Krock of the New York Times did a service when he explored this question (April 23, 1946) and pointed out the extraordinary competence displayed by Soviet diplomats in editing the English texts of their own statements.

<sup>1</sup> Both of these documents are printed in supplement I to this report.

<sup>2</sup> Of Columbia University, a leading authority on Soviet Government and politics.

An illustration of how confused American circles became in the midst of this transition was given when the Soviet paid its dues in the United Nations in March 1946 and it was taken as a reassuring sign of good faith and good intentions. Actually this sign came later than Stalin's speech of February 9, 1946, and Churchill's speech at Fulton, Mo., March 5, 1946. These announced, on the one hand, the continued adherence of the Soviet Government to its basic doctrine of world revolution, and on the other hand the dangers that this would mean for the United States.

If all of the speculations concerning Soviet-Communist motives and tactics are boiled down, we may find a certain common core. This common core must include all that is demonstrated to be significant by any one of the many lines of argument. It must include the evidence of their actions, on the simple principle that actions speak better than words, but it must include evidence of their words also, for only in their words do we find an explanation of why they do not always act the same in what appear to us to be similar circumstances. We must examine further, not only the actions of the Soviets but also the actions of Communists outside the Soviet Union. The tools and methods available to the Soviets and those available to Communist parties abroad simply afford a choice of means to the same ends. And we must examine not only the propaganda and agitation of Communists in all countries but the economic weapons used to weaken countries that are under attack, and the political tactics used to weaken the structure of free societies, and the psychological arts for confusing their opponents and attracting converts. We must take evidence from a broader range in time than any few years or we will have no guard against thinking of them as liberal and progressive as in 1935-39, or pro-Nazi as in 1939-41.

Finally, we must take note of the relation of tactics to strategy and of strategy to theory, as they themselves see these relations.

Any less comprehensive approach neglects essential evidence. The multitude of explanations for Communist policy has certain common characteristics. Each of the explanations is logical within the scope of the evidence admitted. Most of them are open to contradiction on the basis of broader evidence.

An examination of all aspects of Soviet and Communist policy and tactics leads directly to some simple conclusions.

1. The Communists have one goal—world revolution.
2. They assume that the revolution will be violent.
3. They are incapable of accepting the idea that peace can endure from now on, and they expect one more catastrophic war.
4. The Soviet Union is regarded as the main force of the revolution.
5. They fear a coalition against the Soviet Union.
6. They therefore fear reconstruction or federation in the non-Communist world.
7. They utilize the most modern and effective means of cold warfare to strengthen their own forces and to weaken all others.
8. The Communist parties outside the Soviet Union are junior partners or auxiliaries.
9. The tactics are based upon a definite theory, and the central propositions of that theory do not change.

10. The division of Europe and Asia between the victors of World War II is to be settled by power politics and not by negotiation.

It is the purpose of this report to summarize the evidence, explain the logical relationships involved, and to justify the conclusions stated.

## PART II. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM

### A. COMMUNIST RELIANCE UPON THEORY

Theory is often an unwelcome term, taken as suggestive of unreality and vagueness. There are people occasionally in the course of history, however, to whom theory is a matter of great seriousness, and who act in accordance with what they call their theory. The Communists revel in theory.

Arguments are sometimes made that Stalin is a hard-headed pragmatist to whom theory means nothing. He may well seem so to those who meet him on business terms in the course of negotiations. But there is this to remember, that the Communists consider their theory scientific. This being so, those who believe in the theory may be temperamentally more like engineers than like men of theoretical bent in the vague, foggy, unpractical, academic sense. For an engineer to be wholeheartedly intent upon practical aspects of a problem does not at all mean that he does not believe the principles of theoretical mechanics. It may rather indicate how deeply he does believe in them, so deeply that he takes them for granted and pays no conscious attention to them because they are his second nature.

One might say that a doctor cares nothing for the germ theory of disease because he never mentions it when he vaccinates a baby. But it would not be true.

Americans habitually neglect, or even forget, that there is any theory behind their own institutions. Communists never forget their theoretical principles. In part this difference is a matter of age, for younger movements are always more conscious of theory than older ones. Also in part it reflects the idea that Marxism is a science. They regard their strategy and tactics as derivatives from their theory, by strictly logical deduction.

Without a revolutionary theory, there cannot be a revolutionary movement.<sup>3</sup> Only a party guided by an advanced theory can act as a vanguard in the fight.<sup>4</sup>

Stalin himself makes a broader explanatory comment.

Revolutionary theory is a synthesis of the experience of the working-class movement throughout all lands—the generalized experience. Of course, theory out of touch with revolutionary practice is like a mill that runs without any grist, just as practice gropes in the dark unless revolutionary theory throws a light on the path. But theory becomes the greatest force in the working-class movement when it is inseparably linked with revolutionary practice; for it, and it alone, can give the movement confidence, guidance, and understanding of the inner links between events; it alone can enable those engaged in the practical struggle to understand the whence and the whither of the working-class movement.<sup>5</sup>

Strategy is the application of theory to a broad situation, the identification of the main factors in the situation, and the recognition of

<sup>3</sup> Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 94, lecture at Sverdlov University, April 1924. Printed in part, in supplement I to this report.

<sup>4</sup> Lenin, quoted by Stalin, *Leninism*, pp. 94, 95.

<sup>5</sup> Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 94, lecture at Sverdlov University, April 1924.

which ones are favorable or unfavorable. Tactics in turn are the direct practical application of theoretical and strategic principles in ordinary daily work.

Tactic is the determination of the line to be taken by the proletariat during a comparatively short period of the ebb or flow of the movement, of advance or retreat of the revolution; the maintenance of this line by the substitution of new forms of struggle and organization for those that have become out of date, or by the discovery of new watchwords, or by the combination of new methods with old, etc. Whereas strategy is concerned with such wide purposes as the winning of the war against tsarism or the bourgeoisie, tactic has a narrower aim. Tactic is concerned, not with the war as a whole, but with the fighting of this or that campaign, with the gaining of this or that victory which may be essential during a particular period of the general revolutionary advance or withdrawal. Tactics are thus parts of strategy, and subordinate thereto.<sup>6</sup>

A most important element in strategy and tactics is an understanding of when and how to shift from the offensive to the defensive and back again. This is as essential a principle to the revolutionary movement as it is to military strategy. It also reflects the unending practicality and patience with which the Communists are ready to face the shifts of circumstances and the delays of hope. Lenin took particular note of the superiority of communism on the offensive over communism on the defensive in his time, and pointed out that they must learn not only to advance but to retreat.

Revolutionary parties must go on learning. They have learned how to attack. Now it is time for them to realize that this knowledge must be supplemented by acquiring a knowledge of how best to retreat. We have got to understand (and a revolutionary class learns this by bitter experience) that victory can only be won by those who have learned the proper method both of advance and of retreat.<sup>7</sup>

He also emphasized the long drawn-out character of the struggle, and the many changes that may occur.

To wage a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, more prolonged, more complicated, than the most bloodthirsty of wars between States, while renouncing beforehand the use of maneuvering, of playing off (though for a time only) the interests of one foe against the other, of entering upon agreements and effecting compromises (even though these may be of an unstable and temporary character)—would not such renunciation be the height of folly? We might as well, when climbing a dangerous and hitherto unexplored mountain, refuse in advance to make the ascent in zigzag, or to turn back for a while, to give up the chosen direction in order to test another which may prove to be easier to negotiate.<sup>8</sup>

This insistence on what is sometimes called the "Leninist line", or a zigzag line of advance and retreat, is the theoretical basis for the grand shifts of Communist strategy that have marked the 30 years since the Russian Revolution. This series of great zigzag shifts is the main framework of their policy, and the incidental cause of most of the confusion as to just what their policy is. First, after the revolution, there came the 3 years of war communism, when the party in Russia drove toward the left, nationalizing industries, requisitioning goods, and drafting manpower. Then came the 6 years of the New Economic Policy or NEP, when free enterprise was encouraged, in order to revive production and trade from the terrible break-down left after the civil wars. Next came the Five Year Plan or "Piatiletka." The drive to the left in this period brought the socialization

<sup>6</sup> Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 148.

<sup>7</sup> Lenin, quoted by Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 153.

<sup>8</sup> Lenin, quoted by Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 158.

of agriculture, the famine in the Ukraine in 1931, and the slaughter of the cattle which reduced Russian livestock so far that they have never since surpassed their former numbers. It also started the growth of heavy industry which has been the backbone of the growth of Soviet power. Hitler's rise to power in 1933 brought another transition, a swing to the right in foreign relations. In 1935 the new Soviet Constitution was adopted, in a form that apparently accepted the familiar standards of western democracy. The Popular Front became the announced policy, and the alliance of communism with socialism, instead of bitter opposition to the Socialists as misleaders of the working class, was made the basis of political tactics in France and other countries. The Communist role in the Spanish Civil War in alliance with Socialist and democratic elements was the outstanding illustration of what this meant. The great purges of 1937 and 1938 showed how an intensification of leftism in Russia could accompany cooperation with capitalist countries abroad.

The Popular Front died in the period of Nazi preparation and appeasement. The preparatory Nazi moves, of course, date back to the occupation of the Rhineland in 1935 and the naval treaty with Britain. The appeasement of the Nazis or the Italian Fascists by the democracies begins at least as early as that and, of course, includes the failure of the League to stop Mussolini's Ethiopian war. It was not until after Munich, however, that the Soviet purges on the one hand and the appeasement by the western democracies on the other brought the shift of Soviet strategy that was announced so suddenly with the Nazi-Soviet pact in August 1939. In the period that followed the Soviets seized what they could entirely on their own. They thereby gained the position in the Karelian Peninsula which later helped save Leningrad, and occupied the Baltic States and eastern Poland. They also discussed with the Nazis a world revolutionary partnership, but set their own demands too high for Nazi acceptance.<sup>9</sup>

The failure to make a satisfactory deal with Hitler brought the German attack on Russia on June 22, 1941. The United Kingdom promptly announced its acceptance of the Soviet Union as an ally and its own persistence in the fight against Hitler. The United States moved swiftly to include Russia under lend-lease, and the first lend-lease protocol with the Soviet Union was signed before Pearl Harbor. Thus began a new "right" period of collaboration between Communists and other democratic and progressive forces. Some call this the Tehran period. From the time of Tehran until the Soviet repudiation of the Marshall plan in June 1947, there was a 2½-year period which can only be regarded as transitional to a new leftward drive. There was evidence throughout this period of some effort to retain the psychological and political assets that had been built up in the time of collaboration. At the same time there was an effort to seize new assets through Communist control of eastern European countries, Communist action to change the balance of power in eastern Asia, and Communist readiness to delay the peace. If there is any major characteristic of their strategy in this period, it was the readiness to grab anything they could get without great risk. These 2½ years were, of course, years of transition not only in Communist

<sup>9</sup> See *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41*, published by the Department of State, 1948.

policy and strategy but also in the psychology and therefore the policy of the United States and other countries.

The present time, at least since June 1947, has all the characteristics of past periods of radical leftism. The Communists are pursuing their own objective, not perhaps at the risk of war, but at least at the risk of open enmity. Psychologically the recreation of the Cominform is the clearest of all the symptoms. It represents the liquidation of whatever they gained in western minds by the abolition of the Comintern.

It is current facts that cause them to recognize a new situation. But it is theory that guides their estimate of how to act toward a new situation when they see one. Their decision for offensive action in the present situation is a theoretical decision.

## B. CAPITALISM AND REVOLUTION

If Communist theory offers the basis and guide for Communist tactics, how does it do it? The body of their theory is an analysis of cause and effect in modern society, and since it is a theory of cause and effect, it is equally a theory of means and ends. For any theory to guide any tactics, it must offer an analysis of a practical situation, throw the focus of attention upon certain features, explain the meaning of these features, and explain clearly how to act within the situation. Communist theory does just this, it is a sort of field manual for revolutionists, explaining what are the important features of any battlefield, and how action should be adapted to the variations of the field in any particular situation.

Capitalism may be taken, for our present purposes, as the starting point in the Communist theory of human society. While they also make great to-do about "materialism" and "dialectics," this is philosophical underpinning which is not essential to the present discussion. Capitalism, as they see it, is the dominating feature of human society in the present age. The whole of human culture in any society is, according to their ideas, shaped and colored by the "mode of production." The present mode of production in all leading countries except the Soviet Union is capitalism, that is private ownership of the means of production. Capitalism, as a system, requires exploitation of the laboring class, or proletariat, and an inhibiting of the whole productive process by the distorted motives of profit. The disparity between the rewards to capital and the rewards to labor must become greater and greater, and finally the progress of production must be halted by the faults of the system.

The real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself. It is the fact that capital and its self-expansion appear as the starting and the closing point, as the motive and aim of production; that production is merely production for capital, and not vice versa, the means of production mere means for an ever-expanding system of the life process for the benefit of the society of producers. The barriers, within which the preservation and self-expansion of the value of capital resting on the expropriation and pauperization of the great mass of producers can alone move, these barriers come constantly in collision with the methods of production, which capital must employ for its purposes, and which steer straight toward an unrestricted extension of production, toward production for its own self, toward an unconditional development of the productive forces of society.<sup>10</sup>

The faults of capitalism involve contradictions, that is to say, the generation of forces that work in opposite directions. These contra-

<sup>10</sup> Marx, Capital, I, p. 293.

dictions develop into opposed interests between individuals and classes, and become political forces of explosive strength. The three most fundamental of these contradictions, in the eyes of the Communists, have been listed by Stalin. ■

Among the most important contradictions of the capitalist system, special mention may be made of the three following:

First contradiction: The conflict between labour and capital. ■ ■ ■

Second contradiction: The conflict between the various financial groups and the different imperialist powers in their competition for control of the sources of raw material, for foreign territory. ■ ■ ■

Third contradiction: The conflict between the small group of dominant "civilized" nations, on the one hand, and the hundreds of millions of persons who make up the colonial and dependent peoples of the world on the other. \* ■ \*<sup>11</sup>

The development of capitalist industry automatically develops the proletariat as a class. This class has, according to Marxist thinking, certain remarkable attributes. First, it is the most numerous, outnumbering the peasants or bourgeoisie. It also is the class which learns, under capitalism, the value of cooperation and discipline, and the social nature of production. It thereby develops common objectives and a firmness of morale lacking to all others, and gains a sense of how society should be organized in contrast to the capitalist system. It thus becomes of necessity the revolutionary agent for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of socialism. As Lenin said:

While the capitalist class breaks up and dissolves the peasantry and all the lower middle classes, it welds together, unites and organizes the town proletariat. Only the proletariat—on account of its economic role in production on a large scale—is capable of leading all the toiling and exploited masses.<sup>12</sup>

The contradictions in society before the revolution, expressed in conflict between groups and classes, require the creation of a monopoly of force in order to prevent chronic civil war. This monopoly of force, serving as the agency for the maintenance of peace in the presence of contradictions, is the state. The state is the agency of the ruling class, for the preservation of the existing order with all its advantages for that class. As such, it is the agent that defends the existing order through the use of force, and ipso facto is the prime target of revolution.

The state is tantamount to an acknowledgement that the given society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has broken up into irreconcilable antagonisms, of which it is powerless to rid itself. And in order that these antagonisms, these classes with their opposing economic interests may not devour one another and society itself in their sterile struggle, some force standing, seemingly, above society, becomes necessary so as to moderate the force of their collisions and to keep them within the bounds of "order." And this force arising from society, but placing itself above it, which gradually separates itself from it—this force is the state.<sup>13</sup>

The state is nothing else than a machine for the oppression of one class by another class, and that no less in the democratic republic than under the monarchy.<sup>14</sup>

The character of a class society and of the state as its preservative is what makes revolution necessary. The conditions of capitalism make it impossible that the capitalist class can understand the real necessities for reform and change. Reform on a genuinely adequate

<sup>11</sup> Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 81 f., lecture at Sverdlov University, April 1924.

<sup>12</sup> Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 132.

<sup>13</sup> Engels, *The Origin of the Family, State and Private Property*, in Burns, *A Handbook of Marxism*, p. 328, quoted by Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 114.

<sup>14</sup> Engels, *Introduction to Marx, The Paris Commune*, p. 90.



scale is impossible, and a stage is sure to be reached eventually at which society must either relapse into decadence or go through a revolution.

If the State is the product of the irreconcilable character of class antagonisms, if it is a force standing above society and "separating itself gradually from it," then it is clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible without a violent revolution, and without the destruction of the machinery of state power, which has been created by the governing class and in which this separation is embodied.<sup>15</sup>

Leninism is preeminently combative and revolutionary.<sup>16</sup>

The possibility of avoiding revolution has been largely neglected in Marxism, but there have been some few comments upon it. It was recognized by Marx and Engels that liberal democracy, as they saw it in England or the United States might possibly evolve toward socialism without the necessity for a violent overthrow. But how improbable the avoidance of revolution appears to them is clearest in their readiness to attack all doctrines of peaceful reform.

The lower middle class Democrats, these sham Socialists who have replaced the class-war by dreams of harmony between classes, have imagined even the transition to socialism, in a dream, as it were—that is, not in the form of the overthrow of the supremacy of the exploiting class, but in the form of the peaceful submission of the minority to the fully enlightened majority. This lower middle class Utopia, indissolubly connected with the vision of a state above classes, in practice led to the betrayal of the interests of the toiling classes, as was shown, for example, in the history of the revolutions of 1848 and 1871. \* \* \*<sup>17</sup>

The later development of industry and capitalism in the United States, from 1880 to the 1920's was regarded as proof that American and English democracy was becoming more and not less capitalistic and that the possibility of avoiding revolution, if it ever existed in these countries, had ceased to exist.

Marx did, in actual fact, admit this possibility, and he had good reason for doing so in regard to the Britain and the United States of the early seventies, before the days of monopolist capitalism and imperialism, and at a time when in those countries (owing to the peculiar conditions of their development) militarism and bureaucracy were but little in evidence. That was at an epoch when imperialism was in its infancy. But several decades later, when the position in the English-speaking lands had radically changed, when imperialism had grown to its full stature and was dominant in all capitalist countries without exception, when militarism and bureaucracy had become established in Britain and the United States as well as on the Continent of Europe, and when the exceptional conditions favorable to a peaceful development in the English-speaking world had passed away—then Marx's reservation "on the Continent" had become obsolete, and what he said of continental Europe applied with equal force to Britain and the United States \* \* \*.

In other words, as far as the imperialist countries are concerned, we must regard it as a universally applicable law of the revolutionary movement that the proletarian revolution will be effected by force, that the bourgeois state machine will have to be smashed, as an indispensable preliminary to the revolution.<sup>18</sup>

The fact that they are so convinced of this that they simply take it for granted is illustrated by Stalin's comment "when I use the word 'prerevolutionary' I am thinking only of the proletarian revolution." In other words, he is assuming that any nation that has not yet had a proletarian revolution is still prerevolutionary, that is to say still faced with such a revolution as a future prospect.

<sup>15</sup> Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 116.

<sup>16</sup> Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 80, lecture at Sverdlov University, April 1924.

<sup>17</sup> Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 132.

<sup>18</sup> Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 117, 1928 edition.

## C. DICTATORSHIP

According to the Communists, society immediately after the revolution must be organized as the dictatorship of the proletariat. The overthrow of the old state does not suffice to eliminate all forms of exploitation and coercion. This task must be accomplished before the classless society can be created and the "withering away" of the state can occur. The dictatorship of the proletariat is at first simply the opposite of the previous "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie." There is a prevailing contrast, however, to which the Communists pay little attention—the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie may be democratic at least in form. The dictatorship of the proletariat, so far as it impinges upon the enemies of the proletariat, is cloaked in no way whatsoever.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is a hard-fought fight against the forces and traditions of the old society, a fight that is both bloody and unbloody, both violent and passive, both military and economic, both educational and administrative.<sup>19</sup>

In the course of time it has become clear that the dictatorship of the proletariat includes the utilization of every known method of mass control in society. Whatever faults may lie in this the fact remains that these methods are certainly effective within limits. If one has a serious problem of a dissident group, one can dispose of that particular problem by wiping out the group. This may cause later problems of a still more serious character, but within the limited terms in which the calculation is made, is a rational method of solving the particular problem. As a close student of the methods of the police state has said:

Behind the cunning devices and speedy action of the secret police as experienced from Fouché to Himmler, there is a certain basic conception of what man is and how he must be treated. \* \* \* At the same time, this negative conception is markedly rational, for it implies that man is a bundle of instincts and emotions, easily perceptible and controllable, which, if necessary, can be annihilated by various specific techniques.<sup>20</sup>

The dictatorship of the proletariat is supposed to end in the eventual "withering away" of the state, a curious feature of the Communist theory which has caused much fruitless speculation. There have been times when developments within the Soviet Union have been interpreted by sympathetic outsiders as the beginnings of this withering away. Every turn toward more democratic forms, as by the Soviet Constitution of 1935, has been welcomed on this ground. If one examined closely the Marxist doctrine of the state, the place of the withering away in the system of concepts becomes apparent. The state is simply the means for the domination of society by a single class at the expense of other classes, and the role of the proletariat is to overthrow the old state, and create a new one. It must then use its power to create a classless society, and the state as defined must cease to exist as the classless society comes into being. In other words, the state will "wither away" because the state is by definition that which must wither away when there are no classes.

Democracy, carried out with the fullest imaginable completeness and consistency, is transformed from capitalist democracy into proletarian democracy: From

<sup>19</sup> Lenin, Works, vol. XVII, Russian edition, p. 136, quoted by Stalin, Leninism, 1928 edition, p. 112.

<sup>20</sup> Bramstedt, Dictatorship and Political Police, p. 137.

the state (that is, a special force for the suppression of a particular class) to something which is no longer really a form of the state.<sup>21</sup>

And, once the majority of the nation itself suppresses its oppressors a "special" force for suppression is no longer necessary.<sup>22</sup>

Any confusion as to when the Soviet State will wither away is unnecessary. As Stalin once made clear,<sup>23</sup> the State cannot wither away in a single socialist country before the world revolution, because of the necessities imposed by capitalist encirclement.

The monopoly of power by the proletariat, not only against the bourgeoisie but to the exclusion of any other classes, is best explained by examining the Marxist teachings concerning the role of the peasants. This also clarifies, by contrast, their conception of the proletariat and its special function in the logic of history. There are many groups in society, not just two, which may be identified as classes at any given time. The bourgeoisie and the landowners are distinct, though allied. The peasants are distinct from both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Also the peasants may become allied with the proletariat, although they can play only an auxiliary role.

\* \* \* The agricultural population, in consequence of its dispersion over a great space and of the difficulty of bringing about an agreement among any considerable portion of it, never can attempt a successful independent movement; they require the initiatory impulse of the more concentrated, more enlightened, more easily moved people of the towns.<sup>24</sup>

The mixture of Marxist emphasis upon dictatorship with their pretensions of being more democratic than democracy has often seemed contradictory. It has been, as noted earlier, one of the focal points in discussions of the difference in the meaning of words as between Soviet negotiators and others. Actually, the meaning of democracy to the Communists is quite clear in Communist doctrine. It was first raised in a sharp form in 1903, when the Russian Social Democratic Party split into the two groups known to the world as Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. This split occurred over the adoption of a clause defining membership in the party constitution. Lenin proposed that the clause should read:

Anyone is a member of the party who participates in the organization of the party.

Martov proposed instead:

Anyone working under the supervision of the party is a member of the party. Lenin's definition meant that the party would include only the small circle of active conspirators, while Martov's would have included all sympathizers and adherents. This would have brought in all politically active labor, whereas for Lenin the party would have the role of disciplined professional revolutionary cadres. Lenin, at a later time, expressed his views on the subject more clearly.

During the present epoch of intense civil warfare, the Communist Party can accomplish its task only on condition that it is highly centralized, that it is dominated by an iron discipline which is quasimilitary in its severity, that it is guided by a group of comrades at the center, enjoying the confidence of the rank and file members, endowed with authority, and possessing wide executive powers.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Lenin, *State*, p. 149.

<sup>22</sup> Lenin, *State*, p. 149.

<sup>23</sup> In his Report on the Work of the Central Committee of the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1939. The part referred to is printed in supplement I.

<sup>24</sup> Marx (Engels) *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, p. 25.

<sup>25</sup> Lenin, *Conditions of Admission Into the Communist International*, quoted by Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 171

The acceptance of this principle by Stalin, at least when he wrote his *Foundations of Leninism*, was explicit.

But when a difference of opinion has been thoroughly thrashed out, when criticism has had its say, and when a decision has been made, then unity of will and action on the part of all our members is the indispensable condition without which unity and discipline are impossible.<sup>26</sup>

Do you think that the interests of any individual comrade are to take precedence of the interests and unity of the party? Surely the comrades of the opposition know that for us Bolsheviks formal democracy is a trifle, and that the real interests of the party are all important.<sup>27</sup>

Well, what does unity demand? Unity demands that the minority should yield to the majority. Unless this rule be followed, there can be no unity, and there can be no party.<sup>28</sup>

The Communists have succeeded in maintaining a pretense of democracy within Communist organizations, and in the Soviet government, while at the same time achieving the effect of dictatorship. The method they use is what they call "democratic centralization," simply the application of the principles expressed above. This term means that there may be free discussion of an issue, within the organization, up to the time when a decision is reached. From that time on discussion stops. The majority decides, and the decision is final. How the majority decides is discussed further below, under the heading of political tactics, but suffice to say that all the arts of manipulation are applied to secure a majority decision in accordance with the will of the leaders. Communists are very able operators in the conduct of meetings. They know the rules, they use the powers of a chairman to full effect, and the cadres of the party provide a well-trained and well-prepared group on any issue, ready and able to dominate the discussion. The forms are democratic in part; the effect is that the mass membership acts in rubber-stamp fashion.

Along with the iron unity and discipline of the party, the Communists recognize that the party must develop its own sense of values and its own moral system. So-called bourgeois values interfere at many points with the pursuit of revolutionary objectives, and with practical tactics. Lenin discussed this need for an independent and exclusive moral system in his paper on the Tasks of the Youth Leagues.<sup>29</sup> Such a tendency to insist upon their own value system is, of course, common to more or less fanatical political and religious groups. Secret societies, from the "Molly McGuires" of Pennsylvania, to the IMRO of Macedonia, and the "Black Hand" of Serbia, have always demonstrated a tendency to regard their own objectives as the embodiments of absolute value. This leaves no barrier whatever in their thinking to prevent a drift into the doctrine that the end justifies the means. This certainly applies to modern communism.

If one believes that one's own group represents the predestined leadership of a great historical human movement, this will, of course, be reflected in one's attitude toward other groups. Outside of the Bolsheviks themselves, any prerevolutionary society contains many groups which vary greatly in their opposition to Bolshevik objectives. This variation extends from those who are die-hard reactionaries and bitter antagonists of bolshevism to those whose objectives, though

<sup>26</sup> Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 171.

<sup>27</sup> Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 450; concluding words at the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, May 1925.

<sup>28</sup> Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 456; concluding words at the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, May 1925.

<sup>29</sup> Printed in supplement I to this report.

foggy, have a great deal in common with the revolutionists. It was laid down by Lenin that Communists must participate in non-Communist groups and organizations and institutions whenever, by so doing, they can advance the cause of revolution. His *Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*<sup>30</sup> is the classic text on this subject. In it Lenin berates those who maintain that Communists should not enter bourgeoisie parliaments, or seek to work in and through non-Communist organizations. He makes the point that their exaggerated "leftism" actually has the effect of favoring "right" tendencies. The logic of this argument is the foundation of the Communist use of "bridge" and "front" organizations, as well as of their jargon concerning "right deviations cloaked in left phraseology."

The readiness of Communists to ride with others who are going part of the way in the same direction was expressed earlier, in a work of Marx now attributed to Engels.

The practical experience of 1848-49 confirmed the reasonings of theory, which led to the conclusion that the democracy of the petty traders must first have its turn, before the Communist working class could hope to permanently establish itself in power and destroy that system of wage slavery which keeps it under the yoke of the bourgeoisie. Thus the secret organization of the Communists could not have the direct purpose of upsetting the present governments of Germany. Being formed to upset not these, but the insurrectionary government, which is sooner or later to follow them, its members might, and certainly would, individually, lend an active hand to a revolutionary movement against the present status quo in its turn; but the preparation of such a movement, otherwise than by spreading of Communist opinions by the masses, could not be an object of the association.<sup>31</sup>

The Communist idea that they must develop their own ethics or morals, independent of any older system, governs their relations with all other groups. Not only are existing liberal groups used and infiltrated. National movements are also used, just so far as they happen in any way to be traveling the Communist road toward world revolution. But the clearest illustration is not offered by liberals or by patriotism, but by religion. The Communist attitude toward all existing religion is the proof and cross-check on how simply and seriously they take their ethical radicalism.

Their hearty rejection of religion is well known. Engels, long ago, declared:

Now all religion is nothing else than the fantastic reflection, in the minds of men, of those external forces which dominate their everyday existence, a reflection in which the earthly forces assume the form of supernatural forces.<sup>32</sup>

And Lenin at a later time reaffirmed and strengthened the original antagonism of Marxism toward religion.

The saying of Marx, "Religion is the opium for the people," is the cornerstone of the Marxist point of view on the matter of religion. All contemporary religion and churches, all and every kind of religious organization Marxism has always viewed as organs of bourgeois reaction, serving as a defense of exploitation and the drugging of the working class.<sup>33</sup>

The Communist intolerance of religion is not quite absolute. When in dire straits, and needing the aid of all forces that can bring human energies to a common cause, they have softened their opposition to religion, and have even made advances to it. This occurred

<sup>30</sup> Printed in part in supplement I to this report.

<sup>31</sup> Marx (Engels), *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, written for the New York Tribune, 1851.

<sup>32</sup> Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, quoted by Gsovsky, article, "The Legal Status of the Church in Soviet Russia," *Fordham Law Review*, January 1939, p. 2.

<sup>33</sup> Lenin, *Works*, second Russian edition, quoted by Gsovsky, op. cit. p. 6.

in the Soviet Union during the war, and parallels the use of patriotic movements as a source of strength that can be followed, or ridden or directed. But, as was most clear in the case of nazism, any movement that makes totalitarian pretensions, that demands fanatic dogmatism of its supporters, and that sets up values on such an absolute basis that it can then place its tactics on the basis that the end justifies the means, must inevitably oppose and seek to destroy any competing value system, and ethical values most of all. No challenge can be so direct to the whole basis of discipline in a totalitarian system as an alternative ethics, setting different ends for human action. This is the central meaning of totalitarianism in any form, and it produces intolerance of religion automatically. Thereby, an attack on religion is also one of the revealing symptoms of the totalitarian nature of such a movement.

What the Communists think of bourgeois democracy is not obscure. They prefer enough democracy, as we mean democracy, to permit them to function freely and easily. There have been times when some Communists have played with the idea that Fascist dictatorship was preferable on the ground that underground activity breeds tougher revolutionaries than legal activities, or on the ground that a Fascist dictatorship is a hopeful sign of the last stages of development before the revolution. The Communist line has in general rejected these positions, but they do not therefore respect bourgeois democracy as true democracy. The issue of freedom of the press is an illustrative case in point. They like freedom of the press in non-Communist countries only. Secretary of State Byrnes, in discussing freedom of the press with Molotov, once argued that correspondents should be permitted free access to Rumania and other Balkan areas, and that their reporting from Greece demonstrated their value. Molotov's answer, as quoted by Secretary Byrnes, was:

Apparently in Greece the correspondents are happy but the people are not; whereas in Rumania the people are happy but the correspondents are not. The Soviet Government attaches more importance to the feeling of the people.<sup>34</sup>

#### D. THE PLACE OF THE U. S. S. R.

The place of the Soviet Union in Communist doctrine and strategy has been a puzzle ever since the Stalin-Trotsky break in 1926-27. The policy of Stalin on socialism in one country, leading to the supposed abandonment of the world revolution, has supported the interpretation of Soviet policy as merely a continuation of Czarist imperialism. The insistence that the world revolution must be the real objective, and that the doctrine of socialism in one country meant a break-down of the world revolution, has been one of the foundations of the Trotsky heresy. The readiness of Communists to adopt the language of Russian nationalism on occasion has facilitated confusion on the point. Stalin's vigorous comments at Yalta concerning the new boundary between Poland and the Soviet Union could be taken as old familiar nationalism.

Now some people want that we should be less Russian than Curzon was and Clemenceau was. You would drive us into shame. What will be said by the White Russians and the Ukrainians? They will say that Stalin and Molotov are far less reliable defenders of Russia than are Curzon and Clemenceau. I could not take such a position and return to Moscow with an open face.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Molotov, quoted by Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 99

<sup>35</sup> Stalin, quoted by Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 30.

During the war the Soviet Government leaned heavily upon Russian patriotism as a morale factor, and even referred to the war as the "great patriotic war." They also boasted of the solidarity of the country standing behind the Red Army.

The Red Army has the most stable and reliable rear of all the armies in the world. This is a source of strength of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that the Soviet state will emerge from the war even stronger and more consolidated.<sup>36</sup>

The relation between the Communist conception of the place of the Soviet Union in history, and their broad theory of history in general, is not made entirely clear at any one point. Lenin's Theses on the Conclusion of a Separate Peace of January 1918,<sup>37</sup> however, offers a first suggestion on the character of the Soviet State and country as the great capital asset of the Communists in the world revolution. It is made clear that considerations of self-determination for smaller areas, such as Finland, must be entirely subordinate to the survival of the Soviet Communist State. On the other hand Stalin's report to the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1930<sup>37</sup> insists that the Soviet Union seeks no territorial acquisitions. Molotov's comments on the Soviet-German pact in 1939<sup>37</sup> make plain that they considered the coming war an imperialist war in which the Soviet Union might properly be neutral, if possible. The common factor in these apparently contradictory positions is a regard for the Soviet Union as the main force in the army of the revolution, to which all other components are subordinate and auxiliary. Its acquisitions of land are in conformity with the strategy of the revolution, and not based upon mere patriotism or national expansion, even though they may be cloaked in the language of nationalism. The defeat of the Soviet Union would be decisive for the course of history, whereas all other Communist defeats would be merely lost skirmishes. The force of nationalism, while a force outside the play of the class struggle, is a force lying ready to hand for Communists, to use and exploit, as easily as others can use it. Its full utilization without compromising the more fundamental Communist objectives, may make difficulty, but in general, patriotism, Russian or other, is in the same class with all other non-Communist forces in society—that is, to be used and guided and not to be snubbed in an excess of "leftism."

The conclusive evidence that Russian patriotism, though a tremendous asset to be cultivated, is nevertheless subordinate to the objective of world revolution lies plain in the record of Soviet domestic policy. Stalin made this plain in his very important speech of February 9, 1946.<sup>38</sup> The security of the Soviet Union in the military sense is so important that agricultural and industrial policies in the Soviet Union must give top priority to defense considerations. But, also, Soviet defense means no more and no less than the preparedness of the Union to play the maximum role in world revolution.

Soviet satisfaction with their military strength reached the stage of confidence as early as 1933.

The Soviet Union has been converted from a weak country, unprepared for defense, into a country mighty in defense, a country prepared for every contingency, a country capable of producing on a mass scale all modern weapons of defense and of equipping its army with them in the event of an attack from without.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Stalin, speech on the anniversary of the revolution, November 6, 1943.

<sup>37</sup> Printed in supplement I to this report.

<sup>38</sup> Printed in supplement I to this report.

<sup>39</sup> Stalin, Jan. 7, 1933, to Joint Plenum of Central Committee and Central Control Commission, quoted by Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, p. 163.

Stalin's message to Moscow, on September 10, 1947,<sup>40</sup> praised Moscow as the center of two things, not one: On the one hand, Moscow is the center of a centralized State, in which one can read centralized as meaning disciplined unity, and on the other hand of a centralized world movement. The world revolutionary movement consists of the Soviet Union plus the Communist movement everywhere else. The place of the Soviet Union is that of a part in a larger whole, more important than any other part, but not so important as the whole.

The problem of establishing friendly relationships between the Soviet Union and her neighbors, particularly on her western frontier, has been a disturbing and disillusioning factor in the course of post-war diplomacy. United States representatives have apparently felt that the Soviet Union should mean no more by the term "friendly neighbor" than we would mean by it. It has been clear, however, that to the Soviets the term meant something much more than anything we mean by "freedom loving" and "peace loving." The Communist idea of democratic centralization is carried over into the principle that no neighbor can be relied upon as friendly until controlled by a disciplined Communist Party.

The idea of an exclusive morality, attaching to the party, is carried over and applied to the Soviet Union (Zhdanov's Speech on Cultural Policy, 1946<sup>41</sup>). The people of the Soviet Union must, like the Communist Party abroad, develop its own sense of values, cease to admire features of bourgeois civilization, and focus its eyes upon the moral values of its own system.

Their insistence that their variety of rigid unity deserves the term "democracy" applies fully to democracy in the Soviet Union. Molotov discussed Soviet democracy at length in his preelection speech of November 6, 1945.

The high degree of activity of our innumerable trade unions, production, cultural, sports, and other working-class organizations, the formation of the collective farms, the constant spread of Socialist emulation in the factories and mills, on the collective and state farms, in the mines and railways—all this reveals a flourishing of true democracy of the people that they did not know in the old days and that cannot exist in any other states, divided as they are into classes of oppressors and oppressed, a thing that Soviet power has long put an end to in our country.

In the rapid strides made by our country's cultural life and in the fact that now our intelligentsia, as the most advanced and cultured section of the population has merged with our people and raised the moral and political unity of Soviet society to a still higher plane—in all this we cannot but discern fresh signs of Soviet democracy, inspiring us with new hope and confidence in our country's future.

The organizing force of Soviet democracy and Soviet patriotism as a source of heroic exploits made themselves felt with particular emphasis in the years of the war. It is the good fortune of Soviet men and women that the October Socialist Revolution, which saved our country from being degraded to the status of a second-rate power, released the forces of the peoples shackled by the regime of the nobles and feudal lords, and afforded them, on the basis of Soviet power, opportunities for development such as they had never had before.<sup>42</sup>

After the election, held in February 1946, Pravda boasted of the result, pointing out that only 48,000,000 of the 60,000,000 qualified voters in the United States had voted in the last Presidential election, whereas 99.7 percent of the qualified voters in the U. S. S. R. cast their votes, and 99.18 percent of them voted for the Communist and

<sup>40</sup> Printed in supplement I to this report.

<sup>41</sup> Excerpt printed in supplement I to this report.

<sup>42</sup> Molotov, speech, November 6, 1945, reviewing war and outlining peace program



nonparty group in power. This, according to Pravda, was a demonstration of democratic strength in the Union far superior to that in the United States.

#### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Communist attitude on nationalism has already been touched upon in connection with the place of the Soviet Union in Communist thought and strategy. Their attitude on nationalism has, of course, other aspects as applied to foreign countries. The complications in practical activities that arise out of this will be discussed further in part III of this report. The general Communist view on nationalism is that the nationalism of the advanced capitalist countries is a factor to be opposed by all means, while nationalist movements in smaller and backward countries are to be used so far as possible. This use of nationalism or patriotism in the backward countries serves both in efforts to disrupt the political and economic stability of the colonial empires and to mobilize popular forces which can in turn be played upon by Communist propaganda. Stalin explained, in his book on Leninism, the importance of distinguishing between the different types of nationalist movements.

The proletariat should support nationalist movements which tend to weaken and subvert imperialism, not those which tend to strengthen and maintain it. In certain oppressed countries, nationalist movements may run counter to the general interests of the proletarian movement. Obviously, there can be no question of our helping such movements as these. The problem of national rights does not stand alone; it is part of the general problem of the proletarian revolution, is subordinate thereto, and can only be considered by the proletariat from that angle.<sup>43</sup>

He also made a statement which clearly suggests the subordination of nationalism in any form to the overriding importance of the world revolution.

Thus we see that the lack of an international revolutionary outlook threatens us with nationalism and with dissolution. That is why the fight against the danger of nationalism is a matter of such urgency for the party.<sup>44</sup>

The International as an organization, and the Internationale, the song of the world revolutionary movement, both tend to emphasize the community of all mankind as against any nationalism whatever. Communist thought also regards the nation state system, with its great number of restricted economic areas, as a major factor in the development of the contradictions upon which they rely as the causes of revolution. They maintain, however, that any fundamental solution of the problem of world government can come only after the revolution and not before it.

The problem of European union has been treated by Communists in this light at least since 1915, when Lenin attacked the slogan of "A United States of Europe" as "either impossible or reactionary."

In 1930 and 1931, when the world depression had begun and when the early intellectual movement for a United States of Europe was in its heyday, the Communists took the same line that Lenin had indicated, and which they have taken again in 1947 and 1948. Stalin, in 1930, linked the advocates of European Union with bourgeois militarism.

The most striking representative \* \* \* of the bourgeois movement toward intervention against the Soviet Union is the bourgeois France of today, the

<sup>43</sup> Stalin, Leninism, p. 138.

<sup>44</sup> Stalin, Leninism, p. 305.

fatherland of Pan-Europe, the cradle of the Kellogg Pact, the most aggressive and militaristic country, among all aggressive and militaristic countries of the world.<sup>45</sup>

Pravda, in 1931, when the Soviet Union had accepted membership in the commission created under the League of Nations to study the problem of European union, explained that the Soviet Union had done so only in order to wreck the project.

By taking part in the work of the European commission, the Soviet Union will wreck the plans of the leaders of the commission, plans for the secret elaboration of anti-Soviet projects. Let the game be played with the cards on the table.<sup>46</sup>

The idea that collaboration or cooperation is possible between the world of communism and the world outside of communism has a stubborn life. It is, of course, encouraged and played upon by Communist policy during certain periods. Nevertheless, when the issue is distinctly drawn they make clear that in their eyes there are two worlds which cannot live together and that sooner or later one or the other must triumph. Stalin's Interview With the First American Labor Delegation in 1927<sup>47</sup> is one clear statement on the subject, and Stalin's Letter to Comrade Ivanov in 1938<sup>47</sup> is another. These merely reaffirm the line established by Lenin much earlier.

We are living not merely in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before this end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.<sup>48</sup>

The establishment of a Soviet Union, together with a world Communist movement, presents an obvious problem of organization. The Communist International (also known as the Third International, and more briefly as the Comintern) was the solution of this problem. It was a league of Communist parties, having an office in Moscow with a secretariat, and governed by a Central Executive Committee with full executive powers between the meetings of its infrequent Congresses. Its Congresses, and its Central Executive Committee, were always dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This provided a solid link in personnel and organization between the Soviet Union and the Comintern. There was always a considerable interlocking through leading personnel between the Council of People's Commissars, or cabinet of the Soviet Union, the Politburo, or supreme executive of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Central Executive Committee of the Communist International.

An international organization of communism, to give common direction to Communist activities in all countries, is very necessary in periods of sharp antagonism. It is not so much needed in periods when collaboration with liberal and progressive elements in other countries is predominant. The Comintern was therefore a very necessary instrument immediately after the Russian revolution. It was scarcely needed at all in the time of the People's Front in 1935 to 1939, and in the period of the alliance against Hitler from 1941 to 1945. The short period of the Nazi-Soviet alliance was too short for any complete reorientation. The Comintern had become so

<sup>45</sup> Stalin, Report to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 26, 1930, quoted by Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, p. 43.

<sup>46</sup> Quoted by Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, p. 43 f.

<sup>47</sup> Printed in supplement I to this report.

<sup>48</sup> Lenin, Report at the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 18, 1919. Works, vol. 8, p. 33.

unnecessary after 1935 that its abolition on May 22, 1943, was simply a gesture, convenient to suggest the loyal acceptance by communism of the collaboration against nazism.

The reestablishment of the Comintern under the new name of Communist Information Bureau, shortened to Cominform, announced on October 5, 1947, was therefore very significant. It marked the acceptance of the fact that a new time period had been entered upon in which Communist activities would have to be closely controlled and coordinated in many countries. It also marked the admission that it was important to have such an organization even though to reestablish it signified open antagonism on a world scale. It also marked the time when the Communists found it necessary to have a formal international organization again, in order to counteract the effects of too much nationalism in some of the parties and countries where they were in control. The communiqué issued on October 5, 1947, stated clearly why the new organization was needed.

A report on the exchange of experience and coordination of activity of Communist parties was made by Comrade Gomulka. On this question, the conference, having in view the negative phenomena produced by the absence of contact between parties represented at the conference and taking into consideration the necessity for mutual exchange and experience, has decided to create an information bureau.<sup>49</sup>

The possibility of avoiding revolution finds one new application in the same international situation that brought the birth of the Cominform. As long ago as 1924 Stalin mentioned that some countries, obviously minor ones and not great powers, might under special international conditions pass from capitalism to socialism without a violent revolution. The meaning of this in practice is illustrated in the countries we now call satellites. The absence of any hope of victory in civil war, if civil war were started close under the shadow of the Red Army, means that "peaceful" transition may be possible.

No doubt in the distant future, if the proletariat has triumphed in the chief countries that are now capitalist, and if the present capitalist encirclement has given place to a Socialist encirclement, it will be possible for a "peaceful" transition to be effected in certain capitalist countries where the capitalists, in view of the "unfavorable" international situation, will deem it advisable "of their own accord" to make extensive concessions to the proletariat. But this is to look far ahead, and to contemplate extremely hypothetical possibilities. As concerns the near future, there is no warrant for any such expectations.<sup>50</sup>

To call this peaceful transition by another name, it is controlled revolution, with none of the spontaneity or enthusiasm of the great historical revolutions, and also, of course, lacking the violence and bloodshed, except as the bloodshed takes the form of police terrorism afterward. With the Red Army in Germany and Austria, the condition of "Socialist encirclement" is conclusive for any "capitalist" elements in some eastern European countries. The consequences have been clear.

#### F. THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION

The world today through Communist eyes has the same characteristics as in the period between the two World Wars. communism has made gains, the non-Communist world is still capi-

<sup>49</sup> Communiqué of Conference of Nine Communist Parties in Poland, issued October 5, 1947, published in the New York Times, October 6, 1947. Printed in supplement I of this report.

<sup>50</sup> Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 118.

talist, with capitalism evolving still along the lines of imperialism. The Second World War was an imperialist war. Two of the capitalist powers, the United States and Britain, eliminated their two greatest competitors in world markets, Germany and Japan. This was one aspect of the war. The other aspect was the attack on the socialist fatherland—the Soviet Union. The possibility of the great imperialist powers forming a coalition against the Soviet Union failed only because there were still too many such powers and too serious issues to be fought out between them. Stalin stated the Communist interpretation of the Second World War in a nutshell in his speech of February 9, 1946.

It would be incorrect to think that the war arose accidentally or as the result of the fault of some of the statesmen. Although these faults did exist, the war arose in reality as the inevitable result of the development of the world economic and political forces on the basis of monopoly capitalism.

Our Marxists declare that the capitalist system of world economy conceals elements of crisis and war, that the development of world capitalism does not follow a steady and even course forward, but proceeds through crises and catastrophes. The uneven development of the capitalist countries leads in time to sharp disturbances in their relations and the groups of countries which consider themselves inadequately provided with raw materials and export markets try usually to change this situation and to change the position in their favor by means of armed force.

As a result of these factors, the capitalist world is sent into two hostile camps and war follows.

Perhaps the catastrophe of war could have been avoided if the possibility of periodic redistribution of raw materials and markets between the countries existed in accordance with their economic needs, in the way of coordinated and peaceful decisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist development of world economy.

Thus, as a result of the first crisis in the development of the capitalist world economy, arose the First World War. The Second World War arose as a result of the second crisis.

The Communist explanation of why capitalism, in the imperialist phase, must lead to war is spelled out most clearly in the program of the Comintern adopted in 1928:

The growth of the productive forces of world economy thus leads to the further internationalization of economic life and simultaneously leads to a struggle for redistribution of the world, already divided up among the biggest finance-capital states, to a change in and sharpening of the forms of this struggle and to the method of forcing down prices being superseded to an increasing degree by the method of forcible pressure (boycott, high protection, tariff wars, wars proper, etc.). Consequently, the monopolistic form of capitalism is inevitably accompanied by imperialist wars, which, by the area they embrace and the destructiveness of their technique, have no parallel in world history.

The effect of the Second World War upon the structure of world capitalism was formulated in the Manifesto of the Cominform, published on October 5, 1947:

As long as the war lasted the Allied states fighting against Germany and Japan marched in step and were one. Nevertheless, in the Allies' camp already during the war there existed differences regarding the aims of the war as well as the objectives of postwar and world organization. The Soviet Union and the democratic countries believed that the main objective of the war was the building and strengthening of democracy in Europe, the liquidation of fascism, and the prevention of a possible aggression on the behalf of Germany, that its further aim was an achievement of an all-around and lasting cooperation between the nations of Europe.

The United States of America, and with them England, placed as their war aim a different goal—the elimination of competition on the world market (Germany and Japan) and the consolidation of their dominant position.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Cominform Manifesto, Moscow, October 5, 1947. Printed in supplement I to this report.

The idea that capitalism, because of its contradictions, is subject to recurring economic depressions is an essential. This now leads the Communists to focus attention upon the coming American depression, which they expect. A depression in the United States would not only fulfill this prediction, it would bring the world revolution to a climax. It might either so weaken the United States that world capitalism would collapse, or it might lead to an American fascism, with a final struggle between capitalism and communism. The interpretation of the economic situation of the United States thereby takes its place as the top priority problem for Soviet intelligence. The urgency of the problem for them is such that it has produced overt controversy in Moscow. The Varga incident, reported in the New York Times of January 25, 1948, is the best evidence of this. Varga had for a long time been the outstanding Marxist economist. His views on the development of the United States economy in the near future were apparently more hopeful for us and less hopeful for their expectations than was tolerable to the dominant clique. This, more clearly than any explicit statement, gives evidence that the dominant line in Moscow today is based on the anticipation of an early crisis in the United States.

Aside from any coming economic crisis, the Communists believe that the world is even now in a political crisis. The war left unfinished business in great areas. The limits of immediate Communist success have by no means been set. The limits of capitalist recovery and reconstruction have also not been set. Much of Europe and Asia remains at stake, even without recourse to war. Vishinsky's speech at the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1947, and Zhdanov's speech to the Cominform, published on October 22, make this perfectly clear. It is this conception of the present situation that necessarily leads to a radical drive for further Communist gains, at least up to the limits of cold warfare. They believe that large areas of the world are close to revolution at the present moment.

The most critical of all questions of tactics is the question of the time for revolution. The Communists have some reason for self-satisfaction in their past handling of this problem. Lenin's strategy in October 1917 left little to be desired in this respect. They have generations of thought and experience behind them in which the prediction of M-day for the revolution has been their ultimate strategic problem. The general equation for this problem was stated by Lenin long ago:

We may consider that the time is ripe for the decisive struggle: when all the class forces arrayed against us are in a state of confusion, are sufficiently embroiled one with another, have been sufficiently weakened in combats for which their strength is inadequate; when all the vacillating, unsteady, unstable intermediate elements (the petty bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeois democracy, in contradistinction to the bourgeoisie) have exposed themselves enough before the people, have made a sufficient parade of their utter bankruptcy; when there has arisen and spread widely among the proletariat a strong feeling in favor of decisive and unhesitatingly bold revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie. Then the time is ripe for revolution. Then, if we have kept good account of the afore-mentioned conditions, and have chosen our moment well, our victory is assured.<sup>62</sup>

Its application to the areas still at issue between the two worlds was implied in every important statement they have made since last June.

<sup>62</sup> Lenin, Works, Russian edition, vol. XVII, pp. 180-181, quoted by Stalin, Leninism, p. 152.

## G. SUMMARY

In summary, the Communists believe that the capitalist system must create class divisions in society on horizontal lines. It creates a clash of interests between the upper classes and the lower classes such that a monopoly of force is required in society, and this monopoly of force is the state. The state as the organ of the upper classes to maintain and defend the system of exploitation must be destroyed in a revolution before any fundamental reform or reorganization of society can occur. Only revolutionary violence can accomplish this task, and it must be followed by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Capitalism in its advanced stages takes the form of imperialism. This means the final division of the world between the capitalist powers, conflict among the capitalist powers, and between the capitalist powers and the colonial countries. It also begins the initial successes of the revolution in one or more countries and the probability of conflict between the capitalist group and the Communist society. This leads to compound wars of the imperialist powers against each other, and of some of them against the Soviet Union. The eventual end is the success of the world revolution.

The Soviet countries represent the main wing of the revolutionary forces, and the Communist Parties all over the world represent the subordinate wing. The conduct of the revolutionary movement in strategy and tactics is under absolute leadership, through the disciplined unity of all the parties.

The Communists do not believe in the possibility of world peace before the revolution. They do not believe in any solution of the problem of continuous full production before the revolution. They do not believe in the possibility of reconciling the advanced nations with the backward or colonial countries before the revolution. Least of all do they believe in the possibility of real collaboration between Communist countries and non-Communist countries, except in brief and special circumstances.

Their dogmatic faith in their system gives them absolute conviction. This, as always, leads them to practice if not preach that the end justifies the means. This permits them to regard all of their minor assets as expendable for the cause. They can, therefore, sacrifice any Communist Party outside Russia for tactical advantage. So much the more are they ready to sacrifice sympathizers or friends who are not disciplined Communists. They are ready to make any alliance for temporary advantage and to betray that alliance at the first change in circumstances. They are ready to use all forces and all motives which lead, even for a moment, in the direction of revolution.

The revolution appears, in much of their thought and writing, to be the conclusion of a long argument. But historically it is clear that the revolution is the one fundamental premise and that all justifying argument is really deduction from this premise. The revolution was firmly formulated in the Communist Manifesto, the first of their fundamental documents, 100 years ago. Through every controversy and vicissitude it has been the unchanging heart of their belief. Every growth of doctrine which strengthened revolution was acceptable, and every growth of doctrine which might weaken it has been suppressed as heresy.

The necessity for violent revolution is the one principle of consistency in the whole history of communism. An attempt to interpret communism as consistent on any other basis is a failure. Soviet policy and Communist policy, and Soviet action and Communist action, are alike meant to serve this single end. Economic and political policy and action, collaboration on the surface and subversion underneath, a swing to the right in one period and a swing to the left in another, are meant to serve this single end, the world revolution.

### III. THE TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

#### A. ENDS AND MEANS

Communist theory is a theory of history, a theory that offers an explanation for the sequence of events in time; a theory, therefore, of cause and effect in human affairs. Any such theory is also a theory of ends and means. If one knows how to identify the inevitable outcome of a great historical process and feels that that outcome will be good, and knows what are the factors that cause the outcome, then one is ready and able to participate, making the outcome an end and using the causes as means.

For any case where men try to effect the course of history in a radical manner, there must be a development of thought concerned with causes and effects, a theory of history. There must then also be a development which transforms the first into a system of ends and means, of practical rules by which to operate. The rules of practical action so developed are a system of strategy and tactics.

The characteristic tactical thinking of Communists is concerned with the method by which to distinguish between apparently similar but essentially different sets of circumstances. To aid and abet the formation of a labor union will generally, but not always, advance the cause of revolution. When should they aid it, and when oppose it? The rise of a nationalist movement will sometimes run counter to the purpose of proletarian revolution but will sometimes help to precipitate a crisis in another more important country. When should they join and promote such nationalist movements, and when should they oppose them? A strenuous drive for power will sometimes succeed in its objectives, and sometimes it will merely provoke a reaction and end in failure. When should they advance, when retreat, when mark time? There may be times when political means to an end are not ready to hand, or are blocked or already engaged. What other means may accomplish the desired effect? There may be situations in which Soviet agencies can act to good practical effect, and where a local Communist Party can also act. Should they use the one or the other, or both? These are the characteristic questions that confront Communist tacticians. The answers to such questions are the parts that make up their tactical system.

Within the wide variety of tactical variations that are possible for the Communists, there are four main phases. These are: First, the tactics of Soviet defense; second, the conduct of Soviet foreign policy; third, the political tactics of communism outside the Soviet Union and Communist-controlled areas; fourth, their economic tactics. All of these are used together, integrated and coordinated for common goals. Communists are not dependent upon one or the other of these four

phases in their general world strategy but work with combined tactics. Their combined tactics permit a range of maneuver difficult to coordinate and control at times, sometimes getting out of hand. But they bring to its conduct experience and energy. At times they show a virtuosity that enables them to surprise and outmaneuver an enemy who does not understand the flexibility and resourcefulness of which they are capable.

#### B. SOVIET DEFENSE

Soviet defense policy imposes considerations that have a direct effect upon Communist tactics both inside and outside of the Soviet Union. The first assumption of Soviet defense is the probability of war against the Soviet Union. The necessary second assumption is about the strength of the probable sides in that war. On this they are fully aware that the United States can at present outproduce them and that the United States has an atomic weapon. But they also expect that the United States will undergo an economic depression, while they expect to continue their own rapid development.

Stalin fully explained in his speech of February 9, 1946, how far they are willing to go in order to accelerate the growth of their own fighting power. Under their 5-year plans before the war they consciously took short cuts toward the development of heavy industry, at very heavy social cost, and succeeded to a great degree. They also have the satisfaction of looking back on the 1930's as a decade in which they grew very rapidly in industrial strength while nearly all other countries were in economic stagnation. Judging by their post-war statements, they hope and expect to repeat this performance in the future. This, taken by itself, would incline them to delay a war by all means.

Their third major assumption is the advantage of space. The effect of space upon military operations is more familiar to people who work in transportation than to most people, but it may be measured in the Soviet case by the effect on the two great invasions by Napoleon and Hitler. Air warfare has given an added importance to peripheral space, for this space sets the distance that bombers must fly over territory defended by antiaircraft weapons.

The importance of strategic materials, and the awkward fact that they are where you find them and not elsewhere is another given premise of their strategy as of any strategy.

The fifth important premise of their strategy, and unique to theirs, is the assumption of two fronts in any war, the formal military front, and the class-war front in all non-Soviet countries.

These five factors lead directly to certain consequences at the tactical level. In the first place preparation for war takes precedence over civilian welfare, in the Soviet Union or anywhere else. They will sacrifice civilian interests to promote war production at home on the one hand, or to inhibit war production in countries they cannot control.

Secondly, space considerations shape the political and economic estimate they make of any area. The industrial heart of the Soviet Union in the Urals and Siberia has priority for industrial development over any area more exposed to either invasion or air bombardment. Any industrial area in a vulnerable position must be relatively neg-



lected. This applies with special force in the new areas of Communist control in eastern Europe and Manchuria. Skoda in Czechoslovakia, Mannfred-Weiss in Hungary, and Resitza in Rumania were all heavy-industry developments that might have played a role in the prosperity of their countries on an increasing scale, even if not in the recovery of Europe generally. But dependence upon them would be dependence upon industries that might be lost as those of the Don region were to the Germans in 1941 and 1942. Those countries are, until a great change in the situation, therefore regarded as parts of the Soviets' cushion space.

Outside the peripheral area under Soviet control lie the potential staging areas for attack by whichever side controls them. In Communist thinking, Germany and Japan have just this character. They are near enough and industrially strong enough to be capable of a dangerous scale of attack in either direction if given time and opportunity, and with the backing of either the United States or of the Soviets. They are therefore the hot squares on the chessboard. The Soviets settled at Yalta for terms that gave them a holding position, a sort of veto, in Germany, and through their invasion of Manchuria a comparable opportunity to make sure Japan, deprived of its large Manchurian component, could not recover her former strength.

Beyond the potential staging areas, the points of intense interest to Soviet defense are, as for us or for Hitler or anyone else, those within strategic bombing range of important targets. The significance of Crete as covering the eastern Mediterranean was in part forgotten when Allied air power made it ineffective in the later years of the war. For a power that could hold its own in the air it would be very important again. Tripoli is also a very strategic area from the air-power point of view, whether for the advantage it would be to the Soviets directly, or for the advantage of denying its use to us.

Strategic materials, if near by, are direct targets for Soviet acquisition. The territory in the north ceded by Finland after the war includes the most important nickel mines in Europe. Rumanian oil, and Austrian oil, help take the load of demand off the overburdened Soviet oil industry. The chrome and zinc and lead of eastern Europe are of importance, and one of the greatest copper mines in the world is at Bor, in Yugoslavia. There is also much unofficial news concerning the pitchblende (uranium ore) deposits in Saxony, and the intensive operations going on there under Soviet occupation. The Soviets have visibly gone out of their way to gain control of some of these resources. In the case of particularly important strategic-material resources far beyond their grasp, there is a task for the foreign Communist parties, to deprive any enemy of the Soviet of such supplies. Bolivian tin, and Congo copper and cobalt are illustrations. The oil of the Near East, of almost equal importance as a deprivation to us and as an asset to them if they could control it, was discussed in another report of Subcommittee 5.<sup>63</sup>

The maintenance of a police state at home, and the use of the disciplined parties abroad for both intelligence and counterintelligence, is an aspect of tactics arising out of defense considerations. It effects political and social conditions in all countries, and both submerges civil rights in the Soviet Union and threatens them everywhere else.

<sup>63</sup> Report, Relative to the Near East, by the Honorable Frances P. Bolton and the Honorable Chester R. Merrow, released February 8, 1948. Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The power of an intransigent and well-organized minority to make civil rights impossible not only for themselves but for others is an extraordinary thing.

The most superficial, but at the same time significant aspect of their police state is the deep suspicion of foreign intentions exhibited by Communists, whether Russian or any other. Almost every witness on United States-Soviet cooperation during the war testifies to instances where this suspicion was the dominant force in Russian behavior. General Deane tells of the Russian refusal to allow a group of Allied bombers to assist in the defense of Stalingrad, and of the refusal, until the Tehran Conference in November 1943 to tell the Allies anything of Red Army operations. Former Secretary Byrnes tells of the Soviet readiness to assume nefarious motives, when they were informed of the negotiations with Kesselring for surrender on the Italian front, and they charged the Western Allies with seeking a separate peace. The republication by Pravda of the so-called Cairo rumor of a separate peace in January 1944, and Molotov's query to Secretary Byrnes on the rumored gold hoard in Japan are other instances. This suspicion is one side of an isolationism that runs deep, and which is related to their development of the different mentality and morality which their theory demands and of which they boast.

The expectation of war and revolution requires this development of a separate and different morality. The two together produce a state of mind of which the police state on the one hand, and universal suspicion of outsiders on the other, are like the heads and tails of the same coin.

In more direct form the police state and its psychology mean the direction of foreign Communist parties through the Soviet police system—the NKVD, later renamed MVD. It is impossible to document this sort of thing publicly, but the record is clear on the extraordinary rapidity with which all foreign Communist parties can adapt themselves to new party lines. The classic instance was the shift that occurred in the world Communist press in August 1939, when the Nazi-Soviet pact was announced. Other such changes have occurred in wheeling the ranks from pro to con on leading political figures. This control goes deeper than the propaganda line however, as was exhibited more than once when the Communist Party of the United States or of other countries, has been forced to change not only its line but also its leaders under directions given from outside.

The police state within the Soviet Union is not very well known through any official documents, for obvious reasons. There are at least a very few very hard facts, however. The NKVD has announced on occasion that it has completed a big construction project somewhere. This means slave labor, on a big scale. And in June 1946 they announced that they had moved large numbers of people out of the Crimea, on charges of collaboration with the Nazis during the war. The important feature of this case was that until they announced the completion of the move there was no report of it whatever; the outside world did not know it was occurring.

All of these phenomena have one common basis, the assumption that another war is probable, and that the Soviet Union is the prime asset of the Communists for the world revolution, overriding all other

considerations. The union is the main task force of communism. The satellites and foreign Communists are the protective screen, expendable at any time for the security of the main force.

### C. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Soviet foreign policy, like their defense policy, begins with the assumption of inevitable war. It is the particular function of the Soviet Foreign Office in the grand strategy of the world revolution to play an intermediate role between that of the Red Army on the one hand and the Communist parties on the other in creating the conditions necessary for Communist victory.

First of all, since the Communists assume that "time is on their side" the problem is to delay a war. Second, since the result of the Second World War has greatly reduced the number of strong capitalist states, leaving only the United States and Britain where there were formerly five, the probability of a great war among the capitalist powers is relatively reduced, and the probability of coalition against the Soviets relatively greater. This calls for planning for some time to come designed to maintain the independence of as many capitalist states as possible, and as much anti-American feeling as possible, in order to restore the likelihood of a war between capitalist states. Thirdly, the Soviet would prefer a one-front war, militarily. They succeeded in limiting their engagement in the Second World War to one front at a time, an achievement matched by no other government.

The Communists prefer a later war to an earlier one. They prefer a capitalist war, with the Soviet in on one side, to a straight Communist-anti-Communist war. They prefer a one-front war to a two-front war. With these objectives or standards in mind, it is the task of the Soviet Foreign Office to use all means of a diplomatic or related nature to attain them.

The range of variation in tactics, by time periods of offense and defense, by geographic zones, by choice of techniques, and by choice of agencies, applies to foreign policy as well as to Communist tactics in general. But the classification of areas is not the same for the Foreign Office as for defense policy or for local Communist parties. In Turkey, for example, the Foreign Office must carry a burden, which in France or Italy might be shared, or shouldered, by the local Communists. A nearby country is naturally more impressed by the Red Army as an ultimate weapon, but may also have a weak Communist Party, or none at all. A more remote country may be outside any consideration of defensive space, yet be particularly vulnerable because of a strong local party. In general, therefore, their foreign policy is simply one of several means available for any given end, and the use of foreign-policy methods varies in a way that may be unaccountable unless this is recalled.

Also, their foreign policy is based on the assumption that depression, stagnation, or collapse in any area not yet under Soviet control can be no disadvantage to the cause of the revolution. They have no expectation of taking over any prosperous country under any circumstances. The doctrine of the state and revolution, the heart of Leninism, requires the destruction of the old state, and only for an encircled country is there any idea of reasonably peaceful transition.

And, finally, as in all other activities, they assume that the world revolution is the foundation of a morality both different and superior, in which the end justifies all means.

Within the general framework given by these assumptions or conditions, their foreign policy has certain definite targets; in brief, to expand the area of Soviet control, and beyond that, the circle of influence; to prevent an anti-Soviet coalition; to encourage colonial rebellions; to weaken all uncontrollable areas; to postpone war for the time being; and to avoid a two-front war.

The practical workings of Soviet diplomacy, assisted occasionally by propaganda from Moscow, or by local party activities, make use of a variety of devices. The iron curtain, as a shield across all controlled as well as purely Soviet areas is a successful means of reducing authoritative public knowledge of what they are doing. This was one of the reasons why the publication of Mr. Byrnes' book was valuable, since much of what he knew, and which would have been publicly known under ordinary circumstances, was known only to official agencies and could not be published by them. The story he tells of Vishinsky's demand for a cabinet change in Rumania is an example of what they can do behind a veil of secrecy that they could not do, or not so readily, in the open.<sup>54</sup>

In ordinary negotiations they display a fine attention to the difference between those parts of an agreement that will be certain to take effect, and those that can be evaded or delayed. The Yalta agreement, for example, gave them a hold in Germany, with an understanding that Germany would be united for economic purposes. The Soviet secured its occupation zone most definitely, and ever since has blocked the economic unification on grounds that some other clauses had not been fulfilled. In the agreement to enter the far-eastern war, the Soviet objectives were immediately and practically attainable, while the Soviet obligations were easy to avoid or postpone. Whenever an agreement with these characteristics could be made they have shown a readiness to make it.

They also show a very agreeable readiness to accept anything that gives us an advantage that they cannot in any case prevent, and which commits us to a position of which they can make propaganda use. The Soviet acquiescence to the United States trusteeship in the Pacific islands falls in this class. They made use of timing for ironical effect in this instance, announcing their agreement to the trusteeship on March 31, 1947, on the very heels of our protests to them concerning Hungary, on March 1 and March 17.

They display a tactical readiness to make agreements whenever there is no special reason against them. The more agreements they can make, of an inconsequential kind, the more they can maintain the propaganda pretense that real disagreements are not their fault. The more agreements grant advantages for us that they are in any case incapable of preventing, the more credit they can claim, either in later diplomacy or through propaganda. This holds especially true whenever they can assist us to commit ourselves to anything that they are fairly sure will prove to be an embarrassing mistake. Some of the conduct of postwar diplomacy is scarcely explicable on any other ground.

<sup>54</sup> Speaking Frankly, p. 51. Vishinsky's intervention occurred on February 27, 1945 (and see his foreword for his own statement of the reasons for publishing.)

Ever since their very first effort in diplomacy, vis-à-vis the Germans at Brest-Litovsk in 1918, they have mixed propaganda with diplomacy. Secretary Marshall took note of this at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1947 as General Max von Hoffmann had at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. This includes the use of liberal slogans and nationalist slogans against liberals and nationalists, abusive attacks on their opponents' motives, and all the other tricks that go with propaganda addressed to a wider audience than the conference in process.

Their tactics in international organizations have a special character that has been too little appreciated, though sometimes fully explained by themselves. The comment by Pravda concerning Soviet participation in the Commission on European Union in 1931, quoted above (p. 19) overtly declares that they participated in that Commission in order to prevent it from accomplishing anything against their interests. Lenin defined their interest in European union in his claim that a United States of Europe under capitalism "is either impossible or reactionary." It is apparent that to prevent anything against their interests means to prevent any federation of Europe. Their role in international organizations generally has this color. There are exceptions, such as the World Health Organization, where they as others stand to gain by interchange of information and by establishment of standards and uniform regulations, and where the rest of the world stands to gain by their participation. But their membership in the League of Nations was primarily intended to prevent the League from serving as an anti-Soviet instrument. Their membership in the United Nations, with their veto power in the Security Council is their guaranty that the UN cannot be used against them, unless or until the Charter can be amended. This leaves the very difficult and laborious process of amending the Charter against their opposition, or of establishing a new organization, as an impediment to any use of an international organization against their interests. In world politics today this amounts to a first line of defense. Any idea that they would abandon the advantage this gives them is in a class with the idea that they might reduce their air force.

Their enthusiastic entry into the UNO contrasts with their stubborn opposition to the Baruch proposals for control of atomic energy. If one examines the Baruch proposals, in their underlying assumptions, it is apparent that they assume the possibility of peace for an indefinite time. To Communists this would require the further assumption that the United States is not prerevolutionary, but post-revolutionary in character. This is an impossible thing for them to accept. They simply cannot believe in any proposition based on stability and peace. Since they also consider war to be avoidable for the time being, and atomic weapons attainable for them within a reasonable time, they know no reason for accepting a control system that would bar them from acquiring the know-how for production of atomic weapons, when we already have it.

The proposal by Secretary Byrnes, for a four-power pact against future German aggression, is parallel to the problem of international control of atomic energy.<sup>55</sup> The proposal amounts to international control of Germany through a guaranty of joint inspection to prevent

<sup>55</sup> For discussion of the proposal see *Speaking Frankly*, p. 171 f.

German armaments, and joint action in case of violation. Like the Baruch proposals, this makes no sense unless one can assume stability and peace between the United States and the Soviet for a long time to come, and like the Baruch proposals, it proved unacceptable to Molotov, though at one time endorsed informally by Stalin. The Soviet judgment on this proposal, was stated by Tass, the Soviet news agency.

A possible paper certain to hide a retreat from agreements made at the time of Germany's capitulation last year, a possible attempt to divert attention from the Ruhr problems, a dangerous weakening of the machinery already set up to guarantee Germany's disarmament and one more maneuver that was introducing superfluous difficulties for the Foreign Ministers Council in Paris.<sup>66</sup>

Their attitude on international organizations, judging by the cases, may be defined as follows: Join any organization that has politically neutral service functions; join any organization that might take action contrary to Soviet interest in the absence of Soviet participation; join no organization that might interfere with Soviet reliance on its own strength in an ultimate show-down.

Such are the guiding principles by which they act. There is one way in which to judge how effective their foreign policy, and their conduct of it, tactically, has been. That is to examine what they have gained or lost by it in the past. On this the record is rich.

Since 1939 they have gained the following territories by annexation, naming them in order from north to south in Europe: Petsamo, Karelia, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Koenigsberg, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bukovina, Bessarabia. In the East they have gained the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin and Dairen. They also hold until further notice the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany, Austria, and Korea.

Aside from direct Soviet control, they have brought under control of the local Communists, supported by the Soviet, the countries we now regard as Soviet satellites, namely: Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, and since February 1948, Czechoslovakia. In these countries the effectiveness of Communist tactics is the resultant of Soviet foreign policy coupled with the tactics of native Communists, giving the wonderful opportunity to use each for whatever the other cannot accomplish, or for which either one cannot conveniently accept responsibility.

Outside of any areas under direct Communist control, there lie the prime targets of pressure, in the present phase called cold war. To list these is a special measure of Soviet gains, for it is a list that lay beyond their grasp a few years ago. In the west these targets are the Turkish Straits and the provinces of Kars and Ardahan in eastern Turkey, Greece, northwestern Iran, and Germany. Germany is the prime target on the western front of the Soviets, the acknowledged key to Europe. The other three, if gained, would dominate the whole of the Near East. In Germany they have the advantages of position gained at Yalta and Potsdam. In Greece and Iran they have only the weapons of diplomacy and local Communists, backed up by Soviet-controlled territory adjacent. In the case of Turkey they must use Soviet leverage and nothing else. In the east they are pressing on China, a special case where tactics are more varied, and more resources are applicable than anywhere else.

<sup>66</sup> New York Times, May 4, 1946.

Beyond the immediate targets of pressure lie the areas where Communist influence and strength are much greater than before the war. The prime examples are France and Italy, but Syria, India, Indochina, Indonesia, and Latin America all reflect increased Communist resources.

Still farther from Soviet control or serious constant pressure are certain areas that are not centers of strong native Communist movements, nor important targets of strategic attack, yet are vulnerable to pressure as occasion may demand. The Scandinavian countries, with their dependence on Baltic trade are examples, with Finland and Sweden the most vulnerable.

In addition to control or influence, the Soviets have treaties of alliance, of which those with Britain and France are most important, serving in each case as a partial bar to anti-Soviet action by the other party. And once again, the Soviet membership in the United Nations, and their permanent seat with veto in the Security Council must be mentioned. For this is worth more to them in the balance of power than any of the territories they have annexed, or of the satellites they dominate.

In conclusion one must say that the conduct of Soviet foreign policy as one element in the tactics of world revolution has had considerable success, and to be consistent, one must say that it has been conducted with considerable skill. It is designed to take care of the interests of the Soviets and of world communism, not just the Soviets. It makes very skillful use of a combined strategy that matches the virtuosity of the Nazis in recourse to propaganda combined with the fifth column and the looming threat of arms to support diplomacy. It is not designed to assist in any project for stability and progress otherwise than through world communism after the revolution. It is designed, especially through membership in international organizations, to impede such projects.

Our reluctance to face the facts concerning Soviet policy, when they have done their best to make its nature explicit, is parallel to our earlier reluctance to recognize the nature of Nazi ambitions when they lay plain in the text of Hitler's book. This reflects our disbelief in the capacity of dogmatists, especially if they take their dogma for a science, to think in theoretical terms and to believe in their own theories.

#### D. THE POLITICAL TACTICS OF COMMUNISM

The material basis of Communist political tactics outside the Soviet Union is the strength of the parties. Information on the strength of all the Communist parties in the world was contained in the list made public at the conference of Communist parties held in London early in 1947.

*Strength of Communist parties*

[From New York Times, Mar. 16, 1947]

## AMERICA

Country	Party name	Party members	Members of legislature
Argentina.....	Communist.....	30,000	-----
Brazil.....	do.....	130,000	17
Canada.....	Labor-Progressives	23,000	-----
Chile.....	Communist.....	50,000	20
Colombia.....	Democrat Socialist	10,000	2
Costa Rica.....	Vanguardia Popular	20,000	6
Cuba.....	Popular Socialist	162,000	12
Ecuador.....	Communist.....	2,500	-----
Haiti.....	Popular Socialist	500	1
Martinique.....	Communist.....	-----	2
Mexico.....	do.....	25,000	-----
Nicaragua.....	Partido Socialista	500	-----
Panama.....	Partido del Pueblo	500	-----
Paraguay.....	Communist.....	8,000	-----
Peru.....	do.....	35,000	5
Puerto Rico.....	do.....	1,200	-----
United States.....	do.....	74,000	-----
Uruguay.....	do.....	15,000	5
Santo Domingo.....	Popular Socialist	2,000	-----
Venezuela.....	Communist.....	20,000	2

## ASIA

Burma.....	Communist.....	4,000	-----
Ceylon.....	do.....	-----	-----
China.....	do.....	2,000,000	-----
Cyprus.....	Akel.....	4,000	-----
India.....	Communist.....	53,700	-----
Indonesia.....	do.....	-----	-----
Japan.....	do.....	6,000	5
Korea.....	do.....	50,000	-----
Lebanon.....	do.....	15,000	-----
Malaya.....	do.....	10,000	-----
Palestine.....	do.....	1,400	-----
Philippines.....	do.....	-----	-----
Slam.....	do.....	-----	-----
Syria.....	do.....	8,000	-----

## AUSTRALASIA

Australia.....	Communist.....	25,000	-----
New Zealand.....	do.....	2,000	-----

## EUROPE

U. S. S. R.....	Communist.....	6,000,000	-----
Albania.....	do.....	-----	-----
Austria.....	do.....	150,000	4
Belgium.....	do.....	100,000	23
Britain.....	do.....	43,000	2
Bulgaria.....	Workers' Party	450,000	278
Czechoslovakia.....	Communist.....	1,000,000	115
Denmark.....	do.....	60,000	18
Finland.....	do.....	28,000	41
France.....	do.....	1,300,000	-----
Germany (Soviet).....	Socialist Unity.....	1,576,300	-----
Germany (western).....	Communist.....	350,000	-----
Greece.....	do.....	400,000	-----
Hungary.....	do.....	650,000	70
Iceland.....	United Socialist	1,000	10
Ireland (Northern).....	Communist.....	500	-----
Italy.....	do.....	2,200,000	108
Luxemburg.....	do.....	5,000	-----
Netherlands.....	do.....	50,000	15
Norway.....	do.....	33,000	11
Poland.....	Workers' Party	600,000	-----
Portugal.....	Communist.....	-----	-----
Rumania.....	do.....	500,000	68
Slovakia.....	do.....	250,000	-----
Spain.....	do.....	-----	-----
Sweden.....	do.....	46,000	-----
Switzerland.....	Parti du Travail	21,000	1



*Strength of Communist parties—Continued*

## AFRICA

Country	Party name	Party members	Members of legislature
Algeria.....	Communist.....		
Eritrea.....	do.....	200	
Morocco.....	do.....		
South Africa.....	do.....		
Tunisia.....	do.....		
Total.....		18, 592, 300	

NOTE.—The United Press released on May 26, 1947, a list showing the strength of Communist Parties all over the world. It differs sharply from the above list on a few countries only, with higher figures for Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia and lower for a few others.

As a measure of comparative strength the above list is not entirely satisfactory. It indicates, for example, that the Italian party is much larger than the French, yet it is also a matter of fact that the French party can swing a larger electoral vote than the Italian, about 28 to 30 percent in France against about 19 percent in Italy. Such discrepancies as this arise out of differences in strictness of enforcement of the Leninist policy on membership. Party membership in most countries is also subject to sharp fluctuations, due to membership drives, followed by purges, or by periods in which the less faithful are allowed to drift away.

The obvious coordination of the activities of Communist parties with those of the Soviet Government has made trouble ever since the First World War. The Soviet Government made a large number of treaties with various countries in which there was mutual acceptance of an obligation not to carry on or assist movements designed to overthrow the other government. These were not purely hypocritical on the side of the Soviets. In the decade after the war there were remnants in many countries from the defeated White Russian or anti-Bolshevik movements. The Soviets were genuinely anxious to obtain agreements that would bind their neighbors not to assist such groups.

As for the Communist parties, these enjoyed a highly sophisticated status in the eyes of the Soviet Government, as local and native to their own countries. This meant that coordination of their activities from Moscow was not in the same class with aid given to anti-Bolshevik Russians. The distinction has always been more clear to Communists than to others.

The Communists within each country for the last 12 years have tended to emphasize national patriotism in their tactics and propaganda. It was in 1935 that the Seventh Congress of the Comintern adopted the "national traditions" line emphasizing the heritage of the French Revolution in France, of Washington and Lincoln in the United States, and so forth. The transition from their former anti-patriotic pose was a contributing factor in the 1930's to the idea that they were becoming more conservative. An interesting thing about this adoption of nationalist or patriotic slogans is that it has now persisted through several major shifts of general policy. During the 2 years of the Nazi-Soviet pact, Communist Parties did not drop their patriotic pretenses of the Popular Front period, but gave them an isolationist color, advocating that their countries should keep out of

the "imperialist war." During the alliance against nazism they of course intensified their use of patriotic slogans in all countries. But since the end of the war they have not changed this particular line, while they have changed their major strategy and tactics entirely.

The reason for this has several aspects, yet is very simple in its logic. First, the veto in the United Nations is the safeguard for the Soviets against adverse action, and the veto rests on the old doctrine of sovereignty. The freedom of Russia from international control is therefore facilitated by insistence upon sovereignty, and numerous statements by Soviet leaders in the United Nations and elsewhere have insisted that the sovereignty of all nations must be preserved. Second, the doctrine of sovereignty serves as a barrier to such projects as atomic-energy control, and is so used. Molotov in addressing the United Nations General Assembly on October 29, 1946, and Gromyko before the Security Council on March 5, 1947, both urged the necessity of the principle of unanimity of the great powers, the importance of the veto, and the origin of the veto in an initiative taken by the United States. Third, the slogans of sovereignty and patriotism have a strong appeal in drumming up opposition to the Marshall plan, on the ground that it represents American interference in the recipient countries.

As the manifesto of the Cominform, published on October 5, 1947, declares:

If the Communist parties stand fast on their outposts, if they refuse to be intimidated and blackmailed, if they courageously guard over the democracy, national sovereignty, independence and self-determination of their countries, if they know how to fight against attempts at the economic and political subjugation of their countries and place themselves at the head of all the forces ready to defend the cause of national honor and independence, then and then only no plans to subjugate the countries of Europe and Asia can succeed.

Fourth, it serves as a high-sounding indirect approach for the tactics of "divide and rule." The Soviets have much to gain and nothing to lose by preserving the anarchy of the old system of too many little states with no common organization. They have no desire for any positive collaboration among nations until they are ripe for the "revolution." They carry this to the length of advocating, as Tito did on June 4, 1945, "Carinthia is ours, and we will fight for her," while at the same time Italian Communists are stoutly defending the right of Italy in the same territory. Fifth, they are particularly anxious that civil war should be possible, and do not wish any international regulation that might interfere. Gromyko, in the debate on Spain in the Security Council of the United Nations, on April 25, 1946, declared in this connection:

Mr. Stettinius \* \* \* pointed out that one of the aims (of the United States Government) \* \* \* was to avoid a repetition of the civil war that had taken place in Spain.

I do not wish to go in detail into an analysis of this problem. It is known that civil wars in some countries have not always had bad results. For example, the historical place and significance of the Civil War in the United States is well known.

Sixth, the doctrine of sovereignty is of the utmost importance in such operations as those by which Communist control was consolidated in Hungary and Rumania in the spring of 1947. The Soviet Government stands back and declares that it is not responsible for the events that occur. The new Communist government is definitely a *de facto* government. Having experimented with direct seizure, as in the

Baltic States, it is clear that a controlled and orderly revolution under the shield of the sovereignty of the country concerned is preferable. They had some experience with this technique in Mongolia in the inter-war period, neatly excising Mongolia from China while giving no opening to serious charges against the Soviet Government. As an authority on Soviet foreign relations describes that situation,

By maneuvering in such a way as to prevent coalition between Chinese and Mongols, Russia was able to rule Mongolia by pretending that the Mongols were free, and also to keep the rest of the world from interfering with its monopoly, by allowing it to be inferred that the Mongols were not free.<sup>57</sup>

Here are six distinct motives or ends, all of which can be served by a single means, the advocacy of national sovereignty. On only one occasion since the war have they slipped and talked the other way, so far as has been noticed. That was at the time of debate in the United Nations Security Council over the crisis in Indonesia, just before the Iranian crisis. Mr. Vishinsky, on the 10th of February, 1946, in addressing the Council rejected the plea that to send a Commission from the United Nations would intrude upon the sovereignty of the Netherlands.

I think that we have to consider the relative importance of the maintenance of the strict sovereignty of national states and, on the other hand, the interests of the United Nations; and I would ask whether the United Nations can be an effective organ if national sovereignty is not limited. The nations must sacrifice a part of their sovereignty if the United Nations is to be a real and effective organ.

In this particular case, the rule of favoring colonial rebellion was the one followed, and it may be presumed that sovereignty, as they defend it, does not extend to the sovereignty of colonial powers over their colonies.

Within any country, under their ultrapatriotic slogans, they pursue the tactics indicated for them by Lenin's Left-wing Communism.<sup>58</sup> That means that they infiltrate, divide, and so far as possible, rule. This tactic applies from the level of the national legislature down to the neighborhood club.

In any national legislature in which they have substantial representation their power is very great. It is not always understood why it is that 10 to 20 percent of a body, at odds with all the rest, can exercise any influence. The answer lies in the fact that any group such as a legislature ordinarily divides by not more than two-thirds against one-third. More extreme divisions may occur, but are less common. To give an obstructionist party 20 percent of the votes, and then to try to legislate, needing 51 percent of the votes, means to rally 51 out of 80, or 64 percent. If the Communists have 30 percent, it then takes about 72 percent of the remaining vote to make a majority. If such a majority is gathered together, it will be far more often for a weak compromise than when a lesser proportion are required. The whole quality and character of legislation deteriorate when a disciplined and dissident minority are present.

This ability of the Communists to sabotage the legislative process had its first great demonstration in Germany under the Weimar constitution. In four successive elections for the Reichstag from 1928 to 1932 they won 54, 77, 89, and 100 seats. In 1930 the Nazis also won a large number of seats, and from then on the two together made up the gross deficit that the legislature had to overcome in any

<sup>57</sup> Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, 1947, p. 241.

<sup>58</sup> For selections from this work of Lenin's see supplement I to this report.

sound democratic legislation. The tactics of the Communists in the French National Assembly, throughout the autumn of 1947, and thus far in 1948, have been of the same kind. Fortunately, with the advantage of historical experience, the democratic parties of France have rallied together better than their German counterparts in the earlier case. Schumann is fighting the same battle, a battle over finances in face of a strong Communist minority, that was fought 17 years ago in Germany.

If it is at all possible to work through other parties they stand a chance to exert a leverage beyond their numbers. This does not often happen, but in the United States from 1943 to 1947 the Communists opposed any third party project, and even dropped the name of a party themselves to try to work through others.

The ability of a minority to embarrass a democratic party finds even easier ground in all kinds of private organizations. Active participation, as distinct from mere hangers-on, is low in most voluntary groups. It may be as easy for a minority to operate a labor union, or a pacifist league, or any other such movement, as it is for a minority group to control a large corporation, when most of the stockholders take no active interest in the management. Communists have not only the injunction of Lenin to infiltrate non-Communist groups, there are also rich fruits easily garnered. If only 10 percent of the members of an organization attend business meetings, only a very small group may be needed to dominate it completely. They know that if they go to meetings, and the others do not, they can rule the organization. The others only know that if enough of them go they can block the disciplined minority, they do not know that they can rule, for they are there to divide on unpredictable lines. So the dice are loaded.

This tactic of joining and working through other groups, called infiltration, applies especially to liberal groups of all kinds, pursuing aims that the Communists, more or less sincerely or hypocritically as the case may be, can also support. It also applies to colonial movements seeking independence, where the Communists' hope is to weaken the controlling power to the advantage of the Soviets, and also, if possible, to twist the independence movement into a social revolution by appealing to and mobilizing the underprivileged masses.

The propaganda line that supports the infiltration tactics is made up of about equal parts of ultra-democratic slogans and vituperation against their opponents. They are for the extension of the suffrage, for tax reduction on small incomes, for proportional representation, for equal rights, for free speech, and against bosses, politicians, the other parties, misleaders of the people. In France and Italy today this line of ultra-democracy, ultra-patriotism, and ultra-abuse of their opponents takes classic forms. They are for national sovereignty, for the annexation of the Saar, proportional representation, an all-powerful assembly and a weak executive. As for what they say of the United States, *L'Humanite*, the leading Communist paper of France, started a special feature in the number for October 24, 1947, under the headline, "America degrades the spirit" devoted to the "decadence" of culture in the United States.

The abuse of opponents is such a normal feature of Communist tactics that it scarcely needs to be proved or even illustrated. However, a few examples may be given in order to aid memory. One such was

the reaction to the speech by Winston Churchill at Fulton, Mo., on March 5, 1946. Pravda ran an editorial on March 11 condemning him for proposing a military alliance against the Soviet Union, for reversing all the truths he had stated during the war, and for reverting to reactionary policies. Two days later Pravda printed an interview with Stalin on the same subject, calling the speech damaging to peace and security, adding "one is reminded remarkably of Hitler and his friends," and ending with a description of Churchill's moves as " \* \* \* quixotic antics."

In another instance, Brooks Atkinson, of the New York Times, formerly stationed as a correspondent in Moscow, wrote a series of articles critical of the then trend of Soviet policies, published in the New York Times for July 7, 1946, and following days. By July 11 Pravda had caught up enough to denounce Atkinson as "an untalented calumniator \* \* \* pen bandit \* \* \* and savage." Other cases may be found in the Izvestia editorial condemning President Truman, on March 14, 1947; an attack on President Truman's plea for admission of 100,000 settlers in Palestine as imperialism, in Pravda on November 1, 1946; an attack on both the Republican and Democratic Parties as bent upon "impetuous imperialist expansion" in Pravda on October 26, 1946, and a general attack on United States policy in all areas from the State of Georgia to the Yangtze River and the Danube, in the Moscow papers on June 23, 1946. Other specimens could be given ad nauseam.

Their outpourings of prodemocratic talk and abuse of their opponents is not wholly indiscriminate. They turn on a special flood of ink when under attack themselves, in the manner of cuttlefish. General Deane discovered this in negotiations with the Soviets for good treatment of prisoners of war liberated from the Nazis.

\* \* \* every agreement which was made regarding the treatment of American prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army was violated, but when these violations were brought to the attention of the appropriate officials they responded with the most unfounded accusations regarding the treatment of liberated Russian prisoners of war then in British or American hands."

They also know when and how to emphasize the line of sweet reasonableness, resorting to appeasement tactics, strictly on the psychological level where it costs least. This is less flexible, however, than the resort to abuse, and may be possible only when the direction of general strategy is defensive for a time. Then it is most profuse. But even during a drive toward the left, or rise of the wave of revolution, as they call it, they will use well-timed concessions with an eye to maximum propaganda effect. Their evacuation of Bornholm Island in the Baltic announced on March 16, 1946, and their agreement to the United States trusteeship in the Pacific on March 31, 1947, were both dramatized as symbols of how reasonable Soviet policy can be.

In all countries the Communists give great attention to the tactical importance of the channels of public information, the so-called media. They give very high priority to the development of their own press, both on the level of popular dailies and weeklies, and on the more

" The Strange Alliance, p. 34.

esoteric level of technical Marxist monthly and quarterly journals.<sup>60</sup> It also includes as much as possible infiltration by Communists and sympathizers into non-Communist media, including radio, movies, book publishing, and even music and the other arts. In a sense they even regard labor unions and other political and economic organizations as media, using them primarily as channels through which to communicate Communist ideas on particular issues in the ordinary course of activities.

In order to fully understand the logic of Communist infiltration, one must examine their attitude, and some of their practices, in relation to reform or liberal movements that they cannot hope to control. If they entered such movements or groups in order to help achieve the progressive objects sought, even though holding the objects inadequate, they might loyally cooperate with the other members up to the point of success. But Communist infiltration has no such character. They simply have no place in their minds for any seriously worth-while purposes but their own. The case of Poland at the close of the war is the best illustration. The Polish underground led by General Bor was ready to rise against the Germans as the Soviet advance was approaching Warsaw in 1944. But a movement of this kind, out of Communist control, was intolerable to communism. The signal for rising was given, and the Soviet advance then stopped long enough for the Nazis to do the work of liquidation.<sup>61</sup> The Soviets were negotiating at the same time for a bombing boundary line drawn far enough to the west to prevent British planes from dropping supplies to the anti-Nazi Poles.<sup>62</sup>

This sort of attitude is simply the reverse side of the same coin as their idea that any real reform of the capitalist system is impossible except in accordance with their own kind of revolution.

The goal of all the tactics that they carry on when revolution is remote is to bring the revolution closer. And that does not mean very close, for they also understand the technique of revolution down to the finest points, and are ready to crowd and jostle their way to power in situations where no spontaneous revolution could succeed. This involves a general readiness for, and training in, the conditions of underground politics, as developed in the world-wide political underworld of the past generation.<sup>63</sup>

The development of a Red army in Korea,<sup>64</sup> the espionage activities revealed by the Canadian spy trials in February 1946, and the development of Greek guerrilla forces based upon aid from north of the Greek frontier are all pieces from the same cloth. An illustration of

<sup>60</sup> A list of their journals in France, as an illustration, may be found in the previous report by a group from Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, dealing with the Near East and other countries, by Hon. Frances P. Bolton and Hon. Chester E. Mallow, at p. 17. There is much further information on this same subject contained in the report on The United States Information Service in Europe, and the appendix, by the special subcommittee under the chairmanship of Hon. Karl E. Mundt. For similar data on the United States, see various reports of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives, published in 1946 and 1947.

<sup>61</sup> See the remarks of Hon. Pete Jarman in the House of Representatives on December 4, 1947, for a brief account of these events.

<sup>62</sup> See *The Strange Alliance*, by Gen. John R. Deane, p. 138.

<sup>63</sup> Jan Valtin's book, *Out of the Night*, was an excellent sample scoop-full of the treachery, immorality, and thuggery of underworld politics in western European countries in the late twenties and early thirties. It was a best seller, yet its impression upon the United States was that of an adventure novel rather than that of a narrative about true conditions.

<sup>64</sup> For a brief account of the Korean forces raised and trained under Soviet occupation, see Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 223.

the promptness and thoroughness with which they entrench and consolidate positions won is given by the mass discharges of personnel from the Romanian Foreign Office, promptly after Comrade Anna Pauker took charge, reported by the Yugoslav news service on November 16, 1947. The general pattern for seizure and retention of power by a strong minority has been exhibited in many cases in the last 2 years.<sup>65</sup>

The training for illegal activities includes systematic attention to the commitment of promising personnel to the movement through criminal activities. This is designed to make it difficult, or impossible, for the recruit, once joined, to change his mind. The importance of arms in the critical stages of the struggle has been an important point in Communist thought on the strategy of revolution ever since 1917. The combination of all of these techniques, to permit the use of physical violence when needed, is a side light on the meaning of democratic centralization and party discipline as explained in the documents printed in supplement I to this report. Their political tactics include helping others to do Communist work whenever there is an opportunity. But they have always one goal, the revolution, and one standard of preparedness, the state of readiness for all-out violence.

#### E. ECONOMIC TACTICS OF COMMUNISM

Whereas for Communist political tactics there are a series of zones, concentric from the power center in the Soviet Union, for economic tactics there are just three classes of areas: first, the Soviet Union; second, newly controlled areas; third, areas not yet controlled.

The basis of economic policy in the Soviet Union has already been discussed under the heading of Soviet defense policy above. And as noted there, an extremely concise and clear basic explanation of it is contained in Stalin's speech of February 9, 1946, reprinted in supplement I to this report. In brief, the Union must achieve economic self-sufficiency for war in the shortest possible time. It met this test for the Second World War, but as Stalin explained, it is bent upon meeting a similar test again.

This requires the highest possible rate of capital formation through the development of industry and this in turn requires the highest possible level of civilian sacrifice. In the Soviet Union, the level of civilian sacrifice in terms of standard of living, measured by the proportions of the national income going into the development of heavy industry, has been comparable since 1928 to the level of sacrifice achieved in the United States only during the war. This is not guided by private initiative, nor does it bring profit to private individuals, but in all other respects, and in basic economic effect, it corresponds very well indeed with the characteristics ascribed by Marx to capitalism.

Not only must the Soviet develop its economic potential for war as rapidly as possible; also, it must avoid dependence upon the external world. This policy of self-sufficiency, or autarchy, means a general inhibition of trading relationships, marked by the fact that Soviet foreign trade has never equaled the volume carried on by Czarist Russia.<sup>66</sup> Russian exports in 1913 reached a value of \$775,000,000,

<sup>65</sup> Documents contained in supplement II to this report deal with a number of such instances. Attention is particularly called to those dealing with Hungary, Rumania, Poland, and Korea.

<sup>66</sup> Beloff, *Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, p. 40.

and the highest postwar year was 1930 when they reached only \$533,000,000. For imports, the 1913 figure was \$700,000,000 and the highest postwar year was 1931, when they amounted to \$569,000,000. Whenever relations have been reasonably good with Britain or Germany or the United States, considerable programs for imports of machinery and equipment in exchange for Soviet wheat or raw materials have been entered into, and credit arrangements in moderate amounts have been utilized. In general, however, the degree of self-sufficiency maintained has been very high.

A curious feature of this system is the emphasis placed by the Soviets upon gold production. Special incentives have been granted to prospectors, and the production of gold from all known sources has been pressed, apparently without intermission. The value of this gold is almost entirely based upon trade; so long as it is more acceptable than any other commodity, and at good prices, it is worth producing. This applies just as long as the labor and other costs involved in gold production can thereby produce more machinery for the Soviets through trade than they could produce directly in other Soviet industries. As long as gold exerts a unique leverage in trade, receivable without challenge on the ground of dumping, and unimpeded by protective tariffs or any other restrictions, this will remain an instrument of Soviet economics.

It was pointed out in connection with Soviet defense policy above that priority for industrial development is given to the areas most remote from foreign attack. This cannot be carried out with perfect symmetry of course. For one reason, the major areas of urban population cannot be replaced immediately, nor for a long time. Leningrad and Moscow are both in this class, as well as the centers of shipbuilding on the Black Sea, and the many large cities of the Don Basin that were not too far away for the Germans to reach. For another reason, the inexorable facts of location of resources cannot be modified by policy. The Dnieper River with its hydroelectric capacity is in the western Ukraine. So is the greatest iron mine in the Union, at Krivoi Rog, and the great manganese deposit of Nikopol.

The organization of the economy is, of course, predominantly under state ownership and planning, with only small sectors of trade, manufacturing, and agriculture still in private hands. Even the remaining private enterprise is subject to planning, and as the entrepreneurs have learned again and again since the first turn-away from the new economic policy in 1928, subject to liquidation without much notice. Within this socialism, there is, as already mentioned, the "capitalist" feature of capital development—

that production is merely production for capital, and not vice versa, the means of production mere means for an ever-expanding system of the life process for the benefit of the society of producers.<sup>67</sup>

There is also a wage differential, that is a range between the highest level of pay and the lowest, that is as wide as the range for all but a tiny fraction in such a country as the United States today. And just as there are extreme fringes outside the ordinary range in the United States, so are there in Russia, where popular authors may acquire incomes through royalties that are certainly large and would be so considered anywhere.

<sup>67</sup> Marx, *Capital*, I, p. 293.



The development of the economy is, as is well known, under a state planning system headed up in the Gosplan, or top level planning organization. This has a massive staff of statisticians and other experts, and performs the work of drafting the 5-year plans, and their annual modifications. These provide detailed plans for every industry and phase of economic activity in the Union.

After the Union itself, the next areas to be considered are those recently brought under Communist control. This includes both the areas recently annexed to the Union, and the countries not annexed, but under Communist governments. Economic policy in these regions is that of a transition period, involving (a) the introduction of the monopoly of foreign trade by the state, (b) the exploitation of war booty and reparations clauses, (c) the totalitarian disciplining (what the Nazis called *Gleichschaltung*) of labor unions and agricultural organizations, (d) the reorganizing of the land system and general break-up of property and savings in order to smash resistant classes and groups, and (e) such physical measures as changing over the gauge of rail lines to the wider Soviet gage.

The introduction of Soviet-type monopolies involves an assortment of methods, not at all as simple as socialization of everything by decree. Some properties are taken over as former enemy property wherever German interest can be found or inferred. This goes so far as the taking over of former Jewish property on the ground that the Nazis seized title to it, and former American or British property, as in Rumanian oil companies, seized by the Germans or by local governments as enemy property during the war. Nationalization by legislative action is of course also applied to selected industries, such as coal, steel, rails, etc.

Since there is nothing like an antitrust policy in any of the regions involved, the range in the power of control enjoyed by the combines that result from these processes is no broader than from plain monopoly to faintly adulterated monopoly. Austria, which happens to be under partial but incomplete Soviet control, serves as a goldfish bowl in which these policies can be observed more readily than in the fully controlled countries. There the Soviets enjoy full control of the Zistersdorf oil field, the richest in Europe west of Rumania. They also hold a controlling share in the Danube shipping concern, and a *mélange* of other industrial property lumped in USIVA (Soviet Administration of German Properties in Austria). They recently gave an exhibition performance featuring the possibilities that such positions afford them. Preparatory to laying down their terms for an Austrian peace treaty, late in January 1948, they first doubled the price of oil out of the Austrian land to the Austrian Government. After a few days in which the impression made could sink in, they then displayed their essential kindness by softening the action taken.

The Communist control of unions and other economic organizations is direct once they achieve political power. Removal of all old personnel is seldom necessary. The process is largely after the manner to be understood from Stalin's statement on the possibility of peaceful evolution to socialism in a case of Socialist encirclement. (See above, p. 20.) Only those willing to run the risk of liquidation need be liquidated.

The use of economic methods for changing the class structure of a country, smashing up the old middle class and landowning groups, and

creating the amorphous mass that dictatorship finds most amenable, is particularly the function of land reforms and currency reforms. Land reform, as in the Soviet zone of Germany, uses whatever argument from past or present politics or social conditions lies most ready to hand. In the countries concerned, the arguments for land reform are often extremely good, and long antedate the advent of Communist power. But under the guise of breaking up the larger estates it is simple to break up the not-so-large also, creating a class of small farmers with inadequate equipment and know-how, helplessly dependent upon state credit for all further development. And currency reform, if timed right, can perform a transfer of wealth from the well-to-do to the state, equalizing all in a common propertyless condition. The revaluation in Rumania last summer, on August 15, caught the better producers largely at the moment when they had sold their wheat crop, which is harvested in June and July. The leu was revalued at the rate of 1 new leu for 20,000 old ones, with the exchange limited for farmers at the amount of 250 to 350 new leu maximum. This kind of limitation on the amount of transfer from old to new currency can catch and fleece all holders of large quantities of the old currency. It does so with a complexity that inhibits criticism and counterpropaganda by forcing the discussion of the subject into technicalities.

There is one issue that draws a line of distinction between the various countries under Soviet control. This is the matter of which side they were on in the war. Countries on the enemy side are subject to reparations claims which eliminate any balance of payments problem for the Soviets in getting what they want of the local resources. Countries on the Allied side get more in return, as Czechoslovakia gets Russian wheat and iron ore in return for her exports.

Soviet and Communist economic relations with the uncontrolled outside world resume the general pattern of coordinated Communist tactics. That is to say, they are designed to advance the revolution first, the Soviet as the main force of the revolution second, the weakening of all capitalist countries third; and they seek these ends through combined use of Soviet and local Communist methods.

Russia enters into trade for commercial among other reasons, but all the reasons that affect major political policies are liable to intervene at any time. This has always made Soviet trade a disturbing factor, by making it unpredictable for normal commercial calculations. They want their imports for strategic reasons, and will take them and pay for them at price terms at which no one expects them to close a deal. Similarly, they export to get the foreign exchange with which to obtain imports whose value to them is not measured by the money cost. They may sell, in order to secure the exchange, at prices impossible to account for on commercial criteria. International trade, from their point of view, is one of the necessary evils of the transition period between the victory of communism in Russia and the final victory of the revolution.

Under their system of planning, with a state monopoly of foreign trade, the measures of bilateral trade are natural methods for them. This, of course, reflects in part a world-wide phenomenon. Insofar as multilateral trade based on convertible currencies is possible, they are capable of entering into it. And insofar as certain technical measures to facilitate trade, such as uniform methods of tariff valuation, free-

dom of transit, marks of origin, uniformity of formalities and terminology, are of advantage to others they may also be of advantage to the Soviets and the Soviets may participate in developing them.

The Soviet role remains in essentials that of a cartel, with a profit-and-loss account calculated not in money but in power. And as has been said of governmental cartels in general, once a government forms a cartel it will pursue its objective more aggressively and more ruthlessly than any private enterprise.

The fact that the Soviet is only a first consideration, and not the only one in the strategy of revolution, is demonstrated time and again, when the aims of trade are visibly a political effect to be gained in the other trading country. Shipments of Russian wheat in 1945 and since then have been clearly directed by political considerations. At this point the Soviet takes on the role of an accessory to the Communist drive in outside countries.

The role of the foreign Communist parties has economic aspects also. Special care is expended to develop the Communist movement in strategically important countries. Special care is expended within countries to seek control of labor in key industries—industries rated as of special importance either in potential for war, or of especial disruptive importance.

Communist activities in all industries and in all countries is very heavily overlaid by apparent concern for the welfare of the worker, for better wages and better conditions of labor. These goals are inherent in the whole of the labor tradition of which Communist proletarian preachings are a branch. But, since the Communists reject all hope of real reform without revolution, their advocacy of these goals lacks certain restraining elements that affect any non-revolutionary labor leadership. This is most conspicuous under inflationary conditions, where Communists have no thought of any solution but higher wages, no matter how many times the inflationary cycle has already revolved. They expect a smash, and lack any impulse to avoid it. This has been apparent in almost all non-Communist countries recently, but especially in France and Italy and the United States.

Short of the tactics of inflation or of revolution they simply seek positions of maximum advantage through the technique of infiltration, using their disciplined minority and technical skills to control unions as groups within which to carry on propaganda activities. The immediate advantages are two: The direct indoctrination and recruitment that can be accomplished, and the swinging of the whole group on particular issues, to vote or to use its strength in other ways for Communist or Soviet advantage on political issues. The ability to slant the support of a group in favor of the Communist choice among non-Communist parties may be a very powerful means of influence in realms of politics where Communist influence seems quite remote.

When the situation reaches a stage where a drive for power may be feasible, economic weapons play a quite different role. Then the policy of wrecking the existing economy by constantly rising wages becomes intensified, and finds its complement in the checking of production through strikes. Then the policy of concentration on key industries pays off, for strikes in coal mines and on the railroads cause production losses far beyond the sector of the economy in which organization has to meet the test and strain of striking. If the produc-

tion losses can accelerate inflation, permitting a resort to new wage demands in other industries, the Communist-influenced labor front may advance in echelon toward the economic and political smash-up. Then can come the "revolution"—that is, a coup d'état by the professional party leaders, with all elements of popular spontaneity under careful control.

The economic tactics in non-Communist countries have three main phases, of which the mildest is infiltration under normal conditions, the next more intensive is the drive toward inflation, and the last is a general tie-up preparatory to seizing power. In none of these stages are their economic forces left to fend for themselves. Any effort to ameliorate economic conditions through the cooperation of non-Communist countries is decried by Soviet and world Communist propaganda as an imperialist alinement. The slogan of "sovereignty" can play a role in economic developments as well as in political tactics. Capital formation, though far lower in rate than in the Soviet Union, is denounced as too high a level of profits. Soviet diplomacy can move to assist local communism in its economic struggles by embarrassing the non-Communist government, and Soviet trade policy can add its contribution either to further disturb an economy in need of commodity imports, or to grant them for political advantage. And the new development of a complex of Communist states instead of a single one will permit a new flexibility, whereby the several Communist countries can divide the labor of disturbance of other European economies through economic warfare. The Cominform, in Belgrade instead of in Moscow, can shield the Soviet Foreign Office from the protests of foreign governments.

#### F. COMBINED TACTICS

Communist tactics include several different kinds of tactics, such as economic and political. But these make up a single broad set of tactics, of wide variety, understood by them as serving a single goal.

There are four different planes on which they can vary, and each of these offers choices for Communist policy. First, there is the choice of defensive or offensive tactics according to the prevailing situation. This is the basis for the great periods of Communist defensive or offensive policy from 1917 to the present. Second, there is the series of zones, with its center in the heart of the Soviet Union, requiring the adaptation of tactics to both the needs and the possibilities of each area, in terms of geographic remoteness, strategic remoteness, and political remoteness. Third, there is the range of choice between economic, political, and psychological or propaganda weapons and methods. Fourth, there is the range of choice among various available agents, from the Red Army and the Soviet Foreign Office, through the satellite governments to the Communist parties in non-Communist countries.

This combination involves nothing more complicated than, for example, the tactics of amphibious warfare, or the plane-tank-infantry team of the modern war of movement on land. The practice of combined tactics in cold warfare was demonstrated for several years by Hitler, to great effect, and his final defeat does not at all change the fact that he gained successes through his combined tactics that contributed enormously to his power. The lesson of history is plain:

that there can be a tactic that combines consideration of when to stand still and when to attack, with a recognition of geopolitical factors, and with a free-handed adaptability in use of economic, political, and psychological weapons, and with the use of the central power of a government supported by satellites and "fifth columns."

Obviously no such system of tactics can exist unless there are clearly understood goals, a clear sense of which available assets are more expendable than others, a common knowledge of the effects that can be gained by each available weapon, over-all control of the basic strategy of offense and defense, and good communications.

This means teamwork. And teamwork is not a requirement which the Communists lack. It is only another name for the "iron discipline" that Lenin demanded and knew how to create. The most obvious basis of high-grade teamwork among Communists is in the rules of "democratic centralization." If there is no more discussion, but unanimous obedience after a decision, then teamwork of course follows. But to have such a system, and not to lose large minorities after every decision that involves any controversy, means a considerable degree of morale and loyalty.

There are some features of communism that lead to similar behavior by Communists everywhere. A Communist in Borneo or in Alaska will try to "organize the unorganized" if he can find any unorganized labor to work on. That is as simple a consequence of the Communist creed as going to church on Sunday is for Christians. A common faith refreshed from common books is sufficient to maintain such a pattern of similar behavior. But teamwork is something else than merely similar behavior; it is dissimilar behavior for a common purpose. Teamwork requires a shared purpose, but it also requires constant communication, signals, and organization in terms of authority, assignments, and specific training.

All of these things the Communists have. Their leading personnel, the kind of members who are on the executive committees of national parties, have had very severe training. They have read the books, and they have discussed them. For years they have been through the mill of party debate about how to work out the right tactics for new situations. Their knowledge is professional in intensity, and as integrated to practice as medical or engineering knowledge.

Now, if one found that a lot of good civil engineers could get together to build a dam or a TVA, and that each would understand what the other said, and know how to divide the job into assignments and each do his part, it would be not at all surprising. They have a common theoretical and practical training. So have the Communists.

Or if one examine a historical case, such as the Crusades or early Islam, or the religious wars in Europe a few centuries ago, or any modern nationalist movement, one finds one is dealing with the power of a common emotional faith. The American patriots at Concord and at Kings Mountain had such a faith. So have the Communists.

Or if one study the conduct of war by the Germans, with the planning of campaigns through a general staff according to strategic principles and tactical principles worked out in advance but adapted constantly to changing circumstances, or the conduct of war by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff in the last war, one finds one is dealing

with an organization working in terms of common rules of how to get things done, a common sense of the objective and of how to use the means on hand to accomplish the end. The great military organizations have a general staff at the center to coordinate the actions of every part of the army. So have the Communists.

They have professional leadership, emotional faith, and a general staff type of control. The professional training is based on the study of just such works as those printed in supplement I to this report. Those are textbooks for the Communists—theoretical, perhaps, but such theory as can be applied to action. They are no more theoretical to Communists than a law text to a lawyer, or a medical text to a doctor. The general staff organization, developed in the Comintern with its staff school in the Marx-Lenin Institute, though truncated from 1943 to 1947, has been revived fully for the critical sector of Europe by the creation of the Cominform. Let there be no doubt, then, that they are equipped by training and organization to conduct a combined strategy and tactics in a systematic and coordinated manner.

The maintenance of identical professional standards rests upon factors as obvious and simple as those of any other profession. They hold conventions, and they have professional journals, they hear speeches by outstanding professional leaders, and they use such open channels of communication as the world press. When a local party, such as the party in the United States, shows signs of difficulty in accepting a new turn of strategy, they can send a "big shot" like Duclos, from France, to lay down the logic of the new line, and support an Eisler who may not be imposing enough to accomplish it. When they find that some of the comrades will not conform to the line, they cut them off, almost in the manner of a disbarment proceeding for lawyers who transgress the standards of the bar.

While there was no Comintern from 1943 to 1947, the coordination of action in all countries was affected through liaison rather than through direct joint staff activities. For the period concerned liaison through NKVD agents or others was quite adequate. There was no perceptible confusion in negotiating the left turn executed in 1945 and 1946, beyond the scattering of comrades who could not follow the signals, such as Earl Browder, and this was a normal feature of all such swings. The more intensive campaigning of 1947 and 1948 however, require, a very close planning and very fine synchronizing of activity in various countries. Also the time had come for the movements in the new Communist countries, depending upon the energies of local nationalism for part of their power and drive, to be brought more into harness, to pull together rather than against each other. The advantages of having them legally independent would be lost if they became independent in any other sense. So the Cominform was set up.

The advantages of all this to the Communists are many. It is extraordinarily easy to outmaneuver the opposition if one has a more flexible but well-coordinated system of tactics. Consider the way in which the Germans baffled an equally large army of French and British in 1940 as a case in point. The Communists, when they find a political move countered and stopped by a countermove in politics, shift into economic or propaganda activities. When a move in one area, say Iran or Greece, is blocked, their next move is in Germany,

or Turkestan, or Korea. When the Soviet is blocked the play may be taken up by satellite governments, or by the parties in non-Communist countries.

Each branch of their tactics is as highly developed as is the system of coordination between them. They have experts in the conduct of work in trade-unions in advanced industries, as in the United States or Germany, and experts in work in backward and colonial areas. They have American specialists and Asiatic specialists. And they have psychological tactics as elaborate as those used by the late Dr. Goebbels, economic tactics that lack nothing known to the Nazis, and political tactics for the coup d'état stage of politics that were the basis of Hitler's technique in 1933. They have fully assimilated everything new and effective from the last 15 years of political violence. This gives them an advantage like the temporary advantage of the Nazis. None of their weapons is inimitable. But until the opposition accepts the logic of the game as they play it, and learns the matching system of defense, they enjoy a sort of monopoly.

In addition they hold the assets that were discussed under the heading of foreign policy above. They have the veto in the United Nations, and the effect is that there is no international organization that can act against them without extremely difficult procedures. They hold a strangle hold on Germany, not the control they would like to have, but enough to make any development of Germany adverse to them extraordinarily difficult. And they hold positions in the Far East that give them strategic advantages. Also there is real distress, disillusionment, and political disorder in much of the world, and they stand, apparently strong and confident, and ready with an assured remedy for every ill.

Much of the world is afraid that there may be another depression, as the Communists predict. After all, no non-Communist government is being run on principles that have stood the test of preventing a depression long enough to be convincing. If we now have such principles, we have still to test them. So, whether or not we can do it, the Communists have, for the time being, the advantage of the doubts that persist, because it has not yet been proved that we can avoid depression.

With all these advantages of their tactics, and the advantages they hold in terms of positions from which to use their tactics, they also have tactical weaknesses. Even for those who doubt that the non-Communist democracies can survive, the Communist outline of the remedy is not attractive. It leads through violence and dictatorship to whatever future it may have; and, though this may be necessary, there is no need to plunge into it until the alternatives have really failed. The Communists promise only for the remote future the economic welfare that many non-Communist countries already enjoy, and only for a still more remote future the chance to enjoy freedom and self-direction.

The strain imposed on Communists themselves by the tight discipline and radical shifts of policy and tactics have high costs. The doctrine that the end justifies the means runs out into a revolt of the means against the ends, when the means are human beings. There has been a constant loss of people, including the central professional type. Trotsky was the most famous, but Lovestone, Gitlow, Budenz, and Browder are other examples from the party in the

United States, and Kravchenko, Barmine, and others can be mentioned from the Soviet system. The number of desertions from the Red Army in Europe has been high, and has been much publicized, though no precise data are available in the nature of the case. Labor in many countries has shown signs of rebellion against Communist leadership, when the inflation lesson has exhausted the hope that one more raise can remedy the rising cost of living. National opposition groups have developed or hung on in areas under Communist control, where the price of communism has been too high and where nationalism is the only available channel around which to organize an opposition, as in the Ukraine or Hungary.

The weaknesses that result from the too strenuous demands of communism upon its followers are apparent in some features of their tactics that exist only to cover these weaknesses. The iron curtain would have no purpose if the peoples behind it were immune to what might come through it. The police state would be unnecessary if opposition were not spontaneous and chronic. Purges of the party, and mass transfers of populations would not occur where dissent was not bred by the automatic effect of the system upon the people who have to live in it.

There are human and material shortages that prevent the full exploitation of the positions already held, or prevent the full support of external communism by the Soviets, or of the Soviets by the foreign Communists. These shortages bear fruit in the satellite countries in the immediate grasping self-advancement of Communists in power, and the impossibility of purging the grafters for lack of replacements.

Finally the system of tactics, by itself, imposes costs that cannot be met. Communism for two generations has been degenerating from a great theory of history, and a great dream of human betterment, into a technique for power. The revolution as the dominant element, the controlling concept, permits the deterioration of the whole system into a drive for power. There may be flexibility at the tactical level, but this very flexibility requires a degree of training, of detailed expert mastery on the level of means that inhibits the development of mastery on the level of ends. The end has become a dogma, and if that dogma is wrong the whole technique of the means is wrong too. They pretend that Marxism is a science. But they are inflexible and dogmatic at the fundamental level where science is flexible, the level of most fundamental theory. Physics is a science, in which the ideas of Newton were upset in theory by Einstein before they were upset in practice by the atom bomb. Communism is no science, for the starting point in the Communist Manifesto is unchallenged and unchallengeable. It rests on the assertion of faith, and the strains produced by experience that contradicts the faith have grown and are continuing to grow.

These weaknesses will be felt over the long pull, but they do not show up in the details of action. A skillful army may win a lot of skirmishes, even in a losing battle. From the point of view of immediate results, Communist tactics are good. They use local resources in many areas where they can be checked only by committing a part of our main strength. The Communist threat to Greece, for example, probably costs the Soviet absolutely nothing, while to counter it has cost us a material outlay running to \$300,000,000. The Communists can act in France or Italy or the Ruhr at no cost to Moscow, but to



meet them may cost us, by present estimates, \$6,800,000,000 for 15 months. And as they threaten one front after another, and we cover their threats with our countermoves, they have yet other fronts to which they can turn. This is the great significance and the great advantage of their four planes of choice, the basis of the variety and resourcefulness of their tactics. But the limits of this variety and resourcefulness and the means to meet it, are the subject of the next section of this report.

#### IV. THE APPROACH TO COUNTERACTION

##### A. OUR PROBLEM

For the Communists the present world situation is the continuation of a long succession of events. They have, they believe, predicted these events, and they have played, they think, a rational role based on understanding and expectation.

Their movement has been based on the expectation of great wars and revolutions growing out of the explosive forces generated in modern society. Their movement has grown in a hundred years from a trickle to a flood. Its growth has accelerated in the last 30 years, first through the capture of power in Russia, then through the building of the might of the Soviet system, then through the fruits of victory in war. And it has grown in relative power even faster than in absolute power, for the breaking of nations in two world wars has left the Soviet power as one of only two great centers of political power in the world.

Today they see the whole process on the brink of its final culmination. Between them and the United States lie broad areas of cracked and repaired but shaky political structures, under severe economic and political strains. There is only one power with strength to spare to prop the weak, and that power, as they see it, is liable to have its own troubles with an economic crash, and soon. Short of running any decisive risk, they know and have announced their own solution to the problem of the present.<sup>68</sup>

For us the situation is radically different. We cannot claim to have expected the present situation, for only 2 or 3 years ago we ignored it and denied it. How to face it is therefore a very different problem for us than it is for them. Where they have only to follow the book, we have to adapt ourselves. We have to learn to recognize and identify the key elements in the problem, assess our own means, and devise methods by which to apply our available resources. We have to take account of stock in a situation we did not anticipate. They have kept a running account in their own terms, and think they know exactly where they stand.

In taking account of stock we can begin by examining the immediate weaknesses and disadvantages of our position. We can then examine our general position in our own terms, and in their terms, and measure our strength to meet the situation. On that basis we can perhaps set ourselves some practical rules on what is to be done.

<sup>68</sup> The most comprehensive Communist statement on the present situation is Zhdanov's speech published on October 22, 1947, given in supplement I to this report.

## B. OUR HANDICAPS

The first category of handicaps under which we find ourselves is the same as a list of their recent gains. We granted to them, in that remote but recent era of the alliance, the veto in the United Nations, the hold upon Germany under the Potsdam agreement, and the opportunity to introduce the "new democracy" in eastern Europe. We also induced them to intervene in eastern Asia, with great benefit to their side of the balance and damage to our side.

These things leave us unable to use instruments that should have been available for the projects of reconstruction, and blocked from any action in areas upon which other areas are partially dependent. We lost these assets through agreements that were final as soon as they were made so far as concerned what we granted. They were subject to future delivery dependent on good will, for the return benefit to us. The results were summed up by Senator Vandenberg when he said:

Too many words, as at Yalta and Potsdam, and in Poland at this very hour, have been distorted of all pretense of integrity.<sup>69</sup>

The next category of our handicaps is the reverse side of their present opportunities. Much of the world is in distress or disorder or both. Much of the world, while reluctant to accept communism, is at best dubious about the prospect of stability under non-Communist auspices. They saw the United States blunder into the world depression, and they know no proof as yet that we are not subject to a repetition. Anti-Communist morale is low. It may be high in certain places or circles, and it may be higher in many places than a year ago; but, by comparison with what it once was, or what it would have to be for reconstruction to be called a success, it is low. There are unsolved economic and political problems of vast scope, and for some of them we have not yet pretended to offer solutions. Mr. Byrnes put it succinctly when he said:

If we regard Europe as the tinderbox of possible world conflagration, we must look upon Asia as a great smoldering fire.<sup>70</sup>

The fact that we are handicapped today by reason of our own past mistakes points the finger to weaknesses in our way of conducting our own business at home. Our agencies of Government that make policy have been too obviously hampered by conflicts of principle within their own ranks. Wrong policies are wrong either because they are made by officials whose ideas are wrong, or they are wrong because they reflect compromise of the bad sort after internecine struggle. Ours have been neither as right as they should be, nor clear. This lack of clarity has extended of course to relations between the branches of Government, and the Congress has exhibited at times the skepticism that is inevitable when the case as presented is not clear and candid and consistent. When inconsistency has been necessary, as it must be in a time of transition, explanations and the fullest possible presentation are called for and must be forthcoming.

Insofar as communications between the Government and the Congress have left something to be desired, so have communications

<sup>69</sup> Senator Vandenberg, speech at Grand Rapids, Mich., March 8, 1947.

<sup>70</sup> Speaking Frankly, p. 204.

between the Government and the public. No democracy can act firmly, with the courage of its own convictions, unless the people know what it is about. A government that tries to correct its past mistakes, without admitting that it ever made any, cannot quite succeed at the same time in reducing confusion. And public confusion is a real handicap in our kind of system.

### C. THE LINE OF LEAST RESISTANCE

Our handicaps, our partial confusion, and the disillusionment of facing an unpleasant situation on the heels of a romantic dream of peace, are enough to account for the desire of some to extend the dream. This is an easy thing to do. We could have some time yet of entirely sweet relations with world communism, if we took no measures to block its aims. We could extend that time without limit by the simple device of turning Communist en masse. But even people in misery and danger do not do that.

Granting concessions to an antagonist is not always wrong. Disraeli granted concessions to Bismarck, and gained a peace. One can grant concessions even to an overt enemy, without betraying oneself, if one gets a fair bargain. And one can yield to an enemy what one cannot practically withhold, and not regret it later. But the things we want from the Soviets today are major things, stabilization of the world and an acceptance of the possibility of peace. What have we to offer? We have already given them what they thought was enough to assure their position; we do not still have those things to give. The stakes now in play include all the areas that are not settled as areas for their system to control or ours. These areas would settle the issue of power once and for all. The only concessions we can make now that would buy immediate peace involve these areas. They are not fools. They think they will win their bets, and they will not sell for any discount. And the price is just too big to concede.

We have granted all that can be granted without giving away what would be decisive. When we did it we thought we were setting the foundations of trust and neighborly relations. We have found that we only gave them the means and opportunity to grasp for more. Now the issue is how to recover from that disadvantage, not how to add enough price to buy the original article.

In the past we have granted to the Soviets concessions in terms of power and position that are of the highest degree of importance. We did so in the agreements concerning the veto in the Security Council, and in the agreements concerning Germany and the Far East. These were very great concessions made in hope of appeasement. They did not have the anticipated effect. In the opinion of this committee we have reached the end of such a policy. There are no more comparable concessions that could be made without fatally weakening our own position.

This does not mean that we must no longer bargain with them. We should bargain with them on practical terms of mutual advantage whenever occasion arises. But we cannot afford to regard them as distrustful children who need a demonstration of our kindness in order to be reassured. They are distrustful, but they are not children.

## D. OUR CASE IN THEIR LANGUAGE

An assessment of the world situation today has been laid out, as they see it, in some of the major statements of Communist authorities since the war. Such statements can be found at the latter part of supplement I to this report. The situation as seen from our point of view has not lacked for eloquent statement in recent times also. But the differences between the two styles of thought and expression leave it far from clear just what the differences are. An effort to state our case in their terms may clarify some of the issues.

To begin with we can take the major Communist assertions about the condition of the United States today, its place in history, the logic of its development and its coming fate, and see how they apply and to whom they apply most.

(a) According to the Communists we are the prime embodiment of the capitalist system. What they mean by this has been discussed above, in particular the deprivation of the producing class of the fruits of production. If there is any country in the world of which this is more true than of any other today it is not, however, the United States but the Soviet Union. And at the same time there is no country in the world where labor gains the benefit of high production so much as in the United States.

(b) They charge us with being in the monopoly and imperialist phase of capitalism. Yet they maintain a foreign trade monopoly and we do not. They have monopolies in every major industry and we in none.

(c) They claim that labor is exploited in our system. But it is they, not we, who use the slave labor of millions on political grounds,<sup>71</sup> plus the slave labor of war prisoners by the hundreds of thousands.

(d) They claim that our trade-unions are a false front, designed to betray the interests of labor, and covertly under capitalist control. But it is their unions that are iron-bound organs for state control, with strikes prohibited, used only as instruments to prevent labor from seeking justice.

(e) They hold that we have a vast spread between the rich and the poor. But their army has a wider range of pay than ours, and the general wage spread in the Soviet has increased while ours has decreased.<sup>72</sup>

(f) They claim that our form of democracy is a sham and theirs is the true one. But in ours the party in power can lose an election, voters can shift their allegiance, new parties can be organized. What they call democracy involves a vote of more than 99 percent for the party in power, with no criticism of policy. Lenin once quoted Engels to the effect that when the state withers away:

The authority of the Government over persons will be replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production

In no country in the world is there a closer approach to this than in the United States, except that our Government does not direct production. In no country in the world today is there such a high degree of authority over persons as in the Soviet.

<sup>71</sup> See *Communism in Action*, H. Doc. No. 754, 79th Cong., ch. V.

<sup>72</sup> *Communism in Action*, ch. IV.

(g) The Communists hold that our parties mislead and deceive the voters. No party in the United States has ever deceived all the voters if it deceived any of them. The single party in the Soviet enjoys unchallenged monopoly of the art of deception.

(h) The Communists declare that the capitalist press is the corrupt instrument of capitalist controlled propaganda. There has been much discussion on this issue in recent years. The Communist point of view was stated by N. Baltisky in *War and the Working Class*, in an article that was reprinted in the *Washington Post* of January 25, 1945. This article was an answer to the arguments put forward by Mr. Kent Cooper of the Associated Press. The text of the Stalin-Stassen interview, published in the *New York Times* for April 15, 1947, also had much to say on the subject of press freedom. The simple fact that the Communist side of the case can be covered by citations to the American press should make further comment unnecessary. But it may be added that their theory of the party and of democratic centralization provides a role for agitation and propaganda, "agitprop" in their vocabulary, but no role for freedom of information.

(i) They hold that corruption is characteristic of our system, and cite our prolific scandals in evidence. But scandal as such depends upon standards of public behavior, and scandal is rarest just where corruption has become the rule instead of the exception. Corruption is, in the nature of the case, an impossible subject on which to make accurate comparisons. The existence of corruption in the Soviet is not unheard of however, and standards of public honesty in the United States have made enormous progress. The evolution of their tactics on the basis that "the end justifies the means," is really a sort of systematic universal corruption, instituted and legitimized.

(j) They call us reactionary. Yet we are the land of maximum progress toward freedom and welfare for all, and the Soviets the land of maximum reassertion of the ancient characteristics of tyranny. Their thinking rejects the possibility of peace while ours asserts it, and theirs rejects the capacity of freemen for self-direction while ours asserts it. Their eminent journalist, Ilya Ehrenburg, some 20 years ago wrote a fine chapter in a novel, in which he drew a parallel between a Bolshevik commissar and the grand inquisitor of Dostoevsky's fable, told in *The Brothers Karamazov*. No account has been publicly given of how Ehrenburg made his peace with the commissars, but his original viewpoint, in contrast with his present career, throws light on both the character of the Soviet system with its reactionary rejection of freedom, and on the meaning of integrity and of careerism in the Soviet press.

(k) According to Marx and his followers the capitalist class are too hide-bound, and too limited in vision by their own special interests, to see the necessary way out of the contradictions of capitalism into a system where production will be unimpeded. Both production and democracy in the United States have been less hide-bound than anywhere else. And in the Soviet, while production has grown it has grown only for the power of the state, and democracy in the sense of freedom has not grown at all.

(l) The Communists hold that we are doomed to suffer another great economic crisis. It is too early yet to claim that we have proved the expectation false. If we can prove that it is false we

will have to go on proving it for a long time to come. But we have already gone past the time when they expected it. Meanwhile they are set in a condition called permanent revolution in their theories. This is not precisely the same as an economic depression, but it is a condition requiring dictatorial controls, the sacrifice of welfare for capital formation, the maintenance of an iron curtain, agitation and propaganda instead of a free press. Permanent revolution is only another way of saying that they live permanently with the conditions that we know only as the consequences of depression.

(m) They denounce us for economic imperialism. Meanwhile we have given freedom to the Philippines, and our imperialist partner, Britain, has granted freedom to more people than any conqueror ever conquered. The United States has freely given away more than the amount of foreign investments ever held by any imperialist power. And the Soviets have grasped every economic means to exploit territories under complete or partial control.

(n) They equally denounce our political imperialism. But it is we who aid others, not to become "Yankee stooges" but to get on their feet and be themselves, and it is they who can tolerate no independent power whatever except for the time being and pending the "inevitable conflict."

(o) They call us "war mongers." But it is we who have believed that there need not be another war, and we who are disillusioned at the difficulties of preventing one, now that the difficulties are apparent. And it is they who lay down as fundamental doctrine that there must be a final ghastly struggle.

(p) They accuse the capitalist world of resorting to terrorism against the challenge of revolution. The roots of Communist terror may originate in communism or in Russian brutality. Russia never went through the historical development of humanitarianism that has reduced brutality in western countries. But this question need not be settled here. The modern classic on terrorism is Trotsky's *Defense of Terrorism*. He was a Bolshevik in good standing when he wrote it, and for years afterward. How much the Hitler terror owed to lessons from the Communists is a story not yet told, though many scraps of evidence have been published.

(q) They regard us as "hard to get along with," and attribute this naturally to our capitalist-imperialist designs. An opinion on the subject has been expressed by a source with which few will choose to differ. Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt, in her column in the *Washington Daily News* for January 3, 1948, said:

I do not think we have always been wise or tactful in our approach to the Government of the U. S. S. R., but basically we have been the ones to make the constructive offers and they have been the ones to refuse.

(r) Their general charges against any idea of hope or successful reform in our system, are variations on the old charge that all such hopes offer the workers "pie in the sky." But if conditions for labor in the United States today are "pie in the sky" or if recovery in other countries by immediate American aid is so described, what figure of speech can be devised to cover the withering away of the state only after a world proletarian dictatorship, which will not begin until after one more great holocaust of war, which may itself not occur until after three or four more 5-year plans have armed the Soviet, as prescribed by Stalin?

Such a catalog of Communist charges and answers may not be conclusive on each single point, but its general weight suggests an irrelevance between the Communist mythology and the facts. A direct approach to the questions that this raises may be made through an examination of Stalin's list of the three great "contradictions" of capitalism, quoted above at page 9. These contradictions are the one between the capitalist class and the working class within a capitalist country, the one between the competing imperialist nations, and the one between the imperialist nations and the subject peoples. Now the Communist idea of the post-revolutionary condition of human life on this planet may be defined as one in which these contradictions have been removed. If we were to add anything, it might be that after the revolution production will be freed of the restraints imposed by the profit system. So far as the first contradiction goes, the working class in the United States, while not finally and forever satisfied now enjoys life in a system that gives the average worker a larger share of the benefits of production than is true in the Soviet. Marx included in his original theory of capitalism the conclusion that the rich must get richer and the poor poorer until the revolution. Under rising wage standards, and with graduated income and inheritance taxes, just the opposite has occurred.

As for the second contradiction, and the third one, both have been succeeded by the present tendency toward the granting of freedom to former colonial areas. The United States has played a small part in this for the simple reason that it has had but few colonies to turn loose. But Britain has spent a century in freeing her dominions from colonial status, and has now extended the process to India and Burma. The "imperialist powers" are loyal participants in the United Nations, where such a case as that of Indonesia can be heard and dealt with, not to immediate and total satisfaction, but at least not conforming to imperialist tradition.

The relative freedom of nations in our system or theirs is explicit in their own argument. As long as ours endures, they themselves expect wars between the capitalist nations. On their side they assume a monolithic bloc. It is clear from this that the preservation of free states by our aid, would not necessarily nor probably mean an anti-Soviet bloc, while any group under their auspices could not fail to be an alliance designed for world revolution and war.

All of this suggests the novel idea that we have evolved solutions for the causes of the revolution, that we are now postrevolutionary in character, not prerevolutionary.

An examination of the history of communism on the one hand and of the advanced nations on the other, throws additional light on this point. Communism was initially based upon observations made by Marx and Engels of the most advanced industrial nations in the midnineteenth century. It found its first practical application in Russia in 1917, a country at that time intermediate in industrial development. Lenin and Stalin have found adequate explanations for the occurrence of the revolution in Russia rather than in any of the more advanced countries. What they failed to notice was that the very ease with which they found the explanation suggested that there might be good reasons why the revolution did not come in the advanced countries. The advanced countries were in fact not so close to revolution as they had been in the time of Marx and Engels. The revolution had receded instead of approaching.

Set this against later experience in the advanced countries. In 1922 in Italy Mussolini came to power, and the Communists have ever since considered this an exhibit of the last form of capitalist resistance to the revolution. Yet even with Mussolini gone the proletarian revolution has not occurred in Italy. In 1933 Hitler came to power in Germany. In the same period Austria evolved a curious breed of government sometimes called "clerical fascism." These forms, as is now evident, were not the last stage of capitalism before the revolution. Hitler's dictatorship was far more like the Jacobin dictatorship of the French Revolution than any other counterpart. These occurrences, whatever their nature may have been, were occurrences unknown to and unaccountable for Marxism. They were events that could occur only in countries more advanced than anything Marxism could deal with. This strengthens the suggestion that the advance of economics and politics has simply passed by and beyond the conditions for which Marxism is pertinent.

The case of the United States expressed in Marxist terms would be somewhat as follows: The United States has passed through and beyond the capitalist system as described by Marxism. The contradictions of capitalism have been eliminated, or are on the way to elimination through genuine and adequate remedies. The United States is post-, not pre-revolutionary, in character.

The problem of world organization is therefore actually soluble without a further stage of revolution. "The United States of Europe" or the same thing in effect, is neither reactionary nor impossible. The rationality of freemen, self-directed, is still superior to the rationality of a rigid theory and a disciplined organization. It has solved and is solving the problems that communism holds are soluble only through and after violent revolution. The anarchy of the system of sixty-odd nation states is evolving into international cooperation. The rich are not getting richer and the poor poorer. Production is not impeded by capitalism, and the worker gets a larger share of the product in the United States than in the Soviet. It is communism which antedates in character the American Revolution, and is obsolete. The United States does not antedate the Russian Revolution, and is not obsolete. It is the United States today that represents most nearly the conditions laid down, even by the Communists, as conditions to be achieved after the revolution. Our present objective must be to fulfill this promise.

#### E. NEGATIVE COUNTERMEASURES

The first conclusion to be drawn from the strategy and tactics of world communism is that we have to do something about them. Whether the revolution is inevitable or not, their ability to disturb and disrupt is such that they might make a revolutionary smashup unavoidable. To prevent this, to make sure that there will not be another world war and a violent world revolution if it is humanly avoidable, requires that the non-Communist world have the chance to prove itself. In order to do so it must be insulated against Communist tactics. Communist action will increase the economic and social strains in non-Communist countries, and if they have free opportunity to do so there may be a catastrophe that would not have occurred without them.

In order to take protective measures we must be clear about what part of the world must be protected. A positive goal of economic



stabilization, international collaboration, and peace cannot be worked out by each nation for itself. All are dependent in large degree upon the iron necessities of material requirements. Modern industry and modern civilization cannot exist without materials that are found in no one country. The abolition of the causes of war cannot go on in each country by itself.

Certain areas must be included in the non-Communist world if that world is to try the experiment of proving that it is past the stage of world revolution. Some of these, such as the Near East must be included because they have necessary materials. The oil of the Near East is indispensable to the energy and power basis of civilization in the non-Communist world. Others must be included, because their human resources, in numbers and skills, are such that if they passed from one side to the other there would be a great increase in the Communist power to hamper the stability of our side, and a great decrease in the power of resistance on our side. Such countries as France and Italy and Germany and China must be included on this account.

This means that the area within which an experiment, to prove that war and revolution are obsolete, can be conducted with hope of success is approximately the same as the present non-Communist world.

Within this non-Communist area, the all-important measures will be the positive ones. But the positive ones cannot be carried on unless Communist sabotage and interference is fended off. In order to fend them off, the following measures are needed.

First. We must analyze communism more thoroughly than in the past, and this study of communism must not be only by specialists on the subject, but must be clearly expressed in terms that can reach the democratic peoples of the world. The fact that Communists do not believe in peace, nor in economic recovery, and that their hopes are only for chaos and dictatorship must be clearly seen by all. The fact that sincere cooperation for our goals is impossible must be put beyond dispute.

Second. We must deny the Communists any favors or special opportunities to practice their infiltration tactics. This does not mean that we must seriously modify our own constitutional system, nor that we can build an absolute Chinese wall against them, but it does mean that we must reduce their opportunities to cut or cross the wires of our system. While we should not deny them the rights of all men under our Constitution, it is hardly consistent with our security, nor required by our conception of rights, to permit them to hold positions in Government departments.

Third. Certain measures of political defense must be taken in many non-Communist countries. Ultrademocratic features, such as proportional representation and supreme power in the hands of the legislature alone, play into the hands of the Communists. The United States cannot by itself control these matters in other countries, but it can at least lend a more sympathetic and understanding support to measures for stronger democratic government, and a less sympathetic support for the ultrademocratic tactics of communism than in the past.

Fourth. Measures of economic defense are needed, by the United States and by all other non-Communist countries. These must not slide into the naive solution of barring all trade with the Soviets.

But trade with the Soviets should be placed and kept on a basis of even advantage to both sides, and an equal respect for obligations. Contracts that transfer industrial knowledge should be screened with particular care. Aid and loans to governments that have not met international obligations within the plain meaning of the words of such agreements should not be made without substantial considerations granted by the recipients. In general, the conduct of all economic relations with the Communist-controlled countries should be designed for equal benefit in all cases, and a balance of benefit to them in none.

Fifth. Our propaganda to the Communist-controlled countries should not be conducted on the defensive. We should tell them that we are more advanced than they are, that we are already postrevolutionary, that we promise peace, not war, while they can only promise war, not peace. We should emphasize every success as a success toward the fulfillment of this promise.

Sixth. We must avoid a drift into recrimination and abuse. It may be that neither side really knows what the world situation today means, that neither one can penetrate the mystery of present development. In that case war may of course be expected as a feature of life in the future as in the past. But to accept this is to accept their doctrine about us, for that is just what they believe about us. And if they are right about that we have no case against them. Our argument is that we do have a case against them. That case calls for mastery, not for drift, and recrimination is a form of drift.

Seventh. If we succeed in the only kind of project that can make positive sense, one of the accompaniments will be a new turn of Communist policy from a radical offensive drive to a moderate defensive policy. When we have brought them to such a turn we will have gained time. It must then be one of our incidental aims to keep them from ever turning back to the offensive. But that aim will be a byproduct of our positive actions, not of our negative ones.

#### F. POSITIVE COUNTERMEASURES

Former Secretary of State Byrnes uses a quotation from Lincoln at the opening of his recent book that deserves emphasis in the United States today. "If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it." We have not known clearly in recent years where we were in relation to communism, nor whither we were tending in relation to communism, and we have in consequence not known very well what to do nor how to do it.

The first and most indispensable thing we have to do is to keep our economy on an even keel, and go forward without a depression. We need not totally abolish all signs of the old "business cycle"; economic fluctuations of moderate scale can, and even should, remain a part of our system and of its superior flexibility. But if we have one more real smash it may shift the scales of power beyond repair. If we have any faith that we are right and they wrong, this is the most immediate test our faith must meet, and faith can meet it only with intelligence.

Second, we must clarify our own argument. One factor in the weakness of morale in the non-Communist world, and in the strength of morale in the Communist world, is the clarity of their ideas and the

vagueness of ours. This does not mean that we must have as neat a cut-glass theory as theirs. But that ours has been unnecessarily vague in the past has been testified by good witnesses. Winston Churchill complained during the war, in speeches to Parliament, that the policies of the United States were not as clear as seemed desirable to him. He was echoed by Senator Vandenberg in his speech to the Senate on January 10, 1945.

Yet it cannot be denied that our Government has not spoken out—to our own people or to our allies—in any such specific fashion as have the others. It cannot be denied, as a result, that too often a grave melancholy settles upon some sectors of our people.

Actually our Government has said much of what ought to be said. But it seems to take it for granted that what has been said has been said once and for all, that the Congress and the people have memories of infinite capacity. The Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan make sense as the bumper to fend off communism on the one hand, and the positive policy of assisting in creative development in the protected area on the other. Yet official statements never attempted to make this relation clear, and public discussion went on for many months on the question of whether the two were in harmony or contradiction with each other.

President Truman made three speeches in rapid succession a year ago, at Baylor University on world trade, at Mexico on inter-American relations, and in Washington when he appealed to the Congress for aid to Greece and Turkey. These three speeches might have been placed side by side as statements on three aspects of the world situation and United States policy. If that had been done the apparently negative character of the policy on Greece and Turkey would have taken on another aspect.

We have a policy toward the United Nations, a policy of hope that it can serve greatly in the mastery of the causes of war. We have a military establishment of our own, designed to guarantee that no power will find an opportunity to start a great, aggressive war with hope of victory. We have a policy on the international control of atomic energy, designed to place this control above the sovereignty of nations, and to make atomic energy a great factor in civilization instead of in war. We have a policy on world trade, designed to make increasing trade a factor in economic stability and economic progress. We have, with our near neighbors, the policy of the good neighbor designed to introduce a common means of mastering common problems, in an area where such common problems are more intense than in the world as a whole. We have followed a policy of extending loans and free gifts to countries needing aid in order to pass more quickly through the postwar adjustments of reconstruction, and in order to shorten the opportunity of communism to take advantage of their difficulties. We have a policy expressed in our adherence to the Bretton Woods agreements, on the World Monetary Fund and on the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, designed to afford means for stabilization and reconstruction to supplement the atrophied use of gold and to assist other means of credit. We have been extending the good neighbor policy in many ways to all areas of Europe and Asia that show any readiness to cooperate. There is little quarrel with most of these principles of our policy taken

singly. But the fact that they add up to make a program is almost unknown.

We have been forced by the events of the last 2 years to admit to ourselves that the Communists do not believe in the things we believe in, and cannot collaborate with us in the work of peace. This has brought us reluctantly to admit that we have ourselves a will, on our own responsibility, to safeguard the chance of the non-Communist world for peace and reconstruction. This requires, as they recognize more clearly than we do, that we also accept on our own responsibility the unavoidable position of the center of the non-Communist world, the main force, the one that must be strong if men anywhere are to be free.

In a nutshell, our objective is to prove that Lenin was wrong. He believed that there could be no solution of the faults of capitalism without violent world revolution. Lenin was not so wrong but that the faults in the existing world could generate two world wars. But the question now is the question of a third one. There are good reasons for believing that the third one need not occur, that the mastery of human affairs has reached the point where man no longer need be the passive victim of automatic forces in history.

In America today we have a freedom and a power that more and more confirm each other. This is the newest thing in the world, the first fulfillment of all the dreams of all the revolutions. It is so new that we scarcely recognize or trust it ourselves. There are those among us who deny that freedom and power can exist together, and who predict strife and conflict. The Communists, gazing through eyes covered by the horny scales of dogma cannot see it at all. In their books it belongs to the future. But there are many signs of it in the present; American equality, and American production, and even the careless generosity of American aid to Russia in her need and beyond her need.

It was laid down in our tradition as long ago as Milton that freedom would approach the goal by the shortest route. The Communists turned their backs on this, and have postponed freedom until after power, seeking to impose truth through a system before men can be trusted to seek it. They claim that the world revolution lies in the future, and that freedom lies beyond the revolution. In those terms, our faith is that the worst of the world revolution lies in the past. The time to prove how men can live is now.

Stalin once paid us a compliment, which we may try to deserve beyond the way in which he meant it. He said:

The best antidote to revolutionary fantasy is practical work imbued with the American spirit. Such businesslike, practical endeavour is an unquenchable force, one which recognizes no obstacles, one which, by sheer common sense, thrusts aside everything that might impede progress, one which invariably carries a thing once embarked upon to completion (even though the affair may seem a puny one), one without which any genuine work of construction is impossible. But the practical, businesslike American spirit is liable to degenerate into unprincipled commercialism, if it be not allied with revolutionary zeal.<sup>73</sup>

To pursue our goals with zeal but without fantasy, to be revolutionary in the sense of progress, but not in the sense of violence and turmoil, this means to accept and to use those American qualities that we have proved in the past, in which we have confidence. We have been

<sup>73</sup> Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 176.

marked by history as the only possible candidate for an important role. If we can still show the qualities of businesslike, practical endeavour and sheer common sense, with a modicum of attention to "where we are and whither we are tending," we may deserve also for this age the terms used by Milton:

Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks: methinks I see her as an eagle mewing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eye at the full midday beam, purging and unscaling her long abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance, while the whole noise of timorous and mocking birds, with those also that love the twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she means, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sects and schisms.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Milton, *Areopagitica*.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF  
WORLD COMMUNISM

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REPORT

SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 5

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

HON. FRANCES P. BOLTON, Chairman

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SUPPLEMENT I

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF COMMUNISM

1848-1948



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1948



## FOREWORD

The publication of such a collection of documents as this requires some justification. There are several reasons why it is needed.

First, though chosen quotations can pin-point the chief ideas of Communists, from Marx and Engels to Stalin and Molotov and Zhdanov, quotations cannot carry the massive impact of larger texts. Also, a modern audience is sophisticated enough to be aware of the arts of quoting short statements out of context, and this skepticism of the audience should be met by telling the whole story. The use of brief quotations in the report is, therefore, backed up by this presentation on a larger, though still moderate, scale.

Second, though there have been other collections made from the Communist classics, none of these serves the present purpose. In some cases, as that of Emile Burns' Handbook of Marxism, the selection emphasizes the economic theory of capitalism far more than is appropriate in the present case and the world-wide strategy and tactics of communism and of the Soviet Union far too little. Other collections are too narrow in range, either in the matter of the time span covered or in the subject matter selected. And no prewar collection can demonstrate that they think the same today. The items at the end of this collection do so.

Third, issues change as times change, for us no less than for the Communists. It is all too clear that only recently the United States was still ready to interpret a temporary phase of Communist tactics as a fundamental change in Communist ideas. In fact, there seems to have been, ever since the first turn-away from radicalism in 1921, a general tendency toward overoptimism in the interpretation of major changes in the Communist line. When they have turned to the right, observers have hailed it as a fundamental change. "They are going capitalist or democratic." Only when they have turned back toward the left have observers admitted that there might be something unchanging; an unchanging faith in revolution and an unchanging faith in the adaptation of a zigzag course to the turns of history. Past studies have permitted, more than they have prevented, the recurrent idea of fundamental change in communism. In this set of examples from the thought of the fathers of communism, and from its present leaders, we have tried to illustrate both what is constant and what can change in communism.

Fourth, a study designed to serve those who must act is very different from a study designed for cogitation only. The latter may navigate the seas of theory on a historical or philosophic level. The former should show not only the theory that guides the action but the way in which the theory is applied, the practical fusion of the theory with the facts of a situation, from which is derived tactics. For it is tactics that must be met, and the tactics of communism must be one basis in the design of our own tactics if ours are to be relevant.



The problem of what is constant and what is changeable in communism is one of the greatest problems we have faced. It is one object of this new compilation of Communist writings to show that this problem can be solved. It is theory, the general plan, that is constant, and only tactics that change. The report of Subcommittee No. 5 deals with this in terms of the evidence of both Communist words and Communist deeds. This collection deals with it in terms of words only, but the words themselves declare that their theory is constant and that only their tactics change and the most recent of their words do this most strongly.

They insist upon violent struggle today as Marx and Engels did a century ago. And they bring to the present phase of struggle all the carefully garnered fruits of a century of intense thought and of most practical experience. Experience is coming to us with a rush as we face the consequences of victory, and demands for action press upon us. Insofar as we have misinterpreted communism in the past, we have wasted some of our thinking; and insofar as we have wasted thought, we have a deficit to catch up. Here is something to think about.

At the close of part I of the Report on the Strategy and Tactics of World Communism several tentative conclusions were stated, as follows:

1. The Communists have one goal: World revolution.
2. They assume that the revolution will be violent.
3. They are incapable of accepting the idea that peace can endure from now on, and they expect one more catastrophic war.
4. The Soviet Union is regarded as the main force of the revolution.
5. They fear a coalition against the Soviet Union.
6. They therefore fear reconstruction or federation in the non-Communist world.
7. They utilize the most modern and effective means of cold warfare to strengthen their own forces and to weaken all others.
8. The Communist parties outside the Soviet are junior partners or auxiliaries.
9. The tactics are based upon a definite theory, and the central propositions of their theory do not change.
10. The division of Europe and Asia between the victors of World War II is to be settled by power politics and not by negotiation.

Insofar as these propositions can be proved by words written by Communists, the proof can be found in the following pages.

*Acknowledgment.*—The expert advice and assistance of Dr. Sergius Yakobson, of the staff of the Legislative Reference Service, in the selecting of the most revealing and pertinent documents was very valuable and is deeply appreciated.

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NOTE.—The magazine, *Sovietskaya Kniga* (Soviet Book), on October 1, 1947, published some statistics on past publications within the Soviet Union, including some data on items included in this supplement.

The Communist Manifesto has been published in 196 editions, totaling 6,036,000 copies, in 50 languages. This is not counting 29 editions between 1917 and 1924 for which the numbers are unknown. (All within the Soviet Union.)

Lenin's Left-Wing Communism has gone through 74 editions and 1,885,000 copies, in 30 languages.

Stalin's Foundations of Leninism has had 99 editions and 2,598,000 copies, in 47 languages.

Stalin's Letter to Comrade Ivanov has had 90 editions and 8,567,000 copies in 47 languages.

Stalin's Report to the Eighteenth Party Congress, 111 editions, 22,695,000 copies, in 68 languages.

Stalin's Speech, February 9, 1946, 246 editions, 16,574,000 copies, in 57 languages.



# NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

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## 1. THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO

NOTE.—The Manifesto was written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and published in Germany in February 1848. It is the first of all the basic documents of communism in all respects. The one most central idea is that of violent revolution. The basis of revolution lies in the class struggle. The existing system of society is the capitalist system, and the class struggle under capitalism is a struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeois class. These are the central ideas of Marxism, to which all later additions are merely elaborations. At the same time it is interesting to examine the list of concrete demands, of which an income tax, a national central banking system, and universal education are in effect in most countries long since, and many of the others in at least some countries outside the Soviet or its satellites.

(By Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels)

[Authorized English translation, edited and annotated by Friedrich Engels]

### PREFACE

The “Manifesto” was published as the platform of the “Communist League,” a workingmen’s association, first exclusively German, later an international, and, under the political conditions of the Continent before 1848, unavoidably a secret society. At a Congress of the League, held in London in November, 1847, Marx and Engels were commissioned to prepare for publication a complete theoretical and practical party-program. Drawn up in German, in January, 1848, the manuscript was sent to the printer in London a few weeks before the French revolution of February 24th. A French translation was brought out in Paris, shortly before the insurrection of June, 1848. The first English translation, by Miss Helen Macfarlane, appeared in George Julian Harney’s “Red Republican,” London, 1850. A Danish and a Polish edition had also been published.

The defeat of the Parisian insurrection of June, 1848—the first great battle between Proletariat and Bourgeoisie—drove again into the background, for a time, the social and political aspirations of the European working class. Thenceforth, the struggle for supremacy was again, as it had been before the revolution of February, solely between different sections of the propertied class; the working class was reduced to a fight for political elbow-room, and to the position of extreme wing of the middle-class Radicals. Wherever independent proletarian movements continued to show signs of life, they were ruthlessly hunted down. Thus the Prussian police hunted out the Central Board of the Communist League, then located in Cologne. The members were arrested, and, after eighteen months’ imprisonment, they were tried in October, 1852. This celebrated “Cologne Communist trial” lasted from October 4th till November

12th; seven of the prisoners were sentenced to terms of imprisonment in a fortress, varying from three to six years. Immediately after the sentence the League was formally dissolved by the remaining members. As to the "Manifesto," it seemed thenceforth to be doomed to oblivion.

When the European working class had recovered sufficient strength for another attack on the ruling classes, the International Working Men's Association sprang up. But this association, formed with the express aim of welding into one body the whole militant proletariat of Europe and America, could not at once proclaim the principles laid down in the "Manifesto." The International was bound to have a program broad enough to be acceptable to the English Trades' Unions, to the followers of the Proudhon in France, Belgium, Italy and Spain, and to the Lassalleans<sup>1</sup> in Germany. Marx, who drew up this program to the satisfaction of all parties, entirely trusted to the intellectual development of the working-class, which was sure to result from combined action and mutual discussion. The very events and vicissitudes of the struggle against Capital, the defeats even more than the victories, could not help bringing home to men's minds the insufficiency of their various favorite nostrums, and preparing the way for a more complete insight into the true conditions of working-class emancipation. And Marx was right. The International, on its breaking up in 1874, left the workers quite different men from what it had found them in 1864. Proudhonism in France, Lasalleanism in Germany were dying out, and even the Conservative English Trades' Unions, though most of them had long since severed their connection with the International, were gradually advancing towards that point at which, last year at Swansea, their president could say in their name, "Continental Socialism has lost its terrors for us." In fact, the principles of the "Manifesto" had made considerable headway among the working men of all countries.

The Manifesto itself thus came to the front again. The German text had been, since 1850, reprinted several times in Switzerland, England and America. In 1872, it was translated into English in New York, where the translation was published in "Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly." From this English version, a French one was made in "Le Socialiste" of New York. Since then at least two more English translations, more or less mutilated, have been brought out in America, and one of them has been reprinted in England. The first Russian translation, made by Bakounine, was published at Herzen's "Kolokol" office in Geneva, about 1863; a second one, by the heroic Vera Zasulitch, also in Geneva, 1882. A new Danish edition is to be found in "Socialdemokratisk Bibliothek," Copenhagen, 1885; a fresh French translation in "Le Socialiste," Paris, 1886. From this latter a Spanish version was prepared and published in Madrid, 1886. The German reprints are not to be counted; there have been twelve altogether, at the least. An Armenian translation, which was to be published in Constantinople some months ago, did not see the light, I am told, because the publisher was afraid of bringing out a book with the name of Marx on it, while the translator declined to call it his own pro-

<sup>1</sup> Lassalle personally, to us, always acknowledged himself to be a disciple of Marx, and, as such, stood on the ground of the "Manifesto." But in his public agitation, 1860-64, he did not go beyond demanding cooperative workshops supported by State credit.

duction. Of further translation into other languages I have heard, but have not seen them. Thus the history of the Manifesto reflects, to a great extent, the history of the modern working-class movement; at present it is undoubtedly the most widespread, the most international production of all Socialist literature, the common platform acknowledged by millions of working men from Siberia to California.

Yet, when it was written, we could not have called it a Socialist Manifesto. By Socialists, in 1847, were understood, on the one hand, the adherents of the various Utopian systems: Owenites in England, Fourierists in France, both of them already reduced to the position of mere sects, and gradually dying out; on the other hand, the most multifarious social quacks, who, by all manners of tinkering, professed to redress, without any danger to capital and profit, all sorts of social grievances; in both cases men outside the working class movement, and looking rather to the "educated" classes for support. Whatever portion of the working class had become convinced of the insufficiency of mere political revolutions, and had proclaimed the necessity of a total social change, that portion, then, called itself Communist. It was a crude, rough-hewn, purely instinctive sort of Communism; still, it touched the cardinal point and was powerful enough amongst the working class to produce the Utopian Communism, in France, of Cabet, and in Germany, of Weitling. Thus, Socialism was, in 1847, a middle-class movement, Communism a working class movement. Socialism was, on the Continent at least, "respectable"; Communism was the very opposite. And as our notion, from the very beginning, was that "the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself," there could be no doubt as to which of the two names we must take. Moreover, we have, ever since, been far from repudiating it.

The "Manifesto" being our joint production, I consider myself bound to state that the fundamental proposition which forms its nucleus, belongs to Marx. That proposition is: that in every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch; that consequently the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution of primitive tribal society, holding land in common ownership) has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes; that the history of these class struggles forms a series of evolution in which, now-a-days, a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class—the proletariat—cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class—the bourgeoisie—without, at the same time, and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class-distinctions and class struggles.

This proposition which, in my opinion, is destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology, we, both of us, had been gradually approaching for some years before 1845. How far I had independently progressed towards it, is best shown by my "Condition of the Working Class in England."<sup>2</sup> But when I again met Marx

<sup>2</sup> The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844. By Friedrich Engels, Translated by Florence R. Wischniewetzky—London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.

at Brussels, in spring, 1845, he had it already worked out, and put it before me, in terms almost as clear as those in which I have stated it here.

From our joint preface to the German edition of 1872, I quote the following:

"However much the state of things may have altered during the last 25 years, the general principles laid down in this Manifesto, are, on the whole, as correct today as ever. Here and there some detail might be improved. The practical application of the principles will depend, as the manifesto itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of Modern Industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organization of the working-class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this program has in some details become antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz, that "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made State machinery, and wield it for its own purposes." (See "The Civil War in France; Address of the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association," London, Truelove, 1871, p. 15; and Chicago, Charles H. Kerr & Co., where this point is further developed.) Further, it is self-evident, that the criticism of socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also, that the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition-parties (Section IV.), although in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties here enumerated, "But then, the Manifesto has become a historical document which we have no longer any right to alter."

The present translation is by Mr. Samuel Moore, the translator of the greater portion of Marx's "Capital." We have revised it in common, and I have added a few notes explanatory of historical allusions.

FRIEDRICH ENGELS

LONDON, *30th January, 1888.*

## MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

By Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre; Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.

Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as communistic by its opponents in power? Where the Opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of Communism, against

the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?

Two things result from this fact.

I. Communism is already acknowledged by all European Powers to be itself a Power.

II. It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with a Manifesto of the party itself.

To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London, and sketched the following Manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.

### I. BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIANS <sup>3</sup>

The history of all hitherto existing society <sup>4</sup> is the history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master† and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the middle ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.

The modern bourgeois Society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society, has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.

Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature; it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.

From the serfs of the middle ages sprang the chartered burghers of the earliest towns. From these burgesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie were developed.

<sup>3</sup> By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern Capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage-labor. By proletariat, the class of modern wage-laborers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor power in order to live.

<sup>4</sup> That is, all written history in 1847, the pre-history of society, the social organization existing previous to recorded history, was all but unknown. Since then, Haxthausen discovered common ownership of land in Russia, Maurer proved it to be the social foundation from which all Teutonic races started in history, and by and by village communities were found to be, or to have been, the primitive form of society everywhere from India to Ireland. The inner organization of this primitive Communistic society was laid bare, in its typical form, by Morgan's crowning discovery of the true nature of the gens and its relation to the tribe. With the dissolution of these primeval communities society begins to be differentiated into separate and finally antagonistic classes. I have attempted to retrace this process of dissolution in "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the States." (Chicago, Charles H. Kerr & Co.)

†Guild-master, that is a full member of a guild, a master within, not a head of, a guild.



The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East Indian and Chinese markets, the colonization of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development.

The feudal system of industry, under which industrial production was monopolized by closed guilds, now no longer sufficed for the growing wants of the new markets. The manufacturing system took its place. The guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle-class; division of labor between the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of division of labor in each single workshop.

Meantime the markets kept ever growing, the demand, ever rising. Even manufacture no longer sufficed. Thereupon, steam and machinery revolutionized industrial production. The place of manufacture was taken by the giant, Modern Industry, the place of the industrial middle-class, by industrial millionaires, the leaders of whole industrial armies, the modern bourgeois.

Modern industry has established the world-market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development, has, in its turn reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages.

We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange.

Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class. An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing association in the mediaeval commune,<sup>1</sup> here independent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany), there taxable "third estate" of the monarchy (as in France), afterwards, in the period of manufacture proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility, and, in fact, corner stone of the great monarchies in general, the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world-market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." It has

<sup>1</sup> "Commune" was the name taken, in France, by the nascent towns even before they had conquered from their feudal lords and masters, local self-government and political rights as "the Third Estate." Generally speaking, for the economical development of the bourgeoisie, England is here taken as the typical country, for its political development. *Englische Geschichte*

drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honored and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-laborers.

The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.

The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of vigor in the Middle Ages, which Reactionists so much admire, found its fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades.

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become

common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures there arises a world-literature.

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i. e., to become bourgeois themselves. In a word, it creates a world after its own image.

The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.

The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralized means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralization. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments, and systems of taxation, became lumped together in one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier and one customs-tariff.

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?

We see then: the means of production and of exchange on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organization of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to burst asunder; they were burst asunder.

Into their places stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economical and political sway of the bourgeois class.

A similar movement is going on before our own eyes. Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer

able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on its trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity—the epidemic of over-production. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation, had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented.

The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.

But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons—the modern working-class—the proletarians.

In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i. e., capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working-class, developed, a class of laborers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labor increases capital. These laborers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.

Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labor, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack that is required of him. Hence, the cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he requires for his maintenance, and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a commodity, and also of labor, is equal to its cost of production. In proportion, therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage decreases. Nay more, in proportion as the use of machinery and division of labor

increases, in the same proportion the burden of toil also increases, whether by prolongation of the working hours, by increase of the work enacted in a given time, or by increased speed of the machinery, etc.

Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of laborers, crowded into the factories, are organized like soldiers. As private of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they the slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State, they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the over-looker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.

The less the skill and exertion or strength implied in manual labor, in other words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the labor of men superseded by that of women. Differences of age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are instruments of labor, more or less expensive to use, according to their age and sex.

No sooner is the exploitation of the laborer by the manufacturer, so far at an end, that he receives his wages in cash, than he is set upon by the other portions of the bourgeoisie, the landlord, the shopkeeper, the pawnbroker, etc.

The lower strata of the middle class—the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants—all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialized skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production. Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.

The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins to struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual laborers, then by the workpeople of a factory, then by the operatives of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploits them. They direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labor, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages.

At this stage the laborers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition. If anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the consequence of their own active union, but of the union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in order to attain its own political ends, is compelled to set the whole proletariat in motion, and is moreover yet, for a time, able to do so. At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie. Thus the whole historical movement is

concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.

But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number, it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalized, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labor, and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level. The growing competition among the bourgeois, and the resulting commercial crises, makes the wages of the workers ever more fluctuating. The unceasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more and more precarious; the collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations (Trades' Unions) against the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there the contest breaks out into riots.

Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry, and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years.

This organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself. Thus the ten-hour bill in England was carried.

Altogether collisions between the classes of the old society further, in many ways, the course of development of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a constant battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, whose interests have become antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all times, with the bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all these battles it sees itself compelled to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for its help, and thus, to drag it into the political arena. The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat with its own elements of political and general education, in other words, it furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie.

Further, as we have already seen, entire sections of the ruling classes are, by the advance of industry, precipitated into the proletariat, are at least threatened in their conditions of existence. These also supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress.

Finally, in times when the class-struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact, within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movements as a whole.

Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.

The lower middle-class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are, therefore, not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so, only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat, they thus defend not their present, but their future interests, they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat.

The "dangerous class," the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.

In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already virtually swamped. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois family-relations; modern industrial labor, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.

All the preceding classes that got the upper hand, sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation. They have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.

All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air.

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.

In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie, lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.

Hitherto, every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under the yoke of feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern laborer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an over-riding law. It is unfit to rule, because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.

The essential condition for the existence, and for the sway of the bourgeois class, is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage-labor. Wage-labor rests exclusively on competition between the laborers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the laborers, due to competition, by their involuntary combination, due to association. The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

## II. PROLETARIANS AND COMMUNISTS

In what relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians as a whole?

The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties.

They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.

They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement.

The Communists are distinguished from the other working class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat independently of all



nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.

The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.

The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all the other proletarian parties; formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, a conquest of political power by the proletariat.

The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer.

They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes. The abolition of existing property relations is not at all a distinctive feature of Communism.

All property relations in the past have continually been subject to historical change consequent upon the change in historical conditions.

The French Revolution, for example, abolished feudal property in favor of bourgeois property.

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonism, on the exploitation of the many by the few.

In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.

We Communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man's own labor, which property is alleged to be the ground work of all personal freedom, activity and independence.

Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property! Do you mean the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it daily.

Or do you mean modern bourgeois private property?

But does wage-labor create any property for the laborer? Not a bit. It creates capital, i. e., that kind of property which exploits wage-labor, and which cannot increase except upon condition of getting a new supply of wage-labor for fresh exploitation. Property, in its present form, is based on the antagonism of capital and wage-labor. Let us examine both sides of this antagonism.

To be a capitalist, is to have not only a purely personal, but a social status in production. Capital is a collective product, and only

by the united action of many members, nay, in the last resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion.

Capital is therefore not a personal, it is a social power.

When, therefore, capital is converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby transformed into social property. It is only the social character of the property that is changed. It loses its class-character.

Let us now take wage-labor.

The average price of wage-labor is the minimum wage, i. e., that quantum of the means of subsistence, which is absolutely requisite to keep the laborer in bare existence as a laborer. What, therefore, the wage-laborer appropriates by means of his labor, merely suffices to prolong and reproduce a bare existence. We by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the products of labor, an appropriation that is made for the maintenance and reproduction of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to command the labor of others. All that we want to do away with is the miserable character of *this* appropriation, under which the laborer lives merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so far as the interest of the ruling class requires it.

In bourgeois society, living labor is but a means to increase accumulated labor. In Communist society, accumulated labor is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the laborer.

In bourgeois society, therefore, the past dominates the present; in Communist society, the present dominates the past. In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality.

And the abolition of this state of things is called by the bourgeois, abolition of individuality and freedom! And rightly so. The abolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois freedom is undoubtedly aimed at.

By freedom is meant, under the present bourgeois conditions of production, free trade, free selling and buying.

But if selling and buying disappears, free selling and buying disappears also. This talk about free selling and buying, and all the other "brave words" of our bourgeoisie about freedom in general have a meaning, if any, only in contrast with restricted selling and buying, with the fettered traders of the Middle Ages, but have no meaning when opposed to the Communistic abolition of buying and selling, of the bourgeois conditions of production, and of the bourgeoisie itself.

You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is, the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society.

In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend.

From the moment when labor can no longer be converted into capital, money, or rent, into a social power capable of being monopo-

lized, i. e., from the moment when individual property can no longer be transformed into bourgeois property, into capital, from that moment, you say, individuality vanishes.

You must, therefore, confess that by "individual" you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property. This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and made impossible.

Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society: all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labor of others by means of such appropriation.

It has been objected, that upon the abolition of private property all work will cease, and universal laziness will overtake us.

According to this, bourgeois society ought long ago to have gone to the dogs through sheer idleness; for those of its members who work, acquire nothing, and those who acquire anything, do not work. The whole of this objection is but another expression of the tautology: that there can no longer be any wage-labor when there is no longer any capital.

All objections urged against the Communistic mode of producing and appropriating material products, have, in the same way, been urged against the Communistic modes of producing and appropriating intellectual products. Just as, to the bourgeois, the disappearance of class property is the disappearance of production itself, so the disappearance of class culture is to him identical with the disappearance of all culture.

That culture, the loss of which he laments, is, for the enormous majority, a mere training to act as a machine.

But don't wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois property, the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom, culture, law, etc. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class, made into a law for all, a will, whose essential character and direction are determined by the economic conditions of existence of your class.

The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property—historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production—this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.

Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.

On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.

The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital.

Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? To this crime we plead guilty.

But, you will say, we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we replace home education by social.

And your education! Is not that also social, and determined by the social conditions under which you educate, by the intervention, direct or indirect, of society by means of schools, etc.? The Communists have not invented the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the character of that intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class.

The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-relation of parent and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labor.

But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams the whole bourgeoisie in chorus.

The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion, than that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women.

He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production.

For the rest, nothing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of our bourgeois at the community of women which, they pretend, is to be openly and officially established by the Communists. The Communists have no need to introduce community of women; it has existed almost from time immemorial.

Our bourgeois, not content with having the wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each others' wives.

Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the Communists might possibly be reproached with, is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalized community of women. For the rest, it is self-evident, that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from that system, i. e., of prostitution both public and private.

The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationalities.

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

National differences, and antagonisms between peoples, are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilized countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the

nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.

The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical, and generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination.

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views, and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?

What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes in character in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.

When people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the fact, that within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.

When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the 18th century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death-battle with the then revolutionary bourgeoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience, merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.

"Undoubtedly," it will be said, "religious, moral, philosophical and juridical ideas have been modified in the course of historical development. But religion, morality, philosophy, political science, and law, constantly survived this change."

"There are besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of society. But Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience."

What does this accusation reduce itself to? The history of all past society has consisted in the development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs.

But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms.

The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property-relations; no wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas.

But let us have done with the bourgeois objections to Communism.

We have seen above, that the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.

The proletariat will use its political supremacy, to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i. e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.

Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production.

These measures will of course be different in different countries.

Nevertheless in the most advanced countries the following will be pretty generally applicable:

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of waste lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal liability of all to labor. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of population over the country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labor in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc., etc.

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms, and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

### III. SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST LITERATURE

#### 1. REACTIONARY SOCIALISM

##### (a) *Feudal Socialism*

Owing to their historical position, it became the vocation of the aristocracies of France and England to write pamphlets against modern bourgeois society. In the French revolution of July, 1830,

and in the English reform agitation, these aristocracies again succumbed to the hateful upstart. Thenceforth, a serious political contest was altogether out of the question. A literary battle alone remained possible. But even in the domain of literature the old cries of the restoration period<sup>6</sup> had become impossible.

In order to arouse sympathy, the aristocracy were obliged to lose sight, apparently, of their own interests, and to formulate their indictment against the bourgeoisie in the interest of the exploited working class alone. Thus the aristocracy took their revenge by singing lampoons on their new master, and whispering in his ears sinister prophecies of coming catastrophe.

In this way arose feudal socialism; half lamentation, half lampoon; half each of the past, half menace of the future; at times, by its bitter, witty and incisive criticism, striking the bourgeoisie to the very hearts' core, but always ludicrous in its effect, through total incapacity to comprehend the march of modern history.

The aristocracy, in order to rally the people to them, waved the proletarian alms-bag in front for a banner. But the people, so often as it joined them, saw on their hindquarters the old feudal coats of arms, and deserted with loud and irreverent laughter.

One section of the French Legitimists, and "Young England," exhibited this spectacle.

In pointing out that their mode of exploitation was different to that of the bourgeoisie, the feudalists forget that they exploited under circumstances and conditions that were quite different, and that are now antiquated. In showing that, under their rule, the modern proletariat never existed, they forget that the modern bourgeoisie is the necessary offspring of their own form of society.

For the rest, so little do they conceal the reactionary character of their criticism, that their chief accusation against the bourgeoisie amounts to this, that under the bourgeois regime a class is being developed, which is destined to cut up root and branch the old order of society.

What they upbraid the bourgeoisie with is not so much that it creates a proletariat, as that it creates a revolutionary proletariat.

In political practice, therefore, they join in all coercive measures against the working-class; and in ordinary life, despite their high falutin phrases, they stoop to pick up the golden apples dropped from the tree of industry, and to barter truth, love, and honor for traffic in wool, beetroot-sugar and potato spirits.<sup>7</sup>

As the parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord, so has Clerical Socialism with Feudal Socialism.

Nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a Socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaimed against private property, against marriage, against the State? Has it not preached in the place of these, charity and poverty, celibacy, and mortification of the flesh, monastic life and Mother Church? Christian Socialism is but the Holy Water with which the priest consecrates the heartburnings of the aristocrat.

<sup>6</sup> Not the English Restoration 1660 to 1689, but the French Restoration 1814 to 1830.

<sup>7</sup> This applies chiefly to Germany where the landed aristocracy and squires have large portions of their estates cultivated for their own account by stewards, and are, moreover, extensive beetroot-sugar manufacturers and distillers of potato spirits. The wealthier British aristocracy are, as yet, rather above that; but they, too, know how to make up for declining rents by lending their names to floaters of more or less shady joint-stock companies.

(b) *Petty Bourgeois Socialism*

The feudal aristocracy was not the only class that was ruined by the bourgeoisie, not the only class whose conditions of existence pined and perished in the atmosphere of modern bourgeois society. The medieval burgesses and the small peasant bourgeoisie, were the precursors of the modern bourgeoisie. In those countries which are but little developed, industrially and commercially, these two classes still vegetate side by side with the rising bourgeoisie.

In countries where modern civilization has become fully developed, a new class of petty bourgeois has been formed, fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society. The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced, in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.

In countries like France, where the peasants constitute far more than half of the population, it was natural that writers who sided with the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, should use, in their criticism of the bourgeoisie regime, the standard of the peasant and petty bourgeois, and from the standpoint of these intermediate classes should take up the cudgels for the working-class. Thus arose petty bourgeois Socialism. Sismondi was the head of this school, not only in France, but also in England.

This school of Socialism dissected with great acuteness the contradictions in the conditions of modern production. It laid bare the hypocritical apologies of economists. It proved, incontrovertibly, the disastrous effects of machinery and division of labor; the concentration of capital and land in a few hands; overproduction and crises; it pointed out the inevitable ruin of the petty bourgeois and peasant, the misery of the proletariat, the anarchy in production, the crying inequalities in the distribution of wealth, the industrial war of extermination between nations, the dissolution of old moral bonds, of the old family relations, of the old nationalities.

In its positive aims, however, this form of Socialism aspires either to restoring the old means of production and of exchange, and with them the old property relations, and the old society, or to cramping the modern means of production and of exchange, within the frame work of the old property relations that have been, and were bound to be, exploded by those means. In either case, it is both reactionary and Utopian.

Its last words are: corporate guilds for manufacture; patriarchal relations in agriculture.

Ultimately, when stubborn historical facts had dispersed all intoxicating effects of self-deception, this form of Socialism ended in a miserable fit of the blues.

*German or "True" Socialism*

The Socialist and Communist literature of France, a literature that originated under the pressure of a bourgeoisie in power, and that was



the expression of the struggle against this power, was introduced into Germany at a time when the bourgeoisie, in that country, had just begun its contest with feudal absolutism.

German philosophers, would-be philosophers, and beaux esprits, eagerly seized on this literature, only forgetting, that when these writings immigrated from France into Germany, French social condition had not immigrated along with them. In contact with German social conditions, this French literature lost all its immediate practical significance, and assumed a purely literary aspect. Thus, to the German philosophers of the Eighteenth Century, the demands of the first French Revolution were nothing more than the demands of "Practical Reason" in general, and the utterance of the will of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie signified in their eyes the laws of pure Will, of Will as it was bound to be, of true human Will generally.

The work of the German literati consisted solely in bringing the new French ideas into harmony with their ancient philosophical conscience, or rather, in annexing the French ideas without deserting their own philosophic point of view.

This annexation took place in the same way in which a foreign language is appropriated, namely, by translation.

It is well known now the monks wrote silly lives of Catholic Saints over the manuscripts on which the classical works of ancient heathendom had been written. The German literati reversed this process with the profane French literature. They wrote their philosophical nonsense beneath the French original. For instance, beneath the Fourth criticism of the economic functions of money, they wrote "Alienation of Humanity," and beneath the French criticism of the bourgeois State they wrote, "Dethronement of the Category of the General," and so forth.

The introduction of these philosophical phrases at the back of the French historical criticisms they dubbed "Philosophy of Action," "True Socialism," "German Science of Socialism," "Philosophical Foundation of Socialism," and so on.

The French Socialist and Communist literature was thus completely emasculated. And, since it ceased in the hands of the German to express the struggle of one class with the other, he felt conscious of having overcome "French one-sidedness" and of representing, not true requirements, but the requirements of Truth, not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests of Human Nature, of Man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, who exists only in the misty realm of philosophical phantasy.

This German Socialism, which took its schoolboy task so seriously and solemnly, and extolled its poor stock-in-trade in such mountebank fashion, meanwhile gradually lost its pedantic innocence.

The fight of the German, and, especially, of the Prussian bourgeoisie, against feudal aristocracy and absolutely monarchy, in other words, the liberal movement, became more earnest.

By this, the long-wished-for opportunity was offered to "True Socialism" of confronting the political movement with the socialist demands, of hurling the traditional anathemas against liberalism, against representative government, against bourgeois competition, bourgeois freedom of the press, bourgeois legislation, bourgeois liberty and equality, and of preaching to the masses that they had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by this bourgeois movement. German Socialism

forgot, in the nick of time, that the French criticism, whose silly echo it was, presupposed the existence of modern bourgeois society, with its corresponding economic conditions of existence, and the political constitution adapted thereto, the very things whose attainment was the object of the pending struggle in Germany.

To the absolute governments, with their following of parsons, professors, country squires and officials, it served as a welcome scarecrow against the threatening bourgeoisie.

It was a sweet finish after the bitter pills of floggings and bullets, with which these same governments, just at that time, dosed the German working-class risings.

While this "True" Socialism thus served the governments as a weapon for fighting the German bourgeoisie, it, at the same time, directly represented a reactionary interest, the interest of the German Philistines. In Germany the petty bourgeois class, a relic of the 16th century, and since then constantly cropping up again under various forms, is the real social basis of the existing state of things.

To preserve this class, is to preserve the existing state of things in Germany. The industrial and political supremacy of the bourgeoisie threatens it with certain destruction; on the one hand, from the concentration of capital; on the other, from the rise of a revolutionary proletariat. "True" Socialism appeared to kill these two birds with one stone. It spread like an epidemic.

The robe of speculative cobwebs, embroidered with flowers of rhetoric, steeped in the dew of sickly sentiment, this transcendental robe in which the German Socialists wrapped their sorry "eternal truths," all skin and bone, served to wonderfully increase the sale of their goods amongst such a public.

And on its part, German Socialism recognized, more and more, its own calling as the bombastic representative of the petty bourgeois Philistine.

It proclaimed the German nation to be the model nation, and the German petty Philistine to be the typical man. To every villainous meanness of this model man it gave a hidden, higher, socialistic interpretation, the exact contrary of its true character. It went to the extreme length of directly opposing the "brutally destructive" tendency of Communism, and of proclaiming its supreme and impartial contempt of all class struggles. With very few exceptions, all the so-called Socialist and Communist publications that now (1847) circulate in Germany belong to the domain of this foul and enervating literature.

## 2. CONSERVATIVE OR BOURGEOIS SOCIALISM

A part of the bourgeoisie is desirous of redressing social grievances, in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeoisie society.

To this section belong economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the condition of the work class, organizers of charity, members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance fanatics, hole and corner reformers of every imaginable kind. This form of Socialism has, moreover, been worked out into complete systems.

We may cite Proudhon's "*Philosophie de la Misère*" as an example of this form.

The socialistic bourgeois want all the advantages of modern social conditions without the struggles and dangers necessarily resulting therefrom. They desire the existing state of society minus its revolutionary and disintegrating elements. They wish for a bourgeoisie without a proletariat. The bourgeoisie naturally conceives the world in which it is supreme to be the best; and bourgeois socialism develops this comfortable conception into various more or less complete systems. In requiring the proletariat to carry out such a system, and thereby to march straightway into the social New Jerusalem, it but requires in reality, that the proletariat should remain within the bounds of existing society, but should cast away all its hateful ideas concerning the bourgeoisie.

A second and more practical, but less systematic, form of this socialism sought to depreciate every revolutionary movement in the eyes of the working class, by showing that no mere political reform, but only a change in the material conditions of existence, in economical relations, could be of any advantage to them. By changes in the material conditions of existence, this form of Socialism, however, by no means understands abolition of the bourgeois relations of production, an abolition that can be effected only by a revolution, but administrative reforms, based on the continued existence of these relations; reforms, therefore, that in no respect affect the relations between capital and labor, but, at the best, lessen the cost, and simplify the administrative work, of bourgeois government.

Bourgeois Socialism attains adequate expression, when, and only when, it becomes a mere figure of speech.

Free trade: for the benefit of the working class. Protective duties: for the benefit of the working class. Prison reform: for the benefit of the working class. This is the last word and the only seriously meant word of bourgeois Socialism.

It is summed up in the phrase: the bourgeois is a bourgeois—for the benefit of the working class.

### 8. CRITICAL-UTOPIAN SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM

We do not here refer to that literature which, in every great modern revolution, has always given voice to the demands of the proletariat: such as the writings of Babeuf and others.

The first direct attempts of the proletariat to attain its own ends were made in times of universal excitement, when feudal society was being overthrown. These attempts necessarily failed, owing to the then undeveloped state of the proletariat, as well as to the absence of the economic conditions for its emancipation, conditions that had yet to be produced, and could be produced by the impending bourgeois epoch alone. The revolutionary literature that accompanied these first movements of the proletariat had necessarily a reactionary character. It inculcated universal asceticism and social leveling in its crudest form.

The Socialist and Communist systems properly so-called, those of St. Simon, Fourier, Owen and others, spring into existence in the early undeveloped period, described above, of the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie (see section I. Bourgeoisie and Proletariat).

The founders of these systems see, indeed, the class antagonisms, as well as the action of the decomposing elements in the prevailing form

of society. But the proletariat, as yet in its infancy, offers to them the spectacle of a class without any historical initiative or any independent political movement.

Since the development of class antagonism keeps even pace with the development of industry, the economic situation, as they find it, does not as yet offer to them the material conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. They therefore search after a new social science, after new social laws, that are to create these conditions.

Historical action is to yield to their personal inventive action, historically created conditions of emancipation to fantastic ones, and the gradual, spontaneous class-organization of the proletariat to an organization of society specially contrived by these inventors. Future history resolves itself, in their eyes, into the propaganda and the practical carrying out of their social plans.

In the formation of their plans they are conscious of caring chiefly for the interests of the working-class, as being the most suffering class. Only from the point of view of being the most suffering class does the proletariat exist for them.

The undeveloped state of the class struggle, as well as their own surroundings, cause Socialists of this kind to consider themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every member of society, even that of the most favored. Hence, they habitually appeal to society at large, without distinction of class; nay, by preference, to the ruling class. For how can people, when once they understand their system, fail to see in it the best possible plan of the best possible state of society?

Hence, they reject all political, and especially all revolutionary action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavor, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social Gospel.

Such fantastic pictures of future society, painted at a time when the proletariat is still in a very undeveloped state, and has but a fantastic conception of its own position, correspond with the first instinctive yearnings of that class for a general reconstruction of society.

But these Socialist and Communist publications contain also a critical element. They attack every principle of existing society. Hence they are full of the most valuable materials for the enlightenment of the working class. The practical measures proposed in them, such as the abolition of the distinction between town and country, of the family, of the carrying on of industries for the account of private individuals, and of the wage system, the proclamation of social harmony, the conversion of the functions of the State into a mere superintendence of production, all these proposals point solely to the disappearance of class-antagonisms which were, at that time, only just cropping up, and which, in these publications, are recognized under their earliest, indistinct and undefined forms only. These proposals, therefore, are of a purely Utopian character.

The significance of Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism bears an inverse relation to historical development. In proportion as the modern class struggle develops and takes definite shape, this fantastic standing apart from the contest, these fantastic attacks on it lose all practical value and all theoretical justification. Therefore,

although the originators of these systems were, in many respects, revolutionary, their disciples have, in every case, formed mere reactionary sects. They hold fast by the original views of their masters, in opposition to the progressive historical development of the proletariat. They, therefore, endeavor and that consistently, to deaden the class struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms. They still dream of experimental realization of their social Utopias, of founding isolated "phalanstères," of establishing "Home Colonies," of setting up a "Little Icaria"<sup>8</sup>—duodecimo editions of the New Jerusalem, and to realize all these castles in the air, they are compelled to appeal to the feelings and purses of the bourgeois. By degrees they sink into the category of the reactionary conservative Socialists depicted above, differing from these only by more systematic pedantry, and by their fanatical and superstitious belief in the miraculous effects of their social science.

They, therefore, violently oppose all political action on the part of the working class; such action, according to them, can only result from blind unbelief in the new Gospel.

The Owenites in England, and the Fourierists in France, respectively, oppose the Chartists and the "Reformistes."

#### IV. POSITION OF THE COMMUNISTS IN RELATION TO THE VARIOUS EXISTING OPPOSITION PARTIES

Section II has made clear the relations of the Communists to the existing working class parties, such as the Chartists in England and the Agrarian Reformers in America.

The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement. In France the Communists ally themselves with the Social-Democrats,<sup>9</sup> against the conservative and radical bourgeoisie, reserving, however, the right to take up a critical position in regard to phrases and illusions traditionally handed down from the great Revolution.

In Switzerland they support the Radicals, without losing sight of the fact that this party consists of antagonistic elements, partly of Democratic Socialists, in the French sense, partly of radical bourgeois.

In Poland they support the party that insists on an agrarian revolution, as the prime condition for national emancipation, that party which fomented the insurrection of Cracow in 1846.

In Germany they fight with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie.

But they never cease, for a single instant, to instill into the working class the clearest possible recognition of the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, in order that the German workers may straightway use, as so many weapons against the bourgeoisie, the

<sup>8</sup> Phalanstères were socialist colonies on the plan of Charles Fourier. Icaria was the name given by Cabot to his Utopia and, later on, to his American Communist colony.

<sup>9</sup> The party then represented in parliament by Ledru-Rollin, in literature by Louis Blanc, in the daily press by the Reforme. The name of Social Democracy signified, with these its inventors, a section of the Democratic or Republican party more or less tinged with Socialism.

social and political conditions that the bourgeoisie must necessarily introduce along with its supremacy, and in order that, after the fall of the reactionary classes in Germany, the fight against the bourgeoisie itself may immediately begin.

The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution, that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilization, and with a more developed proletariat, than that of England was in the seventeenth, and of France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution.

In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things.

In all these movements they bring to the front, as the leading question in each, the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the time.

Finally, they labor everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries.

The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

Working men of all countries, unite!

## 2. THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE SLOGAN

NOTE.—This short piece by Lenin is of particular interest at the present time. The communist insistence that reform cannot really solve fundamental problems is applied directly to the problem of Europe. The statement that a union of Europe under capitalism can only be reactionary foreshadows the rejection by the Soviet of the European recovery program in 1947.

No. 40 of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* carried the information that the conference of the sections of our party situated abroad had decided to postpone the question of the "United States of Europe" slogan pending a press discussion of the *economic* side of the question.

The debate on this question at our conference assumed a one-sided political character. This was partly due to the fact that the manifesto of the Central Committee directly formulated this slogan as a political one ("the nearest *political* slogan," etc.). The document emphasised not only a republican United States of Europe, but it especially mentioned that "without a revolutionary overthrow of the German, Austrian, and Russian monarchies" this slogan is senseless and false.

To argue against such an approach to the question while remaining entirely in the field of political analysis, for instance, to argue that this slogan obstructs or weakens the slogan of a Socialist revolution, is entirely erroneous. Political changes of a truly democratic nature, especially political revolutions, can in no case and under no circumstances either obstruct or weaken the slogan of a Socialist revolution. On the contrary, they always make it nearer, they widen the basis for it, they draw into the Socialist struggle ever new strata of

the petty bourgeoisie and the semi-proletarian masses. On the other hand, political revolutions are inevitable in the course of a Socialist revolution, which must not be looked upon as one single act, but must be considered as an epoch, a number of stormy political and economic upheavals, a most sharpened class struggle, civil war, revolutions and counter-revolutions.

But if the United States of Europe slogan, conceived in connection with a revolutionary overthrow of the three most reactionary monarchies of Europe, headed by Russia, is entirely impregnable as a political slogan, there still remains the most important question of its economic content and meaning. From the point of view of the economic conditions of imperialism, *i. e.*, capital export and division of the world between the "progressive" and "civilised" colonial powers, the United States of Europe under capitalism is either impossible or reactionary.

Capital has become international and monopolistic. The world has been divided among a handful of great powers, *i. e.*, powers successful in great plunder and in oppression of nations. The four great powers of Europe, England, France, Russia, and Germany, with a population of 250 to 300,000,000, with an area of about 7,000,000 square kilometres, possesses colonies numbering almost *half a billion* (494 to 500,000,000 inhabitants) with an area of 64,600,000 square kilometres, *i. e.*, almost half of the globe's surface (153,000,000 square kilometres, barring the Polar region). Add the three Asiatic states, China, Turkey, and Persia, which are now torn to pieces by the plunderers waging a war for "freedom," namely, Japan, Russia, England, and France. In those three Asiatic states, which may be called semi-colonial (in reality they are nine-tenths colonies), there are 360,000,000 inhabitants, and their area is 14,500,000 square kilometres (almost one and one-half times the area of the whole of Europe).

Further, England, France and Germany have invested abroad no less than 70,000,000,000 rubles. To receive a "lawful" little profit from this pleasant sum, a profit exceeding 3,000,000,000 rubles annually, there are in existence the millionaires' national committees called governments, equipped with armies and navies, "placing" in the colonies and semi-colonies the sons and brothers of "Mr. Billion" in the capacity of viceroys, consuls, ambassadors, all kinds of officers, priests and other leeches.

This is how, in the epoch of the highest capitalist development, the plundering of almost a billion of the earth's population by a handful of great powers is organised. No other organisation is possible under capitalism. To give up colonies, "spheres of influence," export of capital? To think so is to come down to the level of a little minister who preaches to the rich every Sunday about the greatness of Christianity, advising them to give to the poor, if not several billions, at least several hundred rubles yearly.

A United States of Europe under capitalism means an agreement as to the division of colonies. Under capitalism, however, only force is possible as the basis, the principle of division. A billionaire cannot share the "national income" of a capitalist country with any one other-wise than in proportion to the capital invested (with an extra bonus in addition, so that the largest capital may receive more than its due).

Capitalism is private property in the means of production, and anarchy of production. To preach a "just" division of income on such a basis is Proudhonism, is thick-headed philistinism. One cannot divide the income otherwise than in proportion to power; and power changes in the course of economic development. Germany, after 1871, grew in power three or four times faster than England and France; Japan, about ten times faster than Russia. To test the real power of a capitalist state, there is, and there can be, no other way than war. War is no contradiction to the foundations of private property—on the contrary, it is a direct and inevitable development of those foundations. Under capitalism, equal economic progress of the individual concerns, or individual states, is impossible. Under capitalism, no other means for periodically re-establishing destroyed equilibrium are possible outside of crises in industry or of war in politics.

Of course, *temporary* agreements between capitalists and powers are possible. In this sense the United States of Europe as the result of an agreement between the *European* capitalists is possible, but what kind of an agreement would that be? An agreement jointly to suppress Socialism in Europe, jointly to guard colonial booty against Japan and America, which feel slighted by the present division of colonies, and which, for the last half century, have grown infinitely faster than backward monarchist Europe, beginning to rot with age. In comparison with the United States of America, Europe as a whole signifies economic stagnation. On the present-day economic basis, *i. e.*, under capitalism, the United States of Europe would mean an organisation of reaction for thwarting the more rapid development of America. The days when the cause of democracy and Socialism was associated with Europe alone have passed forever.

The United States of the World (not of Europe alone) is a state form of national unification and freedom which we connect with Socialism; we think of it as becoming a reality only when the full victory of Communism will have brought about the total disappearance of any state, including its democratic form. As a separate slogan, however, the United States of the World would hardly be a correct one, first, because it coincides with Socialism, second, because it could be erroneously interpreted to mean that the victory of Socialism in one country is impossible; it could also create misconceptions as to the relations of such a country to others.

Unequal economic and political development is an indispensable law of capitalism. It follows that the victory of Socialism is, at the beginning, possible in a few capitalist countries, even in one, taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised Socialist production at home, would rise against the rest of the capitalist world, attracting the oppressed classes of other countries, raising among them revolts against the capitalists, launching, in case of necessity, armed forces against the exploiting classes and their states. The political form of a society in which the proletariat is victorious, in which it has overthrown the bourgeoisie, will be a democratic republic, centralising ever more the forces of the proletariat of a given nation or nations in the struggle against the states that have not yet gone over to Socialism. It is impossible to annihilate classes without a dictatorship of the oppressed class, the proletariat. It is impossible freely to unite the nations in



Socialism without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the Socialist republics against the other states.

It is due to such considerations resulting from repeated debates at the conference of the sections of the R. S.-D. L. P. situated abroad and after, that the editors of the Central Organ came to the conclusion that the United States of Europe slogan is incorrect.

(*Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 44, August 23, 1915.)

### 3. THESES ON THE CONCLUSION OF A SEPARATE PEACE

NOTE.—In January 1918 the Soviet Government was only 2 or 3 months old and was faced by the prospect of civil war and German invasion. The German terms were hard, and the question of accepting them or continuing the fight was a nearly impossible one until the Germans applied persuasion by advancing. When the question was still at issue Lenin laid down his own views in the piece here reprinted. The revolution must be the first consideration; the interests of socialism are more important than the self-determination of nations. The problem is not which of two imperialist groups should be helped but solely "the best way to help a Socialist Revolution in one country."

(The translation here used was prepared for the use of the committee by Mrs. Rowan Shevlin, of Washington, D. C.)

1. At the present moment the development of the Russian Revolution is such that there is no doubt that nearly all the workers and a vast majority of the peasants are supporting Soviet Power—the success of the Soviet Revolution in Russia is guaranteed up to that point.

2. At the same time, the civil war begun by the mad resistance of the propertied classes who know that it is the last and decisive battle for the conservation of private property, land and the means of production, has not yet reached the climax. The victory of Soviet power in this war is guaranteed.

However, it is unavoidable that it will take time, that many forces will have to be used, and that there will be an acute period of disorder and chaos, which accompany every war, and especially a civil war, before the opposition of the bourgeoisie is crushed.

3. This opposition, in its less active and non-military forms, is sabotage, bribery of knaves and agents of the bourgeoisie, who infiltrate the socialist columns for the purpose of destroying the socialist cause. This resistance is so stubborn and versatile that the struggle will inevitably continue for some time, and probably will not cease before several more months. But without a final victory over the passive and hidden opposition of the bourgeoisie and their supporters, the Socialist Revolution will not be a success.

4. The goals for reorganizing the socialistic reconstruction of Russia are so great and difficult of achievement that it will take much time to accomplish them.

The small bourgeois fellow-travelers and the lack of culture in the socialist proletariat will make these aims particularly difficult.

5. Because of all these different circumstances, the success of socialism in Russia requires time. Not less than several months in which the Soviet Government must have complete liberty of movement. The victory over the bourgeoisie must commence in our own country. Complete mass organization must follow.

6. The Soviet power to decide international problems must determine the position of the Socialist Revolution in Russia. Due to the

international situation, it cannot be discounted that any of the imperialist powers, including Germany, may explode into revolution in which the governments will fall. There is no doubt that the Socialist Revolution in Europe must and will take place. All our hopes for the final socialist victory are based upon this conclusion and upon scientific prediction.

Our propaganda must be strengthened and enlarged, and especially the organization of brotherhoods. But it would, however, be a tactical mistake should the Russian Government estimate when the European, or especially the German, revolution will take place. It might be in six months or it might be never. As it is impossible to foresee events, any estimate would be a blind gamble.

7. As the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk have shown, up to the present date (January 20, 1918), the military party in the German Government controls the other governments in the Quadruple Alliance; this military party has practically imposed an ultimatum on Russia, the official and formal presentation of which can be expected any day. The ultimatum will offer the choice of continuing the war or making peace, granting Germany some of our land. The Germans will keep all the territory occupied by them and will require us to contribute three billion rubles; such payment to be made over a period of several years and under the guise of payment for the maintenance of our prisoners of war.

8. There is a decision that the Socialist Government of Russia cannot postpone. Will we accept a peace with capitulations, or immediately commence a revolutionary war? It is impossible to steer a middle course. We cannot further delay. We have already done the utmost, both the possible and the impossible, to postpone the negotiations.

9. In examining the arguments for an immediate revolutionary war, we find first of all that a separate peace would be a direct agreement with the German imperialists (an imperialistic bargain); therefore, such a peace would be in complete disagreement with the fundamental principles of a proletarian International.

However, this argument is incorrect. Workers who lose in a strike against capitalists are no traitors to socialism. The traitors are those who exchange the gains of the workers for the gains of the capitalists. Such a situation is inadvisable.

Those who say that they are making a just and defensive war against German imperialism, but who are also receiving help from the Anglo-French imperialists, doing this secretly from the people, are the real traitors to socialism. Should we sign a disadvantageous peace with the imperialistic powers of one group, because we are at present too weak to continue the war, this in itself does not make us traitors to socialism.

10. Another argument for the continuation of the war is that by signing a peace we become agents of German imperialism, as we would allow them to move troops from our front and liberate millions of German prisoners. But this reasoning is obviously incorrect, as by waging a revolutionary war at this time, we would become agents of the Anglo-French imperialists by helping their objectives. The English have offered to pay our Commander-in-Chief Krylenko 100 rubles a month for each soldier, if we continue to fight the war. Even though

we do not accept a kopeck from the Anglo-French, we would still be helping them by keeping German troops on our front.

In both cases we are caught in the imperialist web, and we will never escape from it unless we overthrow the imperialistic system. It is useless for us to choose between two imperialistic systems. We must look only for the conditions which afford the development of the Socialist Revolution, which has already begun. In other words, the principle of our tactics must not be the choice between two imperialisms, but the best way to help a Socialist Revolution in one country, until all the other countries join it too.

11. The German Social Democrats, who are opposed to war and have become defeatists, ask us not to yield to German imperialists. But we recognize the spirit of defeat only in our imperialistic bourgeoisie. We have always rejected the thought of the victory of imperialism, even when we are allied with friendly imperialistic countries.

If the Left German Social Democrats would ask us to put off making a separate peace for a specified time, also guaranteeing a revolution in Germany, then it would be a different question. But the German Left not only does not ask that of us, but tells us "stay where you are and make your decisions according to the progress of the Russian Socialist Revolution, as we can promise you no positive developments in Germany".

12. It is said that we promised a revolutionary war in our party platform, and the signing of a separate peace would be going back on our word. This is untrue. We spoke of the necessity to prepare for and lead a revolutionary war for socialist governments in the epoch of imperialism. We said that we must fight pacifism. We must fight the idea of "defense of the fatherland". We must remember that many of our soldiers are tired of war. We never committed ourselves to wage a revolutionary war without being able to choose the right moment. We must prepare for a revolutionary war. We will keep this promise as we have kept all the other promises that we were capable of keeping. We tore up secret treaties. We offered all people a just peace. We stopped all peace negotiations in order to give others time to join us.

But the question of whether today we can lead a revolutionary war should be decided only by practical facts in the interest of furthering the revolution.

13. Bringing together all these factors, we must come to the conclusion that while in theory it sounds bright and promising to wage a revolutionary war, the condition of the classes and material supplies as they are now make such a war impracticable.

14. There is no doubt that for weeks to come and probably months, our army will not be in condition to fight the Germans, the reasons being, first, extreme fatigue of the men and the complete break-down of lines of communication; second, the fact that our horses are in bad condition and we would lose our artillery and third, that we are incapable of defending the coastline from Riga to Reval, which gives the enemy a great opportunity to take Latvia and Estonia, flanking most of our troops from the rear, and thus enabling them to take Petrograd.

15. The peasants in our army favor peace with capitulation and are against a revolutionary war. We have just begun the socialist

reorganization of the army, and are only now incorporating within it the Red Guards.

We cannot lead into war a democratic army that does not want war. The creation of a stable idealistic socialist worker peasant army will require many months.

16. The poorer of the Russian peasants are able to help the Socialist Revolution, which is led by the working class, but it is incapable of making war at this moment. It would be a fatal mistake to ignore the divergent views of these classes.

17. To sum up the question, should the German revolution begin and succeed in the next three or four months, then an immediate war would not ruin our Socialist Revolution; if, on the other hand, the German revolution does not occur, the Germans will force Russia to make a harder peace and the peace will not be made with us but with a block including the bourgeois Ukrainians or with the Cossacks or some other combination. The Peasant Army, discouraged by the first defeat, would then overthrow the Socialist Government of Workers.

18. We cannot stake our future on a German revolution. It would be too great a risk to act in this manner.

19. Our separate peace will not stop a possible German revolution. The war with England and America will continue for a long time, and the aggressive imperialism of both sides will be disclosed.

The living example of the Socialist Soviet Republic in Russia will stand out before the peoples of the world, and the propaganda it inspires will be gigantic.

On one side a capitalist society fighting among themselves like two groups of gangsters—on the other side, peace and the Socialist Republic of the Soviets.

20. Let the others fight between themselves. We will make a separate peace and use this time strengthening the revolution. The reorganization of Russia through the dictatorship of the proletariat will mean the nationalization of banks and industry, and barter between towns and small peasant communities. If we have several months of peace this reorganization will make socialism invincible in Russia and the entire world. This also will create a firm foundation for a powerful Red Army.

21. The only true revolutionary war at the present moment would be a war against all capitalist countries. It would have to be approved by all socialist armies wishing to overthrow capitalism in other countries. We cannot do this now. We would have to fight for the liberation of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Every Marxist, if he is not a renegade, must put the interests of socialism above the right of nations to self-determination. Our Socialist Republic has done what it could for the self-determination of Finland, the Ukraine, and other countries. Nevertheless, if the situation demands a choice between the existence of the Socialist Republic, which is being endangered, and the right of self-determination of several nations, it is clear that the conservation of the Socialist Republic is predominant.

Therefore, the man who says "we cannot sign a shameful peace and betray Poland" does not know that in making such a peace and liberating Poland, it would be furthering German imperialism against England, Belgium, Serbia and other countries. A Peace for the purpose of freeing Poland, Lithuania and Latvia would be a "patriotic"

peace from Russia's point of view. But this would not cease to be a peace with the annexionist German imperialists.

(Written January 20, 1918. Printed in Issue No. 34 "PRAVDA."  
Signed: N. Lenin.)

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#### 4. LEFT-WING COMMUNISM, AN INFANTILE DISORDER

NOTE.—This ranks as one of the most vigorous of Lenin's works. Communists had been troubled by the problem of whether or not to accept elective office in "bourgeois" parliaments, and whether or not to work in and through non-Communist organizations, especially labor unions. Lenin settled the issue. It has been elementary ever since then for Communists to work through non-Communist organizations in all possible ways. This is the major basis of tactics in all non-Communist countries. Lenin also demonstrates here again, as in his Theses on the Conclusion of a Separate Peace, the pragmatic judgment that anything that favors the revolution is correct, that the revolutionary end is the test that justifies all means.

Only half of the sections are reprinted here, covering the international significance of the Russian Revolution, work in trade-unions, work in bourgeois parliaments, compromises in general, and the conclusions. The other parts have been omitted as of less interest.

#### A POPULAR ESSAY IN MARXIAN STRATEGY AND TACTICS

##### 1. IN WHAT SENSE CAN WE SPEAK OF THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION?

The first months after the conquest of political power by the proletariat in Russia (November 7 [October 25], 1917) might make it appear that the tremendous difference between backward Russia and the advanced countries of western Europe will cause the proletarian revolution in these latter countries to have very little resemblance to ours. Now we already have very considerable international experience which very definitely establishes the fact that some of the fundamental features of our revolution have a significance which is not local, not peculiarly national, not Russian only, but international. I speak here of international significance not in the broad sense of the term: not a few, but all fundamental and many secondary features of our revolution are of international significance in regard to the influence it has upon all countries. I speak of it in the narrowest sense, *i. e.*, by international significance I mean the international validity, or the historical inevitability of a repetition on an international scale of what has taken place here, and it must be admitted that some of the fundamental features of our revolution possess such significance.

Of course, it would be a very great mistake to exaggerate this truth and to apply it to more than some of the fundamental features of our revolution. It would also be a mistake to lose sight of the fact that after the victory of the proletarian revolution in at least one of the advanced countries, things, in all probability, will take a sharp turn, *viz.*, soon after that Russia will cease to be the model country and once again become a backward (in the "Soviet" and in the Socialist sense) country.

But at the present historical moment the situation is precisely that the Russian model reveals to *all* countries something that is very essential in their near and inevitable future. The advanced workers in every land have long understood this; most often they did not so

much understand it as grasp it, sense it, by their revolutionary class instinct. Herein lies the international "significance" (in the narrow sense of the word) of the Soviet power, as well as of the fundamentals of Bolshevik theory and tactics. This the "revolutionary" leaders of the Second International, such as Kautsky in Germany and Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler in Austria, failed to understand, thereby exposing themselves as reactionaries and advocates of the worst kind of opportunism and social treachery. Incidentally, the anonymous pamphlet, *The World Revolution (Weltrevolution)*, which appeared in 1919 in Vienna (*Sozialistische Bücherei*, Heft II; Ignaz Brand<sup>10</sup>), reveals particularly clearly their whole process of thought, their circle of ideas or, what is more correct, the whole depth of their stupidity, pedantry, baseness and betrayal of working class interests—and all this under the guise of "defending" the idea of "world revolution."

But we shall have to discuss this pamphlet in greater detail some other time. Here we shall note only one more point: Long, long ago, when Kautsky was still a Marxist and not a renegade, he, in approaching the question as a historian, foresaw the possibility of a situation arising in which the revolutionary spirit of the Russian proletariat would serve as a model for Western Europe. This was in 1902, when Kautsky wrote an article entitled "The Slavs and Revolution," for the revolutionary newspaper *Iskra*. In this article he wrote as follows:

"At the present time" (unlike the year 1848) "it may be assumed that not only have the Slavs entered the ranks of the revolutionary peoples, but also that the centre of gravity of revolutionary thought and revolutionary action is shifting ever more and more toward the Slavs. The revolutionary centre is shifting from the West to the East. In the first half of the nineteenth century it was in France, at times in England. In 1848 Germany entered the ranks of revolutionary nations. . . . The new century opens with events that induce us to think that we are approaching a further shifting of the revolutionary centre, namely, to Russia. . . . Russia, which has imbibed so much revolutionary initiative from the West, is now perhaps herself ready to serve as a source of revolutionary energy for the latter. The Russian revolutionary movement, which is now flaring up, will prove, perhaps, to be the most potent means for driving out that spirit of flabby philistinism and sober politics which is beginning to spread in our ranks; it will cause the lust for battle and passionate devotion to our great ideals to flare up in bright flames again. Russia has long ceased to be merely a bulwark of reaction and absolutism in Western Europe. Now, perhaps, the very opposite is the case. Western Europe is becoming the bulwark of reaction and absolutism in Russia. . . . Perhaps the Russian revolutionaries would have settled with the tsar long ago, had they not been compelled to fight simultaneously also against his ally, European capital. Let us hope that this time they will succeed in settling with both enemies, and that the new 'Holy Alliance' will collapse more quickly than its predecessors. But, however the present struggle in Russia may end, the blood and suffering of the martyrs whom it is creating, unfortunately in too great numbers, will not have been in vain. They will nourish the shoots of social upheaval throughout the entire civilised world and cause their more rapid and luxuriant growth. In 1848 the Slavs were a biting frost which blighted the flowers of the peoples' spring. Perhaps now they are destined to be the storm that will break the ice of reaction and will unrestrainedly bring the peoples a new, happy spring." (Karl Kautsky, "The Slavs and Revolution," *Iskra*, Russian Social-Democratic revolutionary newspaper, No. 18, March 10, 1902.)

How well Karl Kautsky wrote eighteen years ago!

#### VI. SHOULD REVOLUTIONARIES WORK IN REACTIONARY TRADE UNIONS?

The German "Lefts" consider the reply to this question to be decidedly in the negative so far as they are concerned. In their opinion,

<sup>10</sup> Ignaz Brand, Socialist Publishers, Vol II.—Ed.

declamations and angry ejaculations (as uttered by K. Horner in a particularly "weighty" and particularly stupid manner) against "reactionary" and "counter-revolutionary" trade unions are sufficient to "prove" that it is unnecessary and even impermissible for revolutionaries and Communists to work in yellow, social-chauvinist, compromising, Legien, counter-revolutionary trade unions.

But however strongly the German "Lefts" may be convinced of the revolutionariness of such tactics, these tactics are in fact fundamentally wrong, and contain nothing but empty phrases.

In order to make this clear, I shall begin with our own experience—in conformity with the general plan of the present essay, the object of which is to apply to Western Europe whatever is of general application, general validity and is generally binding in the history and the present tactics of Bolshevism.

The correlation: leaders—Party—class—masses, as well as the relation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its Party to the trade unions, now present themselves concretely in Russia in the following form: the dictatorship is exercised by the proletariat, which is organised in the Soviets and is led by the Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which, according to the data of the last Party Congress (April 1920), has 611,000 members. Membership fluctuated considerably both before and after the October Revolution, and even in 1918 and 1919 it was considerably less than it is now. We are afraid of an excessive growth of the Party, as careerists and charlatans, who deserve only to be shot, inevitably strive to attach themselves to the ruling party. The last time we opened wide the doors of the Party—for workers and peasants only—was in the days (winter 1919) when Yudenich was a few versts from Petrograd, and Denikin was in Orel (about 350 versts from Moscow), that is, when the Soviet Republic was in desperate, mortal danger, and when adventurers, careerists, charlatans and unreliable persons in general could not possibly count on making a profitable career (they had more reason to expect the gallows and torture) by joining the Communists. The Party, which holds annual congresses (the last on the basis of one delegate for each 1,000 members), is directed by a Central Committee of nineteen elected at the congress, while the current work in Moscow has to be carried on by still smaller bodies, viz., the so-called "Orgburo" (Organisation Bureau) and "Politburo" (Political Bureau), which are elected at plenary sessions of the Central Committee, five members of the Central Committee in each bureau. This, then, looks like a real "oligarchy." Not a single important political or organisational question is decided by any state institution in our republic without the guiding instructions of the Central Committee of the Party.

In its work the Party relies directly on the *trade unions*, which, at present, according to the data of the last Congress (April 1920), have over 4,000,000 members, and which, formally, are *non-Party*. Actually, all the controlling bodies of the overwhelming majority of the unions, and primarily, of course, the all-Russian general trade union centre or bureau (All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions) consist of Communists and carry out all the instructions of the Party. Thus, on the whole, we have a formally non-Communist, flexible, relatively wide, and very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the Party

is closely linked up with the *class* and with the *masses*, and by means of which, under the leadership of the Party, the *dictatorship of the class* is effected. Without close contact with the trade unions, without their hearty support and self-sacrificing work, not only in economic, *but also in military* construction, it would, of course, have been impossible for use to govern the country and to maintain the dictatorship for two months, let alone two years. Of course, in practice, this close contact calls for very complicated and diversified work in the form of propaganda, agitation, timely and frequent conferences, not only with the leading, but also with influential trade union workers general; it calls for a determined struggle against the Mensheviks, who still have a certain, though very small, number of adherents, whom they teach all possible counter-revolutionary tricks, from the ideological defense of (*bourgeois*) democracy and the preaching of the "independence" of the trade unions (independent of the proletarian state!) to the sabotaging of proletarian discipline, etc., etc.

We consider that contact with the "masses" through trade unions is not enough. Our practical experience during the course of the revolution has given rise to *non-Party workers' and peasants' conferences*, and we strive by every means to support, develop and extend these institutions in order to be able to watch the mood of the masses, to come closer to them, to respond to their requirements, to promote the best of their workers to state posts, etc. In a recent decree on the transformation of the People's Commissariat for State Control into the "Workers' and Peasants' Inspection," non-Party conferences of this kind are granted the right to elect members to the State Control to undertake various investigations, etc.

Then, of course, all the work of the Party is carried on through the Soviets, which unite the toiling masses irrespective of occupation. The *wyезд* congresses of Soviets are institutions that are *more democratic* than any in the best democratic republics of the bourgeois world; and through these congresses (the proceedings of which are followed by the Party with the closest attention) as well as by continuously sending class-conscious workers to various posts in the rural districts, the role of the proletariat as leader of the peasantry is fulfilled, the dictatorship of the urban proletariat is effected and a systematic struggle against the rich, bourgeois, exploiting and profiteering peasantry is waged.

Such is the general mechanism of the proletarian state power viewed "from above," from the standpoint of the practical carrying out of the dictatorship. It is to be hoped that the reader will understand why, to a Russian Bolshevik well acquainted with this mechanism and who for twenty-five years has watched its growth from small, illegal, underground circles, all talk about "from above" or "from below," about the dictatorship of leaders or the dictatorship of the masses, cannot but appear to be ridiculous, childish nonsense, something like discussing whether the left leg or the right arm is more useful to a man.

And we cannot but consider the ponderous, very learned, and frightfully revolutionary disquisitions of the German Lefts on why Communists cannot and should not work in reactionary trade unions, why it is permissible to refuse to do such work, why it is necessary to leave the trade unions and to create in their stead brand-new, clean



little "workers' unions," invented by exceedingly nice (and, for the most part, probably, very youthful) Communists, etc., etc., to be equally ridiculous and childish nonsense.

Capitalism inevitably leaves to Socialism a heritage of old trade and craft distinctions among the workers, distinctions created in the course of centuries; and it leaves trade unions which only very slowly and in the course of years can, and will, develop into broader, industrial unions, which will have much less of the craft union about them (they will embrace whole industries and not merely crafts, trades and occupations). Later, these industrial unions will, in their turn, lead to the abolition of division of labour among people, to the education, training and preparation of people who will have *versatile development, and versatile training, people who will be able to do everything*. Communism is marching, much march, towards this goal; and *it will reach it*, but only after very many years. To attempt in practice, today, to anticipate this future result of a fully developed, fully stabilised and formed, fully expanded and mature Communism would be like trying to teach higher mathematics to a four-year-old child.

We can (and must) begin to build Socialism, not with the fantastic human material especially created by our imagination, but with the material bequeathed to us by capitalism. This, no doubt, is very "difficult," but no other approach to this task is serious enough to deserve discussion.

Trade unions represented enormous progress for the working class at the beginning of the development of capitalism as the transition from the disunity and helplessness of the workers to the *rudiments* of class organisation. When the *highest* form of proletarian class organisation began to arise, *viz.*, the *revolutionary party of the proletariat* (which does not deserve the name until it learns to bind the leaders with the class and with the masses into one single indissoluble whole), the trade unions inevitably began to reveal *certain* reactionary traits, a certain craft narrowness, a certain tendency toward becoming non-political, a certain inertness, etc. But the development of the proletariat did not, and could not, anywhere in the world, proceed otherwise than through the trade unions, through their interaction with the party of the working class. The conquest of political power by the proletariat is a gigantic step forward for the proletariat as a class, and the Party must more than ever, and in a new way, not merely in the old way, educate and guide the trade unions; at the same time it must not forget that they are and will long remain a necessary "school of Communism," a preparatory school for training the proletarians to exercise their dictatorship, an indispensable organisation of the workers for gradually transferring the management of the whole economy of the country to the hands of the working *class* (and not of the separate trades), and later to the hands of all the toilers.

A *certain* amount of "reactionariness" in the trade unions, in the sense mentioned, is *inevitable* under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Not to understand this means utterly failing to understand the fundamental conditions of the *transition* from capitalism to Socialism. To fear *this* "reactionariness," to try to *avoid* it, or skip it, is the greatest folly, for it means fearing to assume the role of proletarian vanguard, which implies training, educating, enlightening, and draw-

ing into the new life the most backward strata and masses of the working class and the peasantry. On the other hand, to postpone the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat until such time as not a single worker with narrow craft interests, not a single worker with craft and craft-union prejudices is left, would be a still greater mistake. The art of politics (and the Communist's correct understanding of his tasks) lies in correctly gauging the conditions and the moment when the vanguard of the proletariat can successfully seize power, when it will be able, during and after this seizure of power, to obtain adequate support from sufficiently broad strata of the working class and of the non-proletarian toiling masses, and when, thereafter, it will be able to maintain, consolidate and extend its rule, educating, training and attracting ever broader masses of the toilers.

Further: In countries which are more advanced than Russia, a certain amount of reactionariness in the trade unions has been revealed, and was undoubtedly bound to be revealed much more strongly than in our country. Our Mensheviks found (and in a very few trade unions still find to some extent) support in the trade unions precisely because of the latter's craft narrowness, craft selfishness and opportunism. In the West, the Mensheviks have acquired a much firmer "footing" in the trade unions. There, the *craft-union, narrow-minded, selfish, hard-hearted, covetous and petty-bourgeois "labour aristocracy," imperialistically-minded, bribed and corrupted by imperialism,* represents a much stronger stratum than in our country. This is incontestable. The struggle against the Gomperses, against Messrs. Jouhaux, Henderson, Merrheim, Legien and Co. in Western Europe is much more difficult than the struggle against our Mensheviks, who represent an *absolutely homogeneous* social and political type. This struggle must be waged ruthlessly to the very end, as we have waged it, until all the incorrigible leaders of opportunism and social-chauvinism have been completely discredited and expelled from the trade unions. It is impossible to capture political power (and the attempt to capture it should not be made) until this struggle has reached a *certain* stage. Moreover, this "certain stage" *will be different in different countries and in different circumstances*; it can be correctly gauged only by thoughtful, experienced and well-informed political leaders of the proletariat in each separate country. (In Russia, the measure of success in the struggle was gauged, among other things, by the elections to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917, a few days after the proletarian revolution of November 7 [October 25], 1917. In these elections the Mensheviks were utterly defeated; they obtained 700,000 votes—1,400,000 if the vote of Transcaucasia be added—as against 9,000,000 votes obtained by the Bolsheviks. See my article, "The Elections to the Constituent Assembly and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," in No. 7-8 of *The Communist International*.)<sup>11</sup>

But we wage the struggle against the "labour aristocracy" in the name of the masses of the workers and in order to attract them to our side; we wage the struggle against the opportunist and social-chauvinist leaders in order to attract the working class to our side. To forget this most elementary and self-evident truth would be stupid. But the German "Left" Communists are guilty of just this stupidity when, *because* of the reactionary and counterrevolutionary character of the

<sup>11</sup> See *Selected Works*, Vol. VI.—Ed.

*heads* of the trade unions, they jump to the conclusion that . . . it is necessary to leave the trade unions!! to refuse to work in them!! to create new, *artificial* forms of labour organisations!! This is an unpardonable blunder equivalent to the greatest service the Communists could render the bourgeoisie. Our Menshevik, like all opportunist, social-chauvinist, Kautskian trade union leaders, are nothing more nor less than "agents of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement" (as we have always characterised the Mensheviks), or "labour lieutenants of the capitalist class" (to use the excellent and profoundly true expression of the followers of Daniel DeLeon in America). To refuse to work in the reactionary trade unions means leaving the insufficiently developed or backward masses of the workers under the influence of the reactionary leaders, the agents of the bourgeoisie, the labour aristocrats, or the "completely bourgeois workers." (See Engels' letter to Marx, written in 1852, concerning the British workers.)<sup>12</sup>

It is just this absurd "theory" that Communists must not belong to reactionary trade unions that demonstrates most clearly how frivolously the "Left" Communists regard the question of influencing "the masses," how they misuse their outcries about "the masses." In order to be able to help "the masses" and to win the sympathy, confidence and support of "the masses," it is necessary to brave all difficulties and to be unafraid of the pinpricks, obstacles, insults and persecution of the "leaders" (who, being opportunists and social-chauvinists, are, in most cases, directly or indirectly connected with the bourgeoisie and the police); and it is imperatively necessary to *work wherever the masses are to be found*. Every sacrifice must be made, the greatest obstacles must be overcome, in order to carry on agitation and propaganda systematically, perseveringly, persistently and patiently, precisely in those institutions, societies and associations—even the most reactionary—to which proletarian or semi-proletarian masses belong. And the trade unions and workers' co-operatives (the latter, at least sometimes) are precisely the organisations in which the masses are to be found. In England, according to figures quoted in the Swedish paper, *Folkets Dagblad Politiken* of March 10, 1920, the membership of the trade unions increased from 5,500,000 at the end of 1917 to 6,600,000 at the end of 1918, *i. e.*, an increase of 19 per cent. At the end of 1919 the membership was estimated at 7,500,000. I have not at hand the corresponding figures for France and Germany, but the facts testifying to the rapid growth in membership of the trade unions in these countries as well are absolutely incontestable and generally known.

These facts very clearly indicate what is confirmed by thousands of other symptoms: the growth of class-consciousness and of the desire for organisation precisely among the proletarian masses, among the "rank and file," among the backward elements. Millions of workers in England, France and Germany are *for the first time* passing from complete lack of organisation to the elementary, lowest, most simple, and (for those still thoroughly imbued with bourgeois-democratic prejudices) most easily accessible form of organisation, namely, the trade unions. And the revolutionary, but foolish, Left Communists stand by, shouting "the masses, the masses!"—and *refuse to work within the trade unions!!* refuse on the pretext that they are "reactionary"!! and invent

<sup>12</sup> *The Correspondence of Marx and Engels*, p. 60.—Ed. Eng. ed.

a brand-new, clean little "workers' union," guiltless of bourgeois-democratic prejudices, innocent of craft or narrow craft-union sins, and which they claim will be (will be!) a wide organisation, and the only (only!) condition of membership of which will be "recognition of the Soviet system and the dictatorship"!! (See passage quoted above.)

Greater stupidity and greater damage to the revolution than that caused by the "Left" revolutionaries cannot be imagined! If in Russia today, after two and a half years of unprecedented victories over the bourgeoisie of Russia and the Entente, we were to make the "recognition of the dictatorship" a condition of membership of the trade unions, we should be doing a stupid thing, we would damage our influence over the masses, we would be helping the Mensheviks. For the whole task of the Communists is to be able to *convince* the backward elements, to be able to work *among* them, and not to *fence themselves off* from them by artificial and childish "Left" slogans.

There can be no doubt that Messieurs the Gomperses, Hendersons, Jouhaux, and Legiens are very grateful to such "Left" revolutionaries, who, like the German opposition "on principle" (heaven preserve us from such "principles"! ) or like some revolutionaries in the American Industrial Workers of the World, advocate leaving the reactionary trade unions and refusing to work in them. Undoubtedly, Messieurs the "leaders" of opportunism will resort to every trick of bourgeois diplomacy, to the aid of bourgeois governments, the priests, the police and the courts, in order to prevent Communists from getting into the trade unions, to force them out by every means, to make their work in the trade unions as unpleasant as possible, to insult, to bait and to persecute them. It is necessary to be able to withstand all this, to agree to any and every sacrifice, and even—if need be—to resort to all sorts of stratagems, manœuvres and illegal methods, to evasion and subterfuges in order to penetrate the trade unions, to remain in them, and to carry on Communist work in them at all costs. Under tsarism, until 1905, we had no "legal possibilities"; but when Zubatov, the secret service agent, organised Black Hundred workers' assemblies and workingmen's societies for the purpose of trapping revolutionaries and combating them, we sent members of our Party to these assemblies and into these societies. (I personally remember one such comrade, Babushkin, a prominent St. Petersburg workingman, who was shot by the tsar's generals in 1906.) They established contacts with the masses, managed to carry on their agitation, and succeeded in wresting the workers from the influence of Zubatov's agents.<sup>13</sup> Of course, in Western Europe, which is particularly saturated with inveterate legalist, constitutionalist, bourgeois-democratic prejudices, it is more difficult to carry on such work. But it can and must be carried on, and carried on systematically.

The Executive Committee of the Third International must, in my opinion, positively condemn, and call upon the next congress of the Communist International to condemn, the policy of refusing to join reactionary trade unions in general (stating in detail why this refusal to join is unreasonable, and pointing out the extreme harm it does to

<sup>13</sup> The Gomperses, Hendersons, Jouhaux and Legiens are nothing but Zubatovs, differing from our Zubatov only in their European dress, in their outer polish, in their civilised, refined, democratically sleek manner of conducting their despicable policy.

the cause of the proletarian revolution) and, in particular, the line of conduct of several members of the Dutch Communist Party, who either directly or indirectly, openly or covertly, wholly or partly, supported this erroneous policy. The Third International must break with the tactics of the Second International; it must not evade or cover up sore points, but put them bluntly. The whole truth has been put squarely to the "Independents" (Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany); the whole truth must likewise be put squarely to the "Left" Communists.

#### VII. SHOULD WE PARTICIPATE IN BOURGEOIS PARLIAMENTS?

The German "Left" Communists, very contemptuously, and very frivolously, reply to this question in the negative. Their arguments? In the passage quoted above we read:

... To reject most emphatically ... all reversion to parliamentary forms of struggle, which have become historically and politically obsolete ...

This is said with absurd pretentiousness, and is obviously incorrect. "Reversion" to parliamentarism! Perhaps a Soviet republic already exists in Germany? It does not look like it! How, then, is it possible to speak of "reversion"? Is this not an empty phrase?

Parliamentarism has become "historically obsolete." This is true as regards propaganda. But everyone knows that it is still very far from the *practical* overcoming of parliamentarism. Capitalism could have been rightly declared to be "historically obsolete" many decades ago, but this does not in the least remove the need for a very long and very persistent struggle *on the soil* of capitalism. Parliamentarism is "historically obsolete" from the standpoint of *world history*, that is to say, the *epoch* of bourgeois parliamentarism has come to an end and the *epoch* of the proletarian dictatorship has *begun*. This is incontestable. But in dealing with *world history* one counts in decades. Ten or twenty years sooner or later makes no difference when measured by the scale of world history; from the point of view of world history it is a trifle that cannot be calculated even approximately. But this is precisely why it is a crying theoretical mistake to measure questions of practical politics with the scale of world history.

Is parliamentarism "politically obsolete"? That is quite another matter. If this were true, the position of the "Lefts" would be a strong one. But it has got to be proved by the most searching analysis, and the "Lefts" do not even know how to set to work to do this. In the "Theses on Parliamentarism," published in No. 1 of the *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International*, February 1920, which obviously expresses Dutch-Left or Left-Dutch strivings, the analysis, as we shall see, is also very bad.

In the first place, as is known, contrary to the opinion of such prominent political leaders as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the German "Lefts" considered parliamentarism to be "politically obsolete" as far back as January 1919. It is well known that the "Lefts" were mistaken. This alone at one stroke utterly destroys the proposition that parliamentarism is "politically obsolete." The obligation falls upon the "Lefts" to prove why their indisputable error of that time has now ceased to be an error. They do not, and cannot, produce even the shadow of proof. The attitude of a political party toward its

own mistakes is one of the most important and surest criteria of the seriousness of the party and of how it fulfills *in practice* its obligations toward its *class* and toward the toiling *masses*. To admit a mistake openly, to disclose its reasons, to analyse the conditions which gave rise to it, to study attentively the means of correcting it—these are the signs of a serious party; this means the performance of its duties, this means educating and training the *class*, and then the *masses*. By their failure to fulfil this duty, by failing to give the utmost care, attention and consideration to the study of their obvious mistake, the “Lefts” in Germany (and in Holland) have proved that they are not a *party of the class*, but a circle, not a *party of the masses*, but a group of intellectuals and a few workers who imitate the worst features of intellectualism.

Secondly, in the same pamphlet of the Frankfurt group of “Lefts” that we have already cited in detail, we read :

... The millions of workers who still follow the policy of the Centre” (the Catholic “Centre” Party) “are counter revolutionary. The rural proletarians provide legions of counter-revolutionary troops.” (Page 3 of the above-mentioned pamphlet.)

It is evident from all this that this statement is too sweeping and exaggerated. But the basic fact set forth is incontrovertible, and its acknowledgement by the “Lefts” very clearly testifies to their mistake. How can one say that “parliamentarism is politically obsolete,” when “millions” and “legions” of *proletarians* are not only still in favour of parliamentarism in general, but are downright “counter-revolutionary”!? Clearly, parliamentarism in Germany is *not yet* politically obsolete. Clearly, the “Lefts” in Germany have mistaken *their desire*, their ideological-political attitude, for objective reality. This is the most dangerous mistake revolutionaries can make. In Russia—where the extremely fierce and savage yoke of tsarism, for a particularly long period, and in particularly varied forms, produced revolutionaries of diverse shades, revolutionaries who displayed astonishing devotion, enthusiasm, heroism and will power—we watch this mistake of the revolutionaries particularly closely, we studied it with particular attention, became particularly familiar with it, and hence, we can see it with particular clearness in others. For the Communists in Germany parliamentarism is, of course, “politically obsolete”; but—and this is the whole point—we must *not* regard what is obsolete *for us* as being obsolete *for the class*, as being obsolete *for the masses*. It is precisely here that we see that the “Lefts” do not know how to reason, do not know how to conduct themselves as a party of the *class*, as a party of the *masses*. You must not sink to the level of the masses, to the level of the backward strata of the class. This is incontestable. You must tell them the bitter truth. You must call their bourgeois-democratic parliamentary prejudices—prejudices. But, at the same time, you must *soberly* observe the *actual* state of class consciousness and preparedness of the whole class (not only of the Communist vanguard), of all the toiling *masses* (not only of its advanced elements).

Even if not “millions” and “legions” but a fairly significant *minority* of industrial workers follow the Catholic priests, and a like number of rural workers follow the landlords and kulaks (*Grossbauern*),<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Capitalist farmers.—*Ed Eng. ed.*

it *undoubtedly* follows that parliamentarism in Germany is *not yet* politically obsolete, that participation in parliamentary elections and in the struggle in parliament is *obligatory* for the party of the revolutionary proletariat *precisely* for the purpose of educating the backward strata of *its own class*, precisely for the purpose of awakening and enlightening the undeveloped, downtrodden, ignorant peasant masses. As long as you are unable to disperse the bourgeois parliament and every other type of reactionary institution, you *must* work inside them, *precisely* because in them there are still workers who are stupefied by the priests and by the dreariness of village life; otherwise you run the risk of becoming mere babblers.

Thirdly, the "Left" Communists have a great deal to say in praise of us Bolsheviks. One sometimes feels like telling them that it would be better if they praised us less and tried more thoroughly to understand the tactics of the Bolsheviks, to make themselves more familiar with these tactics! We took part in the elections to the Russian bourgeois parliament, the Constituent Assembly, in September-November 1917. Were our tactics correct or not? If not, then it should be clearly stated and proved; this is essential for working out the correct tactics for international Communism. If they were correct, certain conclusions must be drawn. Of course, there can be no question of drawing a parallel between conditions in Russia and the conditions in Western Europe. But as regards the special question of the meaning of the concept "parliamentarism has become politically obsolete," it is absolutely necessary to take exact account of our experience, because unless definite experience is taken into account such concepts are very easily transformed into empty phrases. Did not we Russian Bolsheviks, in September-November 1917, have more right than any Western Communists to consider that parliamentarism was politically obsolete in Russia? Undoubtedly we had, for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments have existed for a long or a short period, but to what extent the broad masses of the toilers are *prepared* (ideologically, politically and practically) to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the bourgeois-democratic parliament (or allow it to be dispersed). That owing to a number of special conditions the urban working class and the soldiers and peasants in Russia in September-November 1917 were exceptionally well prepared for the acceptance of the Soviet system and for the dispersion of the most democratic bourgeois parliament is an absolutely incontestable and fully established historical fact. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did *not* boycott the Constituent Assembly, but took part in the elections both before and *after* the conquest of political power by the proletariat. That these elections gave exceedingly valuable (and for the proletariat, highly useful) political results I hope I have proved in the above-mentioned article, which analyses in detail the figures of the elections to the Constituent Assembly in Russia.

The conclusion which follows from this is absolutely incontrovertible: it has been proved that participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament even a few weeks before the victory of a Soviet republic, and even *after* that victory, not only does no harm to the revolutionary proletariat, but actually makes it easier for it to *prove* to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispersed; it *facilitates* success in dispersing them, and *facilitates* the process whereby bour-

geois parliamentarism becomes "politically obsolete." To refuse to take this experience into account and at the same time to claim affiliation to the Communist *International*, which must work out its tactics *internationally* (not narrow or one-sided national tactics, but international tactics), is to commit the greatest blunder and actually to retreat from internationalism in deeds while accepting it in words.

Now let us examine the "Dutch-Left" arguments in favour of non-participation in parliaments. The following is the text of the most important of the above-mentioned "Dutch" theses, Thesis No. 4:

When the capitalist system of production has broken down and society is in a state of revolution, parliamentary activity gradually loses its significance compared with the action of the masses themselves. When, under these conditions, parliament becomes a centre and an organ of counter-revolution, while on the other hand the working class is creating the instruments of its power in the form of Soviets, it may even become necessary to abstain from all participation in parliamentary activity.

The first sentence is obviously wrong, since the action of the masses—a big strike, for instance—is more important than parliamentary activity at *all* times, and not only during a revolution or in a revolutionary situation. This obviously untenable and historically and politically incorrect argument only shows in a particularly striking manner that the authors absolutely ignore both the general European experience (the French experience before the Revolutions of 1848 and 1870; the German experience from 1878 to 1890, etc.) and the Russian experience (see above) of the importance of *combining* the legal with the illegal struggle. This question is of immense importance in general, and it is of particular importance because in *all* civilised and advanced countries the time is rapidly approaching when such a combination will become—and partly, has already become—more and more obligatory for the party of the revolutionary proletariat, owing to the fact that civil war between proletariat and the bourgeoisie is maturing and approaching, owing to the fierce persecution of the Communists by republican governments and bourgeois governments generally, which are prepared to resort to all sorts of violations of legality (how much is the American example alone worth?), etc. The Dutch, and the Lefts in general, have utterly failed to understand this very important question.

As for the second sentence, in the first place it is wrong historically. We Bolsheviks took part in the most counter-revolutionary parliaments, and experience has shown that such participation was not only useful but necessary for the party of the revolutionary proletariat, precisely after the first bourgeois revolution in Russia (1905), for the purpose of preparing the way for the second bourgeois revolution (March [February] 1917), and then for the Socialist revolution (November [October] 1917). In the second place, this sentence is amazingly illogical. If parliament becomes an organ and a "centre" (in reality it never has been and never can be a "centre," but that by the way) of counter-revolution, and the workers are creating the instruments of their power in the form of Soviets, it logically follows that the workers must prepare—ideologically, politically and technically—for the struggle of the Soviets against parliament, for the dispersion of parliament by the Soviets. But it does not at all follow that such dispersion is hindered, or is not facilitated, by the presence of a Soviet opposition *within* the counter-revolutionary parliament. During the



course of our victorious struggle against Denikin and Kolchak we never found the existence of a Soviet, proletarian opposition in their midst to be immaterial to our victories. We know perfectly well that we were not hindered but assisted in dispersing the Constituent Assembly on January 18 (5), 1918, by the fact that within the counter-revolutionary Constituent Assembly which was being dispersed there was a consistent, Bolshevik, as well as an inconsistent, Left Socialist-Revolutionary, Soviet opposition. The authors of the theses have become utterly confused and they have forgotten the experience of many, if not all, revolutions, which proves how particularly useful during a revolution is the combination of mass action outside a reactionary parliament with an opposition inside this parliament, which sympathises with (or better still, directly supports) the revolution. The Dutch, and the "Lefts" in general, argue like doctrinaire revolutionaries who have never taken part in a real revolution, or have never deeply pondered over the history of revolutions, or naïvely mistake the subjective "rejection" of a certain reactionary institution for its actual destruction by the united forces of a whole series of objective factors.

The surest way of discrediting a new political (and not only political) idea, and of damaging it, is to reduce it to absurdity while ostensibly defending it. For every truth, if "exorbitant" (as Dietzgen senior said), if it is exaggerated, if it is carried beyond the limits in which it can be actually applied, can be reduced to absurdity, and, under the conditions mentioned, is even inevitably converted into an absurdity. This is just the kind of back-handed service the Dutch and German Lefts are rendering the new truth about the superiority of the Soviet form of government over bourgeois-democratic parliaments. Of course, anyone who would say in the old way, and in general, that refusal to participate in bourgeois parliaments can under no circumstances be permissible would be wrong. I cannot attempt to formulate here the conditions under which a boycott is useful, for the object of this essay is far more modest, namely, to study Russian experience in connection with certain topical questions of international Communist tactics. Russian experience has given us one successful and correct (1905) and one incorrect (1906) example of the application of the boycott by the Bolsheviks. Analysing the first case, we see that we succeeded in *preventing the convocation* of a reactionary parliament by a reactionary government in a situation in which extra-parliamentary, revolutionary mass action (strikes in particular) was growing with exceptional rapidity, when not a single stratum of the proletariat and of the peasantry could support the reactionary government, when the revolutionary proletariat was acquiring influence over the broad, backward masses by means of the strike struggle and the agrarian movement. It is quite obvious that *this* experience is not applicable to present-day European conditions. It is also quite obvious, on the strength of the foregoing arguments, that even a conditional defence of the refusal to participate in parliaments by the Dutch and other "Lefts" is fundamentally wrong and harmful to the cause of the revolutionary proletariat.

In Western Europe and America parliament has become an object of special hatred to the advanced revolutionaries of the working class. This is incontestable; it is quite comprehensible, for it is difficult to

imagine anything more vile, abominable, and treacherous than the behaviour of the overwhelming majority of Socialist and Social-Democratic deputies in parliament during and after the war. But it would be not only unreasonable but actually criminal to yield to this mood when deciding the question of *how* to fight against this generally recognised evil. In many countries of Western Europe the revolutionary mood is at present, we might say, a "novelty," or a "rarity," for which we have been vainly and impatiently waiting for a long time, and perhaps that is why we so easily give way to moods. Of course, without a revolutionary mood among the masses and without conditions favouring the growth of this mood, revolutionary tactics will never be converted into action; but we in Russia have been convinced by long, and painful and bloody experience of the truth that revolutionary tactics cannot be built up on revolutionary moods alone. Tactics must be based on a sober and strictly objective estimation of *all* the class forces in a given state (in neighbouring States and in all States, *i. e.*, on a world scale), as well as on an estimation of the experience of revolutionary movements. To express one's "revolutionariness" solely by hurling abuse at parliamentary opportunism, solely by repudiating participation in parliaments, is very easy; but, just because it is too easy, it is not the solution for a difficult, a very difficult, problem. It is much more difficult to create a really revolutionary parliamentary fraction in a European parliament than it was in Russia. Of course. But this is only a particular expression of the general truth that it was easy for Russia in the definite, historically very unique situation of 1917 to *start* a Socialist revolution, but that it will be more difficult for Russia to *continue* and bring it to its consummation than for the European countries. I had occasion to point this out even in the beginning of 1918,<sup>15</sup> and our experience of the last two years has entirely confirmed the correctness of this argument. Certain specific conditions, *viz.*, 1) The possibility of linking up the Soviet revolution with the ending (as a consequence of this revolution) of the imperialist war which had exhausted the workers and peasants to an incredible degree; 2) The possibility of taking advantage for a certain time of the mortal conflict between two world-powerful groups of imperialist robbers, who were unable to unite against their Soviet enemy; 3) The possibility of holding out in a comparatively lengthy civil war, partly owing to the enormous size of the country and to the poor means of communication; 4) The existence of such a profound bourgeois-democratic revolutionary movement among the peasantry that the party of the proletariat was able to adopt the revolutionary demands of the peasant party (the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the majority of the members of which were very hostile to Bolshevism) and at once realise them, thanks to the conquest of political power by the proletariat—these specific conditions do not exist in Western Europe at present; and a repetition of such or similar conditions will not come about easily. That is why, apart from a number of other causes, it will be more difficult to *start* a Socialist revolution in Western Europe than it was for us. To attempt to "circumvent" this difficulty by "skipping" the difficult task of utilising reactionary parliaments for revolutionary purposes is absolutely childish. You wish to create a new society, and

<sup>15</sup> See *Selected Works*, Vol. VII, pp 281-82.—*Ed.*

yet you fear the difficulties involved in forming, a good parliamentary fraction, consisting of convinced, devoted, heroic Communists, in a reactionary parliament! Is not this childish? If Karl Liebknecht in Germany and Z. Höglund in Sweden were able, even without mass support from below, to set examples of the truly revolutionary utilisation of reactionary parliaments, why, then, should a rapidly-growing revolutionary, mass party, under the conditions of the post-war disillusionment and exasperation of the masses, be unable to *forge* for itself a Communist fraction in the worst of parliaments?! It is just because of the backward masses of the workers and, to a still greater degree, of the small peasants in Western Europe are much more strongly imbued with bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary prejudices than they were in Russia that it is *only* within such institutions as bourgeois parliaments that Communists can (and must) wage a long and persistent struggle—undaunted by difficulties—to expose, dispel and overcome these prejudices.

The German "Lefts" complain about the bad "leaders" in their party, give way to despair, and go to the length of ridiculously "repudiating" "leaders." But when conditions are such that it is often necessary to hide "leaders" underground, the *development* of good, reliable, experienced and authoritative "leaders" is an especially hard task, and these difficulties *cannot* be successfully overcome without combining legal with illegal work, *without testing the "leaders," among other ways*, on the parliamentary arena *also*. Criticism—the sharpest, most ruthless, uncompromising criticism—must be directed, not against parliamentarism or parliamentary action, but against those leaders who are unable—and still more against those who are *unwilling*—to utilise parliamentary elections and the parliamentary tribune in a revolutionary manner, in a Communist manner. Only such criticism—combined, of course, with the expulsion of worthless leaders and their replacement by capable ones—will constitute useful and fruitful revolutionary work that will simultaneously train the "leaders" themselves to become worthy of the working class and of the toiling masses, and will train the masses to be able properly to understand the political situation and the often very complicated and intricate tasks that spring from that situation.<sup>16</sup>

#### VIII. NO COMPROMISES?

In the quotation from the Frankfurt pamphlet we saw how emphatically the "Lefts" advance this slogan. It is sad to see that men who

<sup>16</sup> I have had very little opportunity to make myself familiar with "Left-wing" Communism in Italy. Comrade Bordiga and his faction of "Communist-Boycottists" (*Comunisti astensionista*) are certainly wrong in defending nonparticipation in parliament. But on one point, it seems to me, Comrade Bordiga is right—as far as can be judged from two issues of his paper, *Il Soriet* (Nos. 3 and 4, January 18 and February 1, 1920), from four issues of Comrade Serrati's excellent periodical, *Comunismo* (Nos. 1-4, October 1-November 30, 1919), and from isolated numbers of Italian bourgeois papers which I have come across. Comrade Bordiga and his faction are right in attacking Turati and his followers, who remain in a party which has recognised the Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat, but who at the same time continue their former pernicious and opportunist policy as members of parliament. Of course, in tolerating this, Comrade Serrati and the whole Italian Socialist Party are committing a mistake which threatens to do as much harm and give rise to the same dangers as it did in Hungary, where the Hungarian Turatis sabotaged both the Party and the Soviet government from within. Such a mistaken, inconsistent, or spineless attitude toward the opportunist parliamentarians creates "Left-wing" Communism on the one hand and justifies its existence, to a certain extent, on the other. Comrade Serrati is obviously wrong when he accuses Deputy Turati of being "inconsistent" (*Comunismo*, No. 3), for it is really the Italian Socialist Party itself which is inconsistent, since it tolerates such opportunist parliamentarians as Turati and Co.

doubtless consider themselves to be Marxists, and who want to be Marxists, have forgotten the fundamental truths of Marxism. Let us cite what Engels—who, like Marx, was one of those rare and very rare authors whose every sentence in every one of their great works was of remarkably profound content—wrote in 1874, in opposition to the manifesto of the thirty-three Communard-Blanquists:

“We are Communists” (wrote the Communard-Blanquists in their manifesto) “because we wish to attain our goal without stopping at intermediate stations, without any compromises, which only postpone the day of victory and prolong the period of slavery.”

The German Communists are Communists because at all the intermediate stations and in all compromises, which are created, not by them, but by historical development, they clearly perceive and constantly pursue the final aim, *viz.*, the abolition of classes and the creation of a society in which there will be no private ownership of land or of the means of production. The thirty-three Blanquists are Communists because they imagine that merely because *they* want to skip the intermediate stations and compromises, that settles the matter, and if “it begins” in the next few days—as has been definitely settled—and they once come to the helm, “Communism will be introduced” the day after tomorrow. If that is not immediately possible, they are not Communists. What childish innocence it is to present impatience as a theoretically convincing argument.”

In the same article Engels expresses his profound esteem for Vailant, and speaks of the “undeniable merit” of the latter (who, like Guesde, was one of the most prominent leaders of international Socialism up to August 1914, when they both turned traitor to the cause of Socialism). But Engels does not allow an obvious mistake to go by without a detailed analysis. Of course, to very young and inexperienced revolutionaries, as well as to petty-bourgeois revolutionaries, even though very experienced and of a very respectable age, it seems exceedingly “dangerous,” incomprehensible and incorrect to “allow compromises.” And many sophists (being super or excessively “experienced” politicians) reason precisely in the same way as the British leaders of opportunism mentioned by Comrade Lansbury: “If it is permissible for the Bolsheviks to compromise, then why should we not be allowed to compromise?” But proletarians schooled in numerous strikes (to take only this manifestation of the class struggle) usually understand very well the very profound (philosophical, historical, political and psychological) truth expounded by Engels. Every proletarian has gone through strikes and has experienced “compromises” with the hated oppressors and exploiters, when the workers had to go back to work without having achieved anything, or after consenting to a partial satisfaction of their demands. Every proletarian—owing to the conditions of the mass struggle and of the sharp intensification of class antagonisms in which he lives—notices the difference between a compromise which one is compelled to enter into by objective conditions (such as lack of strike funds, no outside support, extreme hunger and exhaustion), a compromise which in no way lessens the revolutionary devotion and readiness for further struggle of the workers who agree to such a compromise, and a compromise by traitors who ascribe to objective reasons their own selfishness (strikebreakers also effect a “compromise”!), their cowardice, their desire to fawn upon the capitalists and their readiness to yield to threats, sometimes to persuasion, sometimes to sops, and sometimes to flattery on the part of the capitalists. (Such cases of traitors’ compro-

<sup>17</sup> Frederick Engels, in *Volksstaat*, 1874, No. 73. “*Programm der blanquistischen Kommune-Flüchtlinge.*”

mises by trade union leaders are particularly plentiful in the history of the British labour movement; but in one form or another nearly all workers in all countries have witnessed similar things.)

Of course, individual cases of exceptional difficulty and intricacy occur, when it is possible to determine correctly the real character of this or that "compromise" only with the greatest effort; just as cases of homicide occur when it is very difficult to decide whether the homicide was fully justified and even necessary (as, for example, legitimate self-defence), or unpardonable negligence, or even a cunningly executed plan. Of course, in politics, in which, sometimes, extremely complicated—national and international—relationships between classes and parties have to be dealt with, very many cases will arise that will be much more difficult than the question concerning legitimate "compromise" during a strike, or the treacherous "compromise" of a strikebreaker, or of a treacherous leader, etc. It would be absurd to concoct a recipe or general rule ("No Compromise!") to serve all cases. One must have the brains to analyse the situation in each separate case. Incidentally, the significance of a party organisation and of party leaders worthy of the name lies precisely in the fact that with the prolonged, persistent, varied and all-sided efforts of all the thinking representatives of the given class,<sup>18</sup> the necessary knowledge, the necessary experience and—apart from all knowledge and experience—the necessary political instinct for the speedy and correct solution of intricate political problems may be acquired.

Naïve and utterly inexperienced people imagine that it is sufficient to admit the permissibility of compromise *in general* in order to obliterate the dividing line between opportunism, against which we wage and must wage an irreconcilable struggle, and revolutionary Marxism, or Communism. But if such people do not yet know that *all* dividing lines in nature and in society are mutable and, to a certain extent, conventional—they cannot be assisted in any other way than by a long process of training, education, enlightenment, and by political and every-day experience. In the practical questions of the politics of a given or specific historical moment, it is important to single out those questions which reveal the principal type of impermissible, treacherous compromises embodying the opportunism that is fatal to the revolutionary class, and to exert all efforts to explain them and combat them. During the imperialist war of 1914–18 between two groups of equally predatory and rapacious countries, the principal, fundamental type of opportunism was social-chauvinism, that is, the support of "defence of the fatherland," which, in *such* a war, was really equivalent to defence of the predatory interests of "one's own" bourgeoisie. After the war, the defence of the robber "League of Nations," the defence of direct or indirect alliances with the bourgeoisie of one's own country against the revolutionary proletariat and the "Soviet" movement, and the defence of bourgeois democracy and bourgeois parliamentarism against the "Soviet power" became the principal manifestations of those impermissible and treacherous compromises,

<sup>18</sup> In every class, even in the most enlightened countries, even in the case of the most advanced class, placed by the circumstances of the moment in a state of an exceptionally high upsurge of all spiritual forces, there always are—and, as long as classes exist, as long as classless society has not fully entrenched and consolidated itself, has not developed on its own foundation, there inevitably *will be*—class representatives, who do *not* think and are incapable of thinking. Were this not so, capitalism would not be the oppressor of the masses that it is.

the sum total of which represented the opportunism that is fatal to the revolutionary proletariat and its cause.

. . . To reject most emphatically all compromises with other parties . . . all policy of manœuvring and compromise,

write the German Lefts in the Frankfurt pamphlet.

It is a wonder, that, holding such views, these Lefts do not emphatically condemn Bolshevism! Surely, the German Lefts cannot but know that the whole history of Bolshevism, both before and after the October Revolution, is *full* of instances of manœuvring, temporising and compromising with other parties, bourgeois parties included!

To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, prolonged and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to refuse beforehand to manœuvre, to utilise the conflict of interests (even though temporary) among one's enemies, to refuse to temporise and compromise with possible (even though transient, unstable, vacillating and conditional) allies—is not this ridiculous in the extreme? Is it not as though, in the difficult ascent of an unexplored and heretofore inaccessible mountain, we were to renounce beforehand the idea that at times we might have to go in zigzags, sometimes retracing our steps, sometimes abandoning the course once selected and trying various others? And yet, several members of the Dutch Communist Party found it possible to support—it matters not whether directly or indirectly, openly or covertly, wholly or partially—people who are so ignorant and inexperienced!! (It will not be so bad if this ignorance and inexperience are due to their youth; God Himself ordains that young persons should talk such nonsense for a certain period.)

After the first Socialist revolution of the proletariat, after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie in one country, the proletariat of that country *for a long time* remains *weaker* than the bourgeoisie, simply because of the latter's extensive international connections, and also because the small-commodity producers in the land which has overthrown the bourgeoisie restore and regenerate capitalism and the bourgeoisie spontaneously and continuously. It is possible to conquer the more powerful enemy only by exerting the utmost effort, and by *necessarily*, thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skilfully taking advantage of every, even the smallest "fissure" among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries, among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie in the various countries; by taking advantage of every, even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this fail to understand even a grain of Marxism and of scientific, modern Socialism *in general*. Those who have not proved by *deeds* over a considerable period of time, and in sufficiently varied political situations, their ability to apply this truth in practice have not yet learned to assist the revolutionary class in its struggle for the emancipation of the whole of toiling humanity from the exploiters. And this applies equally to the period before and the period after the conquest of political power by the proletariat.

Our theory is not a dogma but a *guide to action*, said Marx and Engels; and the greatest mistake, the greatest crime such "patented" Marxists as Karl Kautsky, Otto Bauer, etc., commit is that they

have not understood this, that they have been unable to apply it in the most important moments of the proletarian revolution. N. G. Chernyshevsky, the great Russian Socialist of the pre-Marxian period, used to say: "Political activity is not the pavement of the Nevsky Prospect" (the clean, broad, smooth pavement of the perfectly straight, principal street of St. Petersburg). Since Chernyshevsky's time the Russian revolutionaries have paid very dearly for ignoring, or forgetting, this truth. Every effort must be made to avert at all costs the possibility of the Left Communists and the West European and American revolutionaries who are devoted to the working class having to pay as *dearly* for the assimilation of this truth as the backward Russians paid.

Before the downfall of tsarism the Russian revolutionary Social-Democrats repeatedly utilised the services of the bourgeois liberals, *i. e.*, concluded numerous practical compromises with them. In 1901-02, prior to the rise of Bolshevism, the old Editorial Board of *Iskra* (consisting of Plekhanov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Martov, Potresov and myself) concluded—not for long it is true—a formal political alliance with Struve, the political leader of bourgeois liberalism, while it was able at the same time to carry on an unceasing and merciless ideological and political struggle against bourgeois liberalism and against the slightest manifestation of its influence in the working class movement. The Bolsheviks always adhered to this policy. From 1905 onward they systematically defended the alliance between the working class and the peasantry against the liberal bourgeoisie and tsarism, never, however, refusing to support the bourgeoisie against tsarism (for instance, during the second stage of elections, or second ballot) and never ceasing their relentless ideological and political struggle against the bourgeois-revolutionary peasant party, the "Socialist-Revolutionaries," exposing them as petty-bourgeois democrats falsely masquerading as Socialists. During the Duma elections in 1907, the Bolsheviks, for a brief period, entered into a formal political *bloc* with the "Socialist-Revolutionaries." Between 1903 and 1912, there were periods of several years in which we were formally united with the Mensheviks in the same Social-Democratic Party; but we *never* ceased our ideological and political struggle against them as opportunists and channels of bourgeois influence among the proletariat. During the war we compromised to a certain extent with the "Kautskians," with the Left Mensheviks (Martov), and with a section of the "Socialist-Revolutionaries" (Chernov and Natanson), we were at Zimmerwald and Kienthal together and issued joint manifestoes; but we never ceased and never relaxed our ideological-political struggle against the "Kautskians," against Martov and Chernov. (Natanson died in 1919; he had become a "Revolutionary Communist" Narodnik—very close to us, and almost in agreement with us.) At the very outbreak of the October Revolution we entered into an informal, but very important (and highly successful) political *bloc* with the petty-bourgeois peasantry and adopted the *Socialist-Revolutionary* agrarian programme in its *entirety* without a single alteration—that is, we entered into what was undoubtedly a compromise in order to prove to the peasants that we did not want to "steam-roller" them, but to come to an agreement with them. At the same time, we proposed (and soon after effected) a formal political *bloc*, including participation in the

government, with the "Left Socialist-Revolutionaries," who dissolved this *bloc* after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, and then, in July 1918, went to the lengths of armed rebellion, and subsequently of armed warfare, against us.

It can be understood, therefore, why the attacks of the German Lefts on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany for entertaining the idea of a *bloc* with the "Independents" (Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, the Kautskians) seem to us to be frivolous, and to prove clearly that the "Lefts" are *wrong*. We in Russia also had Right Mensheviks (who participated in the Kerensky Government) who corresponded to the German Scheidemanns, and Left Mensheviks (Martov) who were in opposition to the Right Mensheviks and who corresponded to the German Kautskians. In 1917, the gradual passing of the masses of the workers from the Mensheviks to the Bolsheviks was clearly observed: at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in June 1917, we had only 13 per cent of the votes; the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks were in the majority. At the Second Congress of Soviets (November 7 [October 25], 1917), we had 51 per cent of the votes. Why did not an absolutely *identical* movement of the workers from Right to Left in Germany immediately strengthen the Communists, but first strengthened the intermediate "Independent" Party, although this party never had independent political ideas, or an independent policy, but only wavered between the Scheidemanns and the Communists?

Obviously, one of the reasons was the *mistaken* tactics of the German Communists, who must fearlessly and honestly admit this mistake and learn to rectify it. The mistake was that they repudiated the necessity of participating in reactionary bourgeois parliaments and in reactionary trade unions; the mistake lay in numerous manifestations of that "Left" infantile disorder which has now broken out on the surface, and will therefore be cured more thoroughly, more quickly and more beneficially.

The German "Independent Social-Democratic Party" is obviously not homogeneous. Alongside the old opportunist leaders (Kautsky, Hilferding and, to a considerable extent, apparently, Crispian, Ledebour and others)—who have shown that they are unable to understand the significance of the Soviet power and the distatorship of the proletariat, that they are unable to lead the proletariat in its revolutionary struggle—there has arisen in this party a Left proletarian wing which is growing with remarkable rapidity. Hundreds of thousands of members of this party, proletarians (and it has, I think, about three-quarters of a million members), are leaving Scheidemann and are rapidly going over to Communism. This proletarian wing has already proposed—at the Leipzig (1919) Congress of the Independents—immediate and unconditional affiliation with the Third International. To fear a "compromise" with this wing of the party is positively ridiculous. On the contrary, it is *the duty* of the Communists to seek *and to find* an appropriate form of compromise with them, such a compromise as, on the one hand, will facilitate and accelerate the necessary complete fusion with this wing and, on the other, will not in any way hamper the Communists in their ideological-political struggle against the opportunist Right wing of the "Independents." Probably it will not be easy to devise the appropriate form of com-



promise, but only a charlatan could promise the German workers and German Communists an "easy" road to victory.

Capitalism would not be capitalism if the "pure" proletariat were not surrounded by a large number of very mixed transitional types, from the proletarian to the semi-proletarian (who earns half his livelihood by the sale of his labour power), from the semi-proletarian to the small peasant (and petty artisan, handicraft worker and small proprietor in general), from the small peasant to the middle peasant, and so on, and if the proletariat itself were not divided into more or less developed strata, divided according to territorial origin, according to trade, sometimes according to religion, and so on. And all this makes it necessary—absolutely necessary—for the vanguard of the proletariat, for its class-conscious section, the Communist Party, to resort to manœuvres and compromises with the various groups of proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small proprietors. The whole point lies in *knowing how* to apply these tactics in such a way as to *raise* and not lower the *general* level of proletarian class consciousness, revolutionary spirit, and ability to fight and to conquer. Incidentally, it should be noted that the victory of the Bolsheviks over the Mensheviks demanded the application of tactics of manœuvring and compromise not only before the October Revolution of 1917, *but also after it*; but these were of such a character, of course, as would facilitate, accelerate, consolidate and strengthen the Bolsheviks at the expense of the Mensheviks. The petty-bourgeois democrats (including the Mensheviks) invariably vacillate between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between bourgeois democracy and the Soviet system, between reformism and revolutionariness, between love for the workers and fear of the proletarian dictatorship, etc. The proper tactics for the Communists to adopt is to *utilise* these vacillations and not to ignore them; and utilising them calls for concessions to those elements which are turning towards the proletariat in accordance with the time and the extent they turn towards the proletariat—while simultaneously fighting those who turn towards the bourgeoisie. As a result of the application of correct tactics, Menshevism in our country became and is becoming more and more disintegrated, the stubbornly opportunist leaders are becoming isolated, and the best workers, the best elements among the petty-bourgeois democrats, are being brought into our camp. This is a long process, and the hasty "decision," "no compromise, no manœuvres," can only hinder the strengthening of the influence of the revolutionary proletariat and the growth of its forces.

Finally, one of the undoubted mistakes of the "Lefts" in Germany is their stubborn insistence on non-recognition of the Versailles Peace. The more "weightily" and "ponderously," the more "emphatically" and dogmatically this viewpoint is formulated (by K. Horner, for instance), the less sensible does it appear. It is not enough to repudiate the crying absurdities of "National Bolshevism" (Lauffenberg and others), which has gone to the length of advocating a *bloc* with the German bourgeoisie for war against the Entente, under the present conditions of the international proletarian revolution. One must understand that the tactics which do not concede that it is essential for a Soviet Germany (if a German Soviet republic were established soon) to recognise the Versailles Peace for a time and to submit to it are fundamentally wrong. From this it does not follow that the

"Independents" were right in putting forward—at a time when the Scheidemanns were in the government, when the Soviet government in Hungary had not yet been overthrown, and when the possibility of a Soviet revolution in Vienna in support of Soviet Hungary was not yet precluded—in putting forward, *under these circumstances*, the demand that the Versailles Peace be signed. At that time the "Independents" tacked and manœuvred very clumsily, for they more or less accepted responsibility for the Scheidemann traitors, they more or less slipped from the viewpoint of the merciless (and most cold-blooded) class war against the Scheidemanns to the "classless" or "above-class" viewpoint.

At present, however, the position is obviously such that the German Communists should not tie their hands and promise, positively and without fail, to repudiate the Versailles Peace in the event of the victory of Communism. That would be foolish. They must say: The Scheidemanns and the Kautskians have perpetrated a series of treacheries which hindered (and partly prevented) an alliance with Soviet Russia and with Soviet Hungary. We Communists will do all we can to *facilitate* and *pave the way* for such an alliance; at the same time we are not in the least obliged to repudiate the Versailles Peace, and certainly not immediately. The possibility of repudiating it successfully will depend not only on the German but also on the international successes of the Soviet movement. This movement has been hampered by the Scheidemanns and Kautskians; we shall further it. Therein lies the crux of the matter; that is where the fundamental difference lies. And if our class enemies, the exploiters, and their lackeys, the Scheidemanns and Kautskians, missed a number of opportunities to strengthen both the German and the international Soviet movement, to strengthen the German and international Soviet revolution, the blame falls upon them. The Soviet revolution in Germany will strengthen the international Soviet movement, which is the strongest bulwark—and the only reliable, invincible, omnipotent bulwark—against the Versailles Peace and against international imperialism in general. To put liberation from the Versailles Peace absolutely, unconditionally and immediately in the forefront, *before the question* of liberating other countries which are oppressed by imperialism from the yoke of imperialism, is petty-bourgeois nationalism (worthy of Kautsky, Hilferding, Otto Bauer and Co.) and not revolutionary internationalism. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie in any of the large European countries, including Germany, would be such a gain to the international revolution that for its sake one can, and must, if necessary, tolerate a *more prolonged existence of the Versailles Peace*. If Russia, by herself, could endure the Brest-Litovsk Peace for several months to the advantage of the revolution, it is not impossible for a Soviet Germany, in alliance with Soviet Russia, to endure an even longer existence of the Versailles Peace to the advantage of the revolution.

The imperialists of France, England, etc., are trying to provoke the German Communists, they are laying a trap for them: "Say that you will not sign the Versailles Peace!" And the Left Communists childishly fall into the trap laid for them, instead of manœuvring skilfully against the crafty and, *at the present moment*, stronger enemy, instead of telling him: "Today we shall sign the Versailles

Peace." To tie one's hands beforehand, openly to tell the enemy, who is at present better armed than we are, whether and when we shall fight him, is stupidity and not revolutionariness. To accept battle at a time when it is obviously advantageous to the enemy and not to us is a crime; and those political leaders of the revolutionary class who are unable "to tack, to manœuvre, to compromise," in order to avoid an obviously disadvantageous battle, are good for nothing.

#### X. SOME CONCLUSIONS

The Russian bourgeois revolution of 1905 revealed a very peculiar turn in world history: in one of the most backward capitalist countries the strike movement attained a breadth and power unprecedented in the world. In the *first month of 1905 alone* the number of strikers was more than ten times the average *yearly* number for the previous ten years (1895-1904); and from January to October 1905, strikes grew continuously and on an enormous scale. Under the influence of a number of entirely unique historical conditions, backward Russia was the first to show to the world, not only a spasmodic growth of independent activity on the part of the oppressed masses during revolution (this happened in all great revolutions), but also a proletariat whose significance was infinitely greater than its numerical proportion to the total population, the combination of the economical and political strike, the transformation of the latter into armed insurrection, and the birth of a new form of mass struggle and mass organisation of the classes oppressed by capitalism, *viz.*, the Soviets.

The February and October Revolutions of 1917 resulted in the all-round development of the Soviets on a national scale, and in their victory in the proletarian, Socialist revolution. And in less than two years, the international character of the Soviets, the spread of this method of struggle and form of organisation to the working class movement of the whole world, and the historical mission of the Soviets to be the grave-digger, the heir, and the successor of bourgeois parliamentarism, of bourgeois democracy in general, became revealed.

More than that, the history of the working class movement now shows that in all countries it is about to experience (and it has already begun to experience) the struggle between nascent Communism—which is becoming strong and marching toward victory—and, first and foremost, *its own* (of each particular country) "Menshevism," *i. e.*, opportunism and social-chauvinism, and, secondly—as a sort of supplement—"Left-wing" Communism. The first struggle has developed in all countries, apparently without a single exception, as a struggle between the Second International (already virtually dead) and the Third International. The second struggle can be observed in Germany, in England, in Italy, in America (at least a certain *section* of the Industrial Workers of the World and the anarcho-syndicalist trends in America defend the errors of "Left-wing" Communism, while simultaneously there is an almost universal, almost unanimous acceptance of the Soviet system) and in France (the attitude of a section of the former syndicalists towards political parties and parliamentarism, and here too, side by side with accepting the Soviet system), *i. e.*, the struggle, undoubtedly, is not only being waged on a national but also on a world scale.

But, while the working class movement is everywhere passing through what is practically the same kind of preparatory school for victory over the bourgeoisie, it is in each country achieving this development in *its own way*. The big, advanced, capitalist countries are marching along this road *much more rapidly* than did Bolshevism, which history granted a period of fifteen years to prepare itself, as an organised political trend, for victory. The Third International has already scored a decisive victory in the short space of one year; it has defeated the Second, yellow, social-chauvinist International, which only a few months ago was incomparably stronger than the Third International and seemed to be firm and strong and enjoyed the all-round support—direct and indirect, material (ministerial posts, passports, the press) and ideological—of the world bourgeoisie.

The whole thing now is that the Communists of every country should quite consciously take into account the main fundamental tasks of the struggle against opportunism and “Left” doctrinairism as well as the *definite peculiar features* which this struggle assumes and inevitably must assume in each separate country in accordance with the peculiar features of its economics, politics, culture, national composition (Ireland, etc.), its colonies, religious divisions, etc. Everywhere we observe wider and growing dissatisfaction with the Second International because of its opportunism, its inability, or incapacity, to create a really centralised, really leading centre that would be capable of guiding the international tactics of the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for the world Soviet republic. We must clearly realise that such a leading centre cannot under any circumstances be built up on stereotyped, mechanically equalised, identical tactical rules of struggle. As long as national and state differences exist among peoples and countries—and these differences will continue to exist for a very long time, even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale—the unity of international tactics of the Communist, working class movement of all countries demands, not the elimination of variety, not the abolition of national differences (This is a foolish dream at the present moment), but such an application of the *fundamental* principles of Communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat) as will *correctly modify* these principles in *certain particulars*, will properly adapt, apply them to the national and national-state differences. To investigate, study, seek out, divine, grasp that which is peculiarly national, specifically national in the *concrete manner* in which each country *approaches* the fulfillment of the single international task, the victory over opportunism and “Left” doctrinairism in the working class movement, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the establishment of a Soviet republic and a proletarian dictatorship—this is the main task of the historical period through which all the advanced (and not only the advanced) countries are now passing. The main thing—of course, not everything, by a very long way, but the main thing—has already been achieved in that the vanguard of the working class has been won over, in that it has gone over to the side of the Soviet power against parliamentarism, to the side of the dictatorship of the proletariat against bourgeois democracy. Now all efforts, all attention, must be concentrated on the *next* step—which seems, and from a certain standpoint really is, less fundamental, but which in fact is much closer to

the practical carrying out of the task—namely, on seeking out the forms of *transition* or *approach* to the proletarian revolution.

The proletarian vanguard has been ideologically won over. This is the main thing. Without this, we cannot take even the first step towards victory; but it is still a fairly long way from victory. With the vanguard alone victory is impossible. To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle before the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality toward it and one in which they cannot possibly support the enemy, would not merely be folly, but a crime. And in order that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of toilers and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not sufficient. For this the masses must have their own political experience. Such is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, confirmed now with astonishing force and vividness not only in Russia but also in Germany. It has been necessary, not only for the uncultured, often illiterate masses of Russia, but for the highly cultured, entirely literate masses of Germany, to realise through their own painful experience the absolute impotence and characterlessness, the absolute helplessness and servility before the bourgeoisie, the utter vileness of the government of the knights of the Second International, the absolute inevitability of a dictatorship of the extreme reactionaries (Kornilov in Russia, Kapp and Co. in Germany) as the only alternative to a dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to turn them resolutely toward Communism.

The immediate task that confronts the class-conscious vanguard of the international labour movement, *i.e.*, the Communist Parties, groups and trends, is to be able to *lead* the broad masses (now, for the most part, slumbering, apathetic, hidebound, inert and dormant) to their new position, or, rather, to be able to lead, *not only* their own party, but also the masses, during the course of their approach, their transition to the new position. While the first historical task (*viz.*, that of winning over the class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat to the side of the Soviet power and the dictatorship of the working class) could not be accomplished without a complete ideological and political victory over opportunism and social-chauvinism, the second task, which now becomes the immediate task, and which is to be able to lead *the masses* to the new position that will ensure the victory of the vanguard in the revolution, this immediate task cannot be accomplished without the liquidation of Left doctrinairism, without completely overcoming and getting rid of its mistakes.

As long as the question was, and insofar as it still is, one of winning over the vanguard of the proletariat to the side of Communism, so long, and to that extent, propaganda took first place; even propaganda circles, with all the imperfections that circles suffer from, are useful under these conditions and produce fruitful results. But when it is a question of the practical activities of the masses, a question of the disposition, if one may so express it, of vast armies, of the alignment of *all* the class forces of the given society for the *final and decisive battle*, then propaganda habits alone, the mere repetition of the truths of "pure" Communism, is of no avail. In these circumstances one must count, not up to a thousand, as the propagandist who belongs

to a small group that has not yet led masses really does; in these circumstances one must count in millions and tens of millions. In these circumstances we must not only ask ourselves whether the vanguard of the revolutionary class has been convinced, but also whether the historically effective forces of *all* classes—positively of all the classes in the given society without exception—are aligned in such a way that the decisive battle has fully matured, in such a way that 1) all the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently confused, are sufficiently at loggerheads with each other, have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle beyond their strength; that 2) all the vacillating, wavering, unstable, intermediate elements—the petty bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois democrats as distinct from the bourgeoisie—have sufficiently exposed themselves before the people, and have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical bankruptcy; and that 3) among the proletariat a mass mood in favour of supporting the most determined, unreservedly bold, revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie has arisen and begins to grow powerfully. Then indeed, revolution is ripe; then indeed, if we have correctly gauged all the conditions indicated above, briefly outlined above, and if we have chosen the moment rightly, our victory is assured.

The divergencies between the Churchills and the Lloyd Georges—with insignificant national differences these types exist in *all* countries—on the one hand, and between the Hendersons and the Lloyd Georges on the other, are quite unimportant and petty from the point of view of pure, *i.e.*, abstract Communism, *i.e.*, Communism that has not yet matured to the stage of practical, mass, political action. But from the point of view of this practical mass action, these differences are very, very important. The whole point, the whole task of the Communist who wants to be not merely a class-conscious, convinced and ideological propagandist but a practical leader of the *masses* in the revolution, is to take them into account, to determine the moment when the inevitable conflicts between these “friends,” which will weaken all the “*friends*” taken together and render them impotent, will have completely matured. The strictest loyalty to the ideas of Communism must be combined with the ability to make all the necessary practical compromises, to “tack,” to make agreements, zigzags, retreats and so on, in order to accelerate the coming into and subsequent loss of political power of the Hendersons (the heroes of the Second International, if we are not to mention the names of individuals; the representatives of petty-bourgeois democracy who call themselves Socialists); to accelerate their inevitable bankruptcy in practice which will enlighten the masses in the spirit of our ideas, in the direction of Communism; to accelerate the inevitable friction, quarrels, conflicts and complete disintegration among the Hendersons, the Lloyd Georges and Churchills (Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Constitutional-Democrats, Monarchists; Scheidemanns, the bourgeoisie, the Kappists, etc.) and properly to select the moment when the disintegration among these “pillars of the sacred right of private property” is at its highest, in order, by a determined attack of the proletariat, to defeat them all and capture political power.

History generally, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more many-sided, more lively and “subtle” than the best parties and the most class-conscious van-

guards of the most advanced classes imagine. This is understandable, because the best vanguards express the class consciousness, the will, the passion, the fantasy of tens of thousands, while the revolution is made, at the moment of its climax and of the exertion of all human capabilities, by the class consciousness, the will, the passion and the fantasy of tens of millions who are spurred on by the most acute class struggle. From this follow two very important practical conclusions: first, that in order to fulfil its task the revolutionary class must be able to master *all* forms or sides of social activity without exception (and complete, after the capture of political power, sometimes at great risk and very great danger, what it did not complete before the capture of power); second, that the revolutionary class must be ready to pass from one form to another in the quickest and most unexpected manner.

Everyone will agree that an army which does not train itself to wield all arms, all means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses or may possess is behaving in an unwise or even in a criminal manner. This applies to politics to a greater degree than it does to war. In politics it is harder to forecast what methods of warfare will be applied and be useful for us under certain future conditions. Unless we are able to master all means of warfare, we stand the risk of suffering great and sometimes decisive defeat if the changes in the position of the other classes, which we cannot determine, will bring to the front forms of activity in which we are particularly weak. If, however, we are able to master all means of warfare, we shall certainly be victorious, because we represent the interests of the really advanced, of the really revolutionary class, even if circumstances do not permit us to use weapons that are most dangerous for the enemy, weapons that are most quickly death-dealing. Inexperienced revolutionaries often think that legal methods of struggle are opportunist because in this field the bourgeoisie most frequently (especially in "peaceful," non-revolutionary times) deceived and fooled the workers, and they think that illegal methods of struggle are revolutionary. But this is not true. What is true is that the opportunists and the traitors to the working class are those parties and leaders who are not able or who do not want to (don't say: you cannot; say: you won't) apply illegal methods of struggle in conditions such as those which prevailed, for example, during the imperialist war of 1914-18, when the bourgeoisie of the freest democratic countries deceived the workers in the most impudent and brutal manner and prohibited everyone from speaking the truth about the predatory character of the war. But the revolutionaries who are unable to combine illegal forms of struggle with *every* form of legal struggle are very poor revolutionaries. It is not difficult to be a revolutionary when the revolution has already flared up and is raging, when everybody joins the revolution simply because he is carried away by it, because it is the fashion, and sometimes even because it might open the way for a career. After the victory, the proletariat has to exert extreme effort, to suffer pain and one might say martyrdom to "liberate" itself from such sorry revolutionaries. It is much more difficult—and much more useful—to be a revolutionary when the conditions for direct, open, really mass and really revolutionary struggle *do not yet* exist, to be able to defend the interests of the revolution

(by propaganda, agitation and organisation) in non-revolutionary bodies and even in downright reactionary bodies, in non-revolutionary circumstances, among the masses who are incapable of immediately appreciating the need for revolutionary methods of action. The main task of contemporary Communism in Western Europe and America is to acquire the ability to seek, to find, to determine correctly the concrete path or the particular turn of events that will *bring* the masses *right up* to the real, decisive, last, great revolutionary struggle.

Take England, for example. We cannot say, and no one is in a position to say beforehand, how soon the real proletarian revolution will flare up there, and *what* will most of all serve as the *cause* to rouse it, to kindle it, and to push into the struggle very wide masses who are at present dormant. Hence, it is our duty to carry on our preparatory work in such a manner as to be "well shod on all four feet," as the late Plekhanov was fond of saying when he was a Marxist and revolutionary. It is possible that a parliamentary crisis will cause the "breach," will "break the ice"; perhaps it will be a crisis caused by colonial and imperialist contradictions becoming hopelessly entangled and increasingly painful and acute; perhaps some third cause, etc. We are not discussing the kind of struggle that *will determine* the fate of the proletarian revolution in England (not a single Communist has any doubts on that score; as far as we are concerned, this question is settled, and definitely settled). What we are discussing is the *immediate cause* that will rouse the at present dormant proletarian masses and bring them right up to the revolution. Let us not forget that in the bourgeois French republic, for example, in a situation which, from both the international and national aspect, was a hundred times less revolutionary than the present one, one of the thousands and thousands of dishonest tricks the reactionary military caste play (the Dreyfus case) was enough to serve as the "unexpected" and "petty" cause which brought the people to the verge of civil war!

In England the Communists should steadily, unfalteringly and undeviatingly utilise the parliamentary elections and all the vicissitudes of the Irish, colonial and world imperialist policy of the British government, and all other spheres and sides of social life, and work in all of them in a new way, in a Communist way, in the spirit, not of the Second, but of the Third International. I have neither the time nor the space here to describe the methods of "Russian" "Bolshevik" participation in parliamentary elections and in the parliamentary struggle; but I can assure the foreign Communists that this was totally unlike the usual West European parliamentary campaign. From this the conclusion is often drawn: "Well, that was in Russia; in our country parliamentarism is something different." The conclusion is wrong. The very purpose of the existence of Communists in the world, adherents to the Third International in all countries, is to *change* all along the line, in all spheres of life, the old Socialists, craft-unionist, syndicalist parliamentary work into *new*, Communist work. In Russia, too, we had a very great deal of opportunist and purely bourgeois commercialism and capitalist swindling during elections. The Communists in Western Europe and America must learn to create a new, unusual, non-opportunist, non-careerist parliamentarism; the Communist Parties must issue their slogans; real proletarians, with the help of the unorganised and very



poorest people, should scatter and distribute leaflets, canvass the workers' houses and the cottages of the rural proletarians and peasants in the remote villages (fortunately there are not nearly so many remote villages in Europe as there are in Russia, and in England there are very few); they should go into the most common taverns, penetrate into the unions, societies and casual meetings where the common people gather, and talk to the people, not in scientific (and not very parliamentary) language, not in the least to strive to "get seats" in parliament, but everywhere to rouse the thoughts of the masses and draw them into the struggle, to take the bourgeoisie at their word, to utilise the apparatus they have set up, the elections they have called for, the appeal to the country that they have made, and to tell the people what Bolshevism is in a way that has not been possible (under bourgeois rule) outside of election times (not counting, of course, times of big strikes, when in Russia a *similar* apparatus for widespread popular agitation worked even more intensively). It is very difficult to do this in Western Europe and America, very, very difficult; but it can and must be done, because the tasks of Communism cannot be fulfilled without effort; and every effort must be made to fulfil the *practical* tasks, ever more varied, ever more connected with all branches of social life, *winning* branch after branch, sphere after sphere, *from the bourgeoisie*.

In England, also, it is necessary to organise in a new way (not in a Socialist manner but in a Communist manner, not in a reformist manner but in a revolutionary manner) the work of propaganda, agitation and organisation among the armed forces and among the oppressed and disfranchised nationalities in "one's own" state (Ireland, the colonies). Because all these spheres of social life, in the epoch of imperialism generally, and particularly now, after the war, which tortured the people and quickly opened their eyes to the truth (*viz.*, tens of millions killed and maimed only for the purpose of deciding whether the British or German pirates shall plunder the largest number of countries)—all these spheres of social life are particularly becoming filled with inflammable material and create numerous causes of conflict, crises and the intensification of the class struggle. We do not know and we cannot know which spark—out of the innumerable sparks that are flying around in all countries as a result of the economic and political world crisis—will kindle the conflagration, in the sense of specially rousing the masses, and we must, therefore, with the aid of our new, Communist principles, set to work to "stir up" all, even the oldest, mustiest and seemingly hopeless spheres, for otherwise we shall not be able to cope with our tasks, we shall not be all-sided, we shall not be able to master all arms and we shall not be prepared either for victory over the bourgeoisie (which ordered all sides of social life, and has now disturbed all sides of social life in a bourgeois way) or for the forthcoming Communist reorganisation of the whole of social life after the victory.

After the proletarian revolution in Russia and the international victories of this revolution, which the bourgeoisie and the philistines did not expect, the whole world has changed and everywhere the bourgeoisie has also changed. It is terrified by "Bolshevism," it is enraged against it almost to madness, and precisely for that reason it, on the one hand, is accelerating the progress of events, and on the

other, it is concentrating attention on the suppression of Bolshevism by force, and by that it is weakening its position in a number of other fields. The Communists in all advanced countries should take both these circumstances into consideration in their tactics.

When the Russian Cadets and Kerensky raised a mad hue-and-cry against the Bolsheviks—especially after April 1917, and more particularly in June and July 1917—they “overdid” it. Millions of copies of bourgeois papers, shouting in all keys against the Bolsheviks, helped to induce the masses to appraise Bolshevism; and, apart from the newspapers, the whole of public life was permeated with discussions about Bolshevism precisely because of the “zeal” of the bourgeoisie. At present, the millionaires of all countries are behaving, on an international scale, in such a manner as to deserve our heartiest thanks. They are hunting down Bolshevism with the same zeal as did Kerensky and Co.; they are “overdoing” it and *helping* us quite as much as did Kerensky. When the French bourgeoisie makes Bolshevism the central point of the election campaign, abusing the comparatively moderate or vacillating Socialists for being Bolsheviks; when the American bourgeoisie, having completely lost its head, seizes thousands and thousands of people on suspicion of Bolshevism and creates an atmosphere of panic, spreading broadcast alarming stories about Bolshevik plots; when the British bourgeoisie—the most “solid” in the world—in spite of all its wisdom and experience, commits acts of incredible stupidity, founds the most richly endowed “societies to combat Bolshevism,” creates a special literature on Bolshevism, and engages for the struggle against it an extra number of scientists, agitators and priests—we must bow and thank Messieurs the capitalists. They are working for us. They are helping us to get the masses interested in the question of the nature and significance of Bolshevism. And they cannot act otherwise; for they have *already* failed to stifle Bolshevism by “silence.”

But at the same time, the bourgeoisie sees practically only one side of Bolshevism, *viz.*, insurrection, violence, terror; it therefore strives to prepare itself especially for resistance and opposition in *this* field. It is possible that in single cases, in individual countries, and for more or less brief periods, it will succeed in this. We must reckon with such a possibility, and there will be absolutely nothing terrible for us if it does succeed. Communism “springs up” from positively all sides of social life. Its shoots are to be seen literally everywhere; the “contagion” (to use the favourite metaphor of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois police, the one that “pleases” them most) has very thoroughly permeated its organism and completely impregnated it. If one of the outlets is “stopped up” with special care, the “contagion” will find another, sometimes a very unexpected one. Life will assert itself. Let the bourgeoisie rave, work itself into a frenzy, overdo things, commit acts of stupidity, take vengeance on the Bolsheviks in advance and endeavour to kill off (in India, Hungary, Germany, etc.) hundreds, thousands, and hundreds of thousands more of yesterday’s and tomorrow’s Bolsheviks. Acting thus, the bourgeoisie acts as all classes doomed by history have acted. Communists should know that at all events the future belongs to them; therefore, we can, and must, combine the most intense passion in the great revolutionary struggle with the coolest and most sober estimation of the mad ravings of the

bourgeoisie. The Russian Revolution was cruelly defeated in 1905; the Russian Bolsheviks were defeated in July 1917;<sup>19</sup> by means of the artful provocations and cunning manoeuvres of Scheidemann and Noske, in conjunction with the bourgeoisie and monarchist generals, over 15,000 German Communists were slaughtered; white terror is raging in Finland and Hungary. But in all cases and in all countries Communism is becoming steeled and is growing; its roots are so deep that persecution does not weaken, does not debilitate it; rather does it strengthen it. Only one thing is lacking to enable us to march forward more surely and more firmly to victory, namely, the full and completely thought out appreciation by all Communists in all countries of the necessity of displaying the utmost *flexibility* in their tactics. Magnificently developing Communism, particularly in the advanced countries, now lacks this appreciation and the ability to apply it in practice.

The experience of leaders of the Second International, highly erudite Marxists who were devoted to Socialism, such as Kautsky, Otto Bauer and others could (and should) serve as a useful lesson. They fully appreciated the need for flexible tactics; they learned and taught Marxian dialectics (and much of what they have done in this respect will forever remain a valuable contribution to Socialist literature); but *in the application* of these dialectics they committed such a mistake, or, rather, proved in practice to be so *undialectical*, so incapable of taking into account the rapid change of forms and the rapid filling of old forms with new content, that their fate is not much more enviable than that of Hyndman, Guesde and Plekhanov. The main reason for their bankruptcy was that they "concentrated their gaze" on one definite form of growth of the working class movement and of Socialism, they forgot all about the one-sidedness of this form, they were afraid of seeing the sharp break which, by virtue of objective conditions, became inevitable, and continued to repeat the simple, routine, and at first glance, incontestable truths, such as: "three is more than two." But politics is more like algebra than arithmetic; it is more like higher than lower mathematics. In reality, all the old forms of the Socialist movement have been filled with a new content, and, consequently, a new sign, the "minus" sign, appeared in front of all figures; but our wiseacres stubbornly continued (and continue) to persuade themselves and others that "minus three" is more than "minus two"!

We must see to it that the Communists do not repeat the same mistake, only the other way round; or rather, we must see to it that the *same mistake* only the other way round that is committed by the "Left" Communists is corrected as soon as possible and is overcome as quickly and as painlessly as possible. It is not only Right doctrinairism that is a mistake; Left doctrinairism is also a mistake. Of course, at the present moment, the mistake of Left doctrinairism in Communism is a thousand times less dangerous and less significant than the mistake of Right doctrinairism (*i. e.*, social-chauvinism and Kautskyism); but after all, this is only due to the fact that Left Communism is a very young trend, and that it is only just coming into being. It is only for this reason that, given certain conditions, the disease can be easily cured; and it is necessary to set to work to cure it with the utmost energy.

<sup>19</sup> For further particulars about the July days see, *Selected Works*, Vol. VI, pp. 183-89.—*Ed.*

The old forms have burst, for it turned out that their new content—anti-proletarian and reactionary—had obtained inordinate development. We now have what from the standpoint of the development of international Communism is such a lasting, strong and powerful content of work (for the Soviet power, for the dictatorship of the proletariat) that it can *and must* manifest itself in every form, both new and old; that it can and must regenerate, conquer and subjugate all forms, not only the new, but also the old—not for the purpose of reconciling itself with the old, but for the purpose of converting all and sundry forms, new and old, into a weapon for the complete, final, decisive and irrevocable victory of Communism.

The Communists must exert every effort to direct the working class movement, and social development in general, along the straightest and quickest way to the universal victory of the Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is an incontestable truth. But it is enough to take one little step further—a step that seems to be in the same direction—and truth is transformed into error! To say, as the German and British Left Communists say, that we recognise only one road, only the straight road, that we do not agree with tacking, manoeuvring, compromise—would be a mistake, which may cause, and which, in part, has caused, and is causing, very serious harm to Communism. Right doctrinairism persisted in recognising only old forms, and became totally bankrupt, for it did not perceive the new content. Left doctrinairism persists in the unconditional repudiation of certain old forms and fails to see that the new content is forcing its way through all and sundry forms, that it is our duty as Communists to master all forms, to learn how to supplement with the maximum rapidity one form with another, to substitute one for another, and to adopt our tactics to every change that is called forth by something other than our class, or our efforts.

World revolution has received such a powerful impetus and acceleration from the horrors, atrocities and abominations of the world imperialist war and from the hopelessness of the situation created thereby, this revolution is spreading widely and deeply with such supreme rapidity, with such a splendid variety of changing forms, with such an instructive, practical refutation of all doctrinairism, that there is every ground for hoping for the rapid and complete recovery of the international Communist movement from the infantile disorder of "Left-wing" Communism.

(April 27, 1920.)

## 5. THE TASKS OF THE YOUTH LEAGUES

**NOTE.**—In this speech to the Young Communist League Lenin laid down the principle that morality in the Communist movement must be independent of any other morality and must be "entirely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat."

*Speech Delivered at the Third All-Russian Congress of the Russian Young Communist League, October 2, 1920*

Comrades, I should like today to discuss the fundamental tasks of the Young Communist League, and in connection with this subject I should like to discuss what, in general, the youth organisations should be like in a Socialist republic.

It is all the more necessary to deal with this question for the reason that, in a certain sense, we may say that it is precisely the youth who are confronted with the real task of creating Communist society. Clearly, the generation of workers that was brought up in capitalist society can at best fulfil the tasks of abolishing the foundations of the old, capitalist, social life based on exploitation. At best it can fulfil the task of creating a social system that will help the proletariat and the toiling classes to retain power and to lay a firm foundation on which only the generation that is starting to work under the new conditions, under conditions in which exploiting relations between men no longer exist, can build.

And so, in approaching the tasks of the youth from this point of view, I must say that the tasks of the youth in general, and of the Young Communist League and all other organisations in particular may be summed up in one word: learn.

Of course, this is only "one word." It does not answer the most important and material questions: to learn what; and how to learn? The whole point here is that, simultaneously with the transformation of the old capitalist society, tuition, the training and education of the new generation that will create Communist society, cannot be conducted on the old lines. The tuition, training and education of the youth must be based on the material that was bequeathed to us by the old society. We can build Communism only on the sum of knowledge, organisations and institutions, only on the stock of human forces and means left to us by the old society. Only by radically remoulding the work of instructing, organising and training the youth shall we be able to ensure that the result of the efforts of the young generation will be the creation of a society unlike the old, *i. e.*, of Communist society. That is why we must deal in detail with the question of what we should teach the youth, and of how the youth should learn if it really wants to justify its title of Communist youth; of how it should be trained in order to be able to complete the building of what we have started.

I must say that the first and most natural reply would seem to be that the Young Communist League, and the youth as a whole, which wants to pass to Communism, should learn Communism.

But this reply—"learn Communism"—is too general. What do we need in order to learn Communism? What must be singled out from the whole sum of general knowledge in order to acquire a knowledge of Communism? Here a number of dangers arise, which often confront us when the task of learning Communism is presented incorrectly, or when it is interpreted too one-sidedly.

Naturally, the first thought that enters one's mind is that learning Communism means imbibing the sum of knowledge that is contained in Communist textbooks, pamphlets and books. But such a definition of the study of Communism would be crude and inadequate. If the study of Communism consisted entirely of imbibing what is contained in Communist books and pamphlets, we would too easily obtain Communist text-jugglers or braggarts, and this would very often cause us harm and loss, because those who had learnt by rote what is contained in Communist books and pamphlets, would prove incapable of combining all this knowledge, and would prove incapable of acting in the way Communism really demands.

One of the greatest evils and misfortunes bequeathed to us by the old capitalist society is the complete separation of books from practical life; for we had books in which everything was described in the most attractive manner, and in the majority of cases these books contained the most disgusting, hypocritical lies, and described Communist society falsely. That is why the mere routine absorption of what is written in books about Communism would be extremely wrong. In our speeches and articles we do not now merely repeat what was previously said about Communism, because our speeches and articles are connected with daily and all-sided work. Without work, without struggle, a book knowledge of Communism obtained from Communist books and works would be worthless, for it would continue the old separation of theory from practice, the old separation that was the most disgusting feature of the old bourgeois society.

It would be still more dangerous if we began to learn only Communist slogans. If we did not realise this danger in time and if we did not direct all our efforts to avert this danger, the half a million or million boys and girls who call themselves Communists after learning Communism in this way would only damage the cause of Communism very considerably.

Here the question arises: how should we combine all this in order to learn Communism? What must we take from the old school, from the old science? The old school declared that its aim was to give a versatile education, to teach science in general. We know that this was utterly false, for the whole of society was based and maintained on the division of men into classes, into exploiters and oppressed. Naturally, the old school, being thoroughly imbued with the class spirit, imparted knowledge only to the children of the bourgeoisie. Every word was adapted to the interests of the bourgeoisie. In these schools the young generation of workers and peasants were not educated: their minds were stuffed with things that were to the interest of that bourgeoisie. They were trained to become their obedient servants who could create profits for them and not disturb their peace and idleness. That is why, rejecting the old school, we have set ourselves the aim of taking from it only what we require in order to secure a real Communist education.

This brings me to the reproaches and accusations which we constantly hear about the old school, and which very often had to totally wrong conclusions. It is said that the old school was a school for learning by rote, in which knowledge was drilled into the pupils. That is true; nevertheless, we must distinguish between what was bad in the old school and what was useful for us, and we must be able to choose from it what is necessary for Communism.

The old school was a school for learning by rote; it compelled pupils to imbibe a mass of useless, superfluous, barren knowledge which clogged the brain, and which transformed the young generation into officials all of one pattern, as it were. But you would be committing a great mistake if you attempted to draw the conclusion that one can become a Communist without acquiring what human knowledge has accumulated. It would be a mistake to believe that it is sufficient to learn Communist slogans, the conclusions of Communist science, and that it is not necessary to acquire the sum of knowledge of which Communism itself is a consequence. Marxism is an example of how Communism arose out of the sum total of human knowledge.

You have read and heard that Communist theory, the science of Communism, mainly created by Marx, the doctrines of Marxism, have ceased to be the product of a single Socialist of the nineteenth century, even though he was a genius, and that they have become the doctrines of millions and tens of millions of proletarians all over the world who are applying them in their struggle against capitalism. And if you asked, "Why were the doctrines of Marx able to capture the hearts of millions and tens of millions of the most revolutionary class?" the only answer you would receive would be: It was because Marx took his stand on the firm foundation of human knowledge which had been gained under capitalism. After studying the laws of development of human society, Marx realised that the development of capitalism was inevitably leading to Communism. And the principal thing is that he proved this only on the basis of the most exact, most detailed, most profound study of this capitalist society, with the aid of preceding knowledge, which he had thoroughly assimilated. He critically studied all that had been created by human society, and did not ignore a single point of it. He studied all that had been created by the human mind, subjected it to criticism, tested it on the working class movement, and arrived at conclusions which those who were restricted within bourgeois limits, or bound by bourgeois prejudices, could not arrive at.

This is what we must bear in mind when we talk about proletarian culture, for example. Unless we clearly understand that only by an exact knowledge of the culture created by the whole development of mankind, that only by re-working this culture, is it possible to build proletarian culture, unless this is understood, we shall not be able to solve our problem. Proletarian culture is not something that has sprung from nowhere, it is not an invention of those who call themselves experts in proletarian culture. That is all nonsense. Proletarian culture must be the result of the natural development of the stores of knowledge which mankind has accumulated under the yoke of capitalist society, landlord society and bureaucratic society. All these roads and paths have led, are leading, and continue to lead, to proletarian culture in the same way as the political economy re-worked by Marx showed us what human society must arrive at, showed us the transition to the class struggle, to the beginning of the proletarian revolution.

When we sometimes hear representatives of the youth and certain advocates of a new system of education attacking the old school and saying that it taught by rote, we say to them that we must take what was good in the old school. We must not take from the old school the system whereby the young man's mind was crammed with knowledge nine-tenths of which was useless and one-tenth of which was distorted. But this does not mean that we must confine ourselves to Communist conclusions and learn only Communist slogans. We shall not create Communism by this means. One can become a Communist only when one enriches one's mind with the knowledge of all the wealth created by mankind.

Learning by rote is of no use to us, but we must develop and perfect the mind of every student with a knowledge of the main facts. Communism would become a void, would become a mere signboard, the Communist would be a mere braggart if all the knowledge he has

obtained were not mentally digested. You must not only assimilate this knowledge but assimilate it critically, so that your mind is not crammed with useless lumber but enriched with all the facts that are indispensable for the modern man of education. If a Communist took it into his head to boast about his Communism on the basis of the ready-made conclusions he has obtained without having put in a great deal of serious and hard work, without understanding the facts which he must examine critically, he would be a very deplorable Communist. Such superficiality would be decidedly fatal. If I know that I know little I will strive to learn more; but if a man says that he is a Communist and that he need know nothing thoroughly, he will never be anything like a Communist.

The old school turned out servants which the capitalists needed; the old school transformed men of science into men who had to write and say what pleased the capitalists. That means that we must abolish it. But does the fact that we must abolish it, destroy it, mean that we must not take from it all that mankind has accumulated for the benefit of men? Does that mean that it is not our duty to distinguish between what was necessary for capitalism and what is necessary for Communism?

For the old drill-sergeant methods that were employed in bourgeois society in opposition to the will of the majority, we shall substitute the class conscious discipline of the workers and peasants who combine their hatred for the old society with the determination, the ability and the readiness to unite and organise their forces for this fight, to transform the wills of millions and hundreds of millions who are disunited, dispersed and scattered over the territory of a huge country, into a single will; for without that single will we shall inevitably be defeated. Without this solidarity, without this class conscious discipline of the workers and peasants, our cause would be hopeless. Without this we shall be unable to conquer the capitalists and landlords of the whole world. We shall not even be able to consolidate the foundation let alone build the new Communist society on this foundation. Similarly, in rejecting the old school, bearing a legitimate and necessary hatred for the old school, prizing the readiness to destroy the old school, we must understand that in place of the old system of tuition, in place of the old system of memorising, the old drilling methods, we must put the ability to take for ourselves the sum total of human knowledge and to take it in such a way that Communism shall not be something learnt by rote, but something that you yourselves have thought over, that it shall be an inevitable conclusion from the point of view of modern education.

That is how we must present the main tasks when we speak of the task of learning Communism.

In order to explain this to you and at the same time to take up the question of how to learn, I will give you a practical example. You all know that following the military tasks, the tasks of protecting the republic, we are now confronted with economic tasks. We know that Communist society cannot be built up unless we rebuild industry and agriculture, and these cannot be rebuilt in the old way. They must be rebuilt on a modern basis, according to the last word of science. You know that this basis is electricity, that only when the whole country, all branches of industry and agriculture have been



electrified, only when you have mastered this task, will you be able to build up for yourselves the Communist society which the old generation cannot build. We are confronted with the task of economically regenerating the whole country, of reorganising, restoring both agriculture and industry on a modern technical basis, which rests on modern science, on technique, on electricity. You understand perfectly well that illiterate people are unsuitable for electrification, and even the mere ability to read and write is inadequate. It is not enough to understand what electricity is; it is necessary to know how to apply it to industry and to agriculture, and to the various branches of industry and agriculture. We must learn this ourselves, and teach it to the whole of the younger generation of toilers. This is the task that confronts every class conscious Communist, every young man who regards himself as a Communist and who clearly understands that, having joined the Young Communist League, he has pledged himself to help the Party to build Communism and to help the whole of the young generation to build Communist society. He must understand that he can build this only on the basis of modern education; and if he does not acquire this education Communism will remain a pious wish.

The task that confronted the old generation was that of overthrowing the bourgeoisie. The main task in their day was to criticise the bourgeoisie, to rouse the hatred of the masses towards them, to develop the class consciousness of the masses and their ability to combine their forces. The new generation is confronted with a much more complicated task. Not only have you to combine all your forces to protect the rule of the workers and peasants against the attacks of the capitalists: that you must do; that you understand perfectly; the Communist sees this distinctly before him. But this is not enough. You must build up Communist society. In many respects the first half of the work is done. The old is destroyed, as it deserved to be destroyed; it has been transformed into a heap of ruins, as it deserved to be. The ground has been cleared, and on this ground the young Communist generation must build Communist society. You are confronted with the task of construction, and you will be able to cope with it only if you master all modern knowledge, and if you are able to transform Communism from ready-made, memorised formulae, counsels, recipes, prescriptions and programmes into that living thing which unites your immediate work; if you are able to transform Communism into a guide for your practical work.

This is the task by which you should be guided in the work of educating, training and rousing the whole of the young generation. You must be in the front ranks of the millions of builders of Communist society, and every young man and young woman should be such a builder. Unless you enlist the whole mass of young workers and peasants in the work of building Communist society you will not succeed in building it.

Naturally, this brings me to the question of how we should teach Communism and what are the specific features of our methods.

Here, first of all, I will deal with the question of Communist ethics.

You must train yourselves to become Communists. The task of the Young Communist League is to organise its practical activities in such a way that, in learning, organising, uniting and fighting, it

shall train its members and all those who look upon it as their leader, train them to become Communists. The whole object of the training, education and tuition of the youth of today should be to imbue them with Communist ethics.

But is there such a thing as Communist ethics? Is there such a thing as Communist morality? Of course there is. Often it is made to appear that we have no ethics of our own; and very often the bourgeoisie accuse us Communists of repudiating all ethics. This is a method of shuffling concepts, of throwing dust in the eyes of the workers and peasants.

In what sense do we repudiate ethics and morality?

In the sense that they were preached by the bourgeoisie, who declared that ethics were God's commandments. We, of course, say that we do not believe in God, and that we know perfectly well that the clergy, the landlords and the bourgeoisie spoke in the name of God in order to pursue their own exploiters' interests. Or, instead of deducing these ethics from the commandments of morality, from the commandments of God, they deduced them from idealistic or semi-idealistic phrases, which were always very similar to God's commandments.

We repudiate all morality that is taken outside of human, class concepts. We say that this is deception, a fraud, which clogs the brains of the workers and peasants in the interests of the landlords and capitalists.

We say that our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. Our morality is deduced from the class struggle of the proletariat.

The old society was based on the oppression of all the workers and peasants by the landlords and capitalists. We had to destroy this, we had to overthrow this; but for this we had to create unity. God will not create such unity.

This unity could be created only by the factories and works, only by the proletariat, trained, and roused from its age-long slumber; only when that class was formed did the mass movement begin which led to what we see now—the victory of the proletariat revolution in one of the weakest countries in the world, a country which for three years has repelled the attacks of the bourgeoisie of the whole world. And we see that the proletarian revolution is growing all over the world. We now say, on the basis of experience, that the proletariat alone could create the compact force that could take the lead of the disunited and scattered peasantry, that could withstand all the attacks of the exploiters. This class alone can help the toiling masses to unite, to rally and completely withstand all attacks upon, completely consolidate and completely build up, Communist society.

That is why we say that for us there is no such thing as morality taken outside of human society; such a morality is a fraud. For us, morality is subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat.

What is this class struggle? It is—overthrowing the tsar, overthrowing the capitalists, abolishing the capitalist class.

And what are classes in general? Classes are that which permits one section of society to appropriate the labour of another section. If one section of society appropriates all the land, we have a land-

lord class and a peasant class. If one section of society possesses the factories and works, has shares and capital, and the other section works in these factories, we have a capitalist class and a proletarian class.

It was easy to kick out the tsar—only a few days were required for that. It was not very difficult to kick out the landlords—we succeeded in doing that in a few months. Nor was it difficult to kick out the capitalists. But it is much more difficult to abolish classes; we still have the division into workers and peasants. If the peasant is settled on a plot of land and appropriates to himself superfluous grain, that is, grain that he does not need for himself or for his cattle, while all the rest of the people have to go without grain, then the peasant becomes an exploiter. The more grain he clings to, the more profit he can make; as for the rest, let them starve. He says to himself: "The more they starve, the higher the price at which I can sell my grain." Everybody should work according to a common plan, on common land, in common factories and works, under common management. Is it easy to bring this about? You see that it is not as easy as kicking out the tsar, the landlords and the capitalists. In order to achieve this the proletariat must re-educate, re-train a section of the peasantry; it must win over to its side those of them who are toiling peasants, in order to crush the resistance of those peasants who are rich and make profit out of the poverty and want of the rest. Hence, the object of the proletarian struggle has not yet been achieved by the fact that we have overthrown the tsar and have kicked out the landlords and capitalists; and this is precisely the object of the system which we call the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The class struggle is still proceeding; it has merely changed its forms. It is the class struggle of the proletariat to prevent the return of the old exploiters, to unite the scattered masses of ignorant peasants into one union. The class struggle is still proceeding, and our task is to subordinate everything to the interests of this struggle. And we subordinate our Communist morality to this task. We say: Morality is that which serves to destroy the old exploiting society and to unite all the toilers around the proletariat, which is creating a new Communist society.

Communist morality is the morality which serves this struggle, which unites the toilers against all exploitation, against all small property, for small property puts into the hands of one person what has been created by the labour of the whole of society. The land in our country is common property.

But suppose I take a piece of this common land and grow twice as much grain as I need and speculate with the surplus? Suppose I argue that the more starving people there are, the more I will get for my grain? Would I then behave like a Communist? No. I would behave like an exploiter, like a property-owner. This must be combated. If this is allowed to go on, everything will slip back to the rule of the capitalists, to the rule of the bourgeoisie, as has happened more than once in previous revolutions. And in order to prevent the restoration of the rule of the capitalists and the bourgeoisie we must put a stop to this huckstering, we must prevent individuals from enriching themselves at the expense of the rest; the toilers must unite with the proletariat and form a Communist society.

This is the principal specific feature of the fundamental task of the Young Communist League and of its local organisations.

The old society was based on the principle: "Rob or be robbed, work for others or make others work for you, be a slave-owner or a slave." Naturally, people brought up in such a society imbibe with their mother's milk, so to speak, the psychology, the habit, the concept: "Either a slave-owner or a slave, or a small owner, a small employee, a small official, an intellectual—in short, a man who only looks after himself, and does not care a scrap about anyone else."

I own this plot of land and I do not care a scrap about anyone else; if the others starve, all the better, the more will I be able to get for my grain. I have a job as a doctor, or an engineer, or a teacher, or a clerk, and I do not care about anyone else. Perhaps, if I toady to and please the powers that be I shall keep my job and even climb up into the ranks of the bourgeoisie. A Communist cannot have such a psychology and such sentiments. When the workers and peasants proved that they were able by their own efforts to defend themselves and create a new society, a new Communist upbringing began, an upbringing in the midst of the struggle against the exploiters, an upbringing in alliance with the proletariat against the self-seekers and small owners, against the psychology and habits which say, "I seek my own profit and I do not care about anyone else."

This is the reply to the question of how the young, rising generation should learn Communism.

It can learn Communism only by linking up every step in its studies, training and education with the continuous struggle the proletarians and the toilers are waging against the old exploiting society. When people talk to us about morality we say: For the Communist, morality consists entirely of compact united discipline and conscious mass struggle against the exploiters. We do not believe in eternal morality, and we expose all the fables about morality. Morality serves the purpose of helping human society to rise to a higher level and to abolish the exploitation of labour.

In order to achieve this we must have the young generation which began to awaken to conscious life in the midst of the disciplined, desperate struggle against the bourgeoisie. In this struggle it will train genuine Communists, to this struggle it must subordinate, and with it must link up, every step in its studies, education and training. The upbringing of the Communist youth must not consist of all sorts of sentimental speeches and moral precepts. This is not upbringing. When people see how their fathers and mothers lived under the yoke of the landlords and capitalists, when they themselves experience the sufferings of those who started the struggle against the exploiters, when they see the sacrifice entailed by the continuation of this struggle in order to hold what has been won, and when they see what frenzied foes the landlords and capitalists are—they, in this environment, receive a Communist upbringing. At the basis of Communist morality lies the struggle for the consolidation and consummation of Communism. That also is the basis of Communist training, education and tuition. That is the reply to the question of how to learn Communism.

We would not believe in learning, training and education if they were confined to the school and isolated from seething life. As long

as the workers and peasants are oppressed by the landlords and capitalists, and as long as the schools remain in the hands of the landlords and capitalists, the young generation remains blind and ignorant. But our schools must impart to the youth the fundamentals of knowledge, must train them to be able to work out Communist views independently; they must make educated people of them. At the same time, as long as they attend school, the school must make them participants in the struggle for emancipation from the exploiters. The Young Communist League will justify its name as the league of the young Communist generation when it links up every step in its tuition, training and education with participation in the general struggle of all the toilers against the exploiters; for you know perfectly well that as long as Russia remains the only workers' republic and the old bourgeois system continues in the rest of the world, we shall be weaker than they, we shall be under the constant menace of attack. Only if we learn to be compact and united shall we win in future struggles, and, having become stronger, become really invincible. Thus, to be a Communist means that you must organise and unite the whole of the rising generation and set an example of training and discipline in this struggle. Then you will be able to start building the edifice of Communist society and bring it to completion.

In order to make this clearer to you I will quote an example. We call ourselves Communists. What is a Communist? The word Communist is derived from the Latin word for "common." Communist society is a society in which all things—the land, the factories—are owned in common. Communism means working in common.

Is it possible to work in common if each works on a separate plot of land? Common labour cannot be created all at once. It does not drop from the skies. It comes as a result of toil and suffering. It is created in the course of the struggle. Old books are of no use for this; no one will believe them. One's own living experience is required. When Kolchak and Denikin were marching from Siberia and the South the peasants were on their side. They did not like Bolshevism because the Bolsheviks took their grain at a fixed price. But when the peasants experienced the rule of Kolchak and Denikin in Siberia and the Ukraine, they realised that they had only one alternative: either to go to the capitalist, and he would at once hand them over into slavery to the landlords; or to follow the workers, who, it is true, do not promise a land flowing with milk and honey, who demand iron discipline and staunchness in the arduous struggle, but who will lead them out of slavery to the capitalists and landlords. When even the ignorant peasants realized and saw this as a result of their own experience, after having passed through a stern school, they became conscious adherents of Communism. It is such experience that the Young Communist League must lay at the basis of all its activities.

I have replied to the question of what we must learn, what we must take from the old school and from the old science. I will now try to answer the question of how we must learn this. The answer is: only by inseparably linking up every step in the activities of the school, every step in training, education and tuition, with the struggle of the toilers against the exploiters.

I will quote a few examples from the experience of the work of one or another of the youth organizations to illustrate how the learning of Communism should proceed. Everybody is talking about abolishing illiteracy. You know that it is impossible to build Communist society in a country in which the people are illiterate. It is not enough for the Soviet government to issue an order, or for the Party to issue a definite slogan, or even to assign a certain number of the best workers for this work. The young generation itself must take up this work. Communism means that the youth, the young men and women who belong to the Young Communist League, shall say: This is our job. We shall unite and go into the country to abolish illiteracy, so that there shall be no illiterates among our rising generation. We should like to see the rising youth devote their activities to this work. You know that it will not be possible to transform ignorant, illiterate Russia into a literate country quickly. But if the Young Communist League sets to work on it, if all the young men and women work for the benefit of all, the League, which has a membership of 400,000 young men and women, will have a right to call itself the Young Communist League. One of the tasks of the League is, after having acquired certain knowledge, to help those young people who cannot by their own efforts liberate themselves from the gloom of illiteracy. Being a member of the Young Communist League means giving one's labour, giving one's efforts to the common cause. That is what Communist education means. Only by performing such work does a young man or woman become a real Communist. Only if they achieve practical results in this work will they become Communists.

Take, for example, work on the suburban vegetable farms. It is one of the tasks of the Young Communist League. The people are starving; there is starvation in the factories and works. In order to put a stop to starvation, vegetable gardens ought to be developed; but agriculture is being carried on in the old way. The more class conscious elements should take this up; if they did, you would find that the number of vegetable gardens would increase, their area would grow, and we would get better results. The Young Communist League should take an active part in this. Every local League organization should regard this as its job.

The Young Communist League should be the shock group which, in every job that has to be done, gives a hand, displays initiative, makes the start. The League should be such that any worker may see that it consists of people whose doctrines he may not understand, whose doctrines he may not immediately adopt, but whose practical work, whose activities, prove to him that they are the people who are showing him the right road.

If the Young Communist League fails to organise its work in this way in all spheres, it will show that it is slipping into the old bourgeois road. We must combine our training with the struggle of the toilers against the exploiters in order to help the former to fulfill the tasks that logically follow from the doctrines of Communism.

The members of the League should spend every spare hour on the vegetable gardens in order to improve them; or on organising the education of young people in some factory, works, etc. We want to transform Russia from a poverty-stricken and wretched country into

a wealthy country. And so the Young Communist League must combine its education, its tuition, its training with the labour of the workers and peasants, and not shut itself up in its schools and confine itself to reading Communist books and pamphlets. Only by working side by side with the workers and peasants is it possible to become a genuine Communist. Everyone must be able to see that all those who belong to the Young Communist League are literate and at the same time are able to work. When everyone sees that we have driven the old drill methods from the school and substituted class conscious discipline for them, that every young man and woman takes part in subbotniks, that they utilise every vegetable garden to help the people—the people will cease to look upon labour as they looked upon it before.

One of the tasks of the Young Communist League is to render assistance in the village or block in which the members live in the matter of—I will take a small example—cleanliness and distribution of food. How was this done in the old capitalist society? Everybody worked for himself, and no one cared whether there were any sick or aged, or whether all the housework fell on the shoulders of the women, who, as a result, were in a state of oppression and slavery. Whose business is it to fight against this? It is the business of the Young Communist League, which must say: We shall change all this, we shall organise detachments of young people who will help to maintain cleanliness, or help to distribute food, make systematic house-to-house inspections; who will work in an organised manner for the benefit of the whole of society, properly distribute its forces and prove that labour must be organised.

The generation which is now about fifty years old cannot count on seeing Communist society. This generation will die out before Communist society is established. But the generation which is now fifteen years old will see Communist society, and will itself build it. And it must realise that the whole purpose of its life is to build this society. In the old society, work was carried on by separate families, and nobody united them except the landlords and the capitalists, who oppressed the masses of the people. We must organise all labour, no matter how dirty and arduous it may be, so that every worker and peasant may regard himself as part of the great army of free labour and feel convinced that he will be able to build up his life without the landlords and capitalists, will be able to establish the Communist system. The Young Communist League must train the masses for conscious and disciplined labour when they are still young, from the age of twelve. That is what will enable us to count on being able to solve the problems that now confront us. We must reckon that not less than ten years will be required for the electrification of the country, so that our impoverished land may be served with the latest achievements of technique. And so, the generation which is now fifteen years old, and which in ten or twenty years' time will be living in Communist society, must arrange all their tasks of tuition in such a way that every day, in every village, and in every city, the young people shall engage in the practical solution of the problems of common labour, even of the smallest, even of the most simple kind. To the extent that this is done in every village, to the extent that Communist competition is developed, to the extent that the youth prove that they

are able to unite their labour, to that extent will the success of Communist construction be ensured. Only by regarding every step one takes from the point of view of the success of this construction, only if we ask ourselves whether we have done all we can to be united, conscious toilers, only by passing through this prolonged process, will the Young Communist League unite its half a million members into a single army of labour and win universal respect.

## 6. THE FOUNDATIONS OF LENINISM

NOTE.—Stalin in 1924 gave several lectures at Sverdlov University on the foundations of Leninism. These lectures are the chief basis of his stature as a Communist thinker. They are also of especial interest as the clearest of all Communist statements on the importance of theory, the dependence of strategy and tactics upon theory, and the problems of intellectual method confronting revolutionary leadership. Also the remarks on the dictatorship of the proletariat as a "new democracy" go far to explain many recent occurrences. The most important sections are here given in full, with short excerpts from some of the others.

### INTRODUCTION

THE foundations of Leninism: it is a big subject. To expound it thoroughly, a whole volume, or several, would be needed. Obviously, then, the present exposition cannot possibly be exhaustive. At best, it can be nothing more than an outline of the foundations of Leninism. Nevertheless, it may be of considerable use.

An exposition of the foundations of Leninism is a different thing from an exposition of the foundations of Lenin's philosophy. Lenin is a Marxist, so of course his philosophy is based upon Marxism. But this does not mean that an account of Leninism ought to begin with an account of the foundations of Marxism. To expound Leninism means to expound what is distinctive in the work of Lenin, what new thing Lenin brought to Marxism, what is particularly connected with Lenin's name. Only in this sense shall I speak here of the foundations of Leninism.

What, then, is Leninism?

According to some, it is the application of Marxism to the peculiar conditions of Russia. This definition contains only part of the truth, not the whole. It is true that Lenin applied Marxism to the Russian situation, and that his application was masterly. But if Leninism were nothing more than the application of Marxism to the peculiar conditions of Russia, it would have a purely Russian and exclusively national character. Nevertheless, as we know, Leninism is an international phenomenon. It is rooted in internationalism, and is not solely Russian. That is why the foregoing definition is too narrow.

Others declare that Leninism is a revival of the Marxism of the late forties, as contrasted with the Marxism of subsequent years, which (they contend) became "moderate", and lost its revolutionary fire. Although it is stupid to split up Marx's teaching in this way into "revolutionary Marxism" and "moderate Marxism", we have to admit that the second definition of Leninism, for all its inadequacy, likewise embodies part of the truth. It is a fact that Lenin brought to light once more the revolutionary content of Marxism, which had been glossed over by the opportunists of the Second International. But that is only a fragment of the truth. The whole truth is that Lenin-



ism is not merely a revival of Marxism, but is a step forward. Leninism is a development of Marxism adapting it to the new conditions of capitalism and to the class struggle of the proletariat.

What, then, is Leninism?

Leninism is the Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and of the proletarian revolution. To be more precise: Leninism is the theory and the tactic of the proletarian revolution in general and the theory and the tactic of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular. Marx and Engels lived in a prerevolutionary period,<sup>20</sup> when imperialism was still in an embryonic condition, when the workers were only preparing for the revolution, when the proletarian revolution had not yet become an immediate and practical necessity. Lenin, the disciple of Marx and Engels, lived in a period of fully developed imperialism; in a period when the proletarian revolution was already under way; in a period when the proletarian revolution had already triumphed in one country, had made an end of bourgeois democracy, and had begun the era of proletarian democracy, the era of soviets.

That is why I describe Leninism as a development of Marxism.

It is usual to point out that Leninism is preeminently combative and revolutionary. There are two reasons why Leninism has these peculiar characteristics. First of all, Leninism issued from the proletarian revolution, and therefore necessarily bears the imprint of that revolution. Secondly, Leninism originated and grew strong in conflict with the opportunism of the Second International—a conflict essential to success in the struggle against capitalism. We must never forget that between the epoch of Marx and Engels and the epoch of Lenin came the epoch when the opportunism of the Second International held unrestricted sway; and that a ruthless fight with this opportunism was one of Lenin's chief tasks.

## I. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF LENINISM

Leninism has grown and become established in the age of imperialism, when the conflicts within capitalism have reached a climax, when the proletarian revolution has become a question of practical politics, when the period of working-class preparation for the revolution is passing into that in which the capitalist fortress is being stormed.

Lenin spoke of imperialism as "capitalism on its death-bed". Why? Because imperialism carries the conflicts inherent in capitalism to their farthest limits, beyond which the revolution begins. Among the most important contradictions of the capitalist system, special mention may be made of the three following:

*First Contradiction.*—The conflict between labour and capital. Imperialism means the omnipotence of monopolist trusts and syndicates, of banks and the financial oligarchy, in industrial countries. The usual methods of the working-class struggle (trade unions, cooperatives, parliamentary parties, and the fight in parliament) are unable to cope with this omnipotence. The workers are now faced by two alternatives: either they must surrender to capitalism, vegetating and degenerating more and more; or else they must arm themselves with

<sup>20</sup> When I use the word "prerevolutionary," I am thinking only of the proletarian revolution.

new weapons. Thus imperialism ripens the working class for the revolution.

*Second Contradiction.*—The conflict between the various financial groups and the different imperialist powers in their competition for control of the sources of raw material, for foreign territory. Imperialism is the export of capital to the sources of raw material; a pitiless struggle for monopolist ownership of these sources; a fight for the redistribution of the spoils in a world which has already been shared out; a fight which is waged with especial savagery by new financial groups and powers seeking "a place in the sun," against old-established groups and powers retaining a firm grip on their acquisitions. Imperialist wars, wars for the seizure of foreign territory, are the inevitable outcome of these capitalist rivalries. Such wars, in their turn, result in the weakening of the imperialists by one another, and lead to the general weakening of the capitalist position; they hasten the coming of the proletarian revolution, and make it practically inevitable.

*Third Contradiction.*—The conflict between the small group of dominant "civilised" nations, on the one hand, and the hundreds of millions of persons who make up the colonial and dependent peoples of the world, on the other. Imperialism means the most shameless exploitation and the most inhuman oppression of the hundreds of millions who comprise the populations of the colonies and dependencies. Gain, the drawing of large profits—that is the object of the exploitation and oppression. But, in order to exploit these countries effectively, the imperialists have to construct railways in them, to build factories, to establish industrial and commercial centres. This policy inevitably leads to the formation of a proletariat, to the appearance of a class of native intellectuals, to the awakening of national consciousness, to the strengthening of the movement for national independence. In evidence of these changes, there occurs a strengthening of the revolutionary movement in all colonies and dependencies. Such changes are of the utmost importance to the proletariat, for they undermine the position of capitalism. The colonies and dependencies, which have hitherto been imperialist reserves, become proletarian reserves—reserve forces of the proletarian revolution.

Such are the chief among the contradictions inherent in imperialism; and it is due to them that capitalism, once flourishing, is now moribund.

The historical significance of the great war, the imperialist war, was (among other things) that it concentrated these conflicts, and brought them simultaneously into play, thus facilitating and accelerating the revolutionary battles of the proletariat.

In other words, the growth of imperialism has not only made the revolution a practical necessity; it has also created conditions favourable to an immediate onslaught on the strongholds of capitalism.

It was in this international situation that Leninism took its rise.

"That is all very fine," we are told. "But where does Russia come in—Russia, which is not and cannot be one of the countries where imperialism has assumed a typical form? What has Lenin got to do with it, seeing that Lenin worked primarily in Russia and for Russia? Why has Russia been the birthplace of Leninism, the birthplace of the theory and the practice of the proletarian revolution?"

The reason is that Russia has been the focus of the three great contradictions of imperialism.

The reason is that Russia was ripe for the revolution, more ripe than any other country in the world. Russia was the only land ready to solve the three contradictions by means of revolution.

First of all, every kind of oppression—capitalist, colonial, and military—was trife in tsarist Russia; and in tsarist Russia these kinds of oppression took on peculiarly inhuman and barbarous forms. Every one knows that in Russia capitalist omnipotence walked hand in hand with tsarist despotism; aggressive nationalism, with the most ferocious oppression of non-Russian peoples; the exploitation of whole regions of Turkey, Persia, and China, with the military conquest of these regions by the forces of the tsar. Lenin was right when he declared that tsarism was “feudal-militarist imperialism.” Tsarism was the quintessence of the negative aspects of imperialism.

Secondly, tsarist Russia was a huge reserve force for western imperialism, and this in more ways than one. Not only did it welcome the entry of foreign capital, which controlled such important branches of Russian economic life as the engineering industry and the supply of fuel. In addition, Russia could provide millions of soldiers to fight the battles of the western imperialists. You will remember that a Russian army numbering twelve millions fought and bled on the imperialist front in order to safeguard the limitless profits of the Anglo-French capitalists.

Thirdly, tsarism was not only the watchdog of imperialism in eastern Europe; it was also the agency through which the western imperialists collected from the Russian population the huge sums of interest that were payable upon loans floated in Paris, London, Berlin, and Brussels.

Finally, tsarism was the faithful ally of the western imperialists in the partitioning of Turkey, Persia, China, etc. Every one knows that the imperialist war was carried on by tsarist Russia in alliance with the imperialists of the Entente, and that Russia was an essential element in the war.

That is why the interests of tsarism and of western imperialism became so closely intertwined, so that, in the last resort, the two came to constitute a single coterie of imperialist interests. Could the western imperialists be expected to accept the loss of so powerful a support in the East, so rich a reserve of men and money, as the old, tsarist, bourgeois Russia, without rallying all their forces for a ruthless struggle against the Russian revolution, in the hope of maintaining and protecting tsarism? Of course not!

The logical deduction is that any one who wanted to strike a blow at tsarism must perforce strike a blow at imperialism, that any one who rose in revolt against tsarism must also rise in revolt against imperialism; for he who wished to overthrow tsarism must overthrow imperialism as well—if he wished to get rid of the roots of tsarism, and not merely to cut down the surface growth. That was why an anti-tsarist revolution could not fail to develop into an anti-imperialist revolution, into a proletarian revolution.

Well now, in Russia there occurred the greatest popular uprising in history, headed by the most revolutionary proletariat in the world. The Russian proletariat was supported by an exceedingly formidable

ally, the revolutionary peasantry of Russia. Is it necessary to prove that such a revolution could not possibly stop half way; that if the revolutionists were successful in overthrowing tsarism they would have to go further, would have no choice but to raise the standard of revolt against imperialism?

Now we understand why Russia could not fail to become the focus of the contradictions of imperialism. This was inevitable, not only because these contradictions were most conspicuous in Russia owing to the peculiarly hideous and intolerable forms they assumed in that country; not only because Russia was the mainstay of western imperialism, an essential link between financial capital in the West and the colonies in the East: but also because only in Russia did there exist the concrete force able to solve the contradictions of imperialism by the method of revolution.

That was why the revolution in Russia could not fail to become a proletarian revolution, could not fail to assume an international character in its very earliest days, could not fail to sap the foundations of international imperialism.

In such circumstances, was it possible for the Russian communists to confine their activities within the narrow framework of a purely Russian revolution? Of course not! On the contrary, the enviroing conditions, both at home (the far-reaching revolutionary crisis) and abroad (the war), forced them to transcend such limitations. They had to carry the struggle into the international arena; to lay bare the plague-spots of imperialism; to demonstrate the inevitability of the downfall of capitalism; to make an end of the jingoism and the pacifism that wore a socialist mask; to overthrow capitalism in their own country; and, finally, to formulate the theory and elucidate the practice of the proletarian revolution, thus forging new weapons for the workers of the world to use in the fight against capitalism. The Russian communists had to do these things, for in no other way was there any hope of bringing about the changes in the international situation that would safeguard Russia against a restoration of the bourgeois regime.

That is why Russia was the birthplace of Leninism. That is why a leader of the Russian communists became the founder of Leninism.

The situation in Russia a few years ago, and the position of Lenin in relation to Russia, resembled the situation in Germany eighty years back, and the position of Marx and Engels in relation to Germany at that time. In the late forties of the nineteenth century Germany was pregnant with the bourgeois revolution, just as Russia was at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the *Communist Manifesto* (penned towards the close of 1847 and published early in 1848) we read:

Communists pay special attention to Germany. There are two reasons for this. First of all, Germany is upon the eve of a bourgeois revolution. Secondly, this revolution will take place under comparatively advanced conditions as far as the general civilisation of Europe is concerned, and when the German proletariat is much more highly developed than was the English proletariat in the seventeenth century or the French proletariat in the eighteenth. Consequently, in nineteenth-century Germany, the bourgeois revolution can only be the immediate precursor of a proletarian revolution.

In other words, the centre of the revolutionary movement had been transferred to Germany.

We can hardly doubt that this explains why Germany, rather than any other country, was the birthplace of scientific socialism; and why Marx and Engels, leaders of the German proletariat, were the founders of the new doctrine.

Similar considerations apply, even more powerfully, to twentieth-century Russia. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia was upon the eve of the bourgeois revolution. But in Russia the bourgeois revolution was to take place when the general European situation had made great advances since 1848, and when the Russian proletariat was in a much more developed condition than the German proletariat had been in 1848 (to say nothing of the embryonic condition of the proletariat in England and France at the respective times when the bourgeois revolution occurred in those countries). The general indications were, then, such as to encourage the belief that the Russian bourgeois revolution would act like a ferment, and would be the prologue to a proletarian revolution. It was not a chance happening that in the year 1902, when the first rumblings of the coming Russian revolution were heard, Lenin wrote prophetically in his booklet *What is to be done?*:

History imposes upon the Russian Marxists an immediate task which is more revolutionary than any of those immediately incumbent upon the proletariat in other lands. Its accomplishment, namely the destruction of the most powerful bulwarks of European and Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. v., p. 138.)

In other words, the centre of the revolutionary movement was about to be transferred to Russia.

We know that the course of the Russian revolution has fully confirmed Lenin's forecast.

Is there any reason to be surprised that the country which has undergone such a revolution, and has such a proletariat, should have been the birthplace of the theory and the practice of the proletarian revolution?

Is there any reason to be surprised that the leader of the Russian proletariat, Lenin, should have been the founder of this theory and practice, and should have become the leader of the international proletariat?

## 2. METHOD

I said above (at the close of the introduction) that between the epoch of Marx and Engels and the epoch of Lenin came the epoch when the opportunism of the Second International held unrestricted sway. It is desirable to explain that, whilst opportunism was in actual fact dominant, the dominance was veiled. Formally, the Second International was led by such "orthodox" Marxists as Kautsky. In reality, the substance of its work was opportunist. The opportunists, being adaptable in virtue of their petty-bourgeois temperament, adapted themselves to the bourgeoisie. The "orthodox" Marxists, in their turn, adapted themselves to the opportunists, doing this "for the sake of unity", "for the sake of peace within the Party". Thus the policy of the "orthodox" Marxists was towed along in the wake of bourgeois policy. Opportunism ruled the roost.

This was during what may be called a pre-war phase, during a period when the development of capitalism was comparatively peace-

ful. The disastrous contradictions of imperialism had not yet become fully manifest; the industrial struggle, and trade-union development, were taking a more or less "normal" course; at the polls and in parliament, socialist and labour parties were winning "all along the line"; paeans were being sung in honour of constitutional methods of struggle, which (it was asserted) would amply suffice to effect the overthrow of capitalism. In short, the parties enrolled in the Second International were putting on fat, were becoming stodgy. Their leaders had ceased to think seriously about revolution, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the revolutionary education of the masses.

Unified revolutionary theory had given place to a bundle of contradictory propositions and fragments of theory unrelated to the actual revolutionary struggle of the masses; had given place to superannuated dogma. To outward seeming, the leaders (in continental countries) conformed to Marxist doctrine, but they deprived Marxism of its revolutionary core.

There was no longer a revolutionary policy. The "moderates" were in control, "safe and sane" labour leaders, diplomatic parliamentarians, champions of "statesmanlike" coalitions. For window dressing, "revolutionary" resolutions would be passed at congresses, and "revolutionary" slogans would be voiced from time to time—to be shelved with commendable promptitude.

The parties made no attempt to educate themselves, to work out a sound revolutionary tactic from the study of their own mistakes. Thorny problems were carefully avoided, as far as any serious attempt to solve them was concerned. Here, again, for window dressing, they would occasionally be brought up for discussion, but were always, in the end, evaded by means of some elastic resolution.

Such was the aspect of the Second International; such was its method of work; such was its armoury.

But a new epoch began, an epoch of imperialist wars, of revolutionary proletarian struggles. The old weapons were powerless in face of the omnipotence of financial capital.

All the activities of the Second International had to be reconsidered; its methods revised. An end had to be made of its triviality, its narrowness, its compromises, its renegade spirit, its alternations of jingoism and pacifism under a socialist mask. There was urgent need for an overhaul of the armoury of the Second International rejecting all the weapons that were rusty and out-of-date, and forging new ones. Without this preliminary work, it would have been futile to enter upon a war against capitalism, for the proletariat would have been likely, in the coming revolutionary struggles, to find itself inadequately equipped or even quite weaponless.

To Leninism was assigned the task of undertaking this general inspection this cleaning of the Augean stables of the Second International.

It was in such a situation that the method of Leninism was born and bred.

What are the demands made by this method?

First of all, there must be a *testing of the dogmas* of the Second International in the fire of the revolutionary mass struggle, in the fire of living practice. This means that the unity between theory and practice must be restored, that the breach between theory and prac-

tice must be bridged over, for thus only can there be created a genuine proletarian party, equipped with a revolutionary theory.

Secondly, there must be a *testing of the policy* of the parties affiliated to the Second International—not by their slogans and resolutions (which must not be accepted at face value), but by their deeds, for only by deeds can the confidence of the proletarian masses be won.

Thirdly, there must be a *reorganisation of all the activities* of proletarian parties. Their activities must be given the new revolutionary trend. The masses must be educated and prepared for the coming revolutionary struggle, for the proletarian revolution.

Fourthly, the proletarian parties must undertake *self-criticism*. They must learn by the experience of their own mistakes. Thus only can trustworthy troops and leaders be formed.

Such are the foundations, such is the essence, of the Leninist method. How has this method been applied?

The opportunists of the Second International have a number of theoretical dogmas which they have learned by rote, which they repeat mechanically like a parrot. Let us consider some of them.

Dogma number one relates to the conditions under which the proletariat can seize power. The opportunists declare that the proletariat cannot seize power, and must not try to do so, unless it comprises a majority of the inhabitants of the country. They offer no proof of this assertion, which is in fact an absurd one, devoid of either theoretical or practical justification. "Let us admit it for the sake of argument," says Lenin (substantially) to the gentlemen of the Second International. "But let us suppose that a situation arises—that there is a war, for instance, or an agrarian crisis—in the course of which the proletariat, though a minority of the population, is able to group round itself the immense majority of the toiling masses. Why, in that case, should not the proletariat seize power? Why should it not take advantage of the favourable internal and international situation to break the capitalist front and hasten the general settlement of accounts? Did not Marx say in the fifties of the nineteenth century that the proletarian revolution in Germany would be in a 'splendid' position if it could but be supported by a sort of 'second edition of the Peasants' War'? But at that period the proportion of proletarians in Germany was considerably smaller than the proportion of proletarians in Russia at the time of the 1917 revolution." Has not the practical experience of the Russian proletarian revolution taught us that this dogma, so dear to the heroes of the Second International, has no vital significance for the proletariat? Is it not obvious that the realities of the revolutionary mass struggle are daily refuting this outworn dogma?

Dogma number two runs as follows: The proletariat will not be able to keep power in its hands unless it has at its disposal a large number of intellectuals and technicians, sufficient to carry on the public services. A supply of these must first be assured under capitalist conditions, and only then should power be seized. "Suppose that the first part of what you say is true," answers Lenin. "But why can't we arrange matters in this way? Let's seize power first, thus establishing conditions favourable to the development of the proletariat. Then we'll put on our seven-league boots to stride forward in the work of

raising the cultural level of the masses and training from among them the intellectuals and technicians we need." Has not Russian experience taught us that the development of leaders from among the ranks of the workers goes on a hundred times quicker under the rule of the proletariat than under the rule of the capitalists? Does not the practical work of the revolutionary mass struggle dispose of the second opportunist dogma quite as effectually as the first?

Dogma number three: The general strike on behalf of political ends is inadmissible as part of proletarian tactic. From the theoretical standpoint, it is open to serious objections (see Engels' criticism). In practice, it is dangerous, for it is likely to disturb the normal course of the economic life of the country and to empty the coffers of the trade unions. The general strike cannot take the place of the parliamentary struggle, which is the most important form of proletarian class struggle. "Well and good," answers the Leninists. "But we have to remind you that Engels' criticism related, not to the general strike per se, but to the purely industrial or economic strike advocated by the anarchists, who looked upon it as a substitute for the political struggle of the proletariat. This criticism has no bearing upon the general strike for political ends. Furthermore, who has proved, and where, that the parliamentary struggle is the most important form of proletarian class struggle? Does not the history of the revolutionary movement show beyond dispute that the parliamentary struggle can be nothing more than a school for, and an accessory means to, the extra-parliamentary struggle of the proletariat; that under capitalism the basic problems of the working-class movement are decided by force, by the direct action of the proletarian masses—by a general strike or by an insurrection? In the third place, why introduce talk about substituting the method of the general strike for political ends, for the method of the parliamentary struggle? Where and when did the advocates of the general strike for political purposes propose any such substitution? Fourthly, has not the history of the Russian revolution shown that the general strike for political purposes is an admirable training school for the proletarian revolution, and an invaluable means for mobilising and organising the proletarian masses on the eve of the attempt to storm the capitalist fortress? Why, then, in this connection, introduce petty-bourgeois complaints concerning the disorganisation of economic life and the depletion of trade-union funds? Is it not plain that the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle refutes this opportunist dogma as well as the others?"

That is why Lenin said that "the revolutionary theory is not a dogma", and that "it acquires its definitive formulation only in direct contact with the practical activity of the masses and with an actual revolutionary movement" (*Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*); for theory must serve practice, "theory must answer the questions that arise out of practice" (*The Friends of the People*), and it must be confirmed by the data of practice.

As regards the political slogans and the political decisions of the parties affiliated to the Second International, it will suffice to recall the history of the slogan "War against War". That will serve to remind you how double-faced these parties were, how base their policy, how skilful they were in veiling their antirevolutionary trend behind revolutionary watchwords and resolutions. Every one will remember



the formidable demonstration made by the Second International at the Basle Congress when the imperialists were threatened with all the terrors of an armed rising in the event of war. It was at Basle that the dread slogan "War against War" was issued. But who has forgotten what happened shortly afterwards? Immediately the war really began, the Basle resolution was shelved, and the workers were given a new watchword—were told to exterminate one another for the greater glory of their respective capitalist countries. Is it not plain that revolutionary slogans and resolutions are not worth a brass farthing unless translated into action? Enough to compare the Leninist policy of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war, with the treacherous policy of the Second International when the imperialist war began; this shows us how base a thing is opportunism, how great is Leninism. I cannot refrain from quoting here a passage from Lenin's book *The Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky the Renegade*, in which he scourges Kautsky for judging parties not by their deeds but by their words:

Kautsky adopts a typical petty-bourgeois attitude when he expresses the opinion that the mere utterance of a slogan makes a difference. The history of bourgeois democracy pricks this bubble. Bourgeois democrats have voiced, and continue to voice, all possible slogans, this being one of the ways in which they humbug the people. The vital matter is that we should test the sincerity of those who utter slogans, should compare their deeds with their words, that we should not be content with idealist and cheap-jack phraseology, but should find how much actual class content lies behind the words. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xv, p. 493.)

I shall allude only in passing to some of the other characteristics of the parties affiliated to the Second International: their dread of self-criticism; their way of trying to hide their blunders, and to gloss over thorny problems; their fondness for window dressing as a pretence that everything in the interior is in the best possible order, thus stifling healthy thought and hindering the revolutionary education of their members. Lenin pilloried this incapacity for self-criticism in his *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, writing with mordant sarcasm:

The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the surest tests of its seriousness, and of its ability to fulfil its duties towards its class and towards the labouring masses. Frank admission of an error, discovery of its causes, analysis of the situation in which it occurred, careful study of the ways by which the mistake can be remedied—these are the signs whereby a serious party can be recognised. That is fulfilment of duty. That is the education of the class and of the masses. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvii, p. 147.)

Many people declare that self-criticism is dangerous to a party, that by a frank admission of its errors a proletarian party will put weapons into the hands of the enemies of the proletariat. In Lenin's view, no weight can be attached to this objection. Here is what he said about the matter in *One Step Forward*. The words were penned in 1904, when our Party was still weak and insignificant.

Our adversaries, the enemies of the Marxists, are overjoyed at our dissensions. They will naturally make the most of certain passages in my pamphlet where I refer to the mistakes and shortcomings of our Party, and will try to exploit these admissions for their own purposes. The Russian Marxists have been in the firing line so long that they will disregard such pinpricks. They will, in spite of them, go on with the work of self-criticism. They will continue, unsparingly, to expose their own weaknesses, which will inevitably disappear as the working-class movement gathers strength. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. v, p. 307.)

Such are the general characteristics of Leninist method.

Substantially, the elements of Lenin's method are to be found already in Marxist doctrine, which is (to quote Marx's own words) "in essence, critical and revolutionary". This critical and revolutionary spirit permeates Lenin's method from start to finish. But it would be a mistake to suppose that Lenin's method is nothing more than a revival of that of Marx. It is not a mere revival; it is a practical application and an extension of Marx's critical and revolutionary method, of Marx's materialist dialectics.

### 3. THEORY

Under this head, three matters come up for consideration: *a.* the importance of theory to the proletarian movement; *b.* criticism of the theory of spontaneity; *c.* the theory of the proletarian revolution.

#### a. THE IMPORTANCE OF THEORY

Some think that Leninism signifies the supremacy of practice over theory, in this sense, that the chief thing in Leninism is the translation of Marxist principles into the realm of fact, the "fulfilment" of these principles. Leninism of this sort pays little heed to theory. We know that Plehanoff again and again made fun of Lenin for his indifference to theory, and especially to philosophy. We know, too, that many of those who are engaged in the practical application of Leninism care little for theory, their attitude being due, above all, to the extent to which their time is engrossed in practical work. My business here is to show that this peculiar view of Lenin and Leninism is utterly wrong-headed. It is quite out of touch with the world of reality. The endeavour of "practical" persons to have no truck with "theories" runs counter to the whole spirit of Leninism and is a great danger to our cause.

Revolutionary theory is a synthesis of the experience of the working-class movement throughout all lands—the generalised experience. Of course theory out of touch with revolutionary practice is like a mill that runs without any grist, just as practice gropes in the dark unless revolutionary theory throws a light on the path. But theory becomes the greatest force in the working-class movement when it is inseparably linked with revolutionary practice: for it, and it alone, can give the movement confidence, guidance, an understanding of the inner links between events; it alone can enable those engaged in the practical struggle to understand the whence and the whither of the working-class movement. Again and again, Lenin said:

Without a revolutionary theory, there cannot be a revolutionary movement (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. v., p. 135.)

Lenin knew better than any one else the immense importance of theory, especially for such a party as ours, one called to form the vanguard of the international proletariat; and above all in view of the complicated situation, both at home and abroad, with which the Party is confronted. As far back as 1902, foreseeing the special role of our Party, he thought it necessary to point out that:

Only a party guided by an advanced theory can act as vanguard in the fight. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. v., p. 136.)

To-day, when Lenin's forecast of the role of our Party has been fulfilled, it would be superfluous to labour the point that what he had to say about the matter is of fundamental importance.

The immense importance attached by Lenin to theory is perhaps best shown by this, that he himself undertook the great task of generalising, on behalf of materialistic philosophy, the main achievements of science since the days of Engels, and of comprehensively criticising the anti-materialistic trends of certain Marxists. Engels said that "materialism should take on a new aspect with each new discovery." For his own epoch, Lenin performed this task in his remarkable work *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. Plehanoff, on the other hand, though he had been so ready to condemn Lenin for "indifference to philosophy", did not himself make a serious attempt to perform the necessary task.

#### b. CRITISM OF THE THEORY OF SPONTANEITY, OR THE PART PLAYED BY THE VANGUARD IN THE MOVEMENT

The theory of spontaneity is the theory of opportunism; the theory that we must bow before the spontaneity of the working-class movement; the theory which in practice amounts to a denial that the vanguard of the working class, the Party of the working class, can act as leader for the class as a whole.

This theory that we must bow before the spontaneity of the working-class movement is the theory of those who deny the revolutionary character of the working-class movement, the theory of those who oppose any endeavour to lead the working-class battalions into an attack upon the foundations of capitalism. It is the theory of those who consider that the movement should be content to formulate demands that are "reasonable", demands that will be "acceptable" by the capitalists; it is the theory of those who are glad to follow "the line of least resistance". The theory of spontaneity is the ideology of trade unionism.

The theory that we must bow our heads before the spontaneity of the working-class movement is the theory of those who are decisively opposed to an attempt to give the spontaneous movement a deliberate and purposive character; it is the theory of those who do not want our Party to march in front of the working class, stimulating the masses till they reach the level of conscious action, leading the movement. It is the theory of those who consider that the thinking elements should let the movement go its own way, that the Party should listen for the voice of the spontaneous movement and be content to trot along in the rear, to hold on to the tail, to follow where the movement leads. It is the theory of those who underestimate the importance of the thinking elements, the theory of those whose ideology is that of "hysticism" or "tailism"<sup>21</sup>—the logical foundation of every kind of opportunism.

In practice this theory, which was current in Russia before the revolution of 1905, led those who were guided by it (they were known as the "economists") to deny the need for an independent working-class party in Russia. The "economists" were opposed to the develop-

<sup>21</sup> The ideology of those who cling to the tail (Russian, *hyst*) of the movement instead of trying to lead it; the ideology of those who await the progress of events, and are therefore "opportunists."—E. and C. P.

ment of a revolutionary working-class struggle for the overthrow of tsarism; they advocated a trade-unionist policy within the movement; they wished the working-class movement to remain under the thumb of the liberal bourgeoisie.<sup>22</sup>

The campaign of the old "Iskra", and Lenin's brilliant criticism of "tailism" in *What is to be done?*, not only smote the "economists" hip and thigh, but also provided a theoretical foundation for a truly revolutionary Russian working-class movement.

Had it not been for this preliminary work in the theoretical field, it would have been impossible to create an independent party of class-conscious workers in Russia, and impossible for that party to take the lead in the revolution.

But the theory that we must bow before the spontaneity of the movement is not an exclusively Russian phenomenon. This theory (varying a little in form) is voiced in all the parties affiliated to the Second International. I am thinking now of the theory of "the forces of production". On this theory, as distorted by the leaders of the Second International, everything can be justified and every one can be conciliated; facts obvious to all the world are established and proved; and the mere observing and recording of the facts becomes an end in itself. Marx said that materialist theory must not be content with explaining the world, but must change it. Kautsky and Co., however, are satisfied with explaining, and leave the change to take care of itself. Here is an instance (among many which might be given) of the way in which this precious theory is applied. Just now I reminded you (see above, p. 85) how, at the Basle Congress, the parties affiliated to the Second International threatened to declare "War against War" if the imperialists began a war. But, you will remember, directly the imperialist war began, the "War against War" business was scrapped, and the workers were told to fight "all out" in defense of their several imperialist fatherlands. As a result of this change of front, millions of workers were butchered. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that any one is to blame for this, that any one betrayed the working class. Nothing of the sort! Everything happened as it had to happen. For, first of all, the International is an "instrument of peace", not a "weapon of war". Secondly, in view of "the level of the forces of production" at the time of the outbreak of the war, there was no option. The fault lies with "the forces of production". Mr. Kautsky's "theory of the forces of production" explains this quite clearly, and those who challenge the soundness of the theory are not Marxists.

"The Party?" you venture to ask at this stage. "Has the Party no function?"

"What are you talking about?" comes the ready answer. "Can the Party do anything to affect the working of so decisive a factor as 'the level of the forces of production'?"

A host of such instances of the falsification of Marxism could be marshalled. Their aim is to raise a smoke-screen thick enough to hide the opportunism of those who utter them, and it is self-evident that

<sup>22</sup> The name "economists" was coined because in Russia it is usual to contrast the political struggle with the economic struggle, whereas we in Britain usually speak of the contrast between the struggle in the political and that in the industrial fields. Thus the "economists" wanted the working-class struggle to be confined to the industrial plane, and to the formation of trade unions in which there would be "no politics." In politics, the workers were to follow the liberal lead.—E. and C. P.

they are nothing more than the western European variety of the "tailism" which Lenin was combating in Russia as long ago as the days before the revolution of 1905.

Surely, too, the abandonment of this radically false outlook is an essential preliminary to the formation of genuinely revolutionary parties in western Europe.

### C. THE THEORY OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION

The Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution is based on three fundamental theses.

*First Thesis.*—The dominion of financial capital in countries of advanced capitalist development; the issue of stocks and bonds, as the chief activity of financial capital; the export of capital to the sources of raw material, this being one of the main foundations of imperialism; omnipotence of the financial oligarchy, as a result of the rule of financial capital—all these circumstances disclose the intensely parasitic character of monopolist capital, make the yoke of the capitalist trusts and syndicates a hundred times more intolerable, intensify the workers' indignation, and spur the masses on towards the proletarian revolution, as their only means of deliverance. (See Lenin's *Imperialism*.)

As a result, the revolutionary crisis in capitalist countries becomes more acute; there is a heaping up of combustible material on the internal front, on the proletarian front, in the "mother countries".

*Second Thesis.*—Increasing export of capital to colonies and dependencies; a widening of "spheres of influence" and colonisation until all the land in the world has been grabbed; the transformation of capitalism to become a worldwide system thanks to which a handful of "advanced" countries is able to hold the vast majority of the population of our planet in a state of financial bondage and colonial oppression—all these changes have, first of all, transformed the separate economies of national areas into parts of a unified system known as the "world economy"; and have, secondly, divided the population of the world into two camps. One of these camps contains the small number of "advanced" capitalist countries, which exploit and oppress the rest of the world, the colonial and dependent lands (far more numerous), so that these latter are now compelled to struggle in the hope of freeing themselves from the imperialist yoke. (See Lenin's *Imperialism*.)

As a result, the revolutionary crisis in colonies and dependencies becomes more acute; and the spirit of revolt against imperialism becomes intensified all along the external front, the colonial front.

*Third Thesis.*—Monopolist rule over "spheres of influence" and colonies; differences in the degree of capitalist development attained by various countries, with the result that there is a fierce struggle between the countries that have secured and those that would like to secure a large "share of the spoils"; imperialist wars as the only means of "readjusting the balance", of securing the redistribution desired by the countries that are excluded from "a place in the sun"—all these influences cooperate in leading to the accumulation of tensions on the third front, the intercapitalist front, thus weakening the imperialist forces and promoting a union between the proletarian and the colonial fronts for the fight against imperialism. (See Lenin's *Imperialism*.)

As a result, under imperialism, wars become inevitable; and, under

imperialism, there must necessarily ensue a coalition between the proletarian revolution in Europe and the colonial revolution in the East, this leading to the formation of a united world-front of the revolution against the world-front of imperialism.

All the foregoing inferences are unified and generalized by Lenin in the conclusion that "*imperialism is the immediate forerunner of the socialist revolution*". (Works, Russian edition, vol. xiii., p. 243.)

As a result, our attitude towards the problem of the proletarian revolution has undergone a change. We have new lights upon its character, its scope, its general scheme.

Study of the antecedents of the proletarian revolution used, in general, to be undertaken from an outlook upon the economic conditions peculiar to the country under consideration. This formulation of the problem has to-day become inadequate. We have, nowadays, to approach the matter from a more general outlook, from that upon all or most of the countries in the world, from that upon the world economy. Individual countries and individual national economies have ceased to be independent entities. They have become parts of a united whole, which is spoken of as the world economy. The old "civilising" capitalism has developed into imperialism, which is a worldwide system of financial bondage, a system whereby the inhabitants of colonies and dependencies (forming the great majority of the population of the globe) are oppressed by a small number of "advanced" countries.

In former days the question which came up for discussion was whether the objective conditions requisite for the proletarian revolution were or were not present in this or that highly developed country. This formulation of the problem, likewise, has to-day become inadequate. Our business, nowadays, is to discuss whether the objective conditions requisite for the proletarian revolution do or do not exist in the world economy, in the worldwide imperialist system regarded as a unified whole. Within that system there are certain countries where industrial development is backward, but this is not an insurmountable obstacle to the revolution *if* the system as a whole (it would be more accurate to say, *inasmuch as* the system as a whole) is already ripe for the revolution.

In former days, again, it was usual to think of the proletarian revolution, in this country or that, as an independent magnitude, confronted by another independent magnitude, the capitalist forces of the same country; these two independent magnitudes faced one another upon an independent national front. To-day this formulation is obsolete. Nowadays we have to think in terms of the worldwide proletarian revolution, for the various national capitalist fronts, isolated of yore, have coalesced into a unified whole, the worldwide imperialist front, against which must be arrayed the unified front of the revolutionary movement in all lands.

In former days, finally, it was customary to regard the proletarian revolution as an outcome of conditions that were purely local to the country under consideration. Once more, this formulation is obsolete. Nowadays we have to regard the proletarian revolution, first and foremost, as the outcome of the growth of antagonisms within the worldwide system of imperialism, as the outcome of an effort which (in this country or in that) breaks the chains of worldwide imperialism.

Where will the revolution begin? In what country can the capitalist front be first broken?

The usual answer was that this would happen where industrial development was most advanced, where the proletariat formed the majority of the population, where the level of civilisation was high, where democracy was thoroughly established.

But, according to Leninist theory, this reasoning is unsound. There are no grounds for the belief that the capitalist front will first be broken where industrial development is most advanced, and so on, and so on. The capitalist front will be broken where the chain of imperialism is weakest, and it is there that the proletarian revolution (which follows upon the defeat of imperialism) must begin. It is likely enough, therefore, that the country where the revolution begins, the country where the capitalist front is broken, will be one where capitalist development is comparatively backward; and that, while the revolutionary movement is being successful in such a country, others, where industrial development is much farther advanced, will remain within the framework of capitalism.

In 1917, the weakest part of the imperialist world-front was in Russia. There the front was broken, so that the way was opened for the advance of the proletarian revolution. Why did this happen? Because, in Russia, there occurred a great uprising of the people, led by the revolutionary proletariat, which has as its formidable ally the peasantry, the millions upon millions of those who had been oppressed and exploited by the landowners. Because, in Russia, the forces of imperialism, the forces that faced the revolution, were incorporated in the execrable figure of tsarism, which was devoid of moral authority and was universally detested. Russia was the weakest part of the imperialist world-front, although in Russia capitalism was so much less developed than in France, Germany, Great Britain, or the United States of America.

Where is the front likely to be broken next? Again at the weakest point, obviously. Perhaps that will be in British India.

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Lenin's aim was to *crown* the revolution by the rise of the proletariat to power. On the other hand, the champions of "permanent revolution" wanted to *begin* by establishing the power of the proletariat right away, not realising that when they made this their aim they were closing their eyes to such little matters as survivals of serfdom, were neglecting so puny a force as the Russian peasantry! Thus they were hindering the peasants from rallying to the proletariat.

Lenin therefore opposed the champions of "permanent revolution", not because they asserted the continuity of the revolution (a theory he himself never ceased to support), but because they underestimated the importance of the part played by the peasantry, which forms the great reserve force for the proletariat—and because they did not really understand the nature of proletarian supremacy.

The idea of "permanent revolution" is not new. It dates from 1850, when Marx expounded it in the circular from the central committee to the members of the Communist League. The Russian champions of "permanent revolution" lifted it from that document, but in the process they botched it in such a way as to unfit it for practical use. The skilful hand of Lenin was needed to rectify this error, to restore

Marx's idea of permanent revolution to its pristine form, and to make it one of the cornerstones of our theory of revolution.

In the 1850 circular, Marx, after enumerating the revolutionary demands which the communists ought to put forward, went on as follows:

Whereas the petty-bourgeois democrats want the revolution to be brought to a close as speedily as possible (as soon as their scanty demands are satisfied), it is incumbent upon the workers to make the revolution permanent until the more or less possessing classes have been excluded from power, until the proletariat has achieved the conquest of State authority, and until—not in one country alone, but in all the advanced countries of the world—the association of the proletarians has developed so far that competition among the proletarians of these lands has ceased to exist and the key industries at least are in proletarian hands.

In other words:

1. Whatever our champions of "permanent revolution" may say, Marx did not, in 1850, propose that the revolution in Germany should *begin* by a proletarian conquest of State authority.

2. Marx's idea was that the conquest of State authority by the proletariat would *crown* the work of the revolution. The workers, having successively overthrown one fraction of the bourgeoisie after another, and having attained power, would then kindle the torch of revolution in all the countries of the world.

This is perfectly consistent with what Lenin taught. It is perfectly consistent with what Lenin did in the course of our revolution, guided by his theory of the proletarian revolution as it takes place under imperialist conditions.

Thus the Russian champions of "permanent revolution" have not been content with underestimating the importance of the part played by the peasantry in the Russian revolution, and have not only misunderstood the significance of the idea of the leadership of the proletariat; but they have also degraded Marx's idea of "permanent" revolution, so as to deprive it of practical value.

That is why Lenin ridiculed their theory, and declared that they had closed their eyes to avoid having to see the way in which, for decades, life had been refuting so "original" and "charming" a notion. This was in articles written in 1915, ten years after the formulation of the Russian version of the theory of "permanent revolution". (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xiii, p. 213.)

That is why Lenin considered the theory tainted with menshevism. He wrote:

While it borrows from the bolsheviks the call to the proletariat to engage in a decisive revolutionary struggle and to achieve the conquest of political power, it borrows from the mensheviks the denial that the peasants have an important part to play. (See *The Two Lines of Revolution*, in *Against the Stream*, reference as above.)

Such were Lenin's ideas concerning the way in which the bourgeois-democratic revolution would develop into the proletarian revolution, concerning the way in which the bourgeois-democratic revolution could be turned to account in order to bring about a prompt transition to the proletarian revolution.

It used to be supposed that the victory of the revolution in one country alone would be impossible, the assumption being that the conquest of the bourgeoisie could only be achieved by the united action of the proletarians of all advanced countries, or at any rate those in the



majority of these. This contention no longer fits the facts. We must now set out by assuming the possibility of such a victory: for the varying speed of social evolution in different capitalist countries (proceeding in some, under imperialist conditions, by leaps and bounds); the development of catastrophic conflicts as the outcome of imperialist rivalries, inevitably culminating in wars; the growth of the revolutionary movement in all countries throughout the world—these factors, working together, make proletarian victories in separate countries not merely possible but necessary. The history of the Russian revolution is striking evidence of this. We have, nevertheless, to remember that certain preliminary conditions must be fulfilled before the bourgeoisie can be overthrown, and that unless these conditions have been fulfilled it is futile for the proletariat to think of seizing power.

Here is what Lenin wrote about these indispensable preliminaries in his *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*:

The fundamental law of revolution, confirmed by every revolution, and especially by the three Russian revolutions of the twentieth century, runs as follows. For the revolution, it is not enough that the exploited and oppressed masses should have become aware that they cannot go on living in the old way, and that they should demand changes; in addition, the exploiters must find it impossible to live and rule in the old way. *Not until the "lower classes" cannot put up with the old conditions any longer, and the "upper classes" cannot carry on under the old conditions, can the revolution triumph.*<sup>22</sup> To express this truth in other words: *revolution is impossible unless there is a national crisis affecting both exploited and exploiters.*<sup>23</sup> This means that there are two essentials for the revolution. First of all, the majority of the workers (or at any rate the majority of the class-conscious, the thoughtful, the politically active workers) must be fully aware that a revolution is necessary and must be ready to go to their deaths for its sake. Secondly, the ruling classes must be in the throes of a governmental crisis which draws even the most backward masses into the political arena, and enfeebles the government to such an extent that the revolutionists can speedily overthrow it. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvii, p. 172.)

But the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the power of the proletariat in one country alone does not, per se, mean the complete victory of socialism. Having consolidated its power and having secured the support of the peasantry, the victorious proletariat can and must proceed to upbuild a socialist society. Does this mean that thereby the victorious proletariat will achieve the final victory of socialism? Does this mean that the workers in one country alone, unaided, can definitively instal socialism, guaranteed against intervention, guaranteed against a restoration of the old regime? No, certainly not. For that, the victory of the revolution, if not everywhere, at least in several countries, will be requisite. That is why the fostering of revolution, the support of revolution, in other countries, is incumbent upon the country where the revolution has triumphed. That is why a country in which the revolution has triumphed must not look upon itself as an independent magnitude, but as an auxiliary, as a means for hastening the victory of the proletariat in other lands.

Lenin expressed this idea pithily as follows:

In any country, the victorious revolution must do its utmost to develop, support, and awaken the revolution in all other countries. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xv., p. 502.)

■ Italicised by Stalin.

Such, in broad outline, are the characteristics of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.

#### 4. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

This question must be considered under three main heads: *a.* The dictatorship of the proletariat as the instrument of the proletarian revolution; *b.* the dictatorship of the proletariat as the rule of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie; *c.* the Soviet power as the form of State embodying the dictatorship of the proletariat.

##### a. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION

The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat is, above all, the question of the fundamental meaning of the proletarian revolution. The proletarian revolution, with its movement, its impetus, and its achievements, only becomes a reality through the dictatorship of the proletariat. This dictatorship is the chief fulcrum of the proletarian revolution, its main instrument. The first aim of the dictatorship is to break the resistance of the defeated exploiters. Next, it must lead the revolution onward to the final victory, to the complete triumph of socialism. The revolution can achieve the first conquest of the bourgeoisie, the overthrow of bourgeois dominion, without the dictatorship of the proletariat. But if the resistance of the bourgeoisie is to be crushed, if the conquests of the revolution are to be maintained, if the final victory is to be won by the establishment of socialism, this special revolutionary organ, the dictatorship of the proletariat, must be created in the appropriate phase of the revolution.

Lenin says: "The fundamental question of the revolution is the question of power". Does this mean that the revolution is the seizure of power and nothing more? It does not, for the seizure of power is only the first step. When deprived of power in any one country, the bourgeoisie still remains (for various reasons) stronger than the proletariat which has overthrown it. Power has not merely to be seized; it has to be held, to be consolidated, to be made invincible. To fulfil these aims, it is necessary, on the morrow of the first overthrow of the bourgeoisie, to work along three main lines:

1. We must break the resistance of the landowners and capitalists who have been deprived of power and expropriated by the revolution, and must frustrate their efforts to restore the dominion of capital.

2. We must organise the process of socialist reconstruction by rallying all the toilers to the support of the proletariat, and by preparing for the gradual disappearance of classes.

3. We must arm the revolution, must organise the army of the revolution for the fight against the enemies outside our borders, for the fight against imperialism.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is essential to the performance of these three tasks. Lenin writes:

The transition from capitalism to socialism occupies an entire historical epoch. While the transition is still going on, the exploiters will continue to cherish hopes of a capitalist restoration, and these hopes will find practical expression in attempts to bring about such a restoration. After their first serious defeat, the exploiters (who never expected anything of the kind, and can hardly believe in

it now that it has taken place) throw themselves with redoubled energy, with furious passion, with implacable hatred, into the battle for the recovery of their lost paradise, into the fight to restore their family fortunes, to regain "comfortable" positions for those whom the "rabble" would now condemn to poverty and ruin (or to the simple necessity of work!). . . . The lead of these capitalist exploiters will be followed by the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie. Experience in all countries has shown that the members of this stratum of the population have no steadfastness; that to-day they will march with the proletariat; but to-morrow, alarmed by the difficulties of the revolution, panic-stricken at the first check to the workers' advance, they grow nervous, do not know where to turn, and rush whining from one camp to another. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xv., p. 467.)

For a long time after its overthrow, the bourgeoisie remains stronger than the victorious proletariat, and has therefore good grounds for attempting to re-establish its position. Lenin writes:

If the exploiters have been defeated in one country only (and this is what usually happens, for simultaneous revolutions in many countries are exceptional), they remain very much stronger than the exploited. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xv., pp. 466-467.)

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The dictatorship of the proletariat is not established upon the foundation of the bourgeois system of things; it is established in the course of the destruction of that system, after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, when the landowners and the capitalists are being expropriated, when the most important means of production are being socialised, and when the proletarian revolution is making its way by force. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a revolutionary authority forcibly imposed upon the bourgeoisie.

The State is an instrument in the hands of the dominant class, used to break the resistance of the adversaries of that class. In this respect, the dictatorship of the proletariat does not differ fundamentally from the dictatorship of any other class, seeing that the proletarian State is an instrument used to break the resistance of the bourgeoisie. But in another respect there is a fundamental difference. Hitherto, the class State has always been the dictatorship of an exploiting minority over the exploited majority, whereas the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of the exploited majority over the exploiting minority.

To put it briefly, *the dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, a rule unrestricted by law, based upon force, enjoying the sympathy and the support of the labouring and exploited masses.* (Cf. *The State and Revolution*.)

From this two important inferences may be drawn.

*First inference.* The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot possibly be "complete democracy"; cannot be democracy for all, for the rich as well as the poor. Lenin writes:

The dictatorship of the proletariat must be a State that embodies a new kind of democracy, *for* "the proletarians and the dispossessed; and a new kind of dictatorship, *against* "the bourgeoisie. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xiv., part II., p. 324.)

The sermons of Kautsky and Co. on "universal" equality, "pure" democracy, "complete" democracy, and the like, are but bourgeois ver-

\* Italicized by Stalin.

biage to mask the indisputable fact that there can be no equality between exploited and exploiters. The theory of "pure" democracy is the theory of a favoured labour caste which has been tamed by the imperialist robbers and has learned to feed out of their hands. It was formulated in order to plaster the sores of capitalism, to camouflage imperialism, and to give the exploiters moral strength in their fight against the exploited masses.

Under capitalism, there can be no real "freedom" for the exploited, were it only for the reason that the buildings, the printing presses, and the paper supplies necessary for the utilisation of this freedom are in privileged hands, in the hands of the exploiters. Under capitalism, the exploited masses cannot effectively participate in the government of the country.

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### C. THE SOVIET POWER AS THE FORM OF STATE EMBODYING THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

The triumph of the dictatorship of the proletariat means the crushing of the bourgeoisie, the break-up of the bourgeois State machine, and the replacement of bourgeois democracy by proletarian democracy. That is plain enough. But what are the organisations through whose instrumentality these colossal undertakings can be carried out? It can hardly be supposed that the old forms of proletarian organisation, which are rooted in the soil of bourgeois parliamentarism, will prove equal to the task. The question is, what new types of organisation will be able, not only to smash the bourgeois State machinery and clear the fragments away, not only to substitute proletarian democracy for bourgeois democracy, but also to constitute the foundations of the proletarian State authority.

The soviets are this new type of proletarian organisation.

What is the secret of the strength of the soviets, as compared with organisations of the familiar kind?

1. Soviets are the most comprehensive mass organisations of the proletariat, being the only organisations to which all the workers, without exception, belong.

2. Soviets are the only mass organisations which enrol all the oppressed and exploited, workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors, so that, through the instrumentality of the soviets, the political leadership of the mass struggle by the proletarian vanguard can be effectively realised.

3. Soviets are the most powerful instruments of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, of the political activity of the masses, of the revolt of the masses; they are instruments competent to break the power of financial capital and its political satellites.

4. Soviets are the direct organisations of the masses, consequently the most democratic, and therefore the most influential, mass organisations; thus they are able to have a maximal effect in the way of inducing the masses to participate in the upbuilding of the new State,

facilitating its administration, and, to the greatest possible extent, developing the revolutionary energy, the initiative, and the creative faculty of the masses in the struggle for the destruction of the old order and the upbuilding of the new proletarian order.

The Soviet power is the unification and transformation of the local soviets to constitute a general State organisation, the State organisation of the proletariat as the vanguard of the oppressed and exploited masses and as the ruling class. This unified State organisation is the Soviet Republic.

The essential nature of the Soviet power is this, that the most revolutionary and most comprehensive organisations of those very classes which have been oppressed by the capitalists and the landowners, have now become "the permanent and exclusive foundation of the whole State power, of the whole State apparatus"; that the masses—which even in the most democratic republics (where by law all men are equal) "are as an actual fact by manifold devices excluded from participation in political life and from the enjoyment of democratic rights and liberties"—have now been enabled to share effectively and permanently in the democratic administration of the State. (Cf. Lenin, *Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvi., p. 44.)

That is why the Soviet power is a new form of State organisation, essentially different from the old bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary form; a new type of State, adapted, not for the exploitation and oppression of the labouring masses, but for their full and final liberation from every kind of oppression and exploitation—adapted for the work of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Lenin was right when he said that the establishment of the Soviet power "marks the end of the era of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism, and the opening of a new chapter in universal history, the epoch of proletarian dictatorship".

What are the main characteristics of the Soviet power?

1. The Soviet power is, of all State organisations possible while classes continue to exist, the most comprehensive and the most democratic. In actual fact, seeing that the Soviet power is the expression of the *smychka*,<sup>25</sup> the expression of the collaboration of the workers and the exploited peasants in the struggle against the exploiters, and is dependent upon the *smychka* in all its activities, it is, consequently, the power exercised by the majority of the population over the minority, is the State of that majority, is the embodiment of a majoritarian dictatorship.

2. The Soviet power is the most international of all the State organisations that are possible in a class society, for, by making an end of all national oppression and by being based upon the collaboration of the labouring masses of various nationalities, it facilitates the coalescence of these masses to form a federation of States.

3. The Soviet power, in virtue of its structure, facilitates the guidance of the oppressed and exploited masses by their vanguard, the proletariat, which forms the stalwart and preeminently class-conscious core of the soviets. "The experience of all movements of oppressed classes, the experience of the worldwide socialist movement, teaches us that the proletariat alone is competent to bring together the scat-

<sup>25</sup> See note to p. 26.

tered and comparatively backward sections of the labouring and exploited population, and to lead them onward." (Lenin, *Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvi., p. 45.) The structure of the Soviet power favours the application of the knowledge gained by such experience.

4. The Soviet power, uniting legislative and executive authority into a single organ, and replacing territorial electoral areas by electoral units based on production (factories and workshops), establishes direct ties between the workers and the labouring masses, on the one hand, and the administrative apparatus on the other, and teaches the former how to use the latter.

5. The Soviet power (and only the Soviet power) is able to withdraw the army from bourgeois command, and to change it from an instrument for the oppression of the people (which is what it is under the bourgeois system) into an instrument for freeing the people from the yoke of the bourgeoisie at home and abroad.

6. "The Soviet power (and only the Soviet power) can destroy, once and for all, the old bourgeois bureaucratic and judicial apparatus." (Lenin, loc. cit.)

7. The Soviet form of State (and no other form of State), admitting the mass organisations of the workers, and the exploited generally, to direct and unconditional participation in the management of public affairs, is able to pave the way for the gradual dying out of the State, which is an essential phase of the progress towards the stateless communist society of the future.

Thus the Republic of Soviets is the long sought and at length discovered political form within whose framework the economic emancipation of the proletariat, the complete triumph of socialism, will ultimately be realised.

The Commune of Paris was the germ of this political form. The Soviet power is its culmination.

That is why Lenin says:

The Republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Delegates is not only a higher type of democratic institution; it is, furthermore, the only form capable of ensuring an almost painless transition to socialism. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xv., p. 50.)

## 5. THE PEASANT PROBLEM

(*Excerpt*)

In virtue of the special conditions of its existence, the peasantry has certain revolutionary possibilities. Are these already exhausted? If not, is there any justification for the hope that they can be turned to account on behalf of the proletarian revolution? Is there any hope of transforming the peasantry, or, rather, its exploited majority, from a reserve of forces for the bourgeoisie (which the rural masses were in the days of the bourgeois revolutions in the West, and still are in that part of the world) into a reserve of forces for the proletariat? Can the rural masses become the allies of the urban workers?

The Leninist answer to this question is in the affirmative. The Leninist answer is that as regards the exploited majority of the peasants there exist revolutionary possibilities which can be turned to account in support of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The history of the three Russian revolutions confirms this deduction abundantly.

From these considerations we draw the practical conclusion that the labouring masses of the peasantry must be unhesitatingly supported in their fight against servitude and exploitation, against oppression and impoverishment. Of course this does not mean that the proletariat should support every peasant movement without exception. But they should support those peasant movements, those peasant struggles, which tend directly or indirectly to promote the emancipation of the proletariat, to supply motive power to the proletarian mill, to make the peasants a proletarian reserve, to transform them into allies of the urban workers.

## 6. THE NATIONAL QUESTION

*(Excerpt)*

The problem must be stated thus: Are the revolutionary possibilities of the revolutionary movement for the liberation of oppressed countries already exhausted; if they are not exhausted, is there any chance of turning these possibilities to account on behalf of the proletarian revolution, is there any chance of transforming the colonial and dependent lands from reserves of force for the bourgeoisie into reserves of force for the proletariat; can the colonial and dependent nationalities become the allies of the revolutionary proletariat?

The Leninist answer to these questions is that the nationalist movements for the freeing of oppressed countries from the imperialist yoke certainly contain unexhausted revolutionary possibilities; that these possibilities can be utilised for the overthrow of our common enemy, for the destruction of imperialism. The mechanism of imperialist development, that of the imperialist war, and that of the Russian revolution, have fully confirmed the conclusions of Leninism in this respect.

From these considerations it follows that the proletariat must decisively and actively support the nationalist movements for the liberation of the oppressed and dependent peoples.

Of course this does not mean that the proletariat ought to support any and every nationalist movement, at all times and in all places, no matter what the concrete conditions may be. The proletariat should support nationalist movements which tend to weaken and subvert imperialism, not those which tend to strengthen and maintain it. In certain oppressed countries, nationalist movements may run counter to the general interests of the proletarian movement. Obviously, there can be no question of our helping such movements as these. The problem of national rights does not stand alone; it is part of the general problem of the proletarian revolution, is subordinate thereto, and can only be considered by the proletariat from that angle. In the forties of the last century, Marx supported the Polish nationalist movement and the Hungarian nationalist movement, while he opposed the Czech nationalist movement and the Yugoslav nationalist movement. Why this difference? The reason was that in those days the Czechs and the Southern Slavs were "reactionary peoples", were "outposts of Russian absolutism", whereas the Poles and the Hungarians were "revolutionary peoples", fighting against absolutism. At that epoch, to support the Czech nationalist movement and the Yugoslav nationalist movement would have been to give indirect support to tsarism, which was then the most dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement in Europe.

## 7. STRATEGY AND TACTICS

This topic will be considered under six heads: *a.* strategy and tactics as the science of the leadership of the proletarian class struggle; *b.* strategy and the phases of the revolution; *c.* tactics and the ebb and flow of the movement; *d.* strategical leadership; *e.* tactical leadership; *f.* reformism and revolutionism.

## A. STRATEGY AND TACTICS AS THE SCIENCE OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAN CLASS STRUGGLE

The period during which the Second International was dominant was, mainly, one when the proletarian forces were being marshalled and instructed in a comparatively tranquil time. The class struggle was being carried on, for the most part, within the walls of parliament. Great clashes between the contending classes, the preparation of the proletariat for revolutionary campaigns, methods of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat—were not topics of discussion. The task of leadership was limited to the utilisation of all the available constitutional and lawful methods for marshalling and training the proletarian army, within the confines of a system where the proletariat was (and was presumably destined to remain) nothing more than the electoral foundation of a parliamentary opposition. Obviously, during this period, and while such a conception of the mission of the proletariat was dominant, there could be no question of systematising proletarian strategy or elaborating proletarian tactics; there could be nothing more than detached thoughts about these matters, nothing more than isolated fragments of strategy and tactics.

The fatal error of the Second International was, not that for a time it concentrated its energies upon the development of the parliamentary form of the class struggle, but that it overestimated the importance of parliamentarism, and regarded parliamentarism as a practically exclusive and all-sufficient method—with the result that, when the period of open revolutionary conflicts began, and when the question of extraparlimentary forms of struggle became urgent, the parties affiliated to the Second International jibbed, refused to leap, would not face the new tasks.

Not until the next phase, the phase of direct action, of proletarian revolution, when the overthrow of the bourgeoisie had become a question of practical politics, did the problem of finding reserves for the proletarian army (strategy) become actual, and the problem of the organisation of that army whether on the parliamentary or on the extraparlimentary field (tactics) clearly demand a solution. Not until this phase had begun, could proletarian strategy be systematised and proletarian tactics be elaborated.

It was now that Lenin disinterred Marx's and Engels' masterly ideas on strategy and tactics, ideas which the opportunists of the Second International had buried out of sight. Lenin was not content with a mere reiteration of his predecessors' words. He developed what they had said, added fresh thoughts of his own, and unified the whole into a system of rules and precepts for the conduct of the proletarian class war. Thus Lenin's booklets, *What is to be done?*, *Two Tactics*, *Imperialism*, *The State and Revolution*, *The Proletarian Revolution*, and *Kautsky the Renegade*, and *Left-Wing Communism*,



*an Infantile Disorder*, are invaluable contributions to the Marxist revolutionary arsenal. Leninist strategy and tactics are the science of the leadership of the revolutionary proletarian struggle.

## b. STRATEGY AND THE PHASES OF THE REVOLUTION

Strategy is the determination of the direction of the main proletarian onslaught in this or that phase of the revolution; the elaboration of the best plan for the distribution of the revolutionary forces (the main reserves and the secondary reserves), and the endeavor to carry out this plan during the whole period of this or that phase of the revolution.

The Russian revolution passed through its first phase from 1903 to the beginning of March 1917 (new style); its second phase between March 1917 and the beginning of November 1917; to enter upon its third phase with the October (November) revolution of that year. Each of these three phases had its appropriate strategy.

### *First Phase, from 1903 to the February (March) revolution in 1917*

Aim: the overthrow of tsarism, and the abolition of the last vestiges of feudalism.

Essential force of the revolution: the proletariat.

First reserve: the peasantry.

Chief line of attack: isolation of the bourgeois liberals (monarchists), who were trying to secure the support of the peasantry and to arrest the progress of the revolution by coming to terms with tsarism.

Plan for the distribution of the revolutionary forces: an alliance between the workers and the peasants.

Consider, in this connexion, Lenin's words:

The proletariat must push the democratic revolution through to an end, inducing the mass of the peasantry to join forces with the workers, in order to break the power of the autocracy and to overcome the vacillations of the bourgeoisie. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. vi., p. 371.)

### *Second Phase, 1917, from the February (March) revolution to the October (November) revolution*

Aim: the overthrow of imperialism in Russia and the withdrawal from participation in the imperialist war.

Essential force of the revolution: the proletariat.

First reserve: the poorer peasants.

Contingent reserve: the proletariat of neighbouring countries.

Favouring circumstances: the protraction of the war and the crisis of imperialism.

Chief line of attack: isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats (the mensheviks and the essers), who were trying to win over the labouring masses of the peasants and to stop the revolution by coming to terms with imperialism.

Plan for the distribution of the revolutionary forces: an alliance between the proletariat and the poorest peasants.

Consider, in this connexion, Lenin's words:

The proletariat must push the socialist revolution through to an end, inducing the mass of the semi-proletarian elements to join forces with the proletariat, in order to break the power of the bourgeoisie and to overcome the vacillations of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. vi., p. 371.)

*Third Phase, after the October (November) revolution*

**Aim:** the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, where it could be used as a fulcrum for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries. This revolution transcends the limits of one country, and begins the epoch of the world revolution.

**Essential force of the revolution:** the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, and the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all countries.

**Chief reserves:** the semi-proletarian and petty-bourgeois masses in the highly developed countries, the nationalist (liberationist) movements in colonial and dependent lands.

**Chief line of attack:** isolation of the petty-bourgeois democracy; isolation of the parties affiliated to the Second International, whose policy it is to come to terms with imperialism.

**Plan for the distribution of the revolutionary forces:** an alliance between the proletarian revolution and the nationalist (liberationist) movements in colonial and dependent lands.

**Strategy** is concerned with the essential forces of the revolution and with its reserves. It changes as the revolution moves on from one phase to the next, but remains unchanged in its principles throughout any one phase.

## C. TACTICS AND THE EBB AND FLOW OF THE MOVEMENT

**Tactic** is the determination of the line to be taken by the proletariat during a comparatively short period of the ebb or flow of the movement, of advance or retreat of the revolution; the maintenance of this line by the substitution of new forms of struggle and organisation for those that have become out of date, or by the discovery of new watch-words, or by a combination of new methods with old, etc. Whereas strategy is concerned with such wide purposes as the winning of the war against tsarism or the bourgeoisie, tactic has a narrower aim. Tactic is concerned, not with the war as a whole, but with the fighting of this or that campaign, with the gaining of this or that victory which may be essential during a particular period of the general revolutionary advance or withdrawal. Tactics are thus parts of strategy, and subordinate thereto.

Tactics vary according as the movement is flowing or ebbing. During the first phase of the Russian revolution, for instance, between 1903 and the revolution of February (March) 1917, there was no change in general strategical plan, though there were several changes in tactics.

From 1903 to 1905, a period of general advance, the Party tactic took the form of an offensive. There were local strikes, directed towards political ends; political demonstrations; a political general strike; boycott of the duma; risings; revolutionary war-cries—such were the changing forms of struggle, which demanded correspondingly different forms of organisation. Factory and workshop committees, committees of revolutionary peasants, strike committees, soviets of workers' deputies, a workers' party carrying on more or less open agitation—such were the forms of organisation during this period.

From 1907 to 1912, the Party tactic had to be one of withdrawal, for the revolutionary movement was in a declining phase, a phase

of ebb. The forms of organisation, too, had to be appropriately modified; participation in the duma, instead of boycott of the duma; parliamentary action, instead of direct action; local and partial strikes for purely industrial ends, instead of the general strike for political ends; absolute inaction, even, at times. Of course during this period the Party had to work underground; revolutionary mass organisations had to be replaced by educational and cultural societies, cooperatives, friendly societies, and other "legal and constitutional" bodies.

In like manner during the second phase of the revolution, and yet again during the third phase, there were frequent changes in tactics—whilst—throughout each phase—there was no change in strategy.

Tactics are concerned with the methods of proletarian struggle and the forms of proletarian organisation, and with the modifications and combinations of these. That is why, in a given phase of the revolution, tactics can change repeatedly, according as the revolutionary tide is ebbing or flowing, according as the revolutionary movement is advancing or receding.

#### D. STRATEGICAL LEADERSHIP

The reserve forces of the revolution are of two kinds, direct and indirect.

##### *Direct Reserves*

1. The peasantry and the intermediate strata of the population of one's own country.
2. The proletariat of neighbouring countries.
3. The revolutionary movement in colonial and dependent countries.
4. The conquests and achievements of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletariat may temporarily renounce one of these conquests or achievements, in order to buy off a powerful adversary or secure a respite.

##### *Indirect Reserves*

1. Antagonisms and conflicts between non-proletarian classes of one's own country, which the proletariat can turn to account in order to weaken an adversary or strengthen its own reserves.
2. Antagonisms, conflicts, and wars (imperialist war, for instance) between capitalist States hostile to the proletarian State, disputes which the proletariat can turn to account for its own purposes—maybe an offensive, maybe manœuvres to cover an enforced retreat.

The importance of the direct reserves is self-evident. The importance of the indirect reserves may be less obvious, though they are sometimes of very great moment to the cause of the revolution. Incontestable, for example, is the great importance of the quarrel which took place, during and after the first revolution, between the petty-bourgeois democrats (the essers) and the monarchist bourgeois liberals (the cadets). Unquestionably, this dispute helped to free the peasants from bourgeois influences. Even more obvious is the enormous importance of the war to the death among the chief groups of imperialists at the time of the October revolution. Their quarrels made it impossible for them to concentrate their forces against the young Soviet power, which was thus enabled to organise its strength,

consolidate its position, and prepare to crush Kolchak and Denikin. To-day, when the antagonisms between the imperialist groups are becoming intensified to a degree which will make a new war inevitable, these indirect reserves grow ever more important to the proletariat.

The function of strategy consists in the right application and utilisation of the various reserves in such a way as to ensure that, during a particular phase of the revolution, there shall be an effective advance towards the goal of the revolution in that phase.

By what methods can this be achieved?

1. The main forces of the revolution must, at the decisive moment, be concentrated for an attack on the enemy's most vulnerable spot, at a moment when conditions are ripe for revolution, when a general offensive can go ahead with full steam, when armed insurrection is imminent, and when the calling of all the reserves into the fighting line is an indispensable preliminary to success. Consider, for example, the strategy from April to October (old style) 1917. Unquestionably, throughout this period the enemy's most vulnerable point was the war. The matter was fundamental, and it was one which made it possible for the Party to gather the whole population round the proletarian vanguard. At this time, therefore, the Party strategy was, having schooled the vanguard at street-corner meetings and in manifestations and demonstrations, to bring the reserves into action through the instrumentality of the Soviets at the rear and the soldiers' committees on the imperialist fighting front. The course of the revolution showed that this strategy was sound.

Lenin, paraphrasing the well-known utterances of Marx and Engels concerning insurrection, writes as follows about this strategical utilisation of the forces of the revolution:

Never play with insurrection; but, having begun one, make up your mind to go through with it to the end. At the right place, and when the time is ripe, assemble forces greatly outnumbering those of the enemy—for otherwise the latter, better prepared and better organised, will annihilate the insurgents. Once the rising has begun, it is essential to act with the utmost resoluteness, and, without fail and unconditionally, to assume the offensive. "A defensive attitude is fatal to an armed rising." We must try to take the enemy by surprise, to seize the moment when his forces are dispersed. We must endeavour to gain some success, however small, day by day (hour by hour, even, if we are operating in a town), so that at all costs we may maintain a superior "morale". (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xiv., part II., p. 270.)

2. The moment for the decisive blow, for raising the standard of revolt, must be carefully chosen. This must be when matters have reached a climax, when the vanguard is ready to fight to the bitter end, when the reserves will not hesitate to rally to the support of the vanguard, and when disorder is paramount in the ranks of the enemy. In this connexion, Lenin writes:

We may consider that the time is ripe for the decisive struggle: when all the class forces arrayed against us are in a state of confusion, are sufficiently embroiled one with another, have been sufficiently weakened in combats for which their strength is inadequate; when all the vacillating, unsteady, unstable intermediate elements (the petty bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeois democracy, in contradistinction to the bourgeoisie) have exposed themselves enough before the people, have made a sufficient parade of their utter bankruptcy; when there has arisen and spread widely among the proletariat a strong feeling in favour of decisive and unhesitatingly bold revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie. Then the time is ripe for revolution. Then, if we have kept good account of the before-mentioned conditions, and have chosen our moment well, our victory is assured. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvii., pp. 180-181.)

The conduct of the October revolution may be regarded as a model for such strategy.

A failure to study the conditions carefully may lead to either of two serious blunders. The Party may lag behind the movement; or it may run on far in advance of the movement, thus risking a setback. As an example of the injudicious choice of the moment may be mentioned the desire of some of the comrades to begin a rising in August 1917 by breaking up the Democratic Conference—at a time when the soviets were still in a vacillating mood, when the soldiers at the front had not yet made up their minds, and before the reserve forces were ready and willing to support the vanguard.

3. Once a line of action has been adopted, it must be followed unerringly to the goal, regardless of hindrances and complications. This is necessary to ensure that the vanguard shall not lose sight of the essential aim of the struggle, and that the masses shall not stray into devious paths, but shall march straight forward towards the goal and consolidate their forces in support of the vanguard. Unless this condition is fulfilled, there will be serious danger that the movement may get (as sailors say of a ship) off its course. As an example I may mention the mistake made immediately after the Democratic Conference, when our Party decided to participate in the Constituent Assembly. The Party apparently forgot for the moment that the Constituent Assembly embodied an attempt by the bourgeoisie to switch the country off the road of the soviets and on to the road of bourgeois parliamentarism. It forgot that participation in the Constituent Assembly could not fail to confuse the issues, to mislead the workers and peasants who were carrying on a revolutionary campaign under the watchword "All power to the Soviets". The mistake was rectified when the bolsheviks decided to withdraw from the Constituent Assembly.

4. The reserves must be handled in such a way as to safeguard an orderly retreat should the enemy be very powerful, should a withdrawal be inevitable, should it be obviously undesirable to accept the enemy's offer of battle, should retreat be the only way whereby (in the circumstances) the vanguard can escape destruction and keep the reserves at its disposal. In this connexion, Lenin writes:

Revolutionary parties must go on learning. They have learned how to attack. Now it is time for them to realise that this knowledge must be supplemented by acquiring a knowledge of how best to retreat. We have got to understand (and a revolutionary class learns this by bitter experience) that victory can only be won by those who have learned the proper method both of advance and of retreat. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvii., p. 121.)

The object of such strategy is to gain time, to scatter the forces of the enemy while consolidating our own for a future advance.

The peace of Brest-Litovsk is a model instance of such strategy. This peace enabled the Party to gain time, to take advantage of the dissensions in the imperialist camp, to disintegrate the enemy forces, to retain the support of the peasants, and to gather strength for an attack on Kolchak and Denikin. In the days of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin wrote:

By concluding a separate peace, we free ourselves as far as is possible at the present moment from both the contending imperialist groups, turning their mutual hostilities to our own account, taking advantage of the state of warfare between them which prevents their joining forces against us, thus freeing ourselves for a time so that we can further and consolidate the socialist revolution. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xv., pp. 68-69.)

Three years after the peace of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin wrote:

Even the dullest have now come to see that the peace of Brest-Litovsk was a concession which strengthened us while it disintegrated the forces of international imperialism. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xviii., part I, p. 355.)

#### E. TACTICAL LEADERSHIP

Tactical leadership is a part of strategical leadership, subordinated to the tasks and needs of the latter. Its aim is to ensure the control of all the forms of proletarian struggle and organisation, and their right utilisation in such a way that in the given situation the best possible results shall be obtained for the promotion of the strategical victory.

The main conditions requisite for the satisfactory utilisation of all the forms of proletarian organisation and struggle are as follows:

1. We must bring to the front those forms of struggle and organisation which are best suited to the condition of the movement at the time, to its ebb or its flow as the case may be; those which are best fitted to mobilise the masses and to distribute them conveniently along the revolutionary front.

It does not suffice that the vanguard should realise the impossibility of maintaining the old order and the need for its overthrow. The masses, likewise, the millionfold masses, must come to understand this need, and must show themselves ready and willing to rally to the support of the vanguard. But such a thoughtful insight can only be acquired by the masses in the school of personal experience. Our task is to see that the masses shall be provided with opportunities for the acquirement of such an understanding, that they shall be brought to realise the inevitability of the overthrow of the old order, that we shall put forward methods of struggle and forms of organisation which shall permit the masses to learn from experience the truth and correctness of our revolutionary watchwords.

The vanguard would have become severed from the working class, and the latter would have lost touch with the masses, had not the bolsheviks decided to take part in the duma, to carry on the agitation within its walls, to concentrate their forces on parliamentary action in order to show the masses the utter futility of the duma, the falseness of the cadets' promises, the impossibility of a compromise with tsardom, and the need for an alliance between the peasantry and the working class. Had the masses lacked this experience during the period when the duma functioned, it would have been impossible to unmask the cadets, and to secure the leadership in the hands of the proletariat.

The tactics of the otzovists ("abstentionists"), who demanded the withdrawal of the social-democratic fraction from the duma, thereby repudiating parliamentary action, gave rise to the danger of detaching the vanguard from its countless reserves.

Again, the vanguard would have alienated itself from the working class, and the latter would have forfeited its influence on the peasants and the soldiers, if the Party had followed the lead of the left-wing communists who advocated a rising in April 1917, before the men-sheviks and the social revolutionaries had discredited themselves in the eyes of the workers by showing themselves to be partisans of the war and of imperialism, before the masses had learned to their sorrow

how lying were the utterances of menshevik and social revolutionary alike concerning peace, land, and liberty. Had the masses been deprived of the experience of the Kerensky regime, the mensheviks and the essers would not have become isolated from the masses, and the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship would have been impossible. The only correct tactic in the circumstances was to lay bare the errors of the petty-bourgeois parties and to carry on an open struggle within the soviets.

The tactics of the left-wing communists threatened to deprive the Party of its position as leader of the proletarian revolution, and to make it a mere handful of futile conspirators having no foothold in reality.

Lenin writes in his *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*:

A vanguard alone will not lead to victory. To hurl the vanguard into the fray before the masses are ready to support it, or, at least, are willing to remain neutral, would not only be the height of folly but a crime. Agitation and propaganda do not suffice to bring the masses to a suitable frame of mind. They need also to be schooled by political experience. This is the law which lies at the root of all far-reaching revolutions, a law which has been confirmed in a striking manner both in Russia and in Germany. The Russian masses, uneducated, often illiterate, and the German masses, whose education and culture are at such an incomparably higher level, had each in turn to learn by bitter experience all the powerlessness, the listlessness, the helplessness, the servility of the governments carried on by the leaders of the Second International—henchmen of the bourgeoisie. The masses had to learn by experience that either of two dictatorships was inevitable: the dictatorship of the ultra-reactionaries (such as Korniloff in Russia and Kapp and Co. in Germany), or the dictatorship of the proletariat as a definite step on the road to communism. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvii, p. 173.)

2. We must find just that one particular link in the chain of events, the possession of which at a given moment will render us masters of the whole chain, and will place us in a position to prepare for a strategical victory.

From among all the tasks confronting the Party we have to choose the one which is of the most immediate importance, the one whose accomplishment constitutes the nodal point of our endeavours, the one whose execution will lead to the carrying out of all the other tasks.

Let us consider this statement in the light of two examples, the first taken from the history of the more remote past (the period when we were building up the Party), and the second culled from the history of very recent times (the period of the New Economic Policy).

During the period when we were upbuilding the Party; when there were innumerable circles, clubs, and organisations having no bonds one with the other; when the Party was split from top to bottom by the circle system of organisation, and by the fact that every comrade did what was right in his own eyes; when confused thinking was the order of the day—during this period, the most important link to grasp, the most important item in the chain of many links and many tasks, was to launch a clandestine newspaper which would circulate throughout the whole of Russia. Why was this such an urgent need? Because a solid kernel of Party organisation could not be created in any other way. Only by issuing such a paper could the innumerable circles and other organisations be united to form a compact whole, could the way be prepared for theoretical and tactical unity; and thus only could the foundations be laid whereon an effective Party could be built up.

In the period of transition from war to economic reconstruction, when industry was stagnant on account of the general disorganisation, when agriculture was suffering from the dearth of industrial commodities, and when the welding together of the State industries with the peasant economy was an essential condition for the successful upbuilding of socialism—in this period the most important link in the chain of events, the most important task, is the development of commerce. Why? Because, under the conditions created by Nep, the only thing which can form an intimate bond between industry and agriculture is commerce; because every commodity that does not find a market is, under the system of Nep, a weapon threatening industry with extinction; because industry cannot grow unless the products of industry find a market; because it is only when we have secured a strong foothold in the domain of commerce, when we have made ourselves masters in the realm of commerce, when we have got a permanent hold on this link of the chain, that we shall be able to create the bond between industry and agriculture, be able to carry out other tasks successfully, and be able to lay the foundations of a socialist economic order.

Lenin, in his essay on *The Significance of Gold*, tells us:

To be a revolutionist, to be a socialist or communist sympathiser, is not enough. It behoves us to find, at any given moment, that particular link in the chain to which we can cling in order to keep the whole chain together, and subsequently to pass on to the next link. . . . For the nonce, the particular link is the stimulation of commerce on the home market, and its effective control and guidance by the State. Commerce is a "link" in the chain of historical events, in the transitional forms of our socialist construction; and we must cling to this link for dear life. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xviii., part I., p. 412.)

#### F. REFORMISM AND REVOLUTION

In what way do revolutionary tactics differ from reformist tactics?

There are some who imagine that Leninism is against all reform, compromise, and agreements of any kind with the enemy. This is utterly wrongheaded. The bolsheviks know just as well as any one else that "the smallest contributions will be thankfully received"! They realise that, in certain circumstances, both reforms in general and compromises and agreements in particular are necessary and useful. Here we have Lenin's testimony on the subject:

To wage war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, more prolonged, more complicated, than the most bloodthirsty of wars between States, while renouncing beforehand the use of manoeuvring, of playing off (though for a time only) the interests of one foe against the other, of entering upon agreements and effecting compromises (even though these may be of an unstable and temporary character)—would not such renunciation be the height of folly? We might as well, when climbing a dangerous and hitherto unexplored mountain, refuse in advance to make the ascent in zigzags, or to turn back for a while, to give up the chosen direction in order to test another which may prove to be easier to negotiate. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvii., p. 158.)

What we are concerned with are not the reforms, compromises, and agreements, *qua* reforms, compromises, and agreements, but with the use they can be put to and the advantages to be gained.

Reform is the first and the last letter of the reformist's alphabet. He looks upon revolutionary work as a matter of no importance. If a reformist speaks of the social revolution, it is for him only a rhe-



torical flourish, used to throw dust in people's eyes. This is why, under a bourgeois regime, reformist tactics achieve reforms which serve merely to bolster up that regime and to scatter the revolutionary forces.

For the revolutionist, however, the revolution is everything, and reform a means to an end, a by-product of the revolution. For this reason, reform brought about by means of a revolutionary tactic carried on under a bourgeois government inevitably tends to weaken that government and to reinvigorate the forces of revolution, it serves as a base for the further development of the revolutionary movement.

A revolutionist may sponsor a reform because he sees in it a means for linking up constitutional action with unconstitutional action, because he feels he can make use of it as a screen behind which he can strengthen his clandestine work, whose aim is to educate and prepare the masses for the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

This is what we mean by the revolutionary use of reforms and of agreements under the imperialistic regime.

A reformist, on the other hand, stands for reform, rejects every unconstitutional action which might spread enlightenment among the masses and prepare them for revolution, and basks in the sunshine of the reforms he has succeeded in putting through.

There you have the reformist tactic, and such is the inevitable significance of reformism under imperialism.

But under the dictatorship of the proletariat, after the overthrow of imperialism, matters assume a different aspect. In certain cases and under certain conditions, the proletarian power may be compelled for a time to forsake the revolutionary path of completely changing the extant social order, and to enter the path of gradual transformation. In his essay on *The Significance of Gold*, Lenin calls this "the path of reforms", the path of "circular movements". Reforms are granted, concessions are made to non-proletarian classes, whereby these classes are weakened. While pursuing this road, the revolutionists gain a breathing space during which they can assemble their forces and prepare for a new attack. No one will deny that, in a certain sense, this is a reformist tactic. But we need to remember that such reforms have one peculiarity which other reforms do not possess: they emanate from a proletarian State. They serve to strengthen that State, to give the proletariat a breathing space, and they are useful weapons for the disintegration of the non-proletarian classes.

If such a policy is compatible with proletarian rule, it is only because the advance of the revolution in the preceding period has been so great as to allow of sufficient room for retreat when a withdrawal becomes necessary. Then the offensive gives way to a tactic of retreat, of flanking movements, and the like.

Thus we see that, whilst under the dominion of the bourgeoisie reforms are no more than by-products of the revolution, under the dictatorship of the proletariat they arise out of the revolutionary achievements of the proletariat. Lenin writes in this connexion:

The relation of reform to revolution can be correctly and precisely determined by Marxist theory alone, though Marx himself could only contemplate this relation from one point of view, namely from the point of view of his own period, before the proletariat had achieved a more or less solid and stable victory even in one single country. In such circumstances, the foundation for a correct rela-

tionship between reform and revolution was the formula: Reforms are by-products of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat. . . . After the victory of the proletariat, even if that victory has taken place in one country alone, a new element enters into the relationship of reform to revolution. As far as principle is concerned, nothing has been altered. But a change has come over the form, a change which Marx could not possibly foresee. And yet the change can be understood only in the light of Marxist philosophy and Marxist politics. . . . After the victory, reforms (though still no more than by-products in the international arena) become, in the land where the workers have been victorious, a necessary and legitimate breathing space when, despite the most intrepid endeavour, the revolutionary forces are obviously not strong enough to pass on from this or that phase of development to a higher phase. Victory gives such a "reserve of strength" that, even when a retreat becomes unavoidable, the revolutionary forces can hold out both materially and morally. (*Works*, vol. xviii, part I, pp. 414-415.)

## 8. THE PARTY

DURING the prerevolutionary epoch, the epoch of comparatively peaceful development, when the parties affiliated to the Second International dominated the labour movement and the parliamentary forms of struggle were looked upon as the chief forms—during that epoch our Party had not, nay it could not have, such a profound and decisive significance as it came to have later during the revolutionary struggles. Kautsky, in his defence of the Second International against various attacks, has declared that the parties composing the Second International were instruments of peace and not of war, and that they were, therefore, not in a position, while the great war lasted, to embark on any serious activity during the period of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. This is quite true. But what does it imply? It implies that the parties affiliated to the Second International are not adapted to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, that they are not fighting organisations capable of leading the proletariat to the seizure of power; they are merely an electoral apparatus, good for parliamentary election campaigns, and appropriate for the parliamentary struggle. This is why, under the aegis of the Second International, the most important political organisation representing the political aspirations of the proletariat was not a party, but a parliamentary fraction. The party, in those days, was no more than an appendage, a servant, of the parliamentary fraction. It can readily be understood that, in such circumstances, and under such a leadership, a party of the kind just described is incapable of preparing the proletariat for the revolution.

But with the advent of a new period, the situation is entirely changed. The new period is one of open class war, a period of revolutionary action on the part of the proletariat, a period of proletarian revolution, a period during which definite preparations are made for the overthrow of imperialism and for the seizure of power by the proletariat. This period sets the proletariat new tasks. One of the first of these is to reorganize the Party work, renewing it and revolutionising it in every way; to educate the workers in the revolutionary struggle for power; to rally the reserves and prepare them for the fight; to seek alliances with the proletariat of neighbouring lands; to create firm ties between the proletariat and the movements for independence in colonial and vassal countries; and so on, and so forth. To rely, for the accomplishment of these tasks, upon the old social-democratic parties, is to doom oneself to despair and defeat. In view

of these tasks, to remain under the leadership of such parties is to consent to march forward unarmed into the coming battle.

Hence the need for the creation of a new party, a revolutionary fighting party, bold enough to lead the proletariat forward into the struggle for the seizure of power, experienced enough to find a solution for all the complications arising out of the revolutionary situation, and flexible enough to be able to steer the revolutionary barque safely through the shoals.

Without such a party it is useless to dream of overthrowing imperialism and installing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This new party is the Party of Leninism.

What are the characteristics of this new Party?

#### a. THE PARTY AS THE VANGUARD OF THE WORKING CLASS

First of all the Party should be the vanguard of the working class. Its membership should comprise the pick of the working class. It should embody the experience of the finest stalwarts, their revolutionary spirit, their unbounded devotion to the cause of the proletariat. But in order to be an effective vanguard, the Party must be armed with a revolutionary theory, with a knowledge of the laws of the movement, of the laws of revolution. Lacking this, the Party is not fit to rally the proletariat for the fight, or to take over the functions of leadership. The Party is no true Party if it limits its activities to a mere registration of the sufferings and thoughts of the proletarian masses, if it is content to be dragged along in the wake of the "spontaneous movement" of the masses, if it cannot overcome the inertia and the political indifference of the masses, if it cannot rise superior to the transient interests of the proletariat, if it is incapable of inspiring the masses with a proletarian class consciousness. The Party should march at the head of the working class, it should see farther than the latter, it should lead the proletariat, and not lag in the rear. The parties affiliated to the Second International, the advocates of "hqvostism" or "tailism" [see above, p. 96], are the fnglemen of bourgeois policy. Their leadership condemns the proletariat to becoming a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Only a party which is conscious of its function as vanguard of the proletariat, which feels itself able to inspire the masses with a proletarian class consciousness, only such a party can lead the workers out of the narrow path of trade unionism and consolidate them into an independent political force. Such a party is the political leader of the working class.

I outlined above some of the difficulties of the proletarian class struggle, and some of the complications arising therefrom; I spoke of strategy and tactics, of reserves and of manœuvring, of offensive warfare and of retreat. The circumstances arising from the proletarian class struggle are just as complicated, if not more so, than were those arising out of the great war. Who can find a way out of the labyrinth of these complexities? Who is competent to guide the millionfold masses of the proletariat? No army can venture forth to battle without an experienced general staff to direct its actions. If it tries to dispense with a general staff it is foredoomed to defeat. To a greater extent, if possible, does this apply in the case of the proletariat. It, too, must possess a general staff if it is to avoid being

handed over to the tender mercies of its enemies. Where shall we find such a general staff? In the revolutionary party of the proletariat. The working class without a revolutionary party is an army without a general staff. Our Party is the war staff of the proletarian army.

But the Party must not content itself with being the vanguard. It must also be a division of the class army, an intimate part of the working class, striking deep roots into the very life of that class. The distinction between the vanguard and the mass of the working class, the distinction between Party members and the non-Party masses, will not disappear so long as classes still continue to exist, so long as elements from other classes come to swell the ranks of the proletariat, and so long as the working class as a whole is not in a position to raise itself to the level attained by the vanguard. On the other hand, the Party would forfeit its position as a Party if this distinction were to lead to its severance from the masses, if the Party were to shut itself up in an ivory tower and thereby effectively cut itself loose from the non-Party masses. The Party cannot be the leader of the working class unless it keeps the closest contact with the non-Party masses, unless there is an alliance between the Party and the non-Party masses, unless the masses accept the Party leadership, unless the Party possesses both moral and political authority among the masses. Our Party has recently added two hundred thousand new working-class members to its ranks. The remarkable thing about these new members is that they have not for the most part entered the Party on their own initiative, but have been sent by their non-Party fellow-workers, who took an active hand in proposing the new members, and without whose approval no new members would have been admitted. This points to the fact that the broad masses of non-Party workers look upon the Party as their Party, a Party which is near and dear to them, a Party in whose development and strengthening they are personally interested, a Party to whose leadership they cheerfully confide their destiny. It is hardly necessary to point out that were it not for these invisible moral threads binding the masses to the Party, the latter could not have become the mainspring of the working-class movement. The Party is an inalienable portion of the working class. Lenin, in his *One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward*, writes:

We are the Party of the working class. Consequently, nearly the whole of that class (in times of war and of civil war, the whole of that class) should work under the guidance of our Party, should create the closest contacts with our Party. But we should be guilty of "hvoztism" and "Maniloffskiyism" <sup>22</sup> were we to believe that, under capitalism, all or nearly all of the workers will become class-conscious and will be prepared to share the activities of the vanguard, the socialist party. No reasonable socialist has ever believed that, under capitalism, even the trade unions (more primitive organisations and therefore more accessible to the backward strata of the working class) can succeed in enrolling all or nearly all of the members of the working class. We should be deceiving ourselves and closing our eyes to the immensity of our task were we to belittle the difficulties ahead of us, were we to overlook the distinction between the vanguard and the masses which are attracted towards it, were we to forget that the perennial duty of the vanguard is to raise ever wider strata of the proletariat to its own level. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. 7., pp. 350-351.)

<sup>22</sup> Maniloffsky is one of the characters in Gogol's famous novel *Dead Souls*. He is always dreaming of splendid projects which he never tries to realise in action. "Maniloffskiyism" has become an epithet in Russia to describe "all talk and no do."—E. and C. P.

## b. THE PARTY AS THE ORGANISED DETACHMENT OF THE WORKING CLASS

The Party is not only the vanguard of the working class. If the Party is to function as the genuine leader in the class struggle it must likewise be the organised detachment of the working class. Under the bourgeois regime, the tasks confronting the Party are manifold and of the utmost importance. The Party has to guide the proletariat in its struggle, and has to do so, everywhere, under extraordinarily difficult conditions; it has to lead the proletariat to assume the offensive when events warrant an attack, and it has to withdraw the proletariat from the onslaught upon the foe when retreat is indicated; it has to instil into the minds of the masses of unorganised workers a sense of discipline, of method in the fight, to inspire them with the spirit of organisation and steadfastness. But the Party will not acquit itself of these tasks unless it is itself an embodiment of discipline and organisation, unless it is in very truth the organised detachment of the working class. Lacking this, the Party is in no condition to act as the leader of the millionfold proletarian masses. The Party is the organised detachment of the working class.

The concept of the Party as being an organised whole was formulated by Lenin in the first paragraph of our Party constitution. Here the Party is described as "the sum of all the organisations", and the Party members as "members of one of the Party organisations". The mensheviks, who opposed this formula as early as 1903, proposed a "system" of "individual membership" of the Party. Any university professor or undergraduate, any "sympathiser", any striker, who was willing to give the Party support, was to be entitled to become a member of the Party, even though he did not belong, and did not wish to belong, to any local group of the Party. It is obvious that had this system been adopted, the Party would have become full of professors, students, and the like, would have become sloppy, formless, disorganised, would have been swamped in a sea of "sympathisers", while the line of demarcation between Party and class would have become blurred and the task of raising the unorganised masses to the level of the vanguard would have been whistled down the wind. Under such an "opportunist" system, our Party could not have fulfilled its mission as organiser of the working class during the period of our revolution. Quoting once more from Lenin's *One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward*:

If we accept Martoff's outlook, the Party frontiers are to be left undefined, so that "every striker" may "declare himself to be a member of the Party". What is to be gained by this vagueness of outline? It will merely lead to a widespread assumption of the name "Party member". Where it is mischievous, is that it tends to blur the fundamental distinction between Party and class. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. v., p. 356.)

The Party is, however, not only the sum of all the Party organisations. It is likewise the centre of unity for all these organisations, the formal concentration point for the united whole, possessing higher and lower organs of leadership, having power to subordinate the minority to the majority, to pass resolutions and make practical decisions whose carrying out is binding upon all members. In the absence of such conditions, the Party could not function as an organised whole capable of methodical and organised guidance of the prole-

tariat in the class struggle. To quote once more from Lenin's *One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward*:

In days gone by, our Party was not a formally organised whole, but the sum of individual groups. Consequently, these groups could exercise no more than an ideological influence one upon the other. To-day we have become an organised Party: and organisation signifies the establishment of power, signifies the transformation of the authority of ideas into the authority of power, signifies the subordination of the lower constituents of the Party to the higher. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. v., p. 442.)

The principle of subordinating the minority to the majority, the centralisation of the Party leadership, has often been attacked by unstable elements as the embodiment of bureaucracy, of formalism, and the like. We need hardly point out that the methodical work of the Party as a whole and the guidance of the class struggle would be impracticable on any other terms. Leninism is, from the organisational point of view, the putting of this principle into practice. Lenin nicknamed the opposition to this principle "Russian nihilism" and "aristocratic anarchism", and he declared that these should be laughed out of court. Here is what he has to say about the matter in his *One Step Forward*:

This aristocratic anarchism is peculiar to the Russian nihilist. In his eyes, the Party organisation appears as a monstrous "factory". The subjection of the part to the whole, of the minority to the majority, seems to him a "slavery"; \* \* \* the apportionment of Party work from and through the Party centre drags from him tragi-comic walls about the transformation of men into "machines"; \* \* \* the very mention of Party rules elicits a grimace, and the remark that we can quite well do without rules. \* \* \* It is abundantly clear that behind these complaints concerning bureaucracy there lurks a spirit of discontent with the composition of the central organism, a complaint that it is, as it were, a fig leaf. \* \* \* You are a bureaucrat because you have been elected to this or that post by the congress and against my will; you are a formalist because you act in accordance with congress decisions and against my consent; you act mechanically because you follow the decisions of the majority and reck little of my approval or my desire to be coopted; you are an autocrat because you will not hand over power and authority into the hands of our dear and trusted comrades." \* \* \* (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. v., pp. 462 and 438.)

#### C. THE PARTY AS THE HIGHEST FORM OF CLASS ORGANISATION OF THE PROLETARIAT

The Party, as we have seen, is the organised detachment of the working class. But it is not the only organisation of the working class. The proletariat has fashioned a number of other organisations without which it could not wage war upon capitalism: trade unions, cooperatives, workshop committees, parliamentary labour parties, women's associations, a labour press, educational leagues, Youth societies, revolutionary fighting units (when the struggle assumes an active form), delegate councils or soviets (as soon as the proletariat has seized power), and so on. As often as not, these are non-party organisations, and only a certain proportion of them are linked up with the Party or constitute a ramification of the Party. Under special conditions, every one of these organisations is necessary; for, lacking them, it would be impossible to consolidate the class positions of

\* The reference is to Axelrod, Martoff, Potresoff, and others, who would not submit to the Party decisions agreed upon by the Second Congress, and who accused Lenin of "bureaucratism."

the proletariat in the various spheres of the struggle, and to make of the proletariat a force capable of replacing the capitalist order by a socialist order. But how can unity of command be achieved in the presence of such a diversity of organisations? How are we to guarantee that their multiplicity will not lead to confusion and disagreement in the guidance of the struggle? Some may contend that these organisations function only within a special sphere of activity, and that therefore they cannot hinder one another. Maybe so. But they must all direct their activities towards the same goal, for each of them serves the same class, the proletariat. It may well be asked, who decides upon the direction, the general direction all these organisations shall take? Where is the central unit of organisation which, because of its past experience, is not only capable of determining the line of activities these manifold organisations should take, but likewise wields sufficient authority to induce these organisations to keep within the prescribed lines in order to achieve unity of command and to avoid any possibility of confusion?

This central unit of organisation is the Party.

The Party possesses all the necessary qualifications. It is the rallying point for the best elements of the working class, elements which are intimately connected with the non-Party organisations of the proletariat and are very often the leading spirit in these organisations. As rallying point for these elements of the working class, it is the best school for the training of leaders who shall be capable of guiding all the forms of organisation thrown up in the course of the working-class struggle. Further, the Party, as the best school for the training of leaders, and the most experienced and authoritative of working-class organisations, is specially fitted for the work of centralising the leadership of the proletarian struggle and for converting each and every non-Party organisation of the working class into an auxiliary corps and into a means for linking up the working class as a whole with the Party. The Party is the highest form of the class organisation of the proletariat.

But this does not mean that the non-Party organisations should be formally subject to the Party. All that is requisite is that the Party members who belong to these organisations should use their influence and all their arts of persuasion to bring these non-Party organisations into the closest proximity to the Party, and to lead them to place themselves of their own free will under the political guidance of the Party.

It is from this point of view that Lenin describes the Party as "the highest form of class organisation of the workers", whose political leadership should be exercised over all the other forms of proletarian organisation. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvii., p. 141.)

The opportunists' theory of "independence" and of "neutrality" in respect of the non-Party organisations, the theory which gives rise to "independent" members of parliament, to "unattached" journalists, to "strait-laced" trade unionists, and to "embourgeoised" cooperators, is, in the light of all these considerations, seen to be quite incompatible with the theory and practice of Leninism.

d. THE PARTY AS THE INSTRUMENT FOR THE DICTATORSHIP OF  
THE PROLETARIAT

The Party is the highest form of proletarian organisation. The Party is the nucleus of leadership within the working class and among the organisations created by the workers. But the Party must not be looked upon as an end in itself, as a self-sufficing force. The Party is not only the highest form of proletarian class unity, it is also an instrument in the hands of the proletariat for the establishment of the dictatorship, and for consolidating and elaborating that dictatorship after the seizure of power. The Party could not attain so notable a position, it could not soar above all the other organisations of the working class, were it not that the proletariat is faced with the problem of the conquest of power, were it not for the existence of imperialism, for the inevitability of wars, for the advent of crises. All these circumstances make it imperative for the proletariat to concentrate its forces, to unite the threads of the revolutionary movement at one central point in order to overthrow the bourgeoisie and install the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletariat has need of the Party as its general staff if the struggle for power is to be crowned with victory. It is plain that without a Party capable of mustering around it the mass organisations of the proletariat and of centralising the management of the movement during the course of the struggle, the Russian proletariat could not have established its revolutionary dictatorship.

Moreover, the Party is not only indispensable to the proletariat for the establishment of the dictatorship. It becomes even more necessary after the seizure of power in order to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat, to consolidate and to enlarge it with a view to inaugurating a completely socialised order. In his book on *Left-Wing Communism* Lenin observes:

Beyond question, almost every one knows by this time that the bolsheviks would not have been able to hold power for two-and-a-half years, nor even for two-and-a-half months, had there not been the strictest possible discipline, a truly iron discipline, within the Party; nor would they have been able to hold power without the whole-hearted support of the entire mass of the working class, or at any rate the full support of all the members of the working class who are class-conscious, sincere, devoted, influential, and competent to lead those who are comparatively backward or attract them into the forward movement. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvii., p. 117.)

What do "consolidate" and "enlarge" signify in relation to the dictatorship of the proletariat? They mean that the proletarian masses must be imbued with the spirit of discipline and organisation; that the proletarian masses must be inoculated against the harmful influence of the petty bourgeoisie, must be prevented from acquiring petty-bourgeois habits and customs; that the organisational activities of the proletariat must be utilised in order to educate and transform the mentality of the petty bourgeoisie; that the proletarian masses must be taught to help themselves, to cultivate their own strength, so that, in the course of time, class may be abolished and the conditions be prepared for the inauguration of socialist production. None of this is possible, however, unless there exists a Party which has been



rendered strong by its solidarity and its discipline. To quote again from Lenin's *Left-Wing Communism*:

The dictatorship of the proletariat is a hard-fought fight against the forces and traditions of the old society; a fight that is both bloody and unbloody, both violent and passive, both military and economic, both educational and administrative. The power of habit, ingrained in millions and tens of millions, is a terrible power. Without the Party, a party of iron which has been tempered in the struggle, a party that enjoys the confidence of all the straightforward members of the working class, a party able to understand and to influence the psychology of the masses, success in such a struggle would be impossible. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvii., p. 136.)

The proletariat needs the Party for the establishment and for the maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Party is an instrument for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It follows from this that as soon as class has been abolished, as soon as the dictatorship of the proletariat has been done away with, the Party likewise will have fulfilled its function and can be allowed to disappear.

#### e. THE PARTY IS THE EXPRESSION OF A UNITY OF WILL INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTENCE OF FRACTIONS

The establishment and the maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a Party which has been steeled in the school of solidarity and discipline. But an iron discipline is unthinkable without unity of will, without whole-hearted and unconditional unity of action on the part of the members. Of course this does not exclude the possibility of a conflict of opinion arising within the ranks of the Party. Quite otherwise. An iron discipline, far from excluding criticism and conflict of opinion, presupposes that such struggles will arise. Neither should we suppose that the discipline is "blind". On the contrary. Discipline does not exclude, but rather, presupposes, the existence of conscious and voluntary submission; for only a conscious discipline can ever become a discipline of iron. But when a difference of opinion has been thoroughly thrashed out, when criticism has had its say, and when a decision has been made, then unity of will and of action on the part of all our members is the indispensable condition without which unity and discipline are impossible. In Lenin's *The Conditions of Admission into the Communist International*, we read:

During the present epoch of intense civil warfare, the Communist Party can accomplish its task only on condition that it is highly centralised, that it is dominated by an iron discipline which is quasi-military in its severity, that it is guided by a group of comrades at the centre, enjoying the confidence of the rank and file members, endowed with authority, and possessing wide executive powers.

This is what Party discipline should be like during the struggle for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Even more appropriate are the above-quoted words when we consider the condition of affairs after the inauguration of the dictatorship. We read in Lenin's *Left-Wing Communism*:

He who weakens, no matter how little, the iron discipline of the Party of the proletariat (especially during the period of dictatorship), effectually helps the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvii., p. 136.)

It follows from this that the existence of fractions within the Party is directly inimical to unity and discipline. Obviously such fractions can only lead to the setting up of several centres of direction. The existence of several centres means a lack of one general controlling body; it means division of purpose, divided will; it means a weakening and an undermining of discipline, a weakening and an undermining of the dictatorship. The Parties affiliated to the Second International can allow themselves the luxury of fractions; they are actively antagonistic to the dictatorship of the proletariat, they do not want to lead the workers to the conquest of power, and they can follow the custom of the liberals in the matter of fraction-building. For them an iron discipline is not necessary. But the parties affiliated to the Communist International cannot afford themselves any such luxury, for they organise their activities with a view to the establishment and to the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They have no time to waste on such "liberal" devices. The Party constitutes a unity of wills which is incompatible with any setting up of fractions and any division of power.

Hence, Lenin's explanation of the "danger of setting up fractions within the Party. It is dangerous from the outlook of Party unity and from the outlook of the unity of will among the vanguard of the proletariat. Unity is an essential prerequisite for the successful maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat." A special resolution concerning Party unity confirmed and strengthened this idea.

That is why Lenin demanded "the complete abolition of all fractions" within the Party. He further demanded the "immediate disbanding of all groups without exception and irrespective of the platform on which they have come together", on pain of "instant and unconditional expulsion from the Party". (See the resolution "On the Unity of the Party", passed by the Tenth Party Congress.)

#### f. THE PARTY IS STRENGTHENED BY PURGING ITSELF OF OPPORTUNIST ELEMENTS

The origin of all fraction-building within the Party is opportunism. The proletariat is not a sharply circumscribed class. A constant stream of recruits from the peasantry, from the petty bourgeoisie, from the intelligentsia, flows into its ranks. In the course of the development of capitalism, these people have become proletarianised. Simultaneously with this influx, a change is taking place in the upper strata of the proletariat, among trade-union leaders, members of parliament and the like, who have been corrupted by the bourgeoisie, bribed with a share of the high profits made by colonial exploitation. In the preface to this book on *Imperialism*, Lenin expresses himself as follows:

These bourgeois-minded workers, this "labour aristocracy", petty-bourgeois in its manner of life, in its income, and in its ideology, are the main strength of the Second International, and, here and now, are the most dependable social (not military) supporters of the bourgeoisie. These persons are veritable agents of the bourgeoisie, active for the bourgeoisie in the ranks of the workers, the touts of the capitalist class, the modern protagonists of jingoism and reform. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvii., pp. 248-249.)

These petty-bourgeois groups crowd into the Party by one means or another and bring with them a spirit of vacillation and opportunism,

of disintegration and mistrust. They are mainly responsible for the creation of fractions within the Party, for the falling away of members, for disorganisation in our ranks, and for the endeavour to break up the Party from within. To do battle against imperialism with such "allies" as these is to lay oneself open to attack from two sides at once. If we are to wage successful warfare against imperialism we need must clear all such persons out of the Party and must conduct a ruthless fight against them.

The assumption that such persons can be won over by moral suasion within the Party, within the framework of one and the same Party, is an unsound and dangerous theory. It is a theory which dooms the Party to paralysis and chronic illness, threatens to hand it over bag and baggage to a policy of opportunism, which would rob the proletariat of its revolutionary Party and deprive it of its best weapon in the fight against imperialism. Our Party could not have led the workers to power and to the inauguration of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it would not have emerged from the civil war as the conqueror, if it had kept all the Martoffs, Dans, Potresoffs, and Axelrods among its members. If our Party has succeeded in creating unity within its ranks, and has welded its membership into a coherent whole, it is because it has shaken itself free from opportunism, has purged itself of the mensheviks and of all those who would fain relinquish the gains of the revolution. The proletarian parties must expel the opportunist and reformist elements, all the socialists who have an imperialist and jingoist bias, all the socialists who are infected with patriotism and pacificism, they must expel all such if they hope to develop and strengthen in the course of the struggle. The more drastic the purge, the more likelihood is there of a strong and influential Party arising. Lenin tells us in his *Lying Speeches about Freedom*:

With reformists and mensheviks in our ranks, we cannot hope to lead the revolutionary proletariat to victory, or to preserve the gains of victory. This is fundamental. Moreover it has been confirmed by recent experiences in Russia and in Hungary. . . . In Russia we have many times pulled through a difficult situation in which, had there been mensheviks, reformists, or petty-bourgeois democrats in our ranks, would have meant the overthrow of the Soviet regime. . . . The opinion is current that the Italian proletariat will soon enter upon a definitive struggle with the Italian bourgeoisie as to which is to become the governing power in Italy. In such circumstances it is essential that the mensheviks, the reformists, and the followers of Turati should be cleared of the Party may ruin everything, may scotch the revolution, may pluck power of responsibility if these comrades show any inclination to vacillate or to make common cause with the reformists. . . . On the eve of a revolution, and during the bitterest hours of the battle, the slightest hesitation within the ranks of the Party may ruin everything, may scotch the revolution, may pluck power from the hands of the workers before the spoils of victory are fully secured and while the proletariat is still subject to furious attack. If hesitant leaders withdraw at such a time, their action tends to strengthen rather than to weaken the Party. In fact the whole of the workers' movement and the revolution gain thereby. (*Works*, Russian edition, vol. xvii., pp. 372-373.)

## 7. INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOR DELEGATION, BY STALIN, SEPTEMBER 9, 1927 (EXCERPT)

NOTE.—In the course of this interview with the first American Labor delegation to visit Soviet Russia, Stalin made a particularly clear statement on the inevitable conflict between world capitalism and world communism.

. . . With regard to the international conditions necessary for the complete triumph of communist society, these will develop and grow

in proportion as revolutionary crises and revolutionary outbreaks of the working class in capitalist countries grow. It must not be imagined that the working class in one country, or in several countries, will march towards socialism, and still more to communism, and that the capitalists of other countries will sit still with folded arms and look on with indifference. Still less must it be imagined that the working class in capitalist countries will agree to be mere spectators of the victorious development of socialism in one or another country. As a matter of fact, the capitalists will do all in their power to crush such countries. As a matter of fact, every important step taken towards socialism, and still more towards communism, in any country will be inevitably accompanied by the unrestrained efforts of the working class in capitalist countries to achieve the dictatorship and socialism in those countries. Thus, in the further progress of development of the international revolution, two world centres will be formed: the socialist centre, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating towards socialism, and the capitalist center attracting to itself all the countries gravitating toward capitalism. The fight between these two centres for the conquest of world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and communism throughout the whole world, for the final defeat of world capitalism means the victory of socialism in the arena of world economy. . . .

## 8. THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

**NOTE.**—The Programme adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, on September 1, 1928, is the best general statement of Communism in a single document between the Communist Manifesto of 1848 and the speech of Andre Zhdanov to the first meeting of the Cominform in 1947. The parts reproduced here deal with the revolutionary objective, the kind of revolution to be fought for, the place of the proletariat, of colonial movements and of the U. S. S. R. in the movement, and the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary movement. The last is obviously derivative from Stalin's earlier treatment, but reinforces and confirms his explanation on behalf of all Communist parties.

### III. THE ULTIMATE AIM OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL— WORLD COMMUNISM

The ultimate aim of the Communist International is to replace world capitalist economy by a world system of Communism. Communist society, the basis for which has been prepared by the whole course of historical development, is mankind's only way out, for it alone can abolish the contradictions of the capitalist system which threaten to degrade and destroy the human race.

Communist society will abolish the class division of society, i. e., simultaneously with the abolition of anarchy in production, it will abolish all forces of exploitation and oppression of man by man. Society will no longer consist of antagonistic classes in conflict with each other, but will represent a united commonwealth of labor. For the first time in its history mankind will take its fate into its own hands. Instead of destroying innumerable human lives and incalculable wealth in struggles between classes and nations, mankind will devote all its energy to the struggle against the forces of nature, to the development and strengthening of its own collective might.

After abolishing private ownership in the means of production and converting them into social property, the world system of Communism will replace the elemental forces of the world market, of competition and the blind process of social production, by consciously organized and planned production for the purpose of satisfying rapidly growing social needs. With the abolition of competition and anarchy in production, devastating crises and still more devastating wars will disappear. Instead of colossal waste of productive forces and spasmodic development of society—there will be planned utilization of all material resources and painless economic development on the basis of unrestricted, smooth and rapid development of productive forces.

The abolition of private property and the disappearance of classes will do away with the exploitation of man by man. Work will cease to be toiling for the benefit of a class enemy: instead of being merely a means of livelihood it will become a necessity of life: want and economic inequality, the misery of enslaved classes, and a wretched standard of life generally will disappear; the hierarchy created in the division of labor system will be abolished together with the antagonism between mental and manual labor; and the last vestige of the social inequality of sexes will be removed. At the same time, the organs of class domination, and the State in the first place, will disappear also. The State, being the embodiment of class domination, will die out insofar as classes die out, and with it all measures of coercion will expire.

With the disappearance of classes the monopoly of education in every form will be abolished. Culture will become the acquirement of all and the class ideologies of the past will give place to scientific materialist philosophy. Under such circumstances, the domination of man over man, in any form, becomes impossible, and a great field will be opened for the social selection and the harmonious development of all the talents inherent in humanity.

In Communist society no social restrictions will be imposed upon the growth of the forces of production. Private ownership in the means of production, the selfish lust for profits, the artificial retention of the masses in a state of ignorance, poverty—which retards technical progress in capitalist society, and unproductive expenditures will have no place in a Communist society. The most expedient utilization of the forces of nature and of the natural conditions of production in the various parts of the world; the removal of the antagonism between town and country, that under capitalism results from the low technical level of agriculture and its systematic lagging behind industry; the closest possible cooperation between science and technics, the utmost encouragement of research work and the practical application of its results on the widest possible social scale; planned organization of scientific work; the application of the most perfect methods of statistical accounting and planned regulation of economy; the rapidly growing social need, which is the most powerful internal driving force of the whole system—all these will secure the maximum productivity of social labor, which in turn will release human energy for the powerful development of science and art.

The development of the productive forces of world Communist society will make it possible to raise the well-being of the whole of humanity and to reduce to a minimum the time devoted to material

production and, consequently, will enable culture to flourish as never before in history. This new culture of a humanity that is united for the first time in history, and has abolished all State boundaries, will, unlike capitalist culture, be based upon clear and transparent human relationships. Hence, it will bury forever all mysticism, religion, prejudice and superstition and will give a powerful impetus to the development of all-conquering scientific knowledge.

This higher stage of Communism, the stage in which Communist society has already developed on its own foundation, in which an enormous growth of social productive forces has accompanied the manifold development of man, in which humanity has already inscribed on its banner: "From each according to his abilities to each according to his needs!"—presupposes, as an historical condition precedent, a lower stage of development, the stage of Socialism. At this lower stage, Communist society only just emerges from capitalist society and bears all the economic, ethical and intellectual birthmarks it has inherited from the society from whose womb it is just emerging. The productive forces of Socialism are not yet sufficiently developed to assure a distribution of the products of labor according to needs: these are distributed according to the amount of labor expended. Division of labor, i. e. the system whereby certain groups perform certain labor function, and especially the distinction between mental and manual labor, still exists. Although classes are abolished, traces of the old class division of society and, consequently, remnants of the Proletarian State power, coercion, laws, still exist. Consequently, certain traces of inequality, which have not yet managed to die out altogether, still remain. The antagonism between town and country has not yet been entirely removed. But none of these survivals of former society is protected or defended by any social force. Being the product of a definite level of development of productive forces, they will disappear as rapidly as mankind, freed from the fetters of the capitalist system, subjugates the forces of nature, re-educates itself in the spirit of Communism, and passes from Socialism to complete Communism.

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### CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM

#### 8. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF REVOLUTIONS

The international proletarian revolution represents a combination of processes which vary in time and character; purely proletarian revolutions; revolutions of a bourgeois-democratic type which grow into proletarian revolutions; wars for national liberation; colonial revolutions. The World Dictatorship of the Proletariat comes only as the final result of the revolutionary process.

The uneven development of capitalism, which became more accentuated in the period of imperialism, has given rise to a variety of types of capitalism, to different stages of ripeness of capitalism in different countries, and to a variety of specific conditions of the revolutionary process. These circumstances make it historically inevitable that the proletariat will come to power by a variety of ways and

degrees of rapidity; that a number of countries must pass through certain transition stages leading to the dictatorship of the proletariat and must adopt varied forms of Socialist construction.

The variety of conditions and ways by which the proletariat will achieve its dictatorship in the various countries may be divided schematically into three main types.

Countries of highly developed capitalism (United States of America, Germany, Great Britain, etc.), having powerful productive forces, highly centralized production, with small-scale production reduced to relative insignificance, and a long established bourgeois-democratic political system. In such countries the fundamental political demand of the program is direct transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the economic sphere, the most characteristic demands are: expropriation of the whole of large-scale industry; organization of a large number of State Soviet farms and, in contrast to this, a relatively small portion of the land to be transferred to the peasantry; unregulated market relations to be given comparatively small scope; rapid rate of Socialist development generally, and of collectivization of peasant farming in particular.

Countries with a medium development of capitalism (Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, the Balkan countries, etc.), having numerous survivals of semi-feudal relationships in agriculture, possessing, to a certain extent, the material prerequisites for Socialist construction, and in which the bourgeois-democratic reforms have not yet been completed. In some of these countries a process of more or less rapid development from bourgeois-democratic revolution to Socialist revolution is possible. In others, there may be types of proletarian revolutions which will have a large number of bourgeois-democratic tasks to fulfill. Hence, in these countries, the dictatorship of the proletariat may not come about at once, but in the process of transition from the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry to the Socialist dictatorship of the proletariat; where the Revolution develops directly as a proletarian revolution it is presumed that the proletariat exercises leadership over a broad agrarian peasant movement. In general, the agrarian revolution plays a most important part in these countries, and in some cases a decisive role; in the process of expropriating large landed property a considerable portion of the confiscated land is placed at the disposal of the peasantry; the volume of market relations prevailing after the victory of the proletariat is considerable; the task of organizing the peasantry along co-operative lines and later, of combining them in production, occupies an important place among the tasks of Socialist construction. The rate of this construction is relatively slow.

Colonial and semi-colonial countries (China, India, etc.) and dependent countries (Argentina, Brazil, etc.), having the rudiments of and in some cases considerably developed industry, but in the majority of cases inadequate for independent Socialist construction; with feudal medieval relationships, or "Asiatic mode of production" relationships prevailing in their economics and in their political superstructure; and in which the principal industrial, commercial and banking enterprises, the principal means of transport, the large landed estates (*latifundia*), plantations, etc., are concentrated in the hands of foreign imperialist groups. The principal task in such countries is, on the one hand, to fight against feudalism and the pro-capitalist forms of ex-

ploitation and to develop systematically the peasant agrarian revolution; on the other hand, to fight against foreign imperialism and for national independence. As a rule, transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat in these countries will be possible only through a series of preparatory stages, as the outcome of a whole period of transformation of bourgeois-democratic revolution into Socialist revolution, while in the majority of cases, successful Socialist construction will be possible only if direct support is obtained from the countries in which the proletarian dictatorship is established.

In still more backward countries (as in some parts of Africa) where there are no wage workers or very few, where the majority of the population still live in tribal conditions, where survivals of primitive tribal forms still exist, where the national bourgeoisie is almost non-existent, where the primary role of foreign imperialism is that of military occupation and usurpation of land, the central task is to fight for national independence. Victorious national uprisings in these countries may open the way for their direct development towards Socialism and their avoiding the stage of capitalism, provided real, powerful assistance is rendered to them by the countries in which the proletarian dictatorship is established.

Thus, in the epoch in which the proletariat in the most developed capitalist countries is confronted with the immediate task of capturing power, in which the dictatorship of the proletariat is already established in the U. S. S. R. and is a factor of world significance, the movement for liberation in colonial and semi-colonial countries, which was brought into being by the penetration of world capitalism, may lead to socialist development—notwithstanding the immaturity of social relationship in these countries taken by themselves—provided they receive the assistance and support of the proletarian dictatorship and of the international proletarian movement generally.

#### 9. STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND COLONIAL REVOLUTION

The special conditions of the revolutionary struggle prevailing in colonial and semi-colonial countries, the inevitably long period of struggle required for the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry and for the transformation of this dictatorship into the dictatorship of the proletariat, and, finally, the decisive importance of the national aspects of the struggle, impose upon the Communist Parties of these countries a number of special tasks, which are preparatory stages to the general tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Communist International considers the following to be the most important of these special tasks:

1. To overthrow the rule of foreign imperialism, of the feudal rulers and of the landlord bureaucracy.
2. To establish the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry on a Soviet basis.
3. Complete national independence and national unification.
4. Annulment of State debts.
5. Nationalization of large-scale enterprises (industrial, transport, banking and others), owned by the imperialists.
6. The confiscation of landlord, church and monastery lands. The nationalization of all the land.



## 7. Introduction of the 8-hour day.

## 8. The organization of revolutionary workers' and peasants' armies.

In the colonies and semi-colonies where the proletariat is the leader of and commands hegemony in the struggle, the consistent bourgeois-democratic revolution will grow into proletarian revolution—in proportion as the struggle develops and becomes more intense (sabotage by the bourgeoisie, confiscation of the enterprises belonging to the sabotaging section of the bourgeoisie, which inevitably extends to the nationalization of the whole of large-scale industry). In the colonies where there is no proletariat, the overthrow of the domination of the imperialists implies the establishment of the rule of people's (peasant) Soviets, the confiscation and transfer to the State of foreign enterprises and lands.

Colonial revolutions and movements for national liberation play an extremely important part in the struggle against imperialism and in the struggle for the conquest of power by the working class. Colonies and semi-colonies are also important in the transition period because they represent the world rural district in relation to the industrial countries, which represent the world city. Consequently, the problem of organizing Socialist world economy, of properly combining industry with agriculture is, to a large extent, the problem of the relation towards the former colonies of imperialism. The establishment of a fraternal, militant alliance with the masses of the toilers in the colonies represents one of the principal tasks the world industrial proletariat must fulfill as leader in the struggle against imperialism.

Thus, in rousing the workers in the home countries for the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, the progress of the world revolution also rouses hundreds of millions of colonial workers and peasants for the struggle against foreign imperialism. In view of the existence of centers of Socialism represented by Soviet Republics of growing economic power, the colonies which break away from imperialism economically gravitate towards and gradually combine with the industrial centers of world Socialism, are drawn into the channel of Socialist construction, and by skipping the further stage of development of capitalism, as the predominant system, obtain opportunities for rapid economic and cultural progress. The Peasants' Soviets in the backward ex-colonies and the Workers' and Peasants' Soviets in the more developed ex-colonies group themselves politically around the centers of proletarian dictatorship, join the growing Federation of Soviet Republics, and thus enter the general system of the world proletarian dictatorship.

Socialism, as the new method of production, thus obtains world-wide scope of development.

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## PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND THE U. S. S. R.

### 2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE U. S. S. R. AND HER WORLD REVOLUTIONARY DUTIES

Having defeated Russian imperialism and liberated all the former colonies and oppressed nations of the Tsarist Empire, and systemati-

cally laying a firm foundation for their cultural and political development by industrializing their territories; having guaranteed the juridical position of the Autonomous Territories, Autonomous Republics and Allied Republics in the Constitution of the Union and having granted in full the right of nations to self-determination—the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U. S. S. R., by this guarantees, not only formal, but also real equality for the different nationalities of the Union.

Being the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of Socialist construction, the land of great working class achievements, of the union of the workers with the peasants and of a new culture marching under the banner of Marxism—the U. S. S. R. inevitably becomes the base of the world movement of all oppressed classes, the center of international revolution, the greatest factor in world history. In the U. S. S. R., the world proletariat for the first time acquires a country that is really its own, and for the colonial movements the U. S. S. R. becomes a powerful center of attraction.

Thus, the U. S. S. R. is an extremely important factor in the general crisis of capitalism, not only because she has dropped out of the world capitalist system and has created a basis for a new Socialist system of production, but also because she plays an exceptionally great revolutionary role generally; she is the international driving force of proletarian revolution that impels the proletariat of all countries to seize power; she is the living example proving that the working class is not only capable of destroying capitalism, but of building up Socialism as well; she is the prototype of the fraternity of nationalities in all lands united in the World Union of Socialist Republics and of the economic unity of the toilers of all countries in a single world Socialist economic system that the world proletariat must establish when it has captured political power.

The simultaneous existence of two economic systems: the Socialist system in the U. S. S. R. and the capitalist system in other countries, imposes on the Proletarian State the task of warding off the blows showered upon it by the capitalist world (boycott, blockade, etc.), and also compels it to resort to economic maneuvering with and utilizing economic contacts with capitalist countries (with the aid of the monopoly of foreign trade—which is one of the fundamental conditions for the successful building up of Socialism, and also with the aid of credits, loans, concessions, etc.). The principal and fundamental line to be followed in this connection must be the line of establishing the widest possible contact with foreign countries—within limits determined by their usefulness to the U. S. S. R., i. e., primarily for strengthening industry in the U. S. S. R. for laying the base for her own heavy industry and electrification and finally, for the development of her own Socialist engineering industry. Only to the extent that the economic independence of the U. S. S. R., in the capitalist environment is secured can solid guarantees be obtained against the danger that Socialist construction in the U. S. S. R. may be destroyed and that the U. S. S. R. may be transformed into an appendage of the world capitalist system.

On the other hand, notwithstanding their interest in the markets of the U. S. S. R., the capitalist States continually vacillate between their commercial interests and their fear of the growth of the U. S. S. R.,

which means the growth of international revolution. However, the principal and fundamental tendency in the policy of the imperialist Powers is to encircle the U. S. S. R. and conduct counter-revolutionary war against her in order to strangle her and to establish a world bourgeois terrorist régime.

The systematic imperialist attempts politically to encircle the U. S. S. R. and the growing danger of an armed attack upon her, do not, however, prevent the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—a section of the Communist International and the leader of the proletarian dictatorship in the U. S. S. R.—from fulfilling its international obligations and from rendering support to all the oppressed, to the labor movements in capitalist countries, to colonial movements against imperialism and to the struggle against national oppression in every form.

### 3. THE DUTIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROLETARIAT TO THE U. S. S. R.

In view of the fact that the U. S. S. R. is the only fatherland of the international proletariat, the principal bulwark of its achievements and the most important factor for its international emancipation, the international proletariat must on its part facilitate the success of the work of Socialist construction in the U. S. S. R. and defend her against the attacks of the capitalist powers by all the means in its power.

"The world political situation has made the dictatorship of the proletariat an immediate issue, and all the events of world politics are inevitably concentrating around one central point, namely, the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Soviet Russian Republic, which must inevitably group around itself the Soviet movements of the advanced workers of all countries on the one hand, and all the national liberation movements of the colonial and oppressed nationalities on the other." (*Lenin*)

In the event of the imperialist States declaring war upon and attacking the U. S. S. R., the international proletariat must retaliate by organizing bold and determined mass action and struggle for the overthrow of the imperialist governments with the slogan of: Dictatorship of the proletariat and alliance with the U. S. S. R.

In the colonies, and particularly the colonies of the imperialist country attacking the U. S. S. R., every effort must be made to take advantage of the diversion of the imperialist military forces to develop an anti-imperialist struggle and to organize revolutionary action for the purpose of throwing off the yoke of imperialism and of winning complete independence.

The development of Socialism in the U. S. S. R. and the growth of its international influence not only rouse the hatred of the capitalist States and their Social-Democratic agents against her, but also inspire the toilers all over the world with sympathy towards her and stimulate the readiness of the oppressed classes of all countries to fight with all the means in their power for the land of the proletarian dictatorship, in the event of an imperialist attack upon her.

Thus, the development of the contradictions within modern world economy, the development of the general capitalist crisis, and the imperialist military attack upon the Soviet Union inevitably lead to a mighty revolutionary outbreak which must overwhelm capitalism

in a number of the so-called civilized countries, unleash the victorious revolution in the colonies, broaden the base of the proletarian dictatorship to an enormous degree and thus, with tremendous strides, bring nearer the final world victory of Socialism.

## VI. THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

### 1. IDEOLOGIES AMONG THE WORKING CLASS INIMICAL TO COMMUNISM

In its fight against capitalism for the dictatorship of the proletariat, revolutionary Communism encounters numerous tendencies among the working class, which to a more or less degree express the ideological subordination of the proletariat to the imperialist bourgeoisie, or reflect the ideological influence exercised upon the proletariat by the petty-bourgeoisie, which at times rebels against the shackles of finance capital, but is incapable of adopting sustained and scientifically planned strategy and tactics or of carrying on the struggle in an organized manner on the basis of the stern discipline that is characteristic of the proletariat.

The mighty social power of the imperialist State, with its auxiliary apparatus—schools, press, theatre and church—is primarily reflected in the existence of confessional and reformist tendencies among the working class, which represent the main obstacles on the road towards the proletarian social revolution.

The Confessional, religiously tinged tendency among the working class finds expression in the confessional trade unions, which frequently are directly connected with corresponding bourgeois political organizations, and are affiliated to one or other of the church organizations of the dominant class (Catholic trade unions, Young Men's Christian Association, Jewish Zionist organizations, etc.). All these tendencies, being the most striking product of the ideological captivity of certain strata of the proletariat, in most cases, bear a romantic feudal tinge. By sanctifying all the abominations of the capitalist régime with the holy water of religion, and by terrorizing their flock with the specter of punishment in the world to come, the leaders of these organizations serve as the most reactionary units of the class enemy in the camp of the proletariat.

A cynically commercial, and imperialistic secular form of subjecting the proletariat to the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie is represented by contemporary "socialist" reformism. Taking its main gospel from the tablets of imperialist politics, its model today is the deliberately anti-socialist and openly counter-revolutionary "American Federation of Labor." The "ideological" dictatorship of the servile American trade union bureaucracy, which in its turn expresses the "ideological" dictatorship of the American dollar, has become, through the medium of British reformism and His Majesty's Socialists of the British Labor Party, the most important constituent in the theory and practice of international Social Democracy and of the leaders of the Amsterdam International, while the leaders of German and Austrian Social Democracy embellish these theories with Marxian phraseology in order to cover up their utter betrayal of Marxism. "Socialist" reformism, the principal enemy of revolutionary Com-

munism in the labor movement, which has a broad organizational base in the Social Democratic parties and through these in the reformist trade unions, in its entire policy and theoretical outlook stands out as a force directed against the proletarian revolution.

In the sphere of foreign politics, the Social Democratic parties actively supported the imperialist war on the pretext of "defending the fatherland." Imperialist expansion and "colonial policy" received their wholehearted support. Orientation towards the counter-revolutionary "Holy Alliance" of imperialist Powers ("The League of Nations"), advocacy of "ultra-imperialism," mobilization of the masses under pseudo-pacifist slogans, and at the same time, active support of imperialism in its attacks upon the U. S. S. R. and in the impending war against the U. S. S. R.—are the main features of reformist foreign policy.

In the sphere of home politics, Social Democracy has set itself the task of directly cooperating with and supporting the capitalist régime. Complete support for capitalist rationalization and stabilization, class peace, "peace in industry"; the policy of converting the labor organizations into organizations of the employers and of the predatory imperialist State; the practice of so-called "industrial democracy" which in fact means complete subordination to trustified capital; adoration of the imperialist State and particularly of its false democratic labels; active participation in the building up of the organs of the imperialist State—police, army, gendarmerie, its class judiciary; the defense of the State against the encroachments of the revolutionary Communist proletariat and the executioner's role Social Democracy plays in time of revolutionary crisis—such is the line of reformist home policy. While pretending to conduct the industrial struggle, reformism considers its function in this field to be to conduct that struggle in such a manner as to guard the capitalist class against any kind of shock, or at all events, to preserve the complete inviolability of the foundations of capitalist property.

In the sphere of theory, Social Democracy has utterly and completely betrayed Marxism, having traversed the road from revisionism to complete liberal bourgeois reformism and avowed social-imperialism: it has substituted in place of the Marxian theory of the contradictions of capitalism, the bourgeois theory of its harmonious development; it has pigeonholed the theory of crisis and of the pauperization of the proletariat; it has turned the flaming and menacing theory of class struggle into prosaic advocacy of class peace; it has exchanged the theory of growing class antagonisms for the petty-bourgeois fairy-tale about the "democratization" of capital; in place of the theory of the inevitability of war under capitalism it has substituted the bourgeois deceit of pacifism and the lying propaganda of "ultra-imperialism"; it has exchanged the theory of the revolutionary downfall of capitalism for the counterfeit coinage of "sound" capitalism transforming itself peacefully into Socialism; it has replaced revolution by evolution, the destruction of the bourgeois State by its active up-building, the theory of proletarian dictatorship by the theory of coalition with the bourgeoisie, the doctrine of international proletarian solidarity—by preaching defense of the imperialist fatherland; for Marxian dialectical materialism it has substituted the idealist philosophy and is now engaged in picking up the crumbs of religion that fall from the table of the bourgeoisie.

Within Social Democratic reformism a number of tendencies stand out that are characteristic of the bourgeois degeneracy of the Social Democracy.

Constructive Socialism (MacDonald & Co.), which, by its very name suggests the struggle against the revolutionary proletariat and a favorable attitude towards the capitalist system, continues the liberal philanthropic, anti-revolutionary and bourgeois traditions of Fabianism (Beatrice and Sydney Webb, Bernard Shaw, Lord Oliver, etc.) While repudiating the dictatorship of the proletariat and the use of violence in the struggle against the bourgeoisie as a matter of principle, it favors violence in the struggle against the proletariat and the colonial peoples. While acting as the apologists of the capitalist State and preaching State capitalism under the guise of Socialism, and, in conjunction with the most vulgar ideologists of imperialism in both hemispheres, declaring the theory of the class struggle to be a "pre-scientific" theory, "Constructive Socialism" ostensibly advocates a moderate program of nationalization with compensation, taxation of land values, death duties, and taxation of surplus profits as a means for abolishing capitalism. Being resolutely opposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U. S. S. R., "Constructive Socialism," in complete alliance with the bourgeoisie—is an active enemy of the Communist proletarian movement and of colonial revolutions.

A special variety of "Constructive Socialism" is "Cooperativism," or "Cooperative Socialism" (Charles Gide, Totomyanz & Co.), which also strongly repudiates the class struggle and advocates the cooperative organization of consumers as a means of overcoming capitalism, but which in fact does all it can to help the stabilization of capitalism. Having at its command an extensive propagandist apparatus, in the shape of the mass consumers' cooperative organizations, which it employs for the purpose of systematically influencing the masses, "Cooperativism" carries on a fierce struggle against the revolutionary labor movement, hampers it in the achievement of its aims and represents today one of the most potent factors in the camp of the reformist counter-revolution.

So-called "Guild Socialism" (Penty, Orage, Hobson and others) is an eclectic attempt to unite "revolutionary" syndicalism with bourgeois liberal Fabianism, anarchist decentralization ("national industrial guilds") with State capitalist centralization and mediaeval guild and craft narrowness with modern capitalism. Starting out with the ostensible demand for the abolition of the "wage system" as an "immoral" institution which must be abolished by means of workers' control of industry, Guild Socialism completely ignores the most important question, viz., the question of power. While striving to unite workers, intellectuals, and technicians into a federation of national industrial "guilds" and to convert these guilds by peaceful means ("control from within") into organs for the administration of industry within the framework of the bourgeois State, Guild Socialism actually defends the bourgeois State, obscures its class, imperialist and anti-proletarian character and allots to it the function of the non-class representative of the interests of the "consumers" as against the guild organized "producers." By its advocacy of "functional democracy," i. e., representation of classes in capitalist society—each class being presumed to have a definite social and productive function—Guild Socialism paves the way for the Fascist "Corporate State." By re-

pudiating both parliamentarism and "direct action," the majority of the Guild Socialists doom the working class to inaction and passive subordination to the bourgeoisie. Thus, Guild Socialism represents a peculiar form of trade unionist utopian opportunism and, as such, cannot but play an anti-revolutionary role.

Lastly, Austro-Marxism represents a special variety of Social Democratic reformism. Being a part of the "Left-wing" of Social Democracy, Austro-Marxism represents a most subtle deception of the masses of the toilers. Prostituting the terminology of Marxism, while divorcing themselves entirely from the principles of revolutionary Marxism (the Kantism, Machism, etc., of the Austro-Marxists in the domain of philosophy), toying with religion, borrowing the theory of "functional democracy" from the British reformists, agreeing with the principle of "building up the Republic," i. e. building up the bourgeois State, Austro-Marxism recommends "class cooperation" in periods of so-called "equilibrium of class forces," i. e. precisely at the time when the revolutionary crisis is maturing. This theory is a justification of coalition with the bourgeoisie for the overthrow of the proletarian revolution under the guise of defending "democracy" against the attacks of reaction. Objectively, and in practice, the violence which Austro-Marxism admits in cases of reactionary attacks is converted into reactionary violence against the proletarian revolution. Hence, the "functional role" of Austro-Marxism is to deceive the workers already marching towards Communism, and therefore, it is the most dangerous enemy of the proletariat, more dangerous than the avowed adherents of predatory social imperialism.

All the above-mentioned tendencies, being constituent parts of "Socialist" reformism, are agencies of the imperialist bourgeoisie within the working class itself. But Communism has to contend also against a number of petty-bourgeois tendencies, which reflect and express the vacillation of the unstable strata of society (the urban petty-bourgeoisie, the degenerate city middle class, the slum proletariat, the declassed Bohemian intellectuals, the pauperized artisans, certain strata of the peasantry, etc., etc.). These tendencies, which are distinguished for their extreme political instability, often cover up a Right wing policy with Left wing phraseology or drop into adventurism, substitute noisy political gesticulation for objective estimation of forces and often tumble from astounding heights of revolutionary bombast to profound depths of pessimism and downright capitulation before the enemy. Under certain conditions, particularly in periods of sharp changes in the political situation and of forced temporary retreat, these tendencies may become very dangerous disrupters of the proletarian ranks and consequently, a drag upon the revolutionary proletarian movement.

Anarchism, the most prominent representatives of which (Kropotkin, Jean Graves and others treacherously went over to the side of the imperialist bourgeoisie in the war of 1914-1918, denies the necessity for wide, centralized and disciplined proletarian organizations and thus leaves the proletariat powerless before the powerful organizations of capital. By its advocacy of individual terror, it distracts the proletariat from the methods of mass organization and mass struggle. By repudiating the dictatorship of the proletariat in the name of "abstract" liberty, anarchism deprives the proletariat of its most impor-

tant and sharpest weapon against the bourgeoisie, its armies, and all its organs of repression. Being remote from mass movements of any kind in the most important centers of proletarian struggle, Anarchism is steadily being reduced to a sect which, by its tactics and actions, including its opposition to the dictatorship of the working class in the U. S. S. R., has objectively joined the united front of the anti-revolutionary forces.

"Revolutionary" Syndicalism, many ideologists of which, in the extremely critical war period went over to the camp of the Fascist type of "anti-parliamentary" counter-revolutionaries, or became peaceful reformists of the Social Democratic type, by its repudiation of political struggle (particularly of revolutionary parliamentarism) and of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat, by its advocacy of the craft decentralization of the labor movement generally and of the trade union movement in particular, by its repudiation of the need for a proletarian party, and of the necessity for rebellion, and by its exaggeration of the importance of the general strike (the "fold arm tactics"), like Anarchism, hinders the revolutionization of the masses of the workers wherever it has any influence. Its attacks upon the U. S. S. R., which logically follow from its repudiation of dictatorship of the proletariat in general, place it in this respect on a level with Social Democracy.

All these tendencies take a common stand with Social Democracy, the principal enemy of the proletarian revolution, on the fundamental political issue, viz., the question of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Hence, all of them come out more or less definitely in a united front with Social Democracy against the U. S. S. R. On the other hand, Social Democracy, which has utterly and completely betrayed Marxism, tends to rely more and more upon the ideology of the Fabians, of the Constructive Socialists and of the Guild Socialists. These tendencies are becoming transformed into the official liberal-reformist ideology of the bourgeois "Socialism" of the Second International.

In the colonial countries and among the oppressed peoples and races generally, Communism encounters the influence of peculiar tendencies in the labor movement which played a useful role in a definite phase of development, but which, in the new stage of development, are becoming transformed into a reactionary force.

Sun Yat-senism in China expressed the ideology of petty-bourgeois democratic "Socialism." In the "Three Principles" (nationalism, democracy, Socialism), the concept "people" obscured the concept "classes"; Socialism was presented, not as a specific mode of production to be carried on by a specific class, i. e., by the proletariat, but as a vague state of social well-being, while no connection was made between the struggle against imperialism and the perspectives of the development of the class struggle. Therefore, while it played a very useful role in the first stage of the Chinese Revolution, as a consequence of the further process of class differentiation that has taken place in the country and of the further progress of the revolution, Sun Yat-senism has now changed from being the ideological expression of the development of that revolution into fetters of its further development. The epigones of Sun Yat-senism, by emphasizing and exaggerating the very features of this ideology that have become objectively reactionary, have made it the official ideology of the Kuomintang,



which is now an openly counter-revolutionary force. The ideological growth of the masses of the Chinese proletariat and of the toiling peasantry must therefore be accompanied by determined decisive struggle against the Kuomintang deception and by opposition to the remnants of the Sun Yat-senist ideology.

Tendencies like Gandhi-ism in India, thoroughly imbued with religious conceptions, idealize the most backward and economically most reactionary forms of social life, see the solution of the social problem not in proletarian Socialism, but in a reversion to these backward forms, preach passivity and repudiate the class struggle, and in the process of the development of the revolution become transformed into an openly reactionary force. Gandhi-ism is more and more becoming an ideology directed against mass revolution. It must be strongly combated by Communism.

Garveyism, which formerly was the ideology of the Negro small property owners and workers in America, and which even now exercises some influence over the Negro masses, like Gandhi-ism, has become a hindrance to the revolutionization of the Negro masses. Originally advocating social equality for Negroes, Garveyism subsequently developed into a peculiar form of Negro "Zionism" which instead of fighting American imperialism, advanced the slogan: "Back to Africa"! This dangerous ideology, which bears not a single genuine democratic trait, and which toys with the aristocratic attributes of a non-existent "Negro kingdom," must be strongly resisted, for it is not a help but a hindrance to the mass Negro struggle for liberation against American imperialism.

Standing out against all these tendencies is Proletarian Communism. The powerful ideology of the international revolutionary working class, it differs from all these tendencies, and primarily from Social Democracy, in that, in complete harmony with the teachings of Marx and Engels, it conducts a theoretical and practical revolutionary struggle for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, and in the struggle applies all forms of proletarian mass action.

## 2. THE FUNDAMENTAL TASKS OF COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

The successful struggle of the Communist International for the dictatorship of the proletariat presupposes the existence in every country of a compact Communist Party, hardened in the struggle, disciplined, centralized, and closely linked up with the masses.

The Party is the vanguard of the working class and consists of the best, most class-conscious, most active, and most courageous members of that class. It incorporates the whole body of experience of the proletarian struggle. Basing itself upon the revolutionary theory of Marxism and representing the general and lasting interests of the whole of the working class, the Party personifies the unity of proletarian principles, of proletarian will and of proletarian revolutionary action. It is a revolutionary organization, bound by iron discipline and strict revolutionary rules of democratic centralism, which can be carried out thanks to the class-consciousness of the proletarian vanguard, to its loyalty to the revolution, its ability to maintain inseparable ties with the proletarian masses and to its correct political leadership, which is constantly verified and clarified by the experiences of the masses themselves.

In order that it may fulfill its historic mission of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Communist Party must first of all set itself and accomplish the following fundamental strategic aims:

Extend its influence over the majority of the members of its own class, including working women and the working youth. To achieve this the Communist Party must secure predominant influence in the broad mass proletarian organizations (Soviets, trade unions, factory councils, cooperative societies, sport organizations, cultural organizations, etc.). It is particularly important for the purpose of winning over the majority of the proletariat, to capture the trade unions, which are genuine mass working-class organizations closely bound up with the everyday struggles of the working class. To work in reactionary trade unions and skillfully to capture them, to win the confidence of the broad masses of the industrially organized workers, to change and "remove from their posts" the reformist leaders, represent important tasks in the preparatory period.

The achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat presupposes also that the proletariat acquires hegemony over wide sections of the toiling masses. To accomplish this the Communist Party must extend its influence over the masses of the urban and rural poor, over the lower strata of the intelligentsia and over the so-called "small man," i. e. the petty-bourgeois strata generally. It is particularly important that work be carried on for the purpose of extending the Party's influence over the peasantry. The Communist Party must secure for itself the whole-hearted support of that stratum of the rural population that stands closest to the proletariat, i. e. the agricultural laborers and the rural poor. To this end, the agricultural laborers must be organized in separate organizations; all possible support must be given them in their struggles against the rural bourgeoisie, and strenuous work must be carried on among the small allotment farmers and small peasants. In regard to the middle strata of the peasantry in developed capitalist countries, the Communist Parties must conduct a policy to secure their neutrality. The fulfillment of all these tasks by the proletariat—the champion of the interests of the whole people and the leader of the broad masses in their struggle against the oppression of finance capital—is an essential condition precedent for the victorious Communist revolution.

The tasks of the Communist International connected with the revolutionary struggle in colonies, semi-colonies and dependencies are extremely important strategic tasks in the world proletarian struggle. The colonial struggle presupposes that the broad masses of the working class and of the peasantry in the colonies be rallied round the banner of the revolution; but this cannot be achieved unless the closest cooperation is maintained between the proletariat in the oppressing countries and the toiling masses in the oppressed countries.

While organizing, under the banner of the proletarian dictatorship, the revolution against imperialism in the so-called civilized States, the Communist International supports every movement against imperialist violence in the colonies, semi-colonies and dependencies themselves (for example Latin-America); it carries on propaganda against all forms of chauvinism and against the imperialist maltreatment of enslaved peoples and races, big and small (treatment of Negroes, "yellow labor," anti-semitism, etc.) and supports their struggles against

the bourgeoisie of the oppressing nations. The Communist International especially combats the chauvinism that is preached in the Empire-owning countries by the imperialist bourgeoisie as well as by its Social-Democratic agency, the Second International, and constantly holds up in contrast to the practices of the imperialist bourgeoisie the practice of the Soviet Union, which has established relations of fraternity and equality among the nationalities inhabiting it.

The Communist Parties in the imperialist countries must render systematic aid to the colonial revolutionary liberation movement and to the movement of oppressed nationalities generally. The duty of rendering active support to these movements rests primarily upon the workers in the countries upon which the oppressed nations are economically, financially or politically dependent. The Communist Parties must openly recognize the right of the colonies to separation and their right to carry on propaganda for this separation, i. e. propaganda in favor of the independence of the colonies from the imperialist State; they must recognize their right of armed defense against imperialism (i. e. the right of rebellion and revolutionary war) and advocate and give active support to this defense by all the means in their power. The Communist Parties must adopt this line of policy in regard to all oppressed nations.

The Communist Parties in the colonial and semi-colonial countries must carry on a bold and consistent struggle against foreign imperialism and unfailingly conduct propaganda in favor of friendship and unity with the proletariat in the imperialist countries. They must openly advance, conduct propaganda for and carry out the slogan of agrarian revolution, rouse the broad masses of the peasantry for the overthrow of the landlords and combat the reactionary and mediaeval influence of the clergy, of the missionaries and other similar elements.

In these countries, the principal task is to organize the workers and the peasantry independently (to establish class Communist Parties of the proletariat, trade unions, peasant leagues and committees and, in a revolutionary situation, Soviets, etc.) and to free them from the influence of the national bourgeoisie, with whom temporary agreements may be made only on the condition that they, the bourgeoisie, do not hamper the revolutionary organization of the workers and peasants, and that they carry on a genuine struggle against imperialism.

In determining its line of tactics, each Communist Party must take into account the concrete internal and external situation, the correlation of class forces, the degree of stability and strength of the bourgeoisie, the degree of preparedness of the proletariat, the position taken up by the various intermediary strata in its country, etc. The Party determines its slogans and methods of struggle in accordance with these circumstances, with the view to organizing and mobilizing the masses on the broadest possible scale and on the highest possible level of this struggle.

When a revolutionary situation is developing, the Party advances certain transitional slogans and partial demands corresponding to the concrete situation; but these demands and slogans must be bent to the revolutionary aim of capturing power and of overthrowing bourgeois capitalist society. The Party must neither stand aloof from the daily needs and struggles of the working class nor confine its

activities exclusively to them. The task of the Party is to utilize these minor every-day needs as a starting point from which to lead the working class to the revolutionary struggle for power.

When the revolutionary tide is rising, when the ruling classes are disorganized, the masses are in a state of revolutionary ferment, the intermediary strata are inclining towards the proletariat and the masses are ready for action and for sacrifice, the Party of the proletariat is confronted with the task of leading the masses to a direct attack upon the bourgeois State. This it does by carrying on propaganda in favor of increasingly radical transitional slogans (for Soviets, workers' control of industry, for peasant committees for the seizure of the big landed properties, for disarming the bourgeoisie and arming the proletariat, etc.) and by organizing mass action, upon which all branches of Party agitation and propaganda, including parliamentary activity, must be concentrated. This mass action includes: a combination of strikes and demonstrations; a combination of strikes and armed demonstrations; and finally, the general strike conjointly with armed insurrection against the State power of the bourgeoisie. The latter form of struggle, which is the supreme form, must be conducted according to the rules of war; it presupposes a plan of campaign offensive fighting operations and unbounded devotion and heroism on the part of the proletariat. An absolutely essential condition precedent for this form of action is the organization of the broad masses into militant units, which, by their very form, embrace and set into action the largest possible numbers of toilers (Councils of Workers' Deputies, Soldiers' Councils, etc.), and intensified revolutionary war in the army and the navy.

In passing over to new and more radical slogans, the Parties must be guided by the fundamental role of the political tactics of Leninism, which call for ability to lead the masses to revolutionary positions in such a manner that the masses may, by their own experience, convince themselves of the correctness of the Party line. Failure to observe this rule must inevitably lead to isolation from the masses, to putschism, to the ideological degeneration of Communism into "Leftist" dogmatism and to petty-bourgeois "revolutionary" adventurism. Failure to take advantage of the culminating point in the development of the revolutionary situation, when the Party of the proletariat is called upon to conduct a bold and determined attack upon the enemy, is not less dangerous. To allow that opportunity to slip by and to fail to start rebellion at that point, means to allow the initiative to pass to the enemy and to doom the revolution to defeat.

When the revolutionary tide is not rising, the Communist Parties must advance partial slogans and demands that correspond to the every day needs of the toilers, and combine them with the fundamental tasks of the Communist International. The Communist Parties must not, however, at such a time, advance transitional slogans that are applicable only to revolutionary situations (for example workers' control of industry, etc.). To advance such slogans when there is no revolutionary situation means to transform them into slogans that favor merging with the capitalist system of organization. Partial demands and slogans generally form an essential part of correct tactics; but certain transitional slogans go inseparably with a revolutionary situation. Repudiation of partial demands and transitional slo-

gans "on principle," however, is incompatible with the tactical principles of Communism, for in effect, such repudiation condemns the Party to inaction and isolates it from the masses. United front tactics also occupy an important place in the tactics of the Communist Parties throughout the whole pre-revolutionary period as a means towards achieving success in the struggle against capital, towards the class mobilization of the masses and the exposure and isolation of the reformist leaders.

The correct application of united front tactics and the fulfillment of the general task of winning over the masses presuppose in their turn systematic and persistent work in the trade unions and other mass proletarian organizations. It is the bounden duty of every Communist to belong to a trade union, even a most reactionary one, provided it is a mass organization. Only by constant and persistent work in the trade unions and in the factories for the steadfast and energetic defense of the interests of the workers, together with ruthless struggle against the reformist bureaucracy, will it be possible to win the leadership in the workers' struggle and to win the industrially organized workers over to the side of the Party.

Unlike the reformists, whose policy is to split the trade unions, the Communists defend trade union unity nationally and internationally on the basis of the class struggle, and render every support to and strengthen the work of the Red International of Labor Unions.

In universally championing the current every day needs of the masses of the workers and of the toilers generally, in utilizing the bourgeois parliament as a platform for revolutionary agitation and propaganda, and subordinating the partial tasks to the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Parties of the Communist International advance partial demands and slogans in the following main spheres:

In the sphere of Labor, in the narrow meaning of the term, i. e. questions concerned with the industrial struggle (the fight against the trustified capitalist offensive, wages questions, the working day, compulsory arbitration, unemployment), which grows into questions of the general political struggle (big industrial conflicts, fight for the right to organize, right to strike, etc.); in the sphere of politics proper (taxation, high cost of living, Fascism, persecution of revolutionary parties, white terror and current politics generally); and finally the sphere of world politics, viz., attitude towards the U. S. S. R. and colonial revolutions, struggle for the unity of the international trade union movement, struggle against imperialism and the war danger, and systematic preparation for the fight against imperialist war.

In the sphere of the peasant problem, the partial demands are those appertaining to taxation, peasant mortgage indebtedness, struggle against usurer's capital, the land hunger of the peasant small holders, rent, the metayer (crop-sharing) system. Starting out from these partial needs, the Communist Party must sharpen the respective slogans and broaden them out into the slogans: confiscation of large estates, and workers' and peasants' government (the synonym for proletarian dictatorship in developed capitalist countries and for democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry in backward countries and in certain colonies).

Systematic work must also be carried on among the proletarian and peasant youth (mainly through the Young Communist International and its Sections) and also among working women and peasant women. This work must concern itself with the special conditions of life and struggle of the working and peasant women, and their demands must be linked up with the general demands and fighting slogans of the proletariat.

In the struggle against colonial oppression, the Communist Parties in the colonies must advance partial demands that correspond to the special circumstances prevailing in each country such as: complete equality for all nations and races; abolition of all privileges for foreigners; the right of association for workers and peasants; reduction of the working day; prohibition of child labor; prohibition of usury and of all transactions entailing bondage; reduction and abolition of rent; reduction of taxation; refusal to pay taxes, etc. All these partial slogans must be subordinate to the fundamental demands of the Communist Parties such as: complete political national independence and the expulsion of the imperialists; workers' and peasants' government, the land to the whole people, eight-hour day, etc. The Communist Parties in imperialist countries, while supporting the struggle proceeding in the colonies, must carry on a campaign in their own respective countries for the withdrawal of imperialist troops, conduct propaganda in the army and navy in defense of the oppressed countries fighting for their liberation, mobilize the masses to refuse to transport troops and munitions and, in connection with this, to organize strikes and other forms of mass protest, etc.

The Communist International must devote itself especially to systematic preparation for the struggle against the danger of imperialist wars. Ruthless exposure of social chauvinism, of social imperialism and of pacifist phrase-mongering intended to camouflage the imperialist plans of the bourgeoisie; propaganda in favor of the principal slogans of the Communist International; every day organizational work in connection with this, in the course of which work legal methods must unfailingly be combined with illegal methods; organized work in the army and navy—such must be the activity of the Communist Parties in this connection. The fundamental slogans of the Communist International in this connection must be the following: Convert imperialist war into civil war; defeat the "home" imperialist government; defend the U.S.S.R. and the colonies by every possible means in the event of imperialist war against them. It is the bounden duty of all Sections of the Communist International, and of every one of its members, to carry on propaganda for these slogans, to expose the "Socialistic" sophisms and the "Socialistic" camouflage of the League of Nations and constantly to keep to the front the experiences of the war of 1914–1918.

In order that revolutionary work and revolutionary action may be coordinated and in order that these activities may be guided most successfully, the international proletariat must be bound by international class discipline, for which, first of all, it is most important to have the strictest international discipline in the Communist ranks.

This international Communist discipline must find expression in the subordination of the partial and local interests of the movement

to its general and lasting interests and in the strict fulfillment, by all members, of the decisions passed by the leading bodies of the Communist International.

Unlike the Social-Democratic, Second International, each section of which submits to the discipline of "its own" national bourgeoisie and of its own "fatherland," the sections of the Communist International submit to only one discipline, viz., international proletarian discipline, which guarantees victory in the struggle of the world's workers for world proletarian dictatorship. Unlike the Second International, which splits the trade unions, fights against colonial peoples, and practices unity with the bourgeoisie, the Communist International is an organization that guards proletarian unity in all countries and the unity of the toilers of all races and all peoples in their struggle against the yoke of imperialism.

Despite the bloody terror of the bourgeoisie, the Communists fight with courage and devotion on all sectors of the international class front, in the firm conviction that the victory of the proletariat is inevitable and cannot be averted.

"The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their aims can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all the existing social conditions. Let the ruling class tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

"Workers of all countries, unite!"

## 9. THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY

**NOTE.**—The passage from Stalin's speech to the American Commission of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, on May 6, 1929, is of obvious interest. On the one hand it speaks quite prophetically of the coming depression. It also indicates an expectation that the depression will lead to revolution in the United States. The "Lovestone group" mentioned was led by Jay Lovestone, expelled from the Communist Party of the United States in 1928 for his insistence that American conditions presented special problems, unlike those facing the other Communist parties. The "Foster group" was led by William Z. Foster, who succeeded Lovestone as secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, to be succeeded by Browder when the popular front period arrived, and to succeed Browder again when the line turned to the left once more.

An end must be put to the situation in the Communist Party of America, in which the questions of positive work, the questions of the struggle of the working class against the capitalists, questions of wages, working hours, work in the trade unions, the fight against reformism, the fight against the Right deviation—when all these questions are kept in the shade, and are replaced by petty questions of factional struggle between the Lovestone group and the Foster group. . . .

The Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the American Communist Party must be reorganized with the inclusion of such workers therein as are capable of seeing something more than the factional struggle, the struggle of the working class against the capitalists, who are capable of placing the interests and the unity of the Party above the interests of individual groups and their leaders. . . .

A word or two regarding the tasks and the mission of the American Communist Party: I think that the American Communist Party is one of the few Communist parties in the world upon which history

has laid tasks of a decisive character from the point of view of the world revolutionary movement. You all know very well the strength and power of American capitalism. Many now think that the general crisis of world capitalism will not affect America. That, of course, is not true. It is entirely untrue, comrades. The crisis of world capitalism is developing with increasing rapidity and cannot but affect American capitalism. The millions now unemployed in America are the first swallows indicating the ripening of the economic crisis in America. The sharpening antagonism between America and England, the struggle for markets and raw materials and, finally, the colossal growth of armaments—that is the second portent of the approaching crisis. I think the moment is not far off when a revolutionary crisis will develop in America. And when a revolutionary crisis develops in America, that will be the beginning of the end of world capitalism as a whole. It is essential that the American Communist Party should be capable of meeting that historical moment fully prepared and of assuming the leadership of the impending class struggle in America. Every effort and every means must be employed in preparing for that, comrades. For that end the American Communist Party must be improved and Bolshevized. For that end we must work for the complete liquidation of factionalism and deviations in the Party. For that end we must work for the re-establishment of unity in the Communist Party of America. For that end we must work in order to forge real revolutionary cadres and a real revolutionary leadership of the proletariat, capable of leading the many millions of the American working class toward the revolutionary class struggles. For that end all personal factors and factional considerations must be laid aside and the revolutionary education of the working class of America must be placed above all.

## 10. THE CAPITALIST CRISIS

NOTE.—This part taken from Stalin's Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in 1930, deals with the world depression then beginning and offers a prognosis of its future course. It is important for its insistence that capitalism cannot ever again recover the stability it enjoyed before the First World War. At its close comes an assertion that the Soviets "don't want a single inch of foreign territory" because they are devoted to a policy of peace. The contrast between this statement and the more recent record is a practical demonstration of Communist strategy and tactics, particularly of the adjustment of advance and retreat to changing circumstance.

### THE CAPITALIST CRISIS

I think that elements of a profound capitalist crisis are growing and will continue to grow in Europe. Capitalism can be partly stabilized, it can rationalize its production, it can temporarily stifle the working class. Capitalism is still able to do these things, but it will never return to that "stability" and that "equilibrium" which existed prior to the war and before the October Revolution. And that this is so can be seen from the fact that in the European countries, as well as in the colonial countries, which are the source of life of European capitalism, we see one revolutionary outburst after another. What is Europe and its colonies? It is the center of capitalism and its periphery. There is "unrest" in the centers of European capitalism.



There is still greater "unrest" in its periphery. Conditions are ripening for new revolutionary events.<sup>28</sup>

To characterize this period in a few words, we might call it the *turn of the tide*. The tide turned not only for us in the U. S. S. R., but also for the capitalist countries of the whole world. But there is a radical difference between these two turns. While the turn for the U. S. S. R. meant a turn towards a new and more important economic *advance*, for the capitalist countries it meant a turn towards economic *decline*. Here, in the U. S. S. R. there is *increasing progress* in socialist construction, both in industry and in agriculture. In the capitalist countries there is a *growing* economic crisis, both in industry and in agriculture.

Recall the state of affairs in the capitalist countries a few years ago. A growth in industrial output and trade in nearly all the countries of capitalism. A growth in output of raw materials and foodstuffs in nearly all agrarian countries. The U. S. A. surrounded by the glamor of the country of the most full-blooded capitalism. Paeans of victory about "prosperity." The whole world bowing low before the dollar. Exalted speeches in honor of the new technique and of capitalist rationalization. The proclamation of the era of "recovery" of capitalism, and of unshakable firmness of capitalist stabilization. "Universal" noise and din about the "inevitable doom" of the land of the Soviets, the "inevitable collapse" of the U. S. S. R.

That was the state of affairs yesterday.

And what is the picture today [1930]?

Today, an economic crisis in nearly all the industrial countries of capitalism. Today, an agricultural crisis in nearly all agrarian countries. Instead of "prosperity," mass poverty and colossal growth of unemployment. Instead of a boom in agriculture, the ruin of millions of peasants. The collapse of illusions about the omnipotence of capitalism generally, and United States capitalism in particular. The strains of triumph in honor of the dollar and of capitalist rationalization grow feebler and feebler. Louder and louder are the pessimistic groans about the "mistakes" of capitalism. And the "universal" din about the "inevitable doom" of the U. S. S. R. is being replaced by "universal" malevolent hissing, about the necessity of punishing "this country," which dares to develop economically while crisis reigns around.

That is the picture today.

Things have happened just as the Bolsheviks said they would happen, two or three years ago.

The Bolsheviks said that the growth of technique in the capitalist countries, the growth of productive forces and capitalist rationalization, in view of the restricted limits of the standard of living of millions of workers and peasants, must inevitably lead to a severe economic crisis. The bourgeois press jeered at the "queer prophecies" of the Bolsheviks. The Right deviators dissociated themselves from the Bolshevik forecast, replacing Marxist analysis by liberal chatter about "organized capitalism." And what happened in reality? What the Bolsheviks said would happen.

These are the facts. . . .

<sup>28</sup> From Stalin's "Interview with Foreign Workers Delegations," Nov. 5, 1927. *Leninism* I, p. 407.

What does this mean?

It means first of all that the imperialist war and its aftermath have intensified the decay of capitalism and described its equilibrium, that we are now living in the epoch of wars and revolutions; that capitalism no longer represents the *sole* and *all-embracing* system of world economy, that side by side with the *capitalist* system of economy there exists the *socialist* system, which is growing, which is flourishing, which is resisting the capitalist system, and which by the very fact of its existence is demonstrating the rottenness of capitalism and shaking its foundations.

It means, furthermore, that the imperialist war and the victory of the revolution in the U. S. S. R. have shaken the foundations of imperialism in the *colonial and dependent* countries, that the prestige of imperialism in these countries has already been undermined, that it is no longer capable of governing in the old way in these countries.

It means, further, that during the war and after it, a young, native capitalism appeared and grew up in the colonial and dependent countries, which competes successfully in the markets with the old capitalist countries, sharpening and complicating the struggle for markets.

It means, finally, that the war has left to the majority of the capitalist countries a painful heritage in the shape of *chronic under-employment of factories* and *armies of unemployed running into millions*, which, moreover, have been transformed from reserve into *permanent* armies of unemployed. This created a mass of difficulties for capitalism even before the present economic crisis, and must still further complicate matters during the crisis.

Such are the circumstances which aggravate and sharpen the world crisis.

It must be admitted that the present economic crisis is the most serious and profound world economic crisis that has ever occurred.

The most important result of the world economic crisis is that it has laid bare and sharpened the contradictions inherent in world capitalism.

(a) It is laying bare and sharpening the *antagonisms between the most important imperialist countries*, the struggle for markets, the struggle for raw materials, the struggle for export of capital. Today none of the capitalist states are satisfied any longer with the old distribution of spheres of influence and colonies. They see that the relation of forces has changed, and that correspondingly markets, sources of raw materials, spheres of influence, etc., must be divided afresh. The principal amongst these antagonisms is the antagonism between the U. S. A. and Great Britain. Both in the sphere of export of manufactured goods and in the sphere of the export of capital, the struggle lies in the main between the U. S. A. and Great Britain. You have only to take up any economic journal, any document dealing with the export of goods and capital, to realize this. The principal arena of struggle is South America, China, the colonies and dominions of the old imperialist states. The balance of forces in this struggle, and a very definite balance, is in favor of the U. S. A. In the train of the principal contradiction come less important but fairly vital contradictions—between America and Japan, between Germany and France, between France and Italy, between England and France, etc.

There can be no doubt at all that, in connection with the developing crisis, the struggle for markets, raw materials, export of capital will be intensified month by month and day by day.

The means of struggle are tariffs, cheap goods, cheap credit, regrouping of forces and new military and political alliances, growth of armaments, preparation for new imperialist wars, and, finally, war itself. I spoke of the crisis which has affected all branches of production. But there is one branch that is not affected by the crisis; that is the armaments branch. It grows constantly, notwithstanding the crisis. The bourgeois states are furiously arming and re-equipping their forces. What for? Of course, not for a friendly talk, but for war. The imperialists need war because it is the only means of dividing the world afresh, dividing anew the markets, sources of raw material and spheres for capital investment.

In such conditions, naturally, the so-called pacifism is living its last days, the League of Nations is rotting alive, "disarmament schemes" are falling into oblivion while conferences for reducing naval armaments become conferences for re-equipping and enlarging navies.

This means that the war danger will grow at an increasingly rapid rate.

Let the Social-Democrats chatter about pacifism, peace, the peaceful development of capitalism, etc. The experience of the Social-Democratic governments in Germany and Great Britain shows that pacifism is to them only a mask to conceal their preparation for new wars.

b) The crisis is laying bare and sharpening the antagonism *between the victorious and vanquished countries*. Among the latter I have in mind principally Germany. Undoubtedly, in connection with the crisis and the sharpening of the problem of markets, the pressure on Germany, not only as a debtor but also as one of the biggest exporters, will be increased. The peculiar relations which have been established between the victorious countries and Germany might be depicted in the form of a pyramid, on the peak of which America, France, Britain, etc., are seated in lordly attitudes, with the Young Plan in their hands inscribed "Pay!" while below, Germany lies flattened out, at the end of her resources, and forced to devote her last energies to carrying out the order to pay the milliards of indemnities. Would you like to know what this is called? It is called the "Spirit of Locarno." To imagine that such a situation can pass without any consequences for world capitalism means to understand nothing at all of real life. To imagine that the German bourgeoisie will be able to pay twenty milliard marks in the next ten years, while the German proletariat, living under the double yoke of "its own" and the "foreign" bourgeoisie, will allow the German bourgeoisie to squeeze these twenty milliards out of its muscles without serious struggles and convulsions, means to go mad. Let the German and French politicians pretend that they believe in this miracle. We Bolsheviks don't believe in miracles.

c) The crisis is laying bare and sharpening the *antagonisms between the imperialist states and the colonial and dependent countries*. The growing economic crisis cannot but reinforce the pressure of the imperialists on the colonies and dependent countries, which represent the basic markets and sources of raw material. And in fact this pressure

is being reinforced to the last degree. It is a fact that the European bourgeoisie is now in a state of war with "its" colonies in India, Indo-China, Indonesia and Northern Africa. It is a fact that "independent" China has already been divided up in effect into spheres of influence, while the counter-revolutionary cliques of Kuomintang generals, fighting among themselves and ruining the Chinese people, are carrying out the will of their masters in the imperialist camp.

We must consider that the bottom has finally been knocked out of the lying story that the staff of the Russian Embassies in China are responsible for the breaches of "peace and quiet" in China. The Russian Embassies have long ago left both Southern and Central China. But there are British, Japanese, German, American, and every other kind of mission. The Russian Embassies have long ago left both Southern and Central China. But the warring Chinese generals have German, British and Japanese military advisors. The Russian Embassies have gone long ago. But there are British, American, German, Czecho-Slovak and every other kind of weapons, rifles, aeroplanes, tanks, poison gases. And what is the result? Instead of "peace and quiet," in Southern and Central China the most unbridled and most destructive war is raging, waged by the militarists who are financed and instructed by the "civilized" states of Europe and America. We get a fairly piquant picture of the "civilized" work of the capitalist states. The only mysterious thing is, what have the Russian Bolsheviks to do with it all?

It would be ridiculous to think that the imperialists can commit these outrages with impunity. The Chinese workers and peasants have already replied to them by setting up soviets and a Red Army. It is said that already a Soviet government has been formed there. If that is true, I think it is nothing to be surprised at. There can be no doubt that only the soviets can save China from final collapse and beggary.

As for India, Indo-China, Indonesia, Africa, etc., the rise of the revolutionary movement in these countries, sometimes assuming the form of a national war for liberation, cannot be doubted. Messieurs of the bourgeoisie expect to flood these countries with blood and to rely on police bayonets, calling to their help people like Gandhi. There can be no doubt that police bayonets are a bad support. Tsarism also tried to rely on police bayonets, but what kind of support it got from them everyone knows. As for helpers of the type of Gandhi, Tsarism had a whole herd of them, in the shape of liberal compromisers of every kind—which, however, led to nothing but disappointment in the end. . . .

I spoke earlier of the contradictions of world capitalism. But besides these contradictions there is still one more. I mean the contradiction between the capitalist world and the U. S. S. R. True, it is not a contradiction of the *internal capitalist* type. It is a contradiction between capitalism as a whole and a country building socialism. But this does not prevent it from decomposing and shaking the very foundations of capitalism. Still more, it lays bare to the very roots all the contradictions of capitalism and gathers them up into one knot, making of them a question of life and death for the capitalist system itself. Therefore, every time that capitalist contradictions begin to grow acute the bourgeoisie turns its gaze towards the U. S. S. R. as if to say: "Cannot we settle this or that contradiction of capitalism, or

all the contradictions taken together, at the expense of the U. S. S. R., the land of the Soviets, the citadel of the revolution, which, by its very existence is revolutionizing the working class and the colonies, preventing us from arranging for a new war, preventing us dividing the world anew, preventing us being masters of its extensive internal market, so necessary for capitalists, particularly today, owing to the economic crisis?"

Hence the tendency to adventurist assaults on the U. S. S. R. and to intervention, a tendency which is bound to be strengthened as a result of the developing economic crisis.

The most vivid expression of this tendency is present-day bourgeois France, the birthplace of that most amiable scheme, "Pan-Europe," the "cradle" of the Kellogg Pact, the most aggressive and militarist country of all aggressive and militarist countries of the world.

But intervention is a two-edged weapon. The bourgeoisie knows this perfectly well. It will be a good thing, the bourgeoisie think, if intervention passes off smoothly and finishes up in the defeat of the U. S. S. R. But supposing it finishes in the defeat of the capitalists? There has already been one intervention, and that ended in defeat. If the first intervention, when the Bolsheviks were weak, ended in defeat, what guarantee is there that the second will not end in defeat? Everyone sees that the Bolsheviks are far stronger today economically, politically and in the sense of the defensive preparedness of their country than they were then. And what about the workers in the capitalist countries who will not permit intervention against the U. S. S. R., who will fight against intervention and, if anything happens, may strike at the rear of the capitalists? Would it not be better to take the line of developing commercial relations with the U. S. S. R.—which the Bolsheviks don't object to, either?

Hence, the tendency to maintain peaceful relations with the U. S. S. R.

Thus, we have two series of factors and two different tendencies acting in opposite directions:

1. The policy of undermining economic relations between the U. S. S. R. and the capitalist countries, provocative assaults on the U. S. S. R., open and clandestine efforts to prepare intervention against the U. S. S. R. These are factors menacing the international position of the U. S. S. R. It is the operation of these factors that explain facts like the rupture of diplomatic relations by the British Conservative Cabinet, the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Chinese militarists, the financial blockade of the U. S. S. R., the clerical "crusade" headed by the Pope against the U. S. S. R., the organization of wrecking through our technical experts by the agents of foreign states, the organization of explosions and arson, like those which were organized by members of the staff of "Lena Goldfields," attempts on the life of representatives of the U. S. S. R. (Poland), attacks on our exports (U. S. A., Poland), etc.

2. Sympathy with and support of the U. S. S. R. by the workers in the capitalist countries, the growth of the economic and political might of the U. S. S. R., the growth of the defensive capacity of the U. S. S. R. the policy of peace undeviatingly pursued by the Soviet government. These are factors which consolidate the international position of the U. S. S. R. It is the operation of these factors that explains events like

the successful liquidation of the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway, the restoration of relations with Great Britain, the growth of economic relations with capitalist countries, etc. . . .

They say further that the promotion of "normal" relations is hampered by the propaganda of Russian Bolsheviks. With the object of preventing the harmful influence of propaganda, the bourgeois gentlemen time and again shut themselves off with "cordons," "barbed wire entanglements" graciously conferring the honor of protecting these "entanglements" upon Poland, Rumania, Finland, etc. It is said that Germany is consumed with envy because they don't want to entrust her with protecting the "cordons" and the "barbed wire entanglements." Is it necessary to prove that the talk about propaganda is not an argument for establishing "normal relations," but a pretext for interventionist propaganda? How can people who don't want to look ridiculous "shut themselves off" from the idea of Bolshevism, if in their own country the ground is favorable for these ideas? Tsarism also "shut itself off" from Bolshevism in its day, but was not successful, as you all know. It was not successful because Bolshevism grows everywhere and anywhere, not from without but from within. It might seem that there are no countries more "shut off" from the Russian Bolsheviks than China, India and Indo-China. Well? Bolshevism is growing there and will grow, in spite of all kinds of "cordons," because apparently the conditions exist there which favor Bolshevism in those countries. What has Russian Bolshevik propaganda got to do with it? Now if the capitalist gentlemen could in some way "shut themselves off" from the economic crisis, from the poverty of the masses, from unemployment, from low wages, from the exploitation of the toilers—then it would be a different story, then they would have no Bolshevik movement. But that is just the point, that every rogue tries to justify his weakness or his incapacity by throwing the blame on the propaganda of the Russian Bolsheviks.

They say, furthermore, that the stumbling block is our Soviet system, collectivization, the struggle against the rich peasantry, anti-religious propaganda, the struggle against wreckers and counter-revolutionaries amongst "men of learning," the expulsion of people like Bessedovsky, Solomon, Dmitrievsky, etc. But this becomes quite a joke. It appears that they don't like the Soviet system. But we don't like the capitalist system, either.

We don't like the idea that tens of millions of unemployed should be obliged to live in starvation and poverty in their countries, while a tiny clique of capitalists own wealth running into milliards. But once we have already agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, is it not clear that there is no use returning to this question? Collectivization, the struggle against the rich peasants, the struggle against wreckers, anti-religious propaganda, etc., represent the inalienable right of the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R., confirmed by our Constitution.

Our policy is a policy of peace and of strengthening trade relations with all countries. The result of that policy is the improvement of relations with a number of countries and the conclusion of a number of agreements for trade, technical assistance, etc. Its result also is the adherence of the U. S. S. R. to the Kellogg Pact, our signature of the well-known protocol referring to the Kellogg Pact with Poland,

Rumania, Lithuania, etc., and the signing of the protocol extending the validity of our treaty of friendship and neutrality with Turkey. Lastly, the result of that policy is the fact that we have succeeded in maintaining peace and have not allowed our enemies to draw us into conflict, despite a number of provocative acts and adventurist assaults by the war-mongers. We shall continue this policy of peace in the future with all our might and with all our resources. We don't want a single foot of foreign territory; but we will not surrender a single inch of our territory to anyone.

That is our foreign policy.

## 11. LETTER TO COMRADE IVANOV

**NOTE.**—Stalin's letter to Comrade Ivanov was in reply to a letter asking him to elucidate the problem of socialism in one country and the relation of the Soviet Union to the rest of the world. It provided an occasion for Stalin to state in downright terms the impossibility of the long coexistence of the two worlds. The relation of the strength of the Soviet Union to the international revolutionary movement is explained once more. At the time he wrote, 1938, the danger of attack was particularly associated with nazism, but since nazism or fascism is one of the developments that Communists expect of capitalism, the distrust of capitalist encirclement applies generally.

### LETTER OF STALIN ON THE EXTERNAL TASKS OF COMMUNISM

#### I. LETTER OF IVANOV TO STALIN

Dear Comrade Stalin, I ask you urgently to elucidate for me the following question. Here on the spot, and even in the regional committee of the Young Communist League, there is a twofold conception of the final victory of Socialism in our country—that is, people confuse the first group of contradictions with the second. In your works on the destinies of Socialism in the Soviet Union there is question of two groups of contradictions, internal and external.

As regards the first group of contradictions, it is clear that we have solved them—Socialism within the country has conquered.

I should like to have an answer about the second group of contradictions, that is, as between the country of Socialism and (those of) Capitalism. You point out that the final victory of Socialism means the solution of external contradictions and gives complete security from intervention, and consequently from the restoration of Capitalism. This group of contradictions can only be solved by the efforts of the workers of all countries.

Yes, comrade Lenin also taught us that "to achieve final victory is only possible on an international scale, only by the joint efforts of the workers of all countries."

While in the seminar for staff propagandists in the regional committee of the Young Communist League, I said, basing myself on your works, that the final victory of Socialism can only be on a world scale, but the regional committee workers—Urozhenko (first secretary of the regional committee) and Kazelkov (propaganda instructor)—treat my statement as a Trotskyist sortie.

I began quoting to them your works on this subject, but Urozhenko suggested that I should shut the three-volume edition, saying that "comrade Stalin was speaking in 1926, whereas we are now in 1938; then we did not have the final victory, but now we have, and there is no

need at all for us to think about intervention and restoration;" he said further that "now we have the final victory of Socialism and complete security from intervention and the restoration of Capitalism." Thus I have been held up as a supporter of Trotskyism and dismissed from propaganda work, and the question of my remaining in the Young Communist League has been raised.

I ask you, comrade Stalin, to explain to me: Have we, or have we not yet, the complete victory of Socialism? Perhaps I have not yet discovered the additional contemporary material on this problem, in view of the changes in the situation.

I also regard as anti-Bolshevist comrade Urozhenko's statement to the effect that comrade Stalin's works on this subject have become somewhat obsolete. And were the regional committee workers right in holding me for a Trotskyist? That is for me a great insult and injury.

I ask you, comrade Stalin, to accede to my request and to send your answer to Ivan Filippovich Ivanov, 1st Zasemsky Village Soviet, Manturovo District, Kursk Region.

I. IVANOV.

## 2. STALIN'S REPLY TO IVANOV

You are, of course, right, comrade Ivanov, and your opponents, that is comrades Urozhenko and Kazelkov, are wrong.

And here are the reasons.

There is no doubt that the question of the victory of Socialism in one country—in this particular case in our country—has two different aspects.

The first aspect of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country concerns the problem of the mutual relations of classes within our country. That is the domain of *internal* relations. Can the working class of our country overcome its contradictions with our peasantry and establish an alliance and co-operation with it? Can the working class of our country, in alliance with our peasantry, defeat the bourgeoisie of our country, take away its land, factories, mines, etc., and build up by its own forces a new classless society, a thoroughgoing Socialist society?

Such are the problems involved in the first aspect of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.

Leninism gives an affirmative answer to those problems. Lenin teaches that "we have all that is necessary for building up a thoroughgoing Socialist society". This means that we can and must, by our own forces, defeat our bourgeoisie and build up a Socialist society. Trotsky, Zinovyev, Kamenev and other gentlemen, who afterwards became the spies and agents of fascism, denied the possibility of building up Socialism in our country without a preliminary victory of Socialist revolution in other countries, in capitalist countries. These gentlemen in fact wanted to turn our country back, on the path of bourgeois development, covering their apostasy by false references to the "victory of the revolution" in other countries. This was the subject of the controversy between our party and those gentlemen. The further course of development of our country showed that the party was right and Trotsky and Co. were wrong. For during this period of time we have succeeded in liquidating our bourgeoisie in establishing brotherly co-operation with our peasantry and in build-



ing up, in the main, a Socialist society, despite the fact that there has been no victory of Socialist revolution in other countries.

That is how the matter stands as regards the first aspect of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.

I think, comrade Ivanov, that your controversy with comrades Urozhenko and Kazelkov, does not concern this aspect of the question.

The second aspect of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country concerns the problem of the mutual relations of our country with other countries, with capitalist countries, the problem of the mutual relations of the working class of our country with the bourgeoisie of other countries. This is the domain of *external, international* relations. Can the victorious Socialism of one country, which has for its environment a number of strong capitalist countries, regard itself as absolutely secure from the danger of military aggression (intervention) and, consequently, from attempts to re-establish capitalism in our country? Can our working class and our peasantry by their own forces, without serious help from the working class of the capitalist countries, defeat the bourgeoisie of other countries just as they defeated their own? In other words, is it possible to regard the victory of Socialism in our country as final, that is, as secure from the danger of a military aggression and of attempts to re-establish capitalism, provided the victory of Socialism has been achieved in one single country and the capitalist surroundings still continue to exist?

Such are the problems involved in the second aspect of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.

Leninism gives a negative answer to these problems. Leninism teaches that "the final victory of Socialism, in the sense of complete security from the restoration of bourgeois conditions, is possible only on an international scale" (see the well-known resolution of the 14th Conference of the All-Union Communist Party). This means that the serious help of the international proletariat is that force without which the problem of the final victory of Socialism in one country cannot be solved. This does not, of course, imply that we must sit with our arms folded and await help from outside. On the contrary, the help on the part of the international proletariat must be combined with our efforts towards reinforcing the defences of our country, reinforcing the Red Army and the Red Navy, and mobilising the whole country in the struggle against military aggression and attempts at restoring bourgeois conditions.

This is what Lenin says on the subject :

"We live not only in a State, but in a system of States, and the existence of the Soviet Republic next to a number of Imperialist States for a long time is unthinkable. In the end either the one or the other will have the better of it. Until that end comes, a series of most terrible conflicts between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States is inevitable. This means that the ruling class, the proletariat, if it wants to and will rule, must prove this also by its military organisation." (Vol. XXIV, p. 122.)

And further :

"We are surrounded by people, classes and governments which openly express their hatred for us. It must be remembered that all the time a hair's breadth divides us from an invasion." (Vol. XXVII, p. 117.)

This is put tartly and strongly, but honestly and truthfully, without ornaments, as was Lenin's way.

On the basis of these premises it was said in Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*:

"The final victory of Socialism means complete security from any attempts at intervention and therefore at restoration, for no serious attempt at restoration can have place unless with serious help from outside, with the help of international capital. Therefore the support of our revolution on the part of the workers of all countries, and still more the victory of those workers in at least some countries, is an indispensable condition of the complete security of the first victorious country from attempts at intervention and restoration, an indispensable condition of the final victory of Socialism." (*Problems of Leninism*, 1937, p. 134.)

Indeed, it would be absurd and ridiculous to shut one's eyes to the fact of the capitalist environment and to think that our enemies, for instance, the Fascists, will not take the opportunity of a military attack against the USSR. Only blind braggarts can think so, or hidden enemies wishing to lull the people. It would be no less ridiculous to deny that in the event of the slightest success of military intervention the interventionists will try to overthrow the Soviet régime in the territories occupied by them and to restore the bourgeois régime. Did not Denikin and Kolchak restore the bourgeois régime in the territories occupied by them? Are the Fascists any better than Denikin or Kolchak? Only bunglers or hidden enemies, wishing to cover their hostility by boasting and trying to demobilise the people, can deny the danger of a military intervention and of attempts at restoration, given the existence of a capitalist environment. But is it possible to regard the victory of Socialism in one country as final if that country has a capitalist environment and if it is not completely secure from the danger of intervention and restoration? Evidently not.

That is how it stands with the question of the victory of Socialism in one country.

It follows that this question comprises two different problems: (a) the problem of the *internal* relations of our country, that is the problem of overcoming our own bourgeoisie and building up thoroughgoing Socialism; and (b) the problem of the *external* relations of our country, that is the problem of the complete security of our country from the dangers of military intervention and restoration. The first problem has already been solved by us, because our bourgeoisie has already been liquidated and Socialism has already been built in essentials. We call this the victory of Socialism or, to be more exact, the victory of socialist construction in one country. We could say that this victory was final if our country were situated on an island and had not been surrounded by a number of other, capitalist, countries. But since we live not on an island but in a "system of States," a considerable number of which are hostile to the country of Socialism, thus creating a danger of intervention and restoration, we say openly and honestly that the victory of Socialism in our country is not yet complete. From this it follows, however, that the second problem is not yet solved and will have to be solved. Moreover, the second problem cannot be solved in the same way in which the first problem was solved, that is, by the unaided efforts of our country alone. The second problem can be solved only by combining a serious effort of the international proletariat with a still more serious effort of the whole of our Soviet people. It is necessary to strengthen and consolidate the international proletarian ties between the working class

of the USSR and the working class of the bourgeois countries; it is necessary to organise the political aid of the working class of the bourgeois countries to the working class of our country in the event of a military aggression against our country, just as to organise all kind of help on the part of the working class of our country to the working class of the bourgeois countries; it is necessary to do our utmost to fortify and consolidate our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Force, and Chemical and Air Defence (Osoaviakhim). It is necessary to keep our entire people in a state of mobilised readiness in the face of the danger of a military aggression, so that no "chance" and no tricks on the part of our external enemies could take us unawares.

From your letter it is evident that comrade Urozhenko professes different views which are not exactly Lenin's. He appears to assert that "we have now the final victory of Socialism and a complete security from intervention and restoration of capitalism." There can be no doubt that comrade Urozhenko is radically wrong. Such an assertion on the part of comrade Urozhenko can only be explained by a misunderstanding of the surrounding reality and by an ignorance of the elementary principles of Leninism, or else by the empty boasting of a conceited young official. If it is true that "we have complete security from intervention and restoration of capitalism," do we then need a strong Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Force, or a strong Osoaviakhim, do we need the strengthening and consolidation of the international proletarian ties? Would it not be better to turn the milliards spent on the reinforcement of the Red Army to some other purpose while reducing the Red Army to a minimum or disbanding it altogether? Such people as comrade Urozhenko, even if they are subjectively loyal to our cause, are, objectively speaking, dangerous to it, because by their boasting, willingly or unwillingly (this does not matter!) they lull our people, demobilise workers and peasants, and help our enemies to take us unawares in case of international complications.

As regards the fact that you, comrade Ivanov, have been dismissed from propaganda work and that the question of your membership of the Young Communist League has been raised, you need have no fears on this score. If the people from the regional committee of the Young Communist League really want to be like Chekhov's Pribishyev, there can be no doubt that they will lose the game. Our country has no use for Pribishyevs.

Now you can judge whether a certain passage from the *Problems of Leninism* on the subject of the victory of Socialism in one country has become obsolete. I myself should very much like to see it become obsolete and to see such unpleasant things as capitalist surroundings, the danger of military aggression, the danger of restoration of capitalism, etc., disappear from the world. But unfortunately those unpleasant things still exist.

12 February, 1938.

(Sgd.) I. STALIN.

## 12. SOME QUESTIONS OF THEORY

NOTE.—This passage is from Stalin's Report on the Work of the Central Committee, to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stalin further analyzed the problem of the position of the State in a Socialist country surrounded by capitalism and made the essential point that the State

*will not wither away* unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated. Until that time it will need "military, punitive, and intelligence organs."

#### 4. SOME QUESTIONS OF THEORY

Another of the defects of our propagandist and ideological work is the absence of full clarity among our comrades on certain theoretical questions of vital practical importance, the existence of a certain amount of confusion on these questions. I refer to the question of the state in general, and of our Socialist state in particular, and to the question of our Soviet intelligentsia.

It is sometimes asked: "We have abolished the exploiting classes; there are no longer any hostile classes in the country; there is nobody to suppress; hence there is no more need for the state; it must die away.—Why then do we not help our Socialist state to die away? Why do we not strive to put an end to it? Is it not time to throw out all this rubbish of a state?"

Or further: "The exploiting classes have already been abolished in our country: Socialism has been built in the main; we are advancing towards Communism. Now, the Marxist doctrine of the state says that there is to be no state under Communism.—Why then do we not help our Socialist state to die away? Is it not time we relegated the state to the museum of antiquities?"

These questions show that those who ask them have conscientiously memorized certain propositions contained in the doctrine of Marx and Engels about the state. But they also show that these comrades have failed to understand the essential meaning of this doctrine; that they have failed to realize in what historical conditions the various propositions of this doctrine were elaborated; and, what is more, that they do not understand present-day international conditions, have overlooked the capitalist encirclement and the dangers it entails for the Socialist country. These questions not only betray an underestimation of the capitalist encirclement, but also an underestimation of the role and significance of the bourgeois states and their organs, which send spies, assassins and wreckers into our country and are waiting for a favourable opportunity to attack it by armed force. They likewise betray an underestimation of the role and significance of our Socialist state and of its military, punitive and intelligence organs, which are essential for the defence of the Socialist land from foreign attack. It must be confessed that the comrades mentioned are not the only ones to sin in this underestimation. All the Bolsheviks, all of us without exception, sin to a certain extent in this respect. Is it not surprising that we learned about the espionage and conspiratorial activities of the Trotskyite and Bukharinite leaders only quite recently, in 1937 and 1938, although, as the evidence shows, these gentry were in the service of foreign espionage organizations and carried on conspiratorial activities from the very first days of the October Revolution? How could we have failed to notice so grave a matter? How are we to explain this blunder? The usual answer to this question is that we could not possibly have assumed that these people could have fallen so low. But that is no explanation, still less is it a justification; for the blunder was a blunder. How is this blunder to be explained? It is to be explained by an underestimation of the strength and consequence of the

mechanism of the bourgeois states surrounding us and of their espionage organs, which endeavour to take advantage of people's weaknesses, their vanity, their slackness of will, to enmesh them in their espionage nets and use them to surround the organs of the Soviet state. It is to be explained by an underestimation of the role and significance of the mechanism of our Socialist state and of its intelligence service, by an underestimation of this intelligence service, by the twaddle that an intelligence service in a Soviet state is an unimportant trifle, and that the Soviet intelligence service and the Soviet state itself will soon have to be relegated to the museum of antiquities.

What could have given rise to this underestimation?

It arose owing to the fact that certain of the general propositions in the Marxist doctrine of the state were incompletely worked out and inadequate. It received currency owing to our unpardonably heedless attitude to matters pertaining to the theory of the state, in spite of the fact that we have twenty years of practical experience in matters of state which provide rich material for theoretical generalizations, and in spite of the fact that, given the desire, we have every opportunity of successfully filling this gap in theory. We have forgotten Lenin's highly important injunction about the theoretical duties of Russian Marxists, that it is their mission to further develop the Marxist theory. Here is what Lenin said in this connection:

"We do not regard Marxist theory as something completed and inviolable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the corner-stone of the science which Socialists *must* further advance in all directions if they wish to keep pace with life. We think that an *independent* elaboration of the Marxist theory is especially essential for Russian Socialists, for this theory provides only general *guiding* principles, which, *in particular*, are applied in England differently from France, in France differently from Germany, and in Germany differently from Russia." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. II, p. 492.)

Consider, for example, the classical formulation of the theory of the development of the Socialist state given by Engels:

"As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in subjection; as soon as, along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the former anarchy of production, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed which would make a special repressive force, a state, necessary. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production. The state is not 'abolished,' it *withers away*." (*Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* [*Anti-Dühring*], p. 308-09).

Is this proposition of Engels' correct?

Yes, it is correct, but only on one of two conditions: (1) *if* we study the Socialist state only from the angle of the internal development of the country, abstracting ourselves in advance from the international factor, isolating, for the convenience of investigation, the country and the state from the international situation; or (2) *if* we assume that Socialism is already victorious in all countries, or in the majority of countries, that a Socialist encirclement exists instead of a capitalist encirclement, that there is no more danger of foreign attack, and that there is no more need to strengthen the army and the state.

Well, but what if Socialism has been victorious only in one country, taken singly, and if, in view of this, it is quite impossible to abstract oneself from international conditions—what then? Engels' formula does not furnish an answer to this question. As a matter of fact, Engels did not set himself this question, and therefore could not have given an answer to it. Engels proceeds from the assumption that Socialism has already been victorious in all countries, or in a majority of countries, more or less simultaneously. Consequently, Engels is not here investigating any specific Socialist state of any particular country, but the development of the Socialist state in general, on the assumption that Socialism has been victorious in a majority of countries—according to the formula: "Assuming that Socialism is victorious in a majority of countries, what changes must the proletarian, Socialist state undergo?" Only this general and abstract character of the problem can explain why in his investigation of the question of the Socialist state Engels completely abstracted himself from such a factor as international conditions, the international situation.

But it follows from this that Engels' general formula about the destiny of the Socialist state in general cannot be extended to the partial and specific case of the victory of Socialism in one country only, a country which is surrounded by a capitalist world, is subject to the menace of foreign military attack, cannot therefore abstract itself from the international situation, and must have at its disposal a well-trained army, well-organized punitive organs, and a strong intelligence service—consequently, must have its own state, strong enough to defend the conquests of Socialism from foreign attack.

We have no right to expect of the classical Marxist writers, separated as they were from our day by a period of forty-five or fifty-five years, that they should have foreseen each and every zigzag of history in the distant future in every separate country. It would be ridiculous to expect that the classical Marxist writers should have elaborated for our benefit ready-made solutions for each and every theoretical problem that might arise in any particular country fifty or one hundred years afterwards, so that we, the descendants of the classical Marxist writers, might calmly doze at the fireside and munch ready-made solutions. [*General laughter.*] But we can and should expect of the Marxists-Leninists of our day that they do not confine themselves to learning by rote a few general tenets of Marxism; that they delve deeply into the essence of Marxism; that they learn to take account of the experience gained in the twenty years of existence of the Socialist state in our country; that, lastly, they learn, with the use of this experience and with knowledge of the essence of Marxism, to apply the various general theses of Marxism concretely, to lend them greater precision and improve them. Lenin wrote his famous book, *The State and Revolution*, in August 1917, that is, a few months before the October Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet state. Lenin considered it the main task of this book to defend Marx's and Engels' doctrine of the state from the distortions and vulgarizations of the opportunists. Lenin was preparing to write a second volume of *The State and Revolution*, in which he intended to sum up the principal lessons of the experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. There can be no doubt that Lenin intended in the

second volume of his book to elaborate and develop the theory of the state on the basis of the experience gained during the existence of Soviet power in our country. Death, however, prevented him from carrying this task into execution. But what Lenin did not manage to do should be done by his disciples. [*Loud applause.*]

The state arose because society split up into antagonistic classes; it arose in order to keep in restraint the exploited majority in the interests of the exploiting minority. The instruments of state authority have been mainly concentrated in the army, the punitive organs, the espionage service, the prisons. Two basic functions characterize the activity of the state: at home (the main function), to keep in restraint the exploited majority; abroad (not the main function), to extend the territory of its class, the ruling class, at the expense of the territory of other states, or to defend the territory of its own state from attack by other states. Such was the case in slave society and under feudalism. Such is the case under capitalism.

In order to overthrow capitalism it was not only necessary to remove the bourgeoisie from power, it was not only necessary to expropriate the capitalists, but also to smash entirely the bourgeois state machine and its old army, its bureaucratic officialdom and its police force, and to substitute for it a new, proletarian form of state, a new, Socialist state. And that, as we know, is exactly what the Bolsheviks did. But it does not follow that the new proletarian state may not preserve certain functions of the old state, changed to suit the requirements of the proletarian state. Still less does it follow that the forms of our Socialist state must remain unchanged, that all the original functions of our state must be fully preserved in future. As a matter of fact, the forms of our state are changing and will continue to change in line with the development of our country and with the changes in the international situation.

Lenin was absolutely right when he said:

"The forms of bourgeois states are extremely varied, but in essence they are all the same: in one way or another, in the final analysis, all these states are inevitably the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*. The transition from capitalism to Communism will certainly create a great variety and abundance of political forms, but in essence there will inevitably be only one: the *dictatorship of the proletariat*." (Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. VII, p. 34.)

Since the October Revolution, our Socialist state has passed through two main phases in its development.

The first phase was the period from the October Revolution to the elimination of the exploiting classes. The principal task in that period was to suppress the resistance of the overthrown classes, to organize the defence of the country against the attack of the interventionists, to restore industry and agriculture, and to prepare the conditions for the elimination of the capitalist elements. Accordingly, in this period our state performed two main functions. The first function was to suppress the overthrown classes inside the country. In this respect our state bore a superficial resemblance to previous states whose functions had also been to suppress recalcitrants, with the fundamental difference, however, that our state suppressed the exploiting minority in the interests of the labouring majority, while previous states had suppressed the exploited majority in the interests of the exploiting minority. The second function was to defend the country from foreign attack. In this respect it likewise bore a super-

ficial resemblance to previous states, which also undertook the armed defence of their countries, with the fundamental difference, however, that our state defended from foreign attack the gains of the labouring majority, while previous states in such cases defended the wealth and privileges of the exploiting minority. Our state had yet a third function: this was the work of economic organization and cultural education performed by our state bodies with the purpose of developing the infant shoots of the new, Socialist economic system and re-educating the people in the spirit of Socialism. But this new function did not attain to any considerable development in that period.

The second phase was the period from the elimination of the capitalist elements in town and country to the complete victory of the Socialist economic system and the adoption of the new Constitution. The principal task in this period was to establish the Socialist economic system all over the country and to eliminate the last remnants of the capitalist elements, to bring about a cultural revolution, and to form a thoroughly modern army for the defence of the country. And the functions of our Socialist state changed accordingly. The function of military suppression inside the country ceased, died away; for exploitation had been abolished, there were no more exploiters left, and so there was no one to suppress. In place of this function of suppression the state acquired the function of protecting Socialist property from thieves and pilferers of the people's property. The function of defending the country from foreign attack fully remained; consequently, the Red Army and the Navy also fully remained, as did the punitive organs and the intelligence service, which are indispensable for the detection and punishment of the spies, assassins and wreckers sent into our country by foreign espionage services. The function of economic organization and cultural education by the state organs also remained, and was developed to the full. Now the main task of our state inside the country is the work of peaceful economic organization and cultural education. As for our army, punitive organs, and intelligence service, their edge is no longer turned to the inside of the country but to the outside, against external enemies.

As you see, we now have an entirely new, Socialist state, without precedent in history and differing considerably in form and functions from the Socialist state of the first phase.

But development cannot stop there. We are going ahead, towards Communism. Will our state remain in the period of Communism also?

Yes, it will, unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated, and unless the danger of foreign military attack has disappeared. Naturally, of course, the forms of our state will again change in conformity with the change in the situation at home and abroad.

No, it will not remain and will atrophy if the capitalist encirclement is liquidated and a Socialist encirclement takes its place.

That is how the question stands with regard to the Socialist state.

### 13. THE MEANING OF THE SOVIET-GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT

**NOTE.**—This speech by Molotov, in 1939, echoes Lenin's discussion of the separate peace in 1918, especially in its disregard of the choice between the two sides drawn up in the non-Soviet world and its acceptance of advantage for the Soviet Union regardless of other considerations. It also foreshadows the Soviet



idea of what a friendly government in Poland must mean, in the course of discussing the Polish objections to Soviet assistance in 1939. And it speaks of Germany in terms that help to explain the Soviet efforts to control Germany, or to prevent any control of Germany adverse to Soviet interest.

(Related documents can be found in the recent publication of the Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41.*)

Comrades: Since the third session of the Supreme Soviet the international situation has shown no change for the better. On the contrary, it has become even more tense. The steps taken by various governments to put an end to this state of tension have obviously proved inadequate. They met with no success. This is true of Europe.

Nor has there been any change for the better in East Asia. Japanese troops continue to occupy the principal cities and a considerable part of the territory of China. Nor is Japan refraining from hostile act against the U. S. S. R. Here, too, the situation has changed in the direction of further aggravation.

In view of this state of affairs, the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression between the U. S. S. R. and Germany is of tremendous positive value, eliminating the danger of war between Germany and the Soviet Union. In order more fully to define the significance of this pact, I must first dwell on the negotiations which have taken place in recent months in Moscow with representatives of Great Britain and France. As you know, Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations for conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance against aggression in Europe began as far back as April.

True, the initial proposals of the British Government were, as you know, entirely unacceptable. They ignored the prime requisites for such negotiations—they ignored the principle of reciprocity and equality of obligations. In spite of this, the Soviet Government did not reject the negotiations and in turn put forward its own proposals. We were mindful of the fact that it was difficult for the Governments of Great Britain and France to make an abrupt change in their policy from an unfriendly attitude towards the Soviet Union which had existed quite recently to serious negotiations with the U. S. S. R. based on the condition of equality of obligation.

However, the subsequent negotiations were not justified by their results. The Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations lasted four months. They helped to elucidate a number of questions. At the same time they made it clear to the representatives of Great Britain and France that the Soviet Union has to be seriously reckoned with in international affairs. But these negotiations encountered insuperable obstacles. The trouble, of course, did not lie in individual "formulations" or in particular clauses in the draft of the pact. No, the trouble was much more serious.

The conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance against aggression would have been of value only if Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union has arrived at agreement as to definite military measures against the attack of an aggressor. Accordingly, for a certain period not only political but also military negotiations were conducted in Moscow with representatives of the British and French armies. However, nothing came of the military negotiations.

They encountered the difficulty that Poland, which was to be jointly guaranteed by Great Britain, France and the U. S. S. R., rejected mili-

tary assistance on the part of the Soviet Union. Attempts to overcome the objections of Poland met with no success. More, the negotiations showed that Great Britain was not anxious to overcome these objections of Poland, but on the contrary encouraged them. It is clear that, such being the attitude of the Polish Government and its principal ally towards military assistance on the part of the Soviet Union in the event of aggression, the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations could not bear fruit. After this it became clear to us that the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations were doomed to failure.

What have the negotiations with Great Britain and France shown? The Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations have shown that the position of Great Britain and France is marked by howling contradictions throughout. Judge for yourselves. On the one hand, Great Britain and France demanded that the U. S. S. R. should give military assistance to Poland in case of aggression. The U. S. S. R., as you know, was willing to meet this demand, provided that the U. S. S. R. itself received like assistance from Great Britain and France. On the other hand, precisely Great Britain and France brought Poland on the scene, who resolutely declined military assistance on the part of the U. S. S. R. Just try under such circumstances to reach an agreement regarding mutual assistance, when assistance on the part of the U. S. S. R. is declared beforehand to be unnecessary and intrusive.

Further, on the one hand, Great Britain and France offered to guarantee the Soviet Union military assistance against aggression in return for like assistance on the part of the U. S. S. R. On the other hand, they hedged around their assistance with such reservations regarding indirect aggression as could convert this assistance into a myth and provide them with formal legal excuse to evade giving assistance and place the U. S. S. R. in a position of isolation in the face of the aggressor. Just try to distinguish between such a "pact of mutual assistance" and a pact of more or less camouflaged chicanery.

Further, on the one hand Great Britain and France stressed the importance and gravity of negotiations for a pact of mutual assistance and demanded that the U. S. S. R. should treat the matter most seriously and settle very rapidly all questions relating to the pact. On the other hand, they themselves displayed extreme dilatoriness and an absolutely light-minded attitude towards the negotiations, entrusting them to individuals of secondary importance who were not invested with adequate powers.

It is enough to mention that the British and French military missions came to Moscow without any definite powers and without the right to conclude any military convention.

More, the British military mission arrived in Moscow without any mandate at all (*general laughter*), and it was only on the demand of our military mission that on the very eve of the breakdown of the negotiations they presented written credentials. But even these credentials were of the vaguest kind, that is, credentials without proper weight. Just try to distinguish between this light-minded attitude towards the negotiations on the part of Great Britain and France and frivolous make-believe at negotiations designed to discredit the whole business of negotiations.

Such are the intrinsic contradictions in the attitude of Great Britain and France towards the negotiations with the U. S. S. R. which led to their breakdown.

What is the root of these contradictions in the position of Great Britain and France? In a few words, it can be put as follows: On the one hand, the British and French governments fear aggression, and for that reason they would like to have a pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union provided it helped strengthen them, Great Britain and France.

But, on the other hand, the British and French governments are afraid that the conclusion of a real pact of mutual assistance with the U. S. S. R. may strengthen our country, the Soviet Union, which, it appears, does not answer their purpose. It must be admitted that these fears of theirs outweighed other considerations. Only in this way can we understand the position of Poland, who acts on the instructions of Great Britain and France.

I shall now pass to the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact.

The decision to conclude a non-aggression pact between the U. S. S. R. and Germany was adopted after military negotiations with France and Great Britain had reached an impasse owing to the insuperable differences I have mentioned. As the negotiations had shown that the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance could not be expected, we could not but explore other possibilities of ensuring peace and eliminating the danger of war between Germany and the U. S. S. R. If the British and French governments refused to reckon with this, that is their affair. It is our duty to think of the interests of the Soviet people, the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (*Prolonged applause.*) All the more since we are firmly convinced that the interests of the U. S. S. R. coincide with the fundamental interests of the peoples of other countries. (*Applause.*) But that is only one side of the matter.

Another circumstance was required before the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact could come into existence. It was necessary that in her foreign policy Germany should make a turn towards good-neighboring relations with the Soviet Union.

Only when this second condition was fulfilled, only when it became clear to us that the German Government desired to change its foreign policy so as to secure an improvement of relations with the U. S. S. R. was the basis found for the conclusion of a Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact. Everybody knows that during the last six years, ever since the National-Socialists [Nazis] came into power, political relations between Germany and the U. S. S. R. have been strained. Everybody also knows that despite the differences of outlook and political systems, the Soviet Government endeavored to maintain normal business and political relations with Germany. There is no need now to revert to individual incidents of these relations during recent years, which are well known to you.

I must, however, recall the explanation of our foreign policy given several months ago at the Eighteenth Party Congress. Speaking of our tasks in the realm of foreign policy, Stalin defined our attitude to other countries as follows:

1. To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries:

2. To be cautious and not to allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Joseph Stalin, *From Socialism to Communism in the Soviet Union*, pp. 17-18, International Publishers, New York.

As you see, Stalin declared in conclusion that the Soviet Union stands for strengthening business relations with all countries. But at the same time Stalin warned us against warmongers who are anxious in their own interests to involve our country in conflicts with other countries.

Exposing the hullabaloo raised in the British, French, and American press about Germany's "plans" for the seizure of the Soviet Ukraine, Stalin said:

It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds.<sup>10</sup>

As you see, Stalin hit the nail on the head when he exposed the machinations of the Western European politicians who were trying to set Germany and the Soviet Union at loggerheads.

It must be confessed that there were some short-sighted people even in our own country who, carried away by oversimplified anti-fascist propaganda, forgot about this provocative work of our enemies. Mindful of this, Stalin even then suggested the possibility of other, un-hostile, good-neighborly relations between Germany and the U. S. S. R. It can now be seen that on the whole Germany correctly understood these statements of Stalin and drew practical conclusions from them. (*Laughter.*) The conclusion of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact shows that Stalin's historic pre-vision has been brilliantly confirmed. (*Loud applause.*)

In the spring of this year the German Government made a proposal to resume commercial and credit negotiations. Soon after, the negotiations were resumed. By making mutual concessions, we succeeded in reaching an agreement. As you know, this agreement was signed on August 19. This is not the first commercial and credit agreement concluded with Germany under her present government.

But this agreement differs favorably not only from the 1935 agreement but from all previous agreements, not to mention the fact that we had no economic agreement equally advantageous with Great Britain, France or any other country. The agreement is advantageous to us because its credit conditions (a seven-year credit) enables us to order a considerable additional quantity of such equipment as we need. By this agreement, the U. S. S. R. undertakes to sell to Germany a definite quantity of our surplus raw materials for her industry, which fully answers the interests of the U. S. S. R.

Why should we reject such an advantageous economic agreement? Surely not to please those who are generally averse to the Soviet Union having advantageous economic agreements with other countries? And it is clear that the commercial and credit agreement with Germany is fully in accord with the economic interests and defense needs of the Soviet Union. This agreement is fully in accord with the decision of the Eighteenth Congress of our Party, which approved Stalin's statement as to the need for "strengthening business relations with all countries."

When, however, the German government expressed the desire to improve political relations as well, the Soviet government had no grounds for refusing. This gave rise to the question of concluding a non-aggression pact.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Voices are now being heard testifying to the lack of understanding of the most simple reasons for the improvement of political relations between the Soviet Union and Germany which has begun. For example, people ask with an air of innocence how the Soviet Union could consent to improve political relations with a state of a fascist type. "Is that possible?" they ask. But they forget that this is not a question of our attitude towards the internal regime of another country but of the foreign relations between the two states. They forget that we hold the position of not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and, correspondingly, of not tolerating interference in our own internal affairs. Furthermore, they forget the important principle of our foreign policy which was formulated by Stalin at the Eighteenth Party Congress as follows:

We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.<sup>11</sup>

The meaning of these words is quite clear: the Soviet Union strives to maintain friendly relations with all non-Soviet countries, provided that these countries maintain a like attitude towards the Soviet Union. In our foreign policy towards non-Soviet countries, we have always been guided by Lenin's well-known principle of the peaceful coexistence of the Soviet state and of capitalist countries. A large number of examples might be cited to show how this principle has been carried out in practice. But I will confine myself to only a few.

We have, for instance, a non-aggression and neutrality treaty with fascist Italy ever since 1933. It has never occurred to anybody as yet to object to this treaty. And that is natural. Inasmuch as this pact meets the interests of the U. S. S. R., it is in accord with our principle of the peaceful coexistence of the U. S. S. R. and the capitalist countries. We have non-aggression pacts also with Poland and certain other countries whose semi-fascist system is known to all. These pacts have not given rise to any misgivings either. Perhaps it would not be superfluous to mention the fact that we have not even treaties of this kind with certain other non-fascist bourgeois-democratic countries, with Great Britain herself, for instance. But that is not our fault.

Since 1926, the political basis of our relations with Germany has been the treaty of neutrality which was already extended by the present German Government in 1933. This treaty of neutrality remains in force to this day. The Soviet Government considered it desirable even before this to take a further step towards improving political relations with Germany, but the circumstances have been such that this has become possible only now.

It is true that it is not a pact of mutual assistance that is in question, as in the case of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, but only of a non-aggression pact. Nevertheless, conditions being what they are, it is difficult to overestimate the international importance of the Soviet-German pact. That is why we favored the visit of Von Ribbentrop, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Moscow.

August 23, 1939, the day the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed, is to be regarded as a date of great historical importance.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

The Non-Aggression Pact between the U. S. S. R. and Germany marks a turning point in the history of Europe, and not only of Europe. Only yesterday the German fascists were pursuing a foreign policy hostile to us. Yes, only yesterday we were enemies in the sphere of foreign relations. Today, however, the situation has changed and we are enemies no longer.

The art of politics in the sphere of foreign relations does not consist in increasing the number of enemies for one's country. On the contrary, the art of politics in this sphere is to reduce the number of such enemies and to make the enemies of yesterday good neighbors, maintaining peaceable relations with one another. (*Applause.*)

History has shown that enmity and wars between our country and Germany have been to the detriment of our countries, not to their benefit. Russia and Germany suffered most of all countries in the war of 1914-1918. Therefore the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Germany stand in need of peaceable relations. The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact puts an end to enmity between Germany and the U. S. S. R. and this is in the interests of both countries. The fact that our outlooks and political systems differ must not and cannot be obstacles to the establishment of good political relations between both states, just as like differences are not impediments to good political relations which the U. S. S. R. maintains with other non-Soviet capitalist countries. Only enemies of Germany and the U. S. S. R. can strive to create and foment enmity between the peoples of these countries. We have always stood for amity between the peoples of the U. S. S. R. and Germany, for the growth and development of friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the German people. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

The importance of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact lies in the fact that the two largest states of Europe have agreed to put an end to the enmity between them, to eliminate the menace of war and live at peace one with the other, making narrow thereby the zone of possible military conflicts in Europe. Even if military conflicts in Europe should prove unavoidable, the scope of hostilities will now be restricted. Only the instigators of a general European war can be displeased by this state of affairs, those who under the mask of pacifism would like to ignite a general conflagration in Europe.

The Soviet-German Pact has been the object of numerous attacks in the English, French and American press. Conspicuous in these efforts are certain "Socialist" newspapers, diligent servitors of "their" national capitalism, servitor of gentlemen who pay them decently. (*Laughter.*) It is clear that the real truth cannot be expected from gentry of this caliber. Attempts are being made to spread the fiction that the signing of the Soviet-German Pact disrupted the negotiations with England and France on a mutual assistance pact. This lie has already been nailed in the interview given by Voroshilov.

In reality, as you know, the very reverse is true. The Soviet Union signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, for one thing, in view of the fact that the negotiations with France and England had run into insuperable differences and ended in failure through the fault of the ruling classes of England and France.

Further, they go so far as to blame us because the pact, if you please, contains no clause providing for its denunciation in case one of the

signatories is drawn into war under conditions which might give someone an external pretext to qualify this particular country as an aggressor. But they forget for some reason that such a clause and such a reservation is not to be found either in the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact signed in 1934 and annulled by Germany in 1939 against the wishes of Poland, or in the Anglo-German declaration on non-aggression signed only a few months ago. The question arises: Why cannot the U. S. S. R. allow itself the same privilege as Poland and England allowed themselves long ago?

Finally, there are wisecracks who construe from the pact more than is written in it. (*Laughter.*) For this purpose, all kinds of conjectures and hints are mooted in order to cast doubt on the pact in one or another country. But all this merely speaks for the hopeless impotence of the enemies of the pact who are exposing themselves more and more as enemies of both the Soviet Union and Germany, striving to provoke war between these countries.

In all this, we find fresh corroboration of Stalin's warning that we must be particularly cautious with warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them. We must be on guard against those who see an advantage to themselves in bad relations between the U. S. S. R. and Germany, in enmity between them, and who do not want peace and good neighborly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

We can understand why this policy is being pursued by out-and-out imperialists. But we cannot ignore such facts as the especial zeal with which some leaders of the Socialist Parties of Great Britain and France have recently distinguished themselves in this matter. And these gentlemen have really gone the whole hog, and no mistake. (*Laughter.*) These people positively demand that the U. S. S. R. get itself involved in war against Germany on the side of Great Britain. Have not these rabid warmongers taken leave of their senses? (*Laughter.*) It is really difficult for these gentlemen to understand the purpose of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, on the strength of which the U. S. S. R. is not obligated to involve itself in war either on the side of Great Britain against Germany or on the side of Germany against Great Britain? Is it really difficult to understand that the U. S. S. R. is pursuing and will continue to pursue its own independent policy, based on the interests of the peoples of the U. S. S. R. and only their interests? (*Prolonged applause.*)

If these gentlemen have such an uncontrollable desire to fight, let them do their own fighting without the Soviet Union. We would see what fighting stuff they are made of.

In our eyes, in the eyes of the entire Soviet people, these are just as much enemies of peace as all other instigators of war in Europe. Only those who desire a grand new slaughter, a new holocaust of nations, only they want to set the Soviet Union and Germany at loggerheads, they are the only people who want to destroy the incipient restoration of good-neighborly relations between the peoples of the U. S. S. R. and Germany.

The Soviet Union signed a pact with Germany, fully assured that peace between the peoples of the U. S. S. R. and Germany is in the interests of all peoples, in the interests of universal peace. Every sincere supporter of peace will realize the truth of this. This pact

corresponds to the fundamental interests of the working people of the Soviet Union and cannot weaken our vigilance in defense of these interests. This pact is backed by firm confidence in our real forces, in their complete preparedness to meet any aggression against the U. S. S. R. (*Loud applause.*)

This pact, like the unsuccessful Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, proves that no important questions of international relations, and questions of Eastern Europe even less, can be settled without the active participation of the Soviet Union, that any attempts to shut out the Soviet Union and decide such questions behind its back are doomed to failure.

The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact spells a new turn in the development of Europe, a turn towards improvement of relations between the two largest states of Europe. This pact not only eliminates the menace of war with Germany, narrows down the zone of possible hostilities in Europe, and serves thereby the cause of universal peace: it must open to us new possibilities of increasing our strength, of further consolidation of our position, of further growth of the influence of the Soviet Union on international developments.

There is no need to dwell here on the separate clauses of the pact. The Council of People's Commissars has reason to hope that the pact will meet with your approval as a document of cardinal importance to the U. S. S. R. (*Applause.*)

The Council of People's Commissars submits the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact to the Supreme Soviet and proposes that it be ratified. (*Loud and prolonged applause. All rise.*)

\* \* \* \* \*

*On the conclusion of Molotov's statement, the joint sitting of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R., on a motion of Deputy Shcherbakov, unanimously adopted the following resolution:*

Having heard the statement of Comrade V. M. Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, on the ratification of the Non-Aggression Pact between the U. S. S. R. and Germany, the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R. resolves:

1. To approve the foreign policy of the government.
2. To ratify the Non-Aggression Pact between the U. S. S. R. and Germany, concluded in Moscow, August 23, 1939.

## 14. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE COMINTERN

NOTE.—The Communist International was dissolved on May 22, 1943. Announcement of this move was made through the publication of a resolution adopted by the Presidium of the Executive Committee. Wide speculation and some controversy were caused by this event, some observers taking it as a definite sign of fundamental change in the Communist line. It was indeed a symbol of the fact that communism was committed, at the moment, to one of its "right" periods, and to collaboration with other countries in "the war of liberation of freedom-loving peoples against the Hitlerite tyranny." That this meant only one of the periodical phases of unchanging communism, not a permanent change of principle, has become evident.

The historic role of the Communist International, which was founded in 1919 as a result of a political union of the great majority of the old pre-war working-class parties, consisted in upholding the principles of the working-class movement, in helping to promote con-



solidation in a number of countries of the vanguard of the foremost workers in the real working-class parties, and in helping them mobilize workers for the defense of their economic and political interests, and for the struggle against Fascism and the war which the latter was preparing, and for the support of the Soviet Union as the chief bulwark against Fascism.

The Communist International from the first exposed the real meaning of the Anti-Comintern Pact as a weapon for the preparation of war by the Hitlerites. Long before the war it ceaselessly and tirelessly exposed the vicious, subversive work of the Hitlerites, who masked it by their screams about so-called interference of the Communist International in the internal affairs of these states.

#### INTERNATIONAL WORK HANDICAPPED

But long before the war it became more and more clear that, with increasing complications in internal and international relations of various countries, any sort of international center would encounter insuperable obstacles in solving the problems facing the movement in each separate country.

Deep differences of the historic paths of development of various countries, differences in their character and even contradictions in their social orders, differences in the level and the tempo of their economic and political development, differences finally in the degree of consciousness and organization of workers, conditioned different problems affecting the working class of the various countries.

The whole development of events in the last quarter of a century and the experience accumulated by the Communist International convincingly showed that the organizational form of uniting workers, chosen by the First Congress of the Communist International, answered conditions of the first stages of the working-class movement, but it has been outgrown by the growth of this movement and by the complications of its problems in separate countries and has even become a drag on the further strengthening of the national working-class parties.

#### NATIONS IN TWO GROUPS

The World War that the Hitlerites have let loose has still further sharpened the differences in the situation of the separate countries and has placed a deep dividing line between those countries that fell under the Hitlerite tyranny and those freedom-loving peoples who have united in a powerful anti-Hitlerite coalition.

In countries of the Hitlerite bloc the fundamental task of the working class, toilers and all honest people consists in giving all help for the defeat of this bloc by sabotage of the Hitlerite military machine from within and by helping to overthrow the governments guilty of war.

In countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition the sacred duty of the widest masses of the people, and in the first place of foremost workers, consists in aiding by every means the military efforts of the governments of these countries aimed at the speediest defeat of the Hitlerite bloc and the assurance of the friendship of nations based on their equality.

At the same time the fact must not be lost sight of that the *separate* countries that are members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition *have their* own particular problems. For example, in countries *occupied by the* Hitlerites that have lost their state of independence the *basic task* of the foremost workers and of the wide masses of people consists in promoting the armed struggle developing into a national war of liberation against Hitlerite Germany.

#### NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FAVORED

At the same time the war of liberation of freedom-loving peoples against the Hitlerite tyranny, which has brought into movement the masses of people, uniting them without difference of party or religion in the ranks of the powerful anti-Hitlerite coalition, has demonstrated with still greater clearness that the general national uprising and mobilization of people for the speediest victory over the enemy can be best of all and most fruitfully carried out by the vanguard of the working-class movement of each separate country, working within the framework of its own country.

Already the Seventh Congress of the Communist International meeting in 1935, taking into account the change that had taken place both in the international situation and in working-class movements that demanded great flexibility and independence of its sections in deciding the problems confronting them, emphasized the necessity for the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in deciding all questions of the working-class movement arising from concrete conditions and peculiarities of each country, to make a rule of avoiding interference in the internal organizational affairs of the Communist parties.

These same considerations guided the Communist International in considering the resolution of the Communist party of the United States of America of November, 1940, on its withdrawal from the ranks of the Communist International.

#### ORGANIZATION HELD FLEXIBLE

Guided by the judgment of the founders of Marxism and Leninism, Communists have never been supporters of the conservation of organizational forms that have outlived themselves. They have always subordinated forms of organization of the working-class movement, and methods of working of such organization, to the fundamental political interest of the working-class movement as a whole, to peculiarities of the concrete historical situation and to problems immediately resulting from this situation.

They remember the example of the great Marx, who united foremost workers in the ranks of the Working Men's International Association, and when the First International had fulfilled its historical task of laying the foundations for the development of working-class parties in the countries of Europe and America, and, as a result of the matured situation creating mass national working-class parties, dissolved first the International, inasmuch as this form of organization already no longer corresponded to the demands confronting it.

In consideration of the above and taking into account the growth and the political maturity of Communist parties and their leading

cadres in separate countries, and also having in view the fact that during the present war some sections have raised the question of the dissolution of the Communist International as the directing center of the international working-class movement, the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in the circumstances of the World War, not being able to convene a Congress of the Communist International, puts forward the following proposal for ratification by the sections of the Communist International:

The Communist International, as the directing center of the international working-class movement, is to be dissolved, thus freeing the sections of the Communist International from their obligations arising from the statutes and resolutions of the Congresses of the Communist International.

The Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International calls on all supporters of the Communist International to concentrate their energies on the whole-hearted support of and active participation in the war of liberation of the peoples and the states of the anti-Hitlerite coalition for the speediest defeat of the deadly enemy of the working class and toilers—German Fascism and its associates and vassals.

### 15. SPEECH OF FEBRUARY 9, 1946

[NOTE.—Stalin's speech in February 1946 is certainly one of the two or three most important Soviet statements since the war. In it he dropped the front of agreeable and cooperative meeting of minds that had characterized high-level dealings between the Allies in the war. He reaffirmed the basic Communist teaching on the causes and nature of capitalist wars, dropped the pretense that the defeat of Germany would eliminate the danger of war, and boasted of the Soviet achievements of theory and planned action that had permitted Soviet survival.

The speech was made at a dramatic time, just before the general elections in the Soviet Union and a month before Mr. Churchill's speech at Fulton, Mo., which was generally cried down as dangerous talk. It was about 6 weeks before the crisis over Iran in the United Nations Security Council. General Deane, who had seen more of the problem of "how to get along with Russia" than most people during the last 2 years of the war, makes an interesting comment on Stalin's speech:

"If the record up until the end of the war was not sufficient to clarify Soviet intentions, certainly all doubt should have been dispelled on February 9, 1946, when Stalin reaffirmed the doctrine of Marx and Lenin and exhorted his people to extraordinary efforts in preparation for the inevitable wars which must be expected so long as the capitalist system exists" (*The Strange Alliance*, p. 320).]

### SPEECH BY J. V. STALIN, FEBRUARY 9, 1946

COMRADES!

Eight years have elapsed since the last election to the Supreme Soviet. This was a period abounding in events of decisive moment. The first four years passed in intensive effort on the part of Soviet men and women to fulfill the Third Five-Year Plan. The second four years embrace the events of the war against the German and Japanese aggressors, the events of the Second World War. Undoubtedly, the war was the principal event in the past period.

It would be wrong to think that the Second World War was a casual occurrence or the result of mistakes of any particular statesmen, though mistakes undoubtedly were made. Actually, the war was the inevitable result of the development of world economic and

political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism. Marxists have declared more than once that the capitalist system of world economy harbors elements of general crises and armed conflicts and that, hence, the development of world capitalism in our time proceeds not in the form of smooth and even progress but through crises and military catastrophes.

The fact is, that the unevenness of development of the capitalist countries usually leads in time to violent disturbance of equilibrium in the world system of capitalism, that group of capitalist countries which considers itself worse provided than others with raw materials and markets usually making attempts to alter the situation and repartition the "spheres of influence" in its favor by armed force. The result is a splitting of the capitalist world into two hostile camps and war between them.

Perhaps military catastrophes might be avoided if it were possible for raw materials and markets to be periodically redistributed among the various countries in accordance with their economic importance, by agreement and peaceable settlement. But that is impossible to do under present capitalist conditions of the development of world economy.

Thus the First World War was the result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of world economy, and the Second World War was the result of a second crisis.

#### NATURE OF WAR

That does not mean of course that the Second World War is a copy of the first. On the contrary, the Second World War differs materially from the first in nature. It must be borne in mind that before attacking the Allied countries the principal fascist states—Germany, Japan and Italy—destroyed the last vestiges of bourgeois democratic liberties at home, established a brutal terrorist regime in their own countries, rode roughshod over the principles of sovereignty and free development of small countries, proclaimed a policy of seizure of alien territories as their own policy and declared for all to hear that they were out for world domination and the establishment of a fascist regime throughout the world.

Moreover, by the seizure of Czechoslovakia and of the central areas of China, the Axis states showed that they were prepared to carry out their threat of enslaving all freedom-loving nations. In view of this, unlike the First World War, the Second World War against the Axis states from the very outset assumed the character of an anti-fascist war, a war of liberation, one the aim of which was also the restoration of democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis states could only enhance, and indeed did enhance, the anti-fascist and liberation character of the Second World War.

It was on this basis that the anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and other freedom-loving states came into being—a coalition which subsequently played a decisive part in defeating the armed forces of the Axis states.

That is how matters stand as regards the origin and character of the Second World War.

By now I should think everyone admits that the war really was not and could not have been an accident in the life of nations, that actually

this war became the war of nations for their existence, and that for this reason it could not be a quick lightning affair.

As regards our country, for it this war was the most bitter and arduous of all wars in the history of our Motherland.

But the war was not only a curse. It was at the same time a great school in which all the forces of the people were tried and tested. The war laid bare all facts and events in the rear and at the front, it tore off relentlessly all veils and coverings which had concealed the true faces of the states, governments and parties and exposed them to view without a mask or embellishment, with all their shortcomings and merits.

The war was something like an examination for our Soviet system, for our State, for our Government, for our Communist Party, and it summed up the results of their work, saying to us as it were: "Here they are, your people and organizations, their deeds and their lives. Look at them well and reward them according to their deeds."

This was one of the positive aspects of war.

For us, for the voters, this circumstance is of great importance, for it helps us to make a speedy and objective appraisal of the work of the Party and its members and to draw correct conclusions. At another time we would need to study the speeches and reports of representatives of the Party, analyze them, compare their words with their deeds, sum up, and so forth. This involves complex and difficult work and there is no guarantee that mistakes will not be made. It is a different matter today when the war is over and when the war itself has tested the work of our organizations and leaders and summarized its results. Today, it is much easier for us to see how things stand and to arrive at correct conclusions.

#### RESULTS OF WAR

And so, what are the results of the war?

There is one chief result in which all other results have their source. This result is that in the upshot of the war our enemies were defeated and we, together with our Allies, emerged the victors. We concluded the war with complete victory over the enemies. That is the chief result of war. But that result is too general and we cannot stop at that. Of course, to crush an enemy in a war like the Second World War, for which the history of mankind knew no parallel, meant to achieve a world historic victory. All that is true. But still, it is only a general result and we cannot rest content with that. In order to grasp the great historic importance of our victory we must examine the thing more concretely.

And so, how is our victory over our enemies to be understood? What is the significance of this victory as regards the State and the development of the internal forces of our country?

#### SOVIET SYSTEM PASSED TEST

Our victory means, first of all, that our Soviet social order has triumphed, that the Soviet social order has successfully passed the ordeal in the fire of war and has proved its unquestionable vitality.

As you know, it was claimed more than once in the foreign press that the Soviet social order was a "risky experiment" doomed to failure, that the Soviet order was a "house of cards" which had no

roots in real life and had been imposed upon the people by the Cheka, and that a slight push from without was enough for this "house of cards" to collapse.

Now we can say that the war refuted all these claims of the foreign press as groundless. The war showed that the Soviet social order is a truly popular order springing from the depths of the people and enjoying their mighty support, that the Soviet social order is a form of organization of society which is perfectly stable and capable of enduring.

More than that, there is no longer any question today whether the Soviet social order is or is not capable of enduring, for after the object lessons of war none of the skeptics ventures any longer to voice doubts as to the vitality of the Soviet social order. The point now is that the Soviet social order has shown itself more stable and capable of enduring than a non-Soviet social order, that the Soviet social order is a form of organization, a society superior to any non-Soviet social order.

#### MULTINATIONAL MODEL STATE

Second, our victory means that our Soviet state system has triumphed, that our multinational Soviet State has stood all the trials of war and has proved its vitality.

As you know, prominent foreign press men have more than once gone on record to the effect that the Soviet multinational State was an "artificial, non-viable structure," that in event of any complications, the disintegration of the Soviet Union would be inevitable, that the fate of Austria-Hungary awaited the Soviet Union.

Today we can say that the war refuted these claims of the foreign press as totally unfounded. The war showed that the Soviet multinational state system passed the test successfully, that it grew even stronger during the war and proved the state system perfectly capable of enduring.

These gentlemen did not understand that the parallel with Austria-Hungary did not apply, for our multinational State has not grown up on a bourgeois foundation which stimulates sentiments of national distrust and national animosity, but on the Soviet foundation which on the contrary cultivates the sentiments of friendship and fraternal collaboration among the peoples of our State.

As a matter of fact, after the lessons of the war, these gentlemen no longer venture to deny that the Soviet state system is capable of enduring. Today it is no longer a question of the vitality of the Soviet state system, for that vitality can no longer be doubted; the point now is that the Soviet state system has proved itself a model for a multinational state, has proved that the Soviet state system is a system of state organization in which the national question and the problem of collaboration among nations has been settled better than in any other multinational state.

#### TRIUMPH OF ARMS

Third, our victory means that the Soviet armed forces have triumphed, that our Red Army has triumphed, that the Red Army bore up heroically under all the trials of war, utterly routed the armies of our enemies and came out of the war as a victor.

(*Voice from floor: "Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin!" All rise—stormy, prolonged applause, rising to an ovation.*)

Now everyone, friend as well as foe, admits that the Red Army proved equal to its great tasks. But this was not the case some six years ago during the prewar period. As you know, prominent men from the foreign press and many recognized military authorities abroad declared more than once that the condition of the Red Army gave rise to grave doubts, that the Red Army was poorly armed and had no proper commanding personnel, that its morale was beneath all criticism, that while it might be of some use in defense, it was useless for an offensive, and that if the German forces should strike, the Red Army was bound to crumble like a "colossus with feet of clay." Statements like these were made not only in Germany, but in France, Great Britain and the United States as well.

Today we can say that the war has refuted all such statements as unfounded and absurd. The war showed that the Red Army is not a "colossus with feet of clay," but a first-class contemporary army with fully modern armaments, highly experienced commanding personnel and high moral and fighting qualities. It must not be forgotten that the Red Army is the army that utterly routed the Germany army which but yesterday was striking terror into the armies of the European states.

#### CRITICS ARE FEWER

It should be noted that the "critics" of the Red Army are growing fewer and fewer. What is more, the foreign press now more and more frequently contains items which note the fine qualities of the Red Army, the skill of its fighting men and commanders and the flawlessness of its strategy and tactics. That is but natural. After the brilliant Red Army victories at Moscow and Stalingrad, at Kursk and at Belgorod, at Kiev and Kirovograd, at Minsk and Bobruisk, at Leningrad and Tallinn, at Jassy and Lvov, on the Vistula and the Niemen, on the Danube and the Oder, at Vienna and Berlin, it cannot but be admitted that the Red Army is a first-class army from which much could be learned. (*Storms of applause.*)

Such is our concrete understanding of our country's victory over its foes.

Such in the main are the results of the war.

It would be a mistake to think that such a historic victory could have been won if the whole country had not prepared beforehand for active defense. It would be no less mistaken to imagine that such preparations could be carried through in a short time—in the space of some three or four years. It would be a still greater mistake to say that we won only owing to the gallantry of our troops.

Of course, victory cannot be achieved without gallantry. But gallantry alone is not enough to vanquish an enemy who has a large army, first-class armaments, well-trained officer cadres, and a fairly good organization of supplies. To meet the blow of such an enemy, to repulse him and then to inflict utter defeat upon him required, in addition to the matchless gallantry of our troops, fully up-to-date armaments and adequate quantities of them as well as well-organized supplies in sufficient quantities.

But that, in turn, necessitated having—and in adequate amounts—such elementary things as metal for the manufacture of armaments,

equipment and machinery for factories, fuel to keep the factories and transport going, cotton for the manufacture of uniforms, and grain for supplying the Army.

Can it be claimed that before entering the Second World War our country already commanded the necessary minimum material potentialities for satisfying all these requirements in the main? I think it can. In order to prepare for this tremendous job we had to carry out three Five-Year Plans of national economic development. It was precisely these three Five-Year Plans that helped us to create these material potentialities. At any rate, our country's position in this respect before the Second World War, in 1940, was several times better than it was before the First World War, in 1913.

#### PREPARATION FOR DEFENSE

What material potentialities did our country command before the Second World War?

To help you examine this point, I shall have to report briefly on the work of the Communist Party in preparing our country for active defense.

If we take the figures for 1940, the eve of the Second World War, and compare them with the figures for 1913—the eve of the First World War—we get the following picture.

In 1913 our country produced 4,220,000 tons of pig iron, 4,230,000 tons of steel, 29 million tons of coal, nine million tons of oil, 21,600,000 tons of marketable grain and 740 thousand tons of raw cotton.

Those were the material potentialities with which our country entered the First World War.

Such was the economic base of old Russia which could be drawn upon for prosecution of the war.

Now as regards 1940. In the course of that year our country produced 15 million tons of pig iron, or nearly four times as much as in 1913; 18,300,000 tons of steel, or nearly four and one-half times as much as in 1913; 166 million tons of coal, or more than five and one-half times as much as in 1913; 31 million tons of oil, or nearly three and one-half times as much as in 1913; 38,300,000 tons of marketable grain, or nearly 17 million tons more than in 1913; 2,700,000 tons of raw cotton, or more than three and one-half times as much as in 1913.

Those were the material potentialities with which our country entered the Second World War.

Such was the economic-base of the Soviet Union which could be drawn upon for prosecution of the war.

The difference as you see is tremendous.

Such an unprecedented increase in production cannot be regarded as the simple and usual development of a country from backwardness to progress. It was a leap by which our Motherland was transformed from a backward into an advanced country, from an agrarian into an industrial country.

#### FIVE-YEAR PLANS

This historic transformation was accomplished in the course of three Five-Year Plan periods, beginning with 1928, the first year of



the First Five-Year Plan. Up to that time we had to concern ourselves with rehabilitating our ravaged industry and healing the wounds received in the First World War and the Civil War. Moreover, if we bear in mind that the First Five-Year Plan was fulfilled in four years, and that the fulfillment of the Third Five-Year Plan was interrupted by war in its fourth year, we find that it took only about 13 years to transform our country from an agrarian into an industrial one.

It cannot but be admitted that 13 years is an incredibly short period for the accomplishment of such an immense task.

This it is that explains the storm of conflicting comment which the publication of these figures produced at the time in the foreign press. Our friends decided that a "miracle" had taken place, while our ill-wishers declared that the Five-Year Plans were "Bolshevik propaganda" and the "tricks of the Cheka." But since miracles do not happen, and the Cheka is not so powerful as to abolish the laws of social development, "public opinion" abroad had to accept facts.

#### METHODS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

By what policy did the Communist Party succeed in providing these material potentialities in the country in such a short time?

First of all, by the Soviet policy of industrializing the country.

The Soviet method of industrializing the country differs radically from the capitalist method of industrialization. In capitalist countries industrialization usually begins with light industry. Since in light industry smaller investments are required and there is more rapid turnover of capital and since, furthermore, it is easier to make a profit there than in heavy industry, light industry serves as the first object of industrialization in these countries.

Only after a lapse of much time, in the course of which light industry accumulates profits and concentrates them in banks, does the turn of heavy industry arrive and accumulated capital begin to be transferred gradually to heavy industry in order to create conditions for its development.

But that is a lengthy process requiring an extensive period of several decades, in the course of which these countries have to wait until light industry has developed and must make shift without heavy industry. Naturally, the Communist Party could not take this course. The Party knew that a war was looming, that the country could not be defended without heavy industry, that the development of heavy industry must be undertaken as soon as possible, that to be behind with this would mean to lose out. The Party remembered Lenin's words to the effect that without heavy industry it would be impossible to uphold the country's independence, that without it the Soviet order might perish.

Accordingly, the Communist Party of our country rejected the "usual" course of industrialization and began the work of industrializing the country by developing heavy industry. It was very difficult, but not impossible. A valuable aid in this work was the nationalization of industry, and banking, which made possible the rapid accumulation and transfer of funds to heavy industry.

There can be no doubt that without this it would have been impossible to secure our country's transformation into an industrial country in such a short time.

#### AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Second, by a policy of collectivization of agriculture.

In order to do away with our backwardness in agriculture and to provide the country with greater quantities of marketable grain, cotton, and so forth, it was essential to pass from small-scale peasant farming to large-scale farming, for only large-scale farming can make use of new machinery, apply all the achievements of agronomical science and yield greater quantities of marketable produce.

There are, however, two kinds of large farms—capitalist and collective. The Communist Party could not adopt the capitalist path of development of agriculture, and not as a matter of principle alone but also because it implies too prolonged a development and involves preliminary ruination of the peasants and their transformation into farm hands. Therefore, the Communist Party took the path of the collectivization of agriculture, the path of creating large-scale farming by uniting peasant farms into collective farms.

The method of collectivization proved a highly progressive method not only because it did not involve the ruination of the peasants but especially because it permitted, within a few years, the covering of the entire country with large collective farms which are able to use new machinery, take advantage of all the achievements of agronomic science and give the country greater quantities of marketable produce.

There is no doubt that without a collectivization policy we could not in such a short time have done away with the age-old backwardness of our agriculture.

#### RESISTANCE MET

It cannot be said that the Party's policy encountered no resistance. Not only backward people, such as always decry everything new, but many prominent members of the Party as well, systematically dragged the Party backward and tried by hook or by crook to divert it to the "usual" capitalist path of development. All the anti-Party machinations of the Trotskyites and the Rightists, all their "activities" in sabotaging the measures of our Government, pursued the single aim of frustrating the Party's policy and obstructing the work of industrialization and collectivization. But the Party did not yield either to the threats from one side or the wails from the other and advanced confidently regardless of everything.

It is to the Party's credit that it did not pander to the backward, was not afraid to go against the tide and always retained its position as the leading force. There can be no doubt that without such firmness and tenacity the Communist Party could not have upheld the policy of industrializing the country and collectivizing agriculture.

Was the Communist Party able to make proper use of the material potentialities thus created in order to develop war production and provide the Red Army with the weapons it needed?

I think that it was able to do so and with maximum success.

## INDUSTRIAL RECORD

If we leave out of account the first year of war, when the evacuation of industry to the East held up the development of war production, we see that in the remaining three years of the war the Party scored such successes as allowed it not only to furnish the front with sufficient quantities of artillery, machine guns, rifles, aircraft, tanks and ammunition, but to accumulate reserves. Moreover, it is known that in quality our weapons were not only nothing inferior to the German but, taken on the whole, were actually superior to them.

It is known that during the last three years of war our tank industry produced an annual average of more than 30 thousand tanks, self-propelled guns and armored cars.

*(Storm of applause.)*

Further, it is known that our aircraft industry produced during the same period up to 40 thousand planes per year.

*(Storm of applause.)*

It is also known that our ordnance industry, during this period, produced annually up to 120 thousand guns of all calibers *(applause)*, up to 450 thousand light and heavy machine guns *(applause)*, over 3 million rifles *(applause)*, about two million tommy guns *(applause)*.

Lastly, it is known that our mortar industry produced between 1942 and 1944 an annual average up to 100 thousand mortars. *(Stormy applause.)*

At the same time, naturally, there were manufactured commensurate quantities of artillery ammunition, various kinds of mortar shells, aircraft bombs and rifle and machine gun ammunition.

It is known, for example, that over 240 million shells, bombs and mortar shells, and 7,400,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition were manufactured in 1944 alone. *(Thunderous applause.)*

Such, in general, is the picture of the supply of arms and ammunition to the Red Army.

As you see, it does not resemble the picture which our army supplies presented during the First World War when the front experienced a chronic shortage of artillery and shells, when the army was fighting without tanks and aircraft, and only one rifle was issued to every three men.

As regards the supply of the Red Army with provisions and uniforms, it is known to all that far from experiencing any shortage in this respect, the front actually had the reserves it required.

That is how matters stand with regard to the work of the Communist Party of our country in the period up to the outbreak of war and during the war itself.

## PLANS FOR FUTURE

Now a few words about the Communist Party's plans of work for the immediate future. As is known these plans are set forth in the new Five-Year Plan which is shortly to be endorsed. The principal aims of the new Five-Year Plan are to rehabilitate the ravaged areas of the country, to restore the prewar level in industry and agriculture, and then to surpass this level in more or less substantial measure. To say nothing of the fact that the rationing system will shortly be abolished *(stormy, prolonged applause)*, special attention will be

devoted to extending the production of consumer goods, to raising the living standard of the working people by steadily lowering the prices of all goods (*stormy, prolonged applause*), and to the widespread construction of all manner of scientific research institutions (*applause*) that can give science the opportunity to develop its potentialities. (*Stormy applause.*)

I have no doubt that if we give our scientists proper assistance they will be able in the near future not only to overtake but to surpass the achievements of science beyond the boundaries of our country. (*Prolonged applause.*)

As regards the plans for a longer period ahead, the Party means to organize a new mighty upsurge in the national economy, which would allow us to increase our industrial production, for example, three times over as compared with the prewar period. We must achieve a situation where our industry can produce annually up to 50 million tons of pig iron (*prolonged applause*), up to 60 million tons of steel (*prolonged applause*), up to 500 million tons of coal (*prolonged applause*) and up to 60 million tons of oil (*prolonged applause*). Only under such conditions can we consider that our homeland will be guaranteed against all possible accidents. (*Stormy applause.*) That will take three more Five-Year Plans, I should think, if not more. But it can be done and we must do it. (*Stormy applause.*)

Such is my brief report on the Communist Party's work in the recent past and its plans of work for the future.

It is for you to judge how correctly the Party has been working and whether it could not have worked better.

#### JUDGMENT BY VOTERS

There is a saying that victors are not judged (*laughter, applause*), that they should not be criticized, should not be checked on. That is not so. Victors can and should be judged (*laughter, applause*), they can and should be criticized and checked upon. That is good not only for work, but for the victors themselves (*laughter, applause*); there will be less conceitedness and more modesty. (*Laughter, applause.*) I consider that in an election campaign the electors are sitting in judgment on the Communist Party as the ruling party. And the election returns will constitute the electors' verdict. (*Laughter, applause.*) The Communist Party of our country would not be worth much if it feared to be criticized and checked upon. The Communist Party is prepared to accept the electors' verdict. (*Stormy applause.*)

In the election struggle the Communist Party is not alone. It goes to the polls in a bloc with non-Party people. In by-gone days the Communists treated non-Party people and non-Party status with some mistrust. This was due to the fact that the non-Party flag was not infrequently used as a camouflage by various bourgeois groups for whom it was not advantageous to face the electorate without a mask.

#### POLITICAL UNITY

That was the case in the past. But now we have different times. Our non-Party people are now divided from the bourgeoisie by a barrier known as the Soviet social order. This same barrier unites non-Party people with the Communists in a single community of Soviet

men and women. Living in this single community they struggled together to build up the might of our country, fought and shed their blood together on the battle fronts for the sake of our country, and in greatness worked together to forge a victory over the enemies of our country and did forge that victory. The only difference between them is that some belong to the Party, others do not. But that is a formal difference. The important thing is that both are furthering the same common cause. Therefore, the bloc of Communists and non-Party people is a natural and vital thing. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

In conclusion, allow me to thank you for the confidence you have shown me (*prolonged, unabating applause. Shout from the audience: "Hurrah for the great captain of all victories, Comrade Stalin!"*) in nominating me to the Supreme Soviet. You need not doubt that I shall do my best to justify your trust.

(*All rise. Prolonged, unabating applause turning into an ovation. From all parts of the hall come cheers: "Long live our great Stalin! Hurrah!" "Hurrah for the great leader of the peoples!" "Glory to the great Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin, the candidate of the entire nation!" "Glory to Comrade Stalin, the creator of all our victories!"*)

## 16. ON CULTURAL POLICY

NOTE.—This speech by Andre Zhdanov was delivered in Leningrad in 1946. In it he exhorts the writers of Leningrad to remember that they are "in the forward line of the ideological front" and calls upon them to stop admiring and imitating bourgeois models. The moral base of bourgeois culture "is rotten and decaying." All past achievements of literature and art must be surpassed. This carries the Communist idea of a moral system independent of bourgeois morals over, and demands esthetic standards that will be equally divorced from, and superior to, the past. The excerpt given here is not, of course, the first statement on this subject, but is a good example. It is taken from the "condensed and integrated" text of two speeches by Zhdanov, printed in *Voks Bulletin*, Moscow, No. 51.

Comrades, our Soviet literature lives and should live only in the interests of the people, the interests of our country. Literature is a matter that is near and dear to the people. That is why the people consider each of our successes, each important work of literature as their own victory. That is why every successful work may be compared with a battle won or with a great victory on the economic front. Conversely, every failure of Soviet literature deeply pains and injures the people, the Party, the state. It is this that the Central Committee had in mind in adopting its decision, for the Central Committee is solicitous of the interests of the people, of the interests of their literature, and extremely concerned over the present state of affairs among the writers of Leningrad.

Although people who have taken no ideological stand wish to deprive the Leningrad detachment of Soviet literary workers of its foundations, wish to undermine the ideological aspect of their work, to deprive the work of the writers of Leningrad of its significance as a means of bringing about social reform, the Central Committee trusts that the literary men of Leningrad will find themselves possessed of the strength to put an end to all attempts to turn the literary detachment of Leningrad and its journals aside into the channel of emptiness, lack of principle and lack of political-mindedness. You have been

placed on the forward line of the ideological front, you are faced with tremendous tasks of international significance, and this should enhance every genuine Soviet writer's sense of responsibility to his people, his state and his party, should enhance his sense of the importance of the duty he is performing.

The bourgeois world does not like our successes, whether these are won within our country or on the international arena.

The position of socialism was strengthened as a result of World War II. The question of socialism has been entered into the agenda of many countries of Europe. This displeases the imperialists of all shades; they fear socialism, fear our socialist country which is an example for the whole of progressive mankind. The imperialists, their ideological henchmen, their writers and journalists, their politicians and diplomats, are trying to slander our country in every way they can, to represent it in a wrong light, to slander socialism. Under these conditions the task of Soviet literature is not only to 'return blow for blow against all this vile slander and these attacks upon our Soviet culture, upon socialism, but also boldly to attack bourgeois culture which is in a state of degeneration and decay.

However beautiful the external presentation of the work of fashionable modern bourgeois writers of Western Europe and America, as well as of film and stage directors, they shall not be able to save or improve their bourgeois culture, for its moral foundation is rotten and decaying. This culture has been put at the service of private capitalist ownership, at the service of the egoistic, selfish interests of the bourgeois top circle of society. A multitude of bourgeois writers, film directors and stage directors is trying to distract the attention of the progressive strata of society from the acute problems of political and social struggle and turn their attention aside into the channel of vulgar, empty literature and art, which treats of gangsters and show-girls and glorifies the adulterer, the adventures of gamblers and rogues.

Does playing the part of admirers or pupils of bourgeois culture befit us, Soviet patriots, representatives of advanced Soviet culture? It goes without saying that our literature, which reflects an order that stands higher than any bourgeois democratic order, a culture that is many times superior to bourgeois culture, has the right to teach others the new universal morals. Where can you find another people or another country such as ours? Where can you find such splendid human qualities as our Soviet people displayed in the Great Patriotic War and as they display every day in the labour of converting our economy to peaceful development and material and cultural rehabilitation? Every day our people climb higher and higher. Today we are not what we were yesterday, and tomorrow we shall not be what we are today. We are no longer the Russians we were until 1917; our Russia is no longer the same and our character is no longer the same. We have changed and grown, together with the great changes which have fundamentally transfigured our country.

To show these great new qualities of the Soviet people, to show our people not only as they are today but to glance into their future, to help light the road ahead—such is the task of every conscientious Soviet writer. The writer cannot jog along behind events; he is obliged to march in the front ranks of the people, to point out to the people the path of their development. Guiding himself by the method

of socialist realism, conscientiously and attentively studying our life, trying to gain a deeper understanding of the processes of our development, the writer must educate the people and arm them ideologically. While selecting the finest feelings and qualities of the Soviet man, while disclosing his future to him, we must at the same time show our people what they should not be like, we must scourge the survivals of yesterday, survivals which hinder the progress of Soviet people. Soviet writers must help the people, the state, and the Party to educate our young people so that they will be optimistic, have confidence in their strength, and fear no difficulties.

As hard as bourgeois politicians and writers may try to conceal the truth about the achievements of the Soviet order and Soviet culture, as hard as they may try to erect an iron curtain beyond which the truth about the Soviet Union may not penetrate abroad, as hard as they may strive to belittle the real growth and scope of Soviet culture—all their attempts are doomed to failure. We know the strength and advantages of our culture very well. It suffices to recall the stupendous successes of our cultural delegations abroad, our physical culture parades, etc. It is not for us to bow to all things foreign or to take a passive position of defence!

If the feudal order and then the bourgeoisie, in the period of their flowering, could create art and literature that asserted the establishment of the new order and sang its praises, we, who form a new, socialist order that represents the embodiment of all that is best in the history of human civilization and culture, are all the more fit to create the most advanced literature in the world, a literature which will far surpass the finest literary examples of former times.

Comrades, what does the Central Committee ask and want? The Central Committee of the Party wants the Party members of Leningrad and the writers of Leningrad to understand well that the time has come when it is necessary to raise our ideological work to a high level. The young Soviet generation will be called upon to consolidate the strength and might of the socialist, Soviet order, to make full use of the moving forces of Soviet society in order to promote our material and cultural progress. To carry out these great tasks the young generation must be brought up to be staunch and cheerful, not to balk at difficulties, to meet these difficulties and be able to surmount them. Our people must be highly educated people of lofty ideals, possessed of high cultural and moral demands and tastes. To this end it is necessary that our literature, our journals should not stand aloof from the tasks of the day, but should help the Party and the people to educate our youth in the spirit of supreme devotion to the Soviet order, in the spirit of supreme service of the interests of the people.

Soviet writers and all our ideological workers now stand on the forward fighting line, for the tasks of the ideological front, and of literature in the first place, are not removed, but, on the contrary, grow more important under conditions of peaceful development. The people, the state and the Party do not want the removal of literature from modern problems, but the active invasion of literature into all aspects of Soviet life. The Bolsheviks value literature highly, have a clear perception of its great historical mission of strengthening the moral and political unity of the people, consolidating their ranks and educating them. The Central Committee of the Party wants us to

abundantly feed the human spirit, for it looks upon the attainment of cultural wealth as one of the main tasks of socialism.

The Central Committee of the Party is certain that the Leningrad detachment of Soviet literature is morally and politically healthy, will quickly correct its mistakes and will take a fitting place in the ranks of Soviet literature.

The Central Committee is certain that the shortcomings in the work of Leningrad writers will be overcome and that the ideological work of the Leningrad Party organization will very shortly be raised to the level that is required at present in the interests of the Party, the people and the state.

## 17. PLAYS, THE THEATRE, AND LIFE

**NOTE.**—This piece by Constantine Simonov, the famous Soviet novelist, is a call to battle addressed to the writers of the Soviet Union. If anyone hoped for a respite after the war the hope was false, for "an ideological war on a world scale is now being waged with unexampled ferocity." The excerpt given here also demands that the writers play up the romance and nobility of the revolutionary movement of home and abroad. It was first published in *Litraturnaya Gazeta* on November 23, 1946.

Very often (especially of late) we hear the just claim that the writer should know, study, and see life. All who make such a claim, and especially the critics, are fully justified. But we rarely hear them express another idea, namely, that the critic whose job it is to judge the extent to which a writer knows life—should himself know and study life. He should know life in general, and especially that fragment of life about which the work he criticises is written.

We must not forget the traditions of classic Russian literary criticism. A work of art should be judged from the point of view of life and for the sake of life. It is necessary to write not only about plays, but about life: about life as it is in actuality and as it is shown in plays. That is the task of the critic.

Let us consider the basic tasks now facing our playwrights, theatres, and dramatic critics.

It is only natural that an art as closely bound up with the life of the people as our Soviet art, must face the same problems as are faced by the people. At present we are exerting tremendous effort to repair the unexampled destruction which our country suffered during the war. And with unbending consistency we are fighting on the world arena for peace and against all supporters of fascist theories, to whatever nation they may belong, in whatever language they may speak.

These are the same tasks which face Soviet art, the only difference being that artists must fulfil them by using artistic means.

Today's theme concerns the rehabilitation of our country, as expressed through character portrayal—the portrayal of yesterday's battle heroes, today's construction heroes.

In literature and on the stage we must show the Soviet person—the builder of the future—in such a light that the audience and the whole world will see the moral and spiritual superiority of people who have been reared in a socialist society.

Our diplomats speak from the world tribune with such brilliance and so convincingly not only because they are great statesmen and orators, but also and mainly because, in spite of the lies and libel



spread about them, they alone speak the truth about humanity, a truth supported by our entire people. It is the moral and ideological superiority of our people which makes our representatives superior to all others in the world tribune.

But the fact that our playwrights, directors, and actors are concerned with what is happening in the world and with how world problems are decided, does not mean that all our plays should be written about the international conference in Paris.

Not at all. The playwright will make his proper contribution to the solution of international problems by revealing in his plays the simple Soviet person, with all his wealth of character, his will to victory, his indomitable spirit—one of those of millions of people on behalf of whom and with the support of whom our delegates speak at international conferences. And by properly interpreting these people on the stage, the actor speaks his word at the world conference.

Such is the general theme into which flow other themes directly and indirectly connected.

The international theme, the anti-fascist theme; republican Spain, where on the streets of Madrid Russian lads fell alongside of German anti-fascists from the Thaelmann Brigade; the people's army of China, Yugoslav guerrillas and Bulgarian anti-fascists—all of these themes also represent the life of our generation, all of them represent part of the beauty of our life, part of its nobility, part of its romance. All of this is included in the circle of interests which so enrich the mind and heart of the Soviet person. We must and shall write of these things.

And shall we not include in our themes subjects taken from History, with a capital H? Are they not likewise included within the circle of interests of our advanced people?

We were not born into a vacuum. We were not born what we are today. The history of the revolutionary movement, the history of our revolution, the biographies of the great men of the revolution—all this has also been absorbed into our characters. This too is included in the circle of interests of our people. This too is thematic material for today and tomorrow.

An ideological war on a world scale is now being waged with unexampled ferocity. And under such circumstances we suddenly hear people propagating the idea of a "respite" after the war, of the necessity of resting a bit, of sitting down and reading the tea leaves to find out what will happen.

During the war they claimed that it was impossible to write because they lacked a proper "perspective". Now that the war is over they claim that it is impossible to write because it is necessary to have a rest. All right. Let them rest if they must. But let them rest outside the limits of Soviet art.

There can be no respite in the ideological war. Any position which we abandon today will not remain empty—tomorrow the enemy will occupy it. And at the present moment our ideological enemies are extremely aggressive. They are attempting to gain ground, and wherever we, representatives of Soviet art, permit it, they will not only attempt it, but will actually gain ground.

We should and shall fight on the ideological front. That follows naturally from what we have been taught by the party of Lenin and

Stalin. That follows naturally from our traditions, from our character, trained by the periods of the five-year plans, tempered during the days of the war.

Our enemies find that we are stubborn and unpleasant. We have no intention of changing, however unpleasant they find us. We take this as a compliment, coming from our enemies.

We declare at the tops of our voices, to the whole world, from the tribune of our art, that we are fighting and shall continue to fight for communism; that we consider communism the only worthy future for mankind; that our communist ideals were, are, and always shall be unchangeable; and that no one can ever cause us to falter.

And to those who languish for "pure" art, we say:

There are different views on beauty in art and beauty in life. One view holds that beauty in life is found outside the limits of struggle, labor, and suffering; accordingly, beauty in art is likewise found outside their limits. But there is another view which holds that it is exactly within the limits of struggle, labor, and suffering that the greatest beauty of life lies, and accordingly that the beauty of art is also found within these limits. That is our view of life and art. This is a view which takes sides. We approve of it. More than that we are proud of it.

## 18. MESSAGE TO MOSCOW

**NOTE.**—Stalin's message to Moscow September 10, 1947, on the eight hundredth anniversary of the city, praises it as the center of the centralized Russian state, of the world Communist movement, and of the struggle for durable peace against imperialist forces "trying to provoke a new war."

Greetings to Moscow, the capital of our Country, on the occasion of its eight hundredth anniversary.

The entire country is celebrating this momentous occasion today. It is celebrating it not formally, but with affection and respect in view of the great services Moscow has rendered the Country.

Moscow's services consist not only in the deliverance of our Country on three occasions in the course of its history from alien bondage—from the Mongol yoke, the Polish-Lithuanian incursion, and the French invasion. Moscow's service consists first and foremost in the fact that it became the foundation for the unification of a disunited Russia into a single state with a single government, a single leadership. No country in the world that has not been able to free itself of feudal disunity and the wrangling among princes can hope to preserve its independence or score substantial economic and cultural progress. Only a country united in a single centralized state can count on being able to make substantial cultural-economic progress and assert its independence. Moscow's historic service consists in the fact that it was and remains the foundation and the initiator of the creation of a centralized state in Rus.

This, however, does not exhaust Moscow's services to the Country. After Moscow was again proclaimed the capital of our Country by the will of the great Lenin, it became the standard bearer of the new, Soviet epoch.

Moscow is now not only the inspirer of the upbuilding of the new, Soviet social and economic ways of life, which have substituted the

supremacy of labor for the supremacy of capital and rejected the exploitation of man by man. Moscow is at the same time the champion of the movement of toiling mankind for liberation from capitalist slavery.

Moscow is now not only the inspirer of the upbuilding of the new, Soviet democracy, which rejects all, direct or indirect, inequality of citizens, men and women, races and nations, and guarantees the right to work and the right to equal pay for equal labor. Moscow is also the battle standard of all toiling folk in the world, all the oppressed races and nations, in her struggle for liberation from the domination of plutocracy and imperialism. There is no doubt that without pursuing such a policy Moscow could not have become the center for organization of the friendship of the peoples and fraternal cooperation among them within the framework of our multi-national state.

Moscow is now not only the initiator of the creation of a new mode of life for the working people of the capital, a mode of life free from poverty and misery of millions of propertyless and unemployed. Moscow is also a model for all other capitals of the world in this respect. One of the most serious ulcers of the large capitals of European, Asiatic and American countries is the existence of slums, where millions of pauperized toilers are doomed to misery and to a slow and painful death. Moscow's service consists in that it has completely eradicated these slums and given the working people an opportunity to move from the basements and hovels into the apartments and houses of the bourgeoisie and into new improved dwellings built by the Soviet Government.

Finally, Moscow's service consists in the fact that it is the champion of the struggle for durable peace and friendship among nations, the champion of the struggle against the incendiaries of a new war. For the imperialists war is a most profitable enterprise. It is not surprising that the agents of imperialism are trying to provoke a new war in one way or another. Moscow's service consists in the fact that it untiringly exposes the incendiaries of a new war and rallies all the peace-loving peoples around the banner of peace. It is common knowledge that the peace-loving peoples look with hope to Moscow as the capital of a great peace-loving power and a mighty bulwark of peace.

It is because of these services that our Country is celebrating the 800th anniversary of Moscow today with such affection and respect for their capital.

Long live our mighty, beloved, Soviet, Socialist Moscow!

J. STALIN.

## 19. SPEECH ON WARMONGERS

NOTE.—Vishinsky's speech at the United Nations General Assembly on September 18 was a landmark in public appreciation of the sharp differences in point of view between the Communists and their former allies. It spells out more fully than any other statement the Communist idea that capitalism in general is capable of aggression, not just fascism or nazism.

Mr. Chairman, Fellow Delegates:

### 1.

1. A year has passed since the First Session of the General Assembly. It is necessary to cast a retrospective glance on the way passed and

to make an analysis of the work performed during this time by the United Nations, to summarize certain results and to outline possible prospectives.

Each Delegation, each Member of the United Nations has a duty to perform its obligations in an unprejudiced manner and with consciousness of its high responsibility in this matter which requires complete clarity, objectiveness and respect of truth which must be placed above all.

Casting its retrospective glance, the Soviet Delegation must state that during the period covered by the report there were serious setbacks in the activity of the United Nations. These setbacks should be disclosed and named with all determination and consistency.

They are to a large extent a result of a tendency of such influential members of the United Nations organization as United States of America, Great Britain to utilize the organization in the interests of their small group without any regard for strengthening of the international cooperation on the basis of the principles expressed in the Charter.

The policy to use the organization by individual states for the purpose of achieving their own selfish narrowly conceived interests leads to undermining the organizations prestige, same as it had place with the grievous memory League of Nations.

On the other hand, the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the United Nations organization which negatively tells upon its prestige, is a result of ignoring of the organization by the States mentioned above who attempt to carry out a number of practical measures outside of the framework of the United Nations organization and with a lack of due regard to it.

It is necessary to draw attention to a serious menace thus created for the United Nations organization by such a policy incompatible with the principles of the Charter and with the aims and purposes envisaged by the United Nations when establishing the organization.

#### DISSATISFACTION ON DISARMING

2. Among the most important setbacks of activities of the United Nations organization one should mention in the first place the unsatisfactory realization of the Assembly's decision of Dec. 14, 1946, on universal reduction of armaments.

The resolution on universal reduction of armaments passed unanimously by the General Assembly corresponds with the vital interests of millions of people who in spite of the termination of the second World War still shoulder the burden of military expenses and heavy burdens connected with unceasing increase of armaments.

The decision on universal reduction of armaments adopted by the Assembly is at the same time an expression of the aspirations and demands of the peace-loving nations for the establishment of durable peace and international security, expression of demands dictated by sufferings those nations experienced and sacrifices they made.

For this particular reason, the above-mentioned decision met a profound approval of the people of the whole world who hoped for its rapid and complete realization. Nevertheless these hopes were not realized.

U. S. A. and Great Britain representatives, at the time attempts were made to outline within the framework of the Security Council and in the Commission for the Conventional Armaments practical measures for the realization of the General Assembly's decision on the universal regulation and reduction of the armaments, proposed such terms for the reduction of the armaments which could not but result in failure to realize the mentioned-above decision of the Assembly.

The whole activity of the American and British delegations in the Commission for the Conventional Armaments testifies that U. S. A. and Great Britain are unwilling to disarm and that they put brakes on the realization of disarmament, which gives reason for anxiety among the peace-loving nations.

Bevin's statement made in Southport to the effect that he was not going to further the disarmament serves as a convincing answer to the question about the reasons for the unsatisfactory state of affairs with regards to the realization of the Assembly's decision on the reduction of armaments.

The recent statement by Truman in Petropolis, in which the President emphasized that U. S. military forces are to be maintained while saying not a single word about the obligation to make a reduction of armed forces assumed upon themselves by the United Nations in accordance with the General Assembly's decisions, speaks of the same.

#### ALARM AND APPREHENSION

Such a position taken by the United States and Great Britain with regard to the reduction of armaments and absence of positive results in solving of problems, indicated in resolution of Dec. 14, 1946, give rise, as we have mentioned, to justified apprehension and alarm with regards to the possibility to successfully complete the undertaken task; the speed-up of armaments, atomic weapon included, and military preparations of some military and economically powerful states particularly promote the spreading of the feeling of alarm and anxiety.

This undermines the faith in the sincerity of peaceful declarations and statements on determination to make future generations free from the hardships of war.

Particularly unsatisfactory state of affairs with the outlawing of atomic and other principal types of weapons of mass extermination gives rise to particular anxiety on the part of millions of common people.

The anxiety is all the more justified for the reason that the atomic weapons are weapons of an attack and that of aggression. After one-and-a-half years of work of the Atomic Commission, none of the tasks set to it by the General Assembly's resolution of Dec. 14, 1946, not only has not been completed but there has not been the slightest progress in the fulfillment of those tasks.

The Soviet Government on its part, undertook a number of steps with the aim to contribute to the positive solution of this question. In addition and furtherance of its own proposal concerning the conclusion of international convention on outlawing atomic and other principal types of weapons of mass extermination, the Soviet Government submitted for the consideration by the Atomic Commission a

proposal dealing with the principal provisions for the international control over the atomic energy.

Nevertheless that proposal met with a resistance, mainly on the part of the United States. USA, believing that it will continue to exercise a monopoly with regards to the atomic weapons, resists any attempts to dismantle the existing stock of atomic bombs and outlaw their further production. At the same time USA systematically increases the production of such bombs.

The disagreement among the Commission members in this respect hinders the work of the Commission and paralyzes all efforts directed to the successful solution of the task set to the Commission.

#### FOR A MORE OBJECTIVE APPROACH

At the same time there is no doubt that many of these disagreements could have been eliminated provided there had been displayed a more objective approach to the question on the part of some Delegations, American Delegation among them.

For instance, it could have been possible to eliminate the disagreement that arose in connection with the Soviet Delegation proposal on destruction of the atomic bombs stocks upon coming into force of the convention on the outlawing of the atomic weapons. As is known, the majority in the Commission agreed in principle that it is necessary to destroy the stock of the atomic weapons and use their nucleous energy only for peaceful aims.

The United States Delegation alone continues to object to the destruction of the stock of atomic bombs, thus obstructing a decision on the question approved by the majority of the Commission.

One's attention is attracted by the situation that has been created with regards to the question of inspection. American Delegation has been stressing the particular significance of the inspection. In the Soviet Delegation proposals, the inspection also occupies the place second to the outlawing of atomic weapons.

At present, however, the American Delegation began unexpectedly to lessen the importance of the inspections, putting in the first place other questions such as transfer of atomic enterprises into the ownership of an international body, management, issuance of licenses, and so on.

At the same time, the American Delegation does not want to take into account the opinion of the authoritative men of science who as is for example, stated in the memorandum of the British Council of the Atomic Scientist's Association which include such prominent scientists as Rudolf Pirels, Oliphant, Moon and others, object of the ownership of means of production of atomic energy by the international control body.

As is known, the British scientists emphasize in this memorandum that transfer to this international control body of means of production "into its full ownership, in the usual sense of this word, would give rise to difficulties, since this ownership would give this control body the right to decide whether this or that country is entitled to construct atomic energy plants and the right to prevent the use of energy manufactured by such plants and set the terms for supplying with such energy."

The British scientists, criticizing the thesis defended by the American Delegation since the time of Baruch's activity, justly state: "Such a restriction would make it possible to intervene in the economic life of each country to an extent not necessary for preventing the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes."

#### INCOMPATIBILITY SEEN

This is the voice of men of science who consider this problem from the point of view of interests of the scientific progress which is incompatible with an unrestricted control exercised by some centralized international body over scientific and research work directed at the achievement of peaceful aims of discoveries and increase of energetic resources.

This is why the memorandum of the British atomic scientists speaks for the plan that would provide a guarantee against accumulation of dangerous materials, without sanction of the organs for the atomic energy control, and give at the same time all the nations a possibility to initiate a construction on their territories of plants producing atomic energy in addition to other energetic resources.

The Soviet Union proposed in the interests of the universal peace to conclude a convention outlawing the use of atomic weapons in all circumstances. This proposal made by the Soviet Union found a warm response and support in all the countries.

"Such a convention," says the memorandum of the British Association of Scientific Workers, "appears to us to be highly desirable and it is difficult to justify the reluctance on the part of Great Britain and U. S. A. to agree to it." The British scientists, estimating the U. S. S. R. demand to destroy the stock of atomic weapons and cease the production of the new ones, write that such a provision appears to be eminently reasonable.

The Soviet Union stands for a strict international control over the atomic energy plants but such a one, however, which should not be transformed into interference with those branches of national industry and with those questions that are not connected with atomic energy.

Here against right are the British atomic scientists who stated in the memorandum of Jan. 23 a wish that "the right of inspection be limited as far as possible and would not serve to satisfy the excessive curiosity with regards to legitimate industry and other forms of activity."

The British Association of Scientific Workers in this memorandum published in August, 1947, also points to the necessity of restricting to certain limits the rights of inspection which should not serve the aims of organized economic and military espionage.

"The U. S. A. and other supporters of the Baruch plan," states the memorandum, "should be encouraged to formulate safeguards to insure that any inspection scheme should not develop into an elaborate system of espionage."

#### LIMITS ON INSPECTION

Proceeding from the principles outlined above of establishing of international control which should be, we repeat real, strong and effective, the Soviet delegation believes it necessary to put the inspection authorities within certain limits to restrict their rights to the aims of the genuine control over atomic energy, excluding the possibility

of the use of the control authorities for an arbitrary intervention into any branches of national economy, disregarding even the fact that such an intervention can only undermine and destroy national economy of any country.

The American delegation and some other delegations who support it insist particularly that international control authority transformed into an owner and acting accordingly to the interests of the majority of this authority, on whose benevolent attitude the Soviet Union cannot count, should own and manage all plants manufacturing atomic materials in a dangerous quantity. But the delegations that group around the American delegation and act under its leadership try to achieve exactly such a situation.

The quoted-before memorandum of British scientists does not conceal the fact that the American plan for the organization of the control over atomic energy provides for the measures which, as stated in the memorandum, "can be interpreted as a support of the United States dominance in the province of the atomic energy . . ."

The Soviet delegation is opposed to such a thesis and will remain opposed to it in future trying to achieve not a dominance of a single nation in the international control body but equality of all participants in this body in all its activity.

It should be recalled in this connection that the United States representatives on the Atomic Commission stubbornly oppose the simultaneous establishment of control over atomic industry on all its stages from the extraction of raw material up to output of finished products.

The United States representatives propose to postpone indefinitely the establishment of control over the most dangerous final stages of the atomic manufacturing, stages in which United States considers itself at present time to be holding monopoly. At the same time, United States insists that control over the initial stage extraction of the raw material should be immediately introduced.

It is abundantly clear that the American position cannot be otherwise interpreted but as a position according to which the control is not to be extended to United States of America while all other countries should come right away under the international control.

Such is the state of affairs with regards to the atomic question.

Naturally, one cannot expect successful results from the work in which there is shown on the part of some delegation no intention to cooperate for the purpose of achieving the aims stated in the General Assembly's resolution of Dec. 14, 1946. Such a situation cannot be suffered. One cannot reconcile oneself with the fact that the threat of the use of atomic energy for the purposes of mass destruction and extermination of a peaceful population is not yet eliminated.

The conscience of the nations cannot tolerate such a state of affairs when notwithstanding the appeal of the United Nations organization to eliminate atomic weapons and other principal types of the means of mass extermination of human beings, the manufacturing of such means not only continues but even more and more increases.

#### VIOLATIONS ARE CHARGED TO U. S.

3. The so-called Truman's doctrine and "Marshall plan" are particularly striking instances of the violation of the United Nations organization principles and of ignoring the organization.



The experience of the few past months has proved that declaration of this doctrine meant that the U. S. A. Government openly gave up the principles of international cooperation and concerted actions of the great powers and passed to the attempts to dictate its will to other independent nations, utilizing at the same time the economic means, allotted as a relief for individual countries in need, for an open political pressure.

This has been sufficiently illustrated by the measures undertaken by the U. S. A. Government in Greece and Turkey outside of the framework of the United Nations organization and in evasion of it, as well as by the measures planned for Europe in accordance with the so-called "Marshall plan."

Such policy is in a deep contradiction with the principle proclaimed by the General Assembly in its resolution of Dec. 11, 1946, that the assistance to other countries "should never be used as a political weapon."

The "Marshall plan" is in fact, as it is quite clear now, but another version of the Truman doctrine adjusted for the conditions of the post-war Europe.

The U. S. A. Government when putting forward this "plan" apparently expected, with the cooperation of the British and French Governments, to make the European countries that are in need of relief to face the necessity to give up their unalienable right to dispose of their own economic resources, to plan their own national economy as they see it fit, same as U. S. A. Government expected to make all those countries directly dependable on the interests of American monopolies which are seeking to avoid the impending crisis by an accelerated export to Europe of the accumulated commodities and capital.

#### ATTEMPT AT TWO BLOCS

As is known, not all the European countries, in spite of their needs and difficulties of the post-war economic rehabilitation, agreed to such an infringement of their sovereignty and to such an interference with their internal affairs, while the countries that consented to take part in certain negotiations on the subject in Paris commence to understand more and more the danger of their position and the true meaning of this offer of relief.

It is getting more and more clear to everybody that the "Marshall plan" being put into effect will mean a subjugation of the European countries to the economic and political control exercised by the U. S. A. and direct interference on their part with the internal affairs of those countries.

At the same time, this plan is an attempt to break Europe into two camps and complete with the assistance of Great Britain and France the formation of a bloc of a number of European countries hostile to the interests of the democratic states of Eastern Europe and, first of all, to those of the Soviet Union.

The tendency to set up the bloc of a number of Western European countries, Western Germany included, as against the countries of Eastern Europe is an important feature of this plan. At the same time it is intended to use Western Germany and German heavy industry (Ruhr) as one of the important economic bases for American expansion in

Europe without any regard to the national interests of the countries—victims of German aggression.

Suffice it to remind of these facts to show undisputably the incompatibility of such U. S. A. policy as well as that of the British and French Governments who support the U. S. A., with the basic principles of the United Nations organization.

#### TROOP DISPOSITIONS CHALLENGED

4. One cannot either consider as normal such a situation with regards to the relations among the members of the United Nations organization when foreign armed forces continue to remain on the territories of the members of the organization, being the instrument of political interference in their internal affairs and thus creating unequal, subordinate relations between the States, incompatible with the Charter.

British troops still remain in Egypt—against the will of that country; they still remain in Greece in violation of her state constitution, in Transjordan, who applied for membership in the United Nations organization.

American troops continue to remain in China; this by no means contributes to the establishing of internal peace in that country. The presence of foreign troops on the territory of non-enemy states should not have place unless such a presence is connected with the protection of the communications with ex-enemy territories during their occupation.

The strengthening of universal peace and mutual confidence among the nations demand an urgent and positive solution of the question of the evacuation from the territories of the non-enemy states of foreign troops, not engaged in guarding of communications with ex-enemy states.

5. One should point out also to the failure on the part of some members of the organization to put into effect important decisions of the Assembly: on the Spanish question (Argentine), on the question of discrimination against Indians in South Africa, on establishment of trusteeship over the former mandatory territory of South-Western Africa (Union of South Africa).

The General Assembly cannot pass by such actions of some individual members of organization who disrupt the achievement of aims set out in the decisions of the Assembly and who weaken the prestige of the United Nations organization.

#### INDONESIAN CASE AN ISSUE

In this connection we cannot avoid to dwell on the developments that are taking place in Indonesia. These events cannot be qualified otherwise than an act of aggression perpetrated against the Indonesian people by a state-member of the United Nations.

Unprovoked military attack by Holland against the Indonesian Republic caused justified indignation of all the honest people throughout the world. Well, did the United Nations organization render due assistance to the Indonesian people? All of us know that it was not the case.

As the result of the consideration of the Indonesian question by the Security Council, certain states made no small efforts to minimize the

importance of developments in Indonesia and to impose upon the Security Council such a decision which by no means cannot be regarded as sufficient for the protection of the legitimate interests of the Indonesian Republic who became victim of the military attack.

It is clear that such decisions cannot but undermine the prestige of the United Nations organization which is exactly called upon to secure the maintenance of peace among the nations.

#### "DOGGEDNESS" ON IRAN SCORED

6. At the same time, one's attention is attracted by the fact that while not showing due interest to the elimination of the unsatisfactory state of affairs with regards to the solution of the Spanish and other questions, cited above, some influential powers display a particular interest to the Iranian question, which still remains on the agenda of the Security Council, notwithstanding the fact that eighteen months have already passed since its complete settlement and that in spite of the request of Iran itself to take this question off the agenda of the Security Council.

It is really worth to note how the delegates of the U. S. A. and Great Britain doggedly try to keep at any cost, against any reasoning, the Iranian question on the agenda of the Security Council for some apparently specific purposes.

The extraordinary doggedness displayed in this respect by the American and British members of the Council is all the more worthy to pay one's attention to that this doggedness remained unshaken even after well-grounded clarification made by the Secretary General to the effect that there are no reasons for the Security Council to deal with the so-called Iranian question.

7. Touching upon the subject of the Trusteeship Council, the Soviet delegation also considers necessary to note the following:

At the meeting of the General Assembly of Dec. 13, 1946, U. S. S. R. delegation criticized the agreements on trusteeship over the ex-mandatory territories, submitted for the approval by the Assembly, for the reason that both the very preparation of those agreements and some of their articles did not correspond to what is required by the U. N. Charter.

The fact of the establishment of the Trusteeship Council was based on the said agreements with above-mentioned setbacks naturally could not but influence the U. S. S. R. delegation's attitude toward the election of the members of the Council. The Soviet delegation still continues to maintain the views stated in this respect by the Soviet delegation at the meeting of the General Assembly on Dec. 13, 1946.

The U. S. S. R. delegation representing the state which is a permanent member of the Trusteeship Council wishes to express the hope that the above-mentioned violations of the Charter that took place at the time the agreements on trusteeship were concluded will be corrected which would undoubtedly facilitate the execution by the Trusteeship Council of its tasks.

It goes without saying that this would serve the interests both of the United Nations organization as a whole and those of the population of the trustee territories.

## WEST'S ATTITUDE DEPLORED

8. Unsatisfactory state of affairs with regard to the work of the United Nations organization is not an accident but a result of an attitude toward the organization on the part of a number of members, U. S. A. and Great Britain first of all.

Such an attitude does not facilitate the strengthening of the organization and does not serve the cause of international cooperation. On the contrary, such an attitude leads to weakening and instability of the United Nations organization which undoubtedly is in keeping the plans and intentions of the reactionary elements in the mentioned countries under whose influence a suitable policy is being carried out.

9. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its policy with regards to the United Nations organization is a policy of strengthening of the organization; it is a policy of broadening and strengthening of international cooperation, a policy of a steady, consistent observance of the Charter and of fulfillment of its principles.

The strengthening of the United Nations organization is only possible on the basis of respectful attitude toward the political and economic independence of the nations, on the basis of respectful attitude toward the sovereign equality of the nations as well as of consistent and unconditional observance of one of the most important principles of the United Nations organization—that is, the principle of unanimity and accord among the Great Powers in taking decisions on the most important problems dealing with maintenance of international peace and security.

It is in full accord with the special responsibility of these Powers for the maintenance of universal peace and is a guarantee of the protection of interests of all the members of the United Nations organization, great and small.

The Soviet Union feels it is its duty to resolutely fight against any attempts to shake this principle, no matter under what motives these attempts are made.

## COMMENT ON MARSHALL STATEMENT

There is left for me to say just a few more words with regard to the address of the Secretary of State, Mr. Marshall.

The questions that not once had been the subject of discussion were touched upon in this address. Most of these questions are included into agenda of the General Assembly as its separate paragraphs, which means that we'll have opportunity to state our opinion on them at the proper place and time.

The Soviet delegation, however, feels necessary to immediately dwell upon the question raised by Mr. Marshall in this first statement, i. e. question of independence and territorial integrity of Greece.

Leaving the discussion at the proper length of this question until the time the General Assembly deals with it according to the adopted agenda, the Soviet delegation feels necessary to state only that the very raising of this question is devoid of any foundation.

The charges made by the American delegation against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania are utterly arbitrary and without any proof. These charges go much further than the conclusions of the majority

of the commission which were not supported by almost 50 percent of the members of the commission and which do not stand any criticism if one is to take any serious approach to the data on which the conclusions are based.

It will not be difficult to prove that the report of the majority of the commission on the so-called Greek question is full of contradictions and gross exaggerations which deprive those conclusions of any importance whatsoever.

Mr. Marshall's address raises new questions as well.

Korean question. Having arbitrarily outlined the situation in such a way that the futility of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea happens to be attributed to the Soviet side, Mr. Marshall makes a proposal which is a direct violation of the Moscow Agreement on Korea reached by the three Foreign Ministers in December, 1945.

The U. S. A. and U. S. S. R. undertook according to this Agreement to prepare a joint solution of the problem of the unification of Korea into one independent democratic State. The new proposal made by Mr. Marshall is a violation of the obligations assumed upon itself by the United States of America and for this reason is not the right one or acceptable.

The U. S. A. Government prefers instead of undertaking arrangements for shaping out adopted measures according to the Moscow Agreement on Korea of December, 1945, and submitting them to the joint consideration by the Governments of the U. S. A., U. S. S. R., Great Britain and China, to violate its undertakings in an attempt to conceal by the prestige of the General Assembly its unilateral and by no means justified action.

The Soviet Government cannot accept such a violation of the said Agreement on Korea and will insist that the proposal made by Mr. Marshall should be rejected for the reason that contrary to the obligations assumed under the tripartite Agreement on Korea.

Mr. Marshall proposes to establish a standing Committee of the General Assembly under the title of "the Interim Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on Peace and Security" to maintain "constant attention" to the work of the Assembly and in order to deal with continuing problems.

#### ATTEMPT AT BY-PASSING COUNCIL

In spite of the reservations in the American proposal to the effect that this committee would not impinge on the matters which are the primary responsibility of the Security Council or of special commissions, there is not the slightest doubt that the attempt to create the Interim Committee is nothing but an ill-conceived scheme to substitute and by-pass the Security Council.

The functions of this committee, whose task is to consider "situations and disputes impairing friendly relations," are nothing else but the functions of the Security Council particularly mentioned in the Article 34 of the Charter. Even by virtue of this situation alone these functions cannot be transferred to any other organ, no matter what its name is, without obvious and direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and of course, the Soviet Delegation can in no way accept it and will energetically oppose it.

I repeat that if the above-mentioned new proposals as well as the old ones in a new form are submitted to the General Assembly by the American delegation, the Soviet delegation reserves its right to make a more detailed and elaborate analysis of these proposals at the time when the substance of these questions is examined and will insist upon the rejection of these proposals, which are in disagreement with the principles, purposes and tasks of the United Nations organization, and the adoption of which could only undermine the very basis of the United Nations.

10. Against the propaganda and instigators of a new war.

The Soviet delegation believes it necessary to raise at the General Assembly a very important question concerning the measures against the propaganda of a new war increasing in a number of countries.

More than two years passed since the Charter of the United Nations Organization was signed in San Francisco and ratified subsequently by fifty-two nations. This Charter marked the beginning of activity of a new international association that set as its task to insure peace and security of nations, development and strengthening of international cooperation in order to promote economic and social progress of nations.

The creation of the United Nations Organization dates back to the period when the principal enemy of the democratic states—Hitlerite Germany—was defeated and the day of the Japanese defeat was near. The attempt of these enemies of mankind to establish their world domination was a complete failure because of the historic victory of the democratic states with the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition at the head. Two traditional hotbeds of war were destroyed.

We wish to be sure that they are destroyed forever, that the task of complete disarmament of Germany and Japan set down by the Allies will be brought to an end and that these states will never threaten again freedom-loving nations with war and aggression.

We wish to be sure that the severe lesson given to the aggressive states during the second World War has not passed away leaving no traces, and that the fate of the aggressors severely punished the last war will serve as a stern warning to those who, disregarding their obligations to develop friendly relations among the nations and strengthen peace and security in the whole world, are preparing both secretly and openly a new war.

#### MILITARISM LAID TO U. S.

War psychosis instigated by the efforts of the militarist and expansionist circles of certain countries, United States of America occupying the foremost place among them, is continually spreading and assuming all the more menacing character.

A furious campaign in the press, mainly in American press, and in the press of the countries following obediently the U. S. A., like Turkey, is being spread already for a considerable lapse of time for the purpose of coaxing the public opinion in favor of a new war. All means of psychological influence—newspapers, magazines, radio, cinema—have been used.

This propaganda of a new war is being carried on under various flags and pretexts. But no matter how much different the flags and pretexts, the essence of the whole propaganda remains the same: to

justify the furious armament race in the U. S. A., atomic weapons included, to justify the limitless desires of the influential circles in the U. S. A. to fulfill the expansionist plans, the keystone of which is a crazy "idea" of world domination. Torrents of the propaganda of a new war and appeals to prepare for it better and more expeditiously flow from the pages of the American press.

A number of newspapers and magazines, mostly American, cry every day and in every way about a new war, systematically promoting this baneful psychological coaxing of the public opinion of their countries. The war-mongers indulge in propaganda under a smoke screen of the cries about the strengthening of national defense and necessity to fight against a war danger which allegedly comes from other countries.

The war-mongering propagandists try by hook and crook to frighten people poorly versed in politics by the fables and vicious fabrications about alleged preparations on the part of the Soviet Union to attack America. They certainly know only too well that they are telling lies, that the Soviet Union is not threatening in any way with an attack on any country, that the Soviet Union devotes all its forces to the cause of rehabilitation of the areas that either were destroyed by the war or suffered general damage in the course of war, that the Soviet Union devotes all its efforts to the cause of rehabilitation and further development of its national economy.

The war-mongering propagandists active in U. S. A. and in England, Turkey, Greece and in some other countries are well aware that the whole population of the Soviet Union—workers, peasants, intellectuals—condemn unanimously any attempts to bring about a new war. And such a thing is impossible in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union is engaged in the work of peaceful reconstruction, is peacefully laboring, having much to do in the field of rehabilitation of areas damaged by the war and in that of strengthening and further development of its national economy, which suffered from the heavy blows of the war imposed upon the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite bandits.

There is not in the Soviet Union, the land of the socialist democracy, the land of peaceful construction of a new life, anything, and cannot be anything, even of remote likeness to what has place in some countries which consider themselves to be democratic and progressive and at the same time allow such shameful performances like war propaganda and poisoning of the public opinion with the venom of hatred and enmity towards other nations.

Should any person in the Soviet Union make a statement, even in infinitesimal degree, resembling the above-mentioned statements full of the criminal greediness for a new manslaughter, such a statement would meet with a severe rebuff and public disapproval as a socially dangerous act leading to a serious harm.

Nevertheless, the gentlemen who made the baiting of the Soviet Union and other democratic Eastern European countries as well as consistent democrats and antagonists of a new war in other countries their profession, never lacks false and slanderous insinuations manufactured by these provocateurs and war-mongers and spread all over the world through numerous information canals.

They stubbornly preach that a new war is inevitable, and this under the pretext that it is necessary to forestall the alleged aggressive policy of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries.

### FAULT SEEN AT WRONG DOOR

Really, this is to lay the fault at another man's door. Truly, as a Russian proverb says: Though it is he who flogs, he cries out in pain.

The preparation for a new war is being carried on literally before the eyes of the whole world. The war-mongering propagandists now do not even try to conceal it. They openly threaten the peace-loving nations with war, trying at the same time to shift onto them the responsibility for the creating of a new hotbed of slaughtering.

As one can judge by a number of signs, the preparation for a new war has already passed the stage of a sheer propaganda, psychological coaxing and war of nerves. Numerous facts prove that in some countries—and this is particularly the case of U. S. A.—the war psychosis is being warmed up by putting into effect practical measures of military and strategical characters, together with such organizational and technical measures like the construction of new military bases, redisclocation of armed forces in accordance with the plans of future military operations, expansion of manufacturing of new armaments and a feverish work for the purpose of improving weapons.

Simultaneously military blocs, military agreements on the so-called mutual defense are concluded, measures for the unification of armaments are being elaborated and the general headquarters plans for a new war are being worked out. The well-known American radio commentator Leon Pearson in his recent statement had reason to admit that "American officers slowly and meticulously prepare themselves for the next world war in which Russia will be the adversary."

This is the way the war-mongering propagandists of a new war are acting. Being afraid of a new crisis, they are instigating a new war, expecting to remove by such means the approaching menace of collapse and loss of their profits.

The instigators of a new war are fussing with a crazy plan to put under their domination by the means of armored fists the countries that struggle for their independence, and reject the right of other powers to interfere with their internal affairs and dictate them the canons of both foreign and home policy.

### WORLD RUIN WOULD RESULT

The war-mongers calling for a new war and inciting their partisans for a fight against some countries expect to achieve their ends through local war. Apparently they do not take into account the experience of the past wars which teach us that nowadays any new war inevitably becomes a new *world* war. They forget the fact that a new world war with all its inane destruction, ruin of many cities, extermination of millions of population and of vast material values accumulated through human labor will crush upon mankind as a new immense disaster and throw mankind many decades back.



## 2.

In this propaganda of a new war the most active part has been assumed by the representatives of American capitalist monopolies, by representatives of the largest enterprises and leading branches of American industrial and banking and financial groups. These are the groups that have received from the second World War great profits and accumulated because of the war vast capital, as it was the case in the first World War.

On comparison of the five pre-war years (1935 to 1939 inclusive) with the five years of the second World War (1940 to 1944 inclusive) we find that profits of all American corporations for the five pre-war years amounted, minus the taxes, to \$15,3 billion and for the five years of the second World War they amounted, after payment of taxes, to \$42,3 billion. According to the data of the Department of Commerce the net profit of those corporations for six years (1940-1945) amounted to \$52 billion.

The bulletin "Economic Review" published by the CIO (No. II, 1946) gives interesting data in the increase of the profits (after payment of taxes) of fifty companies during the years of 1945-46. It can be seen from these data that individual monopolies received exorbitant profits from the war, having pocketed 200-300 and more per cent, in some cases the profits amounting to 500 and even 800 per cent. (Atlantic Sugar Refining Company, for instance).

According to this bulletin, these profits exceeded four times the average profits for the period of 1936-39. As far as the commercial profits are concerned, they reached in October, 1945, the highest peak in all their history, according to the statement by John Stilman [Steelman], Director of the Board of Economic Stabilization.

## WAR THE KEY TO PROSPERITY

Thus it appears that in some countries war is not so hateful after all to those groups of society that skilfully utilize the hardships of wartime for the purpose of enrichment. Therefore it is no accident that James Allen in his book "International Monopolies and Peace," stating that in the capitalist countries economy suffers "loss of balance" and "radical disruption," quotes from the report of a governmental body engaged in the research of this particular problem some extracts which lead to the conclusion that only under the conditions of war the modern economic system is able of securing an approximately full employment.

Any comments to this frank confession are hardly needed: it eloquently speaks for itself.

It should be noted that the capitalist monopolies, having secured a decisive influence during the war, retained this influence on the termination of the war, skilfully utilizing for this purpose governmental subsidies and grants of billion dollars as well as the protection they enjoyed and still are enjoying from the various governmental agencies and organizations. This is facilitated by the close connections of the monopolies with Senators, members of the Government, many of whom very often are either officials or partners in the monopolistic corporations.

Such state of affairs affects also the industrial scientific activity concentrated in the laboratories of various large corporations.

The same can be said with regard to the research in the field of the use of atomic energy. Such capitalist monopolies like duPont Chemical Trust, Monsanto Chemical Company, Westinghouse Company, General Electric, Standard Oil and others are most closely connected with this research work, being complete masters in this field.

Before the war they maintained the closest cartel connections with German trusts, and many cartel agreements contained a clause on the renewal of the exchange of information after the war.

All these facts suffice to explain the extreme interest on the part of various capitalist monopolies in the manufacturing of atomic weapons. One can find in these facts an explanation for the stubborn resistance to the justified demands to outlaw the manufacturing of atomic weapons and to the destruction of the stock of atomic bombs into the manufacturing of which tremendous sums are invested.

The rush for profits on the part of the capitalist monopolies, their endeavor to maintain by all means and to develop further those branches of industry that yield large profits, cannot but influence the foreign policy, strengthening its militaristic, expansionist and aggressive tendencies to satisfy the ever-increasing appetite of the influential monopolistic circles.

### 3.

Such is the soil that feeds in U. S. A. the propaganda of a new war; the promoters of this propaganda are not only prominent representatives of the American influential industrial and military circles, influential organs of press and prominent politicians but official representatives of American Government as well.

It is by no means accidental that the particularly violent war-mongers among them are those who are closely connected with commercial, industrial and financial trusts, concerns and monopolies.

There is no need to name too many of them. It is sufficient to mention some of them, having in view, certainly, not their personalities—personal convictions, personal merits and so on—but mainly those social groups, enterprises, industrial, technical, scientific societies whose views and interests these persons represent.

### NINE AMERICANS DENOUNCED

1. Dorn, member of the House of Representatives, on May 7, when the House of Representatives discussed the proposed "relief" assignments for the Greek and Turkish Governments, made a cynical statement worthy of an experienced war-monger to the effect that "the Soviet Union cannot be halted by 400,000 dollars, but by big air force and bombing potential industrial centers of the Soviet Union, Ural Mountains industrial area, and other vital places."

2. Jordan, the president of the National Industrial Conference, made a slanderous statement on the Soviet Union. According to Jordan, for whom the sky is the limit, U. S. A. "should manufacture many atomic bombs and quickly release them whether there is or there is not any reason to believe that the country concerned manufactures armaments."

3. Earle, former United States Minister in Hungary and Bulgaria, testifying in the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities, stated in a provocative manner that U. S. A. should immediately use atomic bombs against the country that refuses to agree with American draft of inspection system. Frightening with Soviet "reactive bombs released from the submarines" he insisted that "the most terrible weapons should be secretly perfected" and that "the Russians should be informed that when the first atom bomb is dropped against us (U. S. A.), we will destroy every village in Russia."

4. Eaton, chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, published in "American Magazine" an article in which he stated that "We are still able to block Russia psychologically; if we fail in this we should rout Russia by the force of weapon . . ."

5. MacMagon [McMahon], Senator, former chairman of Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, stated in Congress that "U. S. A. should be the first to drop atom bombs if the atom war is inevitable."

In another speech of his MacMagon stated that should the negotiations on international control over atomic energy fail there are four possibilities left for U. S. A.: "First, to accumulate a tremendous stock of atom bombs; second, to immediately begin the war; third, to set up international central authority without participation in it of the Soviet Union; fourth, to fix a date for the coming into force of the international control and declare that any country refusing to recognize it is guilty of "aggression."

6. Brooks, Senator from Illinois, in his speech in Senate on March 12, 1947, did not hesitate to declare cynically that had the United States listened to the advice the Republican party offered before the war yet and "had the Germans eaten up Russia," the present Truman program would have been unnecessary. He added that in the wartime U. S. A. rendered assistance to the Soviet Union, at present U. S. A. may be compelled to wage war against the Soviet Union.

7. General Deane (former head of U. S. Military Mission in the U. S. S. R.) writes in his book that American "military program should be designed to meet specialized situation which the war with Russia would entail."

8. Harwood, vice president of industrial firm Cutler Hammer [Cutler-Hammer], Incorporated, according to the newspaper Journal, said that atom bomb is a poor weapon because instead of exterminating human beings only it destroys as well excessive amount of property. This Harwood cynically said at the conference of American Professional Institute in Milwaukee the following: "Though it sounds cruel but still the type of weapon we should possess if we are to wage the war is such one that will kill only human beings. Such weapon will eliminate during the next war the necessity to rehabilitate countries and material property on such a broad and expensive scale."

9. John Foster Dulles in a speech delivered on Feb. 10, 1947, in Chicago urged "a tough foreign policy towards the Soviet Union," declaring that if the U. S. A. do not take up such a course, counting on the possibility of reaching a compromise with the Soviet Union, then the war is inevitable. In the same speech Dulles boasted that since the collapse of the Roman Empire no nation ever possessed such great superiority of material power as the United States, and urged the United States to utilize this power to promote its ideals.

## CALLED CAMOUFLAGED INSTIGATION

The meaning of these statements is clear. They are poorly camouflaged instigation for war against the U. S. S. R. This is a provocative attempt to divert attention from the true war-mongers to camouflage their war-mongering activity with a slanderous demagoguery about a "social revolution in the whole world" and other rot expecting the simpletons easily to believe it.

Such are the new war inciters from the ranks of American politicians who do not hesitate not only to disseminate slanderous statements about the Soviet Union and to fan a hatred toward the U. S. S. R. but suggest systematically the alleged inevitability and necessity of a new war, thus systematically acting as war-mongers and propagandists of a new war.

Their statements do not differ with those made by such 100 per cent reactionaries like notorious American Legion at a recent congress of which some of the participants in the congress being in the state of war intoxication shouted that "nobody should labor under false impression that America is not going to raise the sword if circumstances demand it."

## 4.

Numerous organs of the American reactionary press which is in the hands of such newspaper magnates as Morgan, Rockefeller, Ford, Hearst, MacCormack and others, do not lag behind the reactionary political statesmen who busy themselves with war-mongering. Morgan controls the following magazines: Time, Life and Fortune published by the well-known publishing corporation Time Incorporated, the largest shareholder being, by the way, the Brown Brothers, Harriman and Co.

It is well known that the richest American capitalists own or control large organs of the press—magazines, newspapers, bulletins; they have their own publishing houses inundating the book market with specific publications.

By the order of their bosses all this press is waging sharp propaganda for unleashing a new war, using all possible insinuations and forgeries, fabricated in a certain way with the view to provoking hatred towards the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations of a new democracy.

Provocation appeals for an attack on other nations which allegedly threaten the security of the United States are being daily heralded from the pages of these newspapers and magazines, although these organs of the press as well as their bosses are well aware of the fact that nobody is going to attack the United States and that there exists no danger whatsoever, for the United States in this respect.

## "PROVOCATIVE" ARTICLES ALLEGED

It cannot be but mentioned as an example that such organs of the press as The New York Herald Tribune and a number of other similar organs especially of the Hearst press, publish systematically all possible provocative articles, which promote in the minds of their readers the necessity for "military action if Europe faces collapse or falls under the control of the Soviet Union."

There are quite a few statements of this kind. But the main thing to be pointed out is not the fact that such statements take place but the fact that they do not encounter the necessary rebuff, thus only encouraging further provocations on their part.

All this press is entirely in the hands of the bosses of various newspaper enterprises, and does what is ordered, claiming their literature daub to be the expression of public opinion and presenting the picture in such a way as if they were the mouthpiece of the feelings, aspirations and cravings of the American people.

It may be said with confidence, however, that the American people as well as the peoples of the other democratic countries are against a new war, while the scars made by the last war have not yet healed on their body.

But in most cases it is impossible for the people to speak of their needs and wishes in books, magazines and newspapers published in millions of copies. This, of course, facilitates the work of propagandists and instigators of a new war who take advantage of their privileged position against the interests of peace-loving peoples.

A few words must be added in regard to the propaganda of a new war on the part of various scientific institutions and universities. In this connection one cannot but mention the works recently published by the Yale University under the title "The Absolute Weapon," in which a group of scientists speaking of the atomic weapon and the control of the use of atomic energy found nothing better than to come to the conclusion that "the most effective existing means of preventing war is the ability to launch atomic war literally in no time."

#### "MASK" OF SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY

Under the mask of scientific objectivity this book treats different variants of atomic war and says that if the American air forces "succeed in using bases in Northern Canada the towns of the Soviet Union will be within a much shorter distance," and thus "it will be possible to destroy, operating from their own bases, the majority of large cities of any other power."

In this book, dedicated to the so-called "absolute weapon" (atomic bomb), the group of American authors are busy with suspicious speculations that "unless we (i. e., the Americans, A. V.) can strike first and eliminate a threat before it is realized in action—something which our national Constitution apparently forbids—we are bound to perish under attack. . . .

Under the mask of all kinds of "scientific" argumentations this book speaks about the danger "of one-sided actions on the part of this or that great power" and that if "one-sided actions" are taken in the future, they are to be expected mostly on the part of the Soviet Union. From this speculation comes a provocative conclusion that "serious danger for the United States lies in the fact that without due warning from our side (i. e., on the part of the U. S. A.) the Soviet Union might one fine day begin war against us."

The above-mentioned extracts alone from this book are sufficient to make it clear how various in the United States of America are the

forms and methods of propaganda for a new war directed first of all against the Soviet Union.

How far went the propaganda for a new war, accompanied by the demands for the production of the deadliest types of weapons, might be seen from the report published in the Chemical and Engineering News of Merk, where, in the section under the title "Science and Civilization," all deadly advantages of bacterial warfare are openly advocated. Just the same direction is also taken in an article in the Army Ordnance concerning new toxin, the development of which, according to this magazine, cost \$50,000,000, which expense, however, to use the author's words "are fully justified," for one ounce of this toxin is quite sufficient to kill 180,000,000 people.

While reading all this so-called scientific literature one feels what a satanic energy is being developed by war-mongers and propagandists of a new war in order to create suitable atmosphere capable of poisoning the people's minds with war madness.

#### BRITISH WRITER QUOTED

What kind of mood is being created in public circles by such propaganda, spread all over the world by the reactionaries that is felt especially in the circles of the American influence, might be seen from an article by Vernon Bartlett, British journalist, who published it in early August of this year in the London newspaper News Chronicle. In this article one may read noteworthy lines:

"From the moment a person going to the zone controlled by General MacArthur reaches Okinawa on his way to Japan he is thunderstruck by the tone of the American newspapers speaking of the Soviet Union. Certainly an American soldier is not to blame if after reading of these newspapers he comes to a conclusion that war against Russia is probably a matter of months. The Japanese would be fools if they didn't notice this almost hysterical attitude."

This information coincides with the material in the News Week, which published an article of Kern, the editor of the foreign section of this magazine, who recently returned from Japan.

Kern says that in Japan the American generals are systematically working up the Japanese militarists in the direction of inevitability and necessity of war against the Soviet Union. Kern points out that a considerable number of Japanese fliers kamikaze who came to the American aerodromes stated their readiness to participate in the new war against Russia which they heard to have started already.

Kern mentions the fact that the Japanese would probably welcome the possibility to fight the Russians and that the Japanese Army supported by the United States could perhaps "conquer the Russian Asia" east of Baikal. Kern added that:

"The United States domination on the seas would make it possible to land at almost any point. And Japan herself would be out of danger under protection of superior American air and naval forces. These threatening strategical facts explain why Russia's absence at the Peace Conference on Japan would be never felt."

## 5.

Thus for a long time already the war propaganda is systematically carried on in the United States of America with the following main trends:

1. Fear of the Soviet Union, a mighty power as though seeking the world domination and preparing an attack on the U. S. A., is propagated and inspired in every way. While doing so, slanderous fictions and provocational attacks of all possible kinds are used against the U. S. S. R. most shamelessly;

2. An open propaganda is carried on for the increase of armaments, further perfection of atomic weapon while any attempt to limit or, all the more, to prohibit the use of the atomic weapon is rejected;

3. Statements openly calling for an immediate attack against the U. S. S. R. are made using provocation intimidations with the military strength of the U. S. S. R., on the one hand, and the necessity to take advantage of the present situation when in war-mongers' opinion the U. S. S. R. is weak militarily not having fully recovery after the second World War;

4. War-hungry psychosis is stimulated in every way among the American public, excited and fanned by militarist and expansionist circles of the U. S. A.

## EXPOSURE BY "PROGRESSIVES"

The American progressive personalities are aware of this situation and make efforts to expose the preparation for war, which is now carried on in America, and to sober the minds of those affected with a war madness. These progressive personalities in the U. S. A. and the progressive of elements of the American press expose the military preparation which is carried on in the U. S. A. instigated by military groups and various reactionary organizations.

For example, Kingdon, the president of the organization The Progressive Citizens of America, stated on this matter in The New York Times that in the center of all this propaganda are militaristically minded persons, who occupy high posts in the War and Navy Departments, the Representatives and Senators, leaders of monopolies and certain representatives of religious circles who lend an ear to war cries. It is said further that the war party hopes that it would be possible to fabricate some incident and to use it as an excuse for atomic bombing.

The American magazine The American Mercury in its issue last February analyzed the project of the American Army which prepares itself for the third World War. It is stated in the article that "industrial preparedness is the keystone of Government planning in Washington today against the contingency of a third World War." Since this conclusion has been made by such military authorities as Peterson, Royal (Royall) and other leaders of the American Army, this article becomes of a special significance.

## 6.

It follows quite obviously from what precedes that American reactionary circles who reckon only with their own selfish interests and are ready for the sake of these interests to plunge the humanity into a new

exterminating world war are the main incitors in the field of propaganda and instigation of a new war.

The American reactionaries, however, are not alone in these efforts of theirs. They are supported by their adherents in some other countries, who are romping with knocking together military political and simply political Western, Northern and other blocs. In this connection it seems necessary to mention the statements made by certain British politicians who, it is true, are acting not so resolutely as their American adherents but mostly in an underhand way but in the same alarmistic spirit.

Everybody remembers Churchill's speech at Fulton where speaking of "general strategic conception," as Churchill called his main utterances, the former British Premier performed "a dangerous act counted upon sowing the seeds of dissension between the Allied Powers and hampering the cooperation between them," as justly stated Generalissimo Stalin in this connection underlying that "Mr. Churchill's standpoint is one aimed at war, one calling for a war against the U. S. S. R."

We all remember Churchill opposing the United Nations organization as the association of nations speaking various languages with the association of English-speaking nations, thus assimilating himself with Hitler—who started "launching the war by proclaiming the racial theory declaring that only those who speak German constitute a full value nation" (Stalin).

We remember many other things in that speech in which Churchill resorted to insinuations and calumny against the Soviet Union.

#### SON SAID TO ECHO FATHER

Churchill, father, is echoed by Churchill, son, who beat the record of war instigation in his statement made at Sydney on the third of September.

The family utterance of the Churchills by themselves would be of little interest to anybody. But they are an indicator of that black work which is being carried out in certain British circles against the cause of peace and which is directed to organizing a new war no matter whether in the form of repeating Churchill's notorious military crusade against Russia or in any other form.

In this connection one also ought to point out the fact that the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington still continues functioning. It will be remembered that on this Joint Chiefs of Staff, Britain is represented by the military mission headed by General Morgan and the United States is represented by the military mission under Admiral Leghy [Leahy]. This Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff set up to co-ordinate the military operations against Germany and Japan, still continues to exist and it is not known for what purposes, in spite of the fact that the war ceased two years ago.

There is no need to recapitulate numerous facts of quite unbridled slanderous and provocative a campaign, which goes beyond any limits of the admissible, of warmongering against the Soviet Union, which campaign has been carried on for a long time in Turkey.

The Turkish press day after day disseminating dirty slanders about the Soviet Union who allegedly intends to seize Turkey (paper Ak-lam) is making provocative prophecies that "the United Nations will



try to inflict the decisive blow upon Russia from the shores of the Black Sea" (Democracy Iksan); it is instigating the Turkish people to get ready for war and is simultaneously praising the military power of the United States of America, stating that it must necessarily enter into war against the USSR.

The notorious Joupkuriet in an article by some Daver, states with cynical frankness that "the only way out which may put Moscow on the right road" is war. In the Ulus he is echoed by the Deputy Atai, editor in chief of this paper, who states that "the time has already come for America and England to take more decisive measures."

### AN "ULTIMATUM" RECALLED

Yalchin, the editor of the Tanin, who is famous for his provocative activities, is not behind them. Already in September last he wrote that the time had come to invite the Russians for frank talks, having hung the atomic bomb over the conference table. He demanded that an ultimatum be sent to the Russians, stating that "they would be subjected to a shower of atomic bombs if they don't agree to the establishment of a new international order." The same Yalchin wrote recently that it was possible to speak with Moscow the language of ultimatum only and asked for "uniting the whole world against Russia."

The same provocative appeals are voiced from the side of other mercenary scribblers, such as Adviz from the reactionary Turkish paper Ergenckon, Prof. Likhath Erim, Deputy and member of the Foreign Commission of the Mejlis [Parliament], and some others.

This provocative hubbub is vigorously supported by the Greek reactionary papers, in particular by the Ellinicon Era, which published an article stating: "Let the Russians not forget that the main source of Russian petroleum in Baku is as on a saucer within only 100 kilometers from the Turkish border."

And all this goes unpunished before the eyes of the whole world.

Such are the evil doings of the enemies of peace instigating a new war for the sake of their selfish interests and for the sake of profit on war bringing new perils and calamities to mankind. There is no doubt that this campaign of instigating a new war meets rigorous and resolute condemnation on the part of millions of people.

The Soviet Government feels that the conscience of the nations who carried the whole burden of the second World War recently terminated and paid for that war, imposed on the peace-loving nations, with their own blood, sufferings and ruins, cannot reconcile itself with such state of affairs.

The U. S. S. R. delegation on instruction of the Soviet Government declares that the U. S. S. R. considers as a matter of urgency the adoption by the United Nations organization of measures directed against the propaganda of a new war, which propaganda is being carried out at present in some countries, chiefly in the U. S. A. For this purpose the Soviet delegation suggests that the following resolution be adopted:

"(1) The United Nations organization condemns the criminal propaganda of a new war which is being carried on by the reactionary circles in a number of countries, particularly in U. S. A., Turkey and Greece by means of spreading all kinds of insinuations through radio, press, cinema and public statements and which contains an open appeal for an attack on peace-loving democratic countries.

"(2) The United Nations organization considers the tolerance and more so the support of such propaganda of a new war that would inevitably be transformed into a third World War as a violation of the obligations undertaken by the members of the United Nations organization, whose Charter provides for an obligation 'to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace, so that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.' (Art. 1, para. 2; Art. 2, para. 3.)

"(3) The United Nations organization considers it necessary to urge the Governments of all countries on pain of criminal punishment to prohibit war propaganda in any form and take measures for the prevention and suppression of war propaganda as a socially dangerous activity threatening the vital interests and welfare of the peace-loving nations.

"(4) The United Nations organization reaffirms the necessity for putting into effect as soon as possible the decision of the Assembly of December 14, 1946, on the reduction of armaments and its decision of January 24, 1946, on the exclusion from the national armaments of atomic weapons and all other principal types of weapons designed for mass extermination, and considers that the realization of these decisions meets the interests of all the peace-loving nations and would be the heaviest blow upon the propaganda and the instigators of a new war."

## 20. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMINFORM

NOTE.—On October 5, 1947, the announcement was made that a Communist Information Bureau had been established by nine of the European Communist Parties, including that of the Soviet Union. The reasons are plain, when laid beside those given for the dissolution of the Comintern. They did not need such an organization at one time, and there were advantages in dissolving it. Later they found that they did need one again to meet new conditions, so they set it up. The advantage gained in international affairs through giving up the Comintern was abandoned. This was directly coupled with a definition of the world situation as one of two opposite camps.

### *Communiqué*

At the end of September in Poland took place an informational conference with the participation of the following Communist parties; Communist party, Yugoslavia—Comrades Edvard Kardelj [Yugoslav Vice-Premier] and Milovan Djilas [Yugoslavian Minister Without Portfolio; Bulgarian Workers party (Communist)—Comrades Vulko Chervenkov and V. Poptomov; Communist party Rumania—Comrades [George] Gheorghiu-Dej Ana] Pauker; Hungarian Communist party—Comrades M. Farkash and Jozsef Revai; Polish Workers party—Comrades [Vice Premier Wladyslaw] Gomulka and H. Minc; All-Union Communist party (Bolshevik of the Soviet Union) Comrades [Andrei] A. Zhdanov and [Georgi M.] Malenkov; Communist party and France—[Jacques] Duclos and [Etienne] Fajon; Communist party of Czechoslovakia—R. Slansky and S. Bash-tovansky; and the Communist party of Italy—Comrades [Luigi] Longo and [Eugenio] Reale.

Members of the conference heard information reports about the activity of the Central Committees of the parties represented from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy.

Having exchanged viewpoints on these reports, the members of the conference decided to discuss the question of the international situation and the questions of exchange of experience and coordination of activity of Communist parties represented at the conference.

A report on the international situation was made by Zhdanov. Members of the conference exchanged viewpoints on the report, fully coordinated their views on the present international situation and the tasks issuing from it and unanimously accepted a declaration on the question of the international situation.

A report on the exchange of experience and coordination of activity by Communist parties was made by Comrade Gomulka.

On this question, the conference, having in view the negative phenomena produced by the absence of contact between parties represented at the conference and taking into consideration the necessity for mutual exchange and experience, has decided to create an Information Bureau.

The Information Bureau will consist of the representatives of the Central Committees of the above mentioned parties.

The tasks of the Information Bureau consist in the organization of an exchange of experience between parties and, in case of necessity, in coordination of their activity on the basis of mutual agreement.

It has been decided that the Information Bureau will publish a printed organ. The city of Belgrade (Yugoslavia) has been decided as the location for the Information Bureau and the editorial board of its organ.

#### TEXT OF RESOLUTION

*The text of a resolution adopted by the conference follows:*

The conference states that the absence of connections between Communist parties who have taken part in this conference is in the present situation a serious shortcoming. Experience has shown that such division between Communist parties is incorrect and harmful. The requirement for an exchange of experience and voluntary coordination of actions of the separate parties has become particularly necessary now in conditions of the complicated post-war international situation and when the disunity of Communist parties may lead to damage for the working class.

Because of this, members of the conference agreed on the following:

First, to set up an Information Bureau of representatives of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian Workers party (of Communists) of Rumania, the Hungarian Communist party, the Polish Workers party, the All-Union Communist party (bolshevik), the Communist party of France, the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, the Communist party of Italy.

Second, the task given to the Information Bureau is to organize and exchange experience and, in case of necessity, coordinate the activity of Communist parties on foundations of mutual agreement.

Third, the Information Bureau will have in its representatives of the Central Committees—two from each Central Committee. Delega-

tions of the Central Committees must be appointed and replaced by the Central Committees.

Fourth, the Information Bureau is to have printed an organ—fortnightly and, later on, weekly. The organ is to be published in French and Russian and, if possible, in other languages.

Fifth, the Information Bureau is to be in Belgrade.

### TEXT OF MANIFESTO

Representatives of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian Workers party (Communist), the Rumanian Communist party, the Hungarian Communist party, the Polish Workers party, the International Communist party (Bolshevik), the French Communist party, the Czechoslovak Communist party, the Italian Communist party, after exchanging opinions on the subject of the international situation, resolved the following declaration:

In the international situation brought about by the second World War and in the period that followed fundamental changes took place.

The characteristic aspect of these changes is a new balance of political forces interplaying in the world arena, a shift in the relationship between states which were the victors in the second World War, their reevaluation.

As long as the war lasted the Allied states fighting against Germany and Japan marched in step and were one. Nevertheless, in the Allies' camp already during the war there existed differences regarding the aims of the war as well as the objectives of post-war and world organization. The Soviet Union and the democratic countries believed that the main objective of the war was the rebuilding and strengthening of democracy in Europe, the liquidation of fascism and the prevention of a possible aggression on the behalf of Germany, that its further aim was an achievement of an all around and lasting cooperation between the nations of Europe.

The United States of America and with them England placed as their war aim a different goal—the elimination of competition on the world market (Germany and Japan) and the consolidation of their dominant position. This difference in the definition of war aims and post-war objectives has begun to deepen in the post-war period.

Two opposite political lines have crystallized: on the one extreme the U. S. S. R. and the democratic countries aim at whittling down imperialism and the strengthening of democracy. On the other side the United States of America and England aim at the strengthening of imperialism and choking democracy. Because the U. S. S. R. and the democratic countries stand in the way of fulfilling imperialistic plans aiming at world domination and crushing democratic movements, a campaign against the Soviet Union and the countries of the new democracy was undertaken, a campaign fed also by a threat of a new war on the part of the most sanguine imperialistic politicians of the United States and England.

In this way there arose two camps—the camp of imperialism and anti-democratic forces, whose chief aim is an establishment of a world-wide American imperialists' hegemony and the crushing of democracy;

and an anti-imperialistic democratic camp whose chief aim is the elimination of imperialism, the strengthening of democracy and the liquidation of the remnants of fascism.

The battle of the two opposite camps—capitalistic and anti-imperialistic—is waged amid conditions of a further sharpening of the universal crisis of capitalism, a weakening of the forces of capitalism and a strengthening of the forces by socialism and democracy.

Because of the above, the imperialistic camp and its directing force, the United States of America show a growing aggressive activity. This activity evolved at the same time in all spheres—in the sphere of military and strategic activities, economic expansion and ideological warfare. The Truman-Marshall plan is only a farce, a European branch of the general world plan of political expansion being realized by the United States of America in all parts of the world. The plan of the economic and political subjugation of Europe through American imperialism is complemented by plans for the economic and political subjugation of China, Indonesia, and South America. The aggressors of yesterday—the capitalist tycoons of Germany and Japan—are being prepared by the United States of America for a new role—as tools of the imperialistic policy in Europe and Asia of the United States of America.

The arsenal of tactical weapons used by the imperialistic camp is further very complex. It combines direct threats of force, blackmail, and intimidation, all sorts of political tricks and economic pressure, bribery, the using for its own ends of conflicting interests and disagreements with the aim of strengthening its position, and all that is camouflaged by a mask of liberalism and pacifism in order to deceive and befuddle people not too dexterous in politics.

A separate place in this arsenal is reserved for the treasonable policy of the Rightist Socialists of the kind of [Leon] Blum in France, [Prime Minister] Attlee and [Foreign Secretary] Bevin in Britain, [Socialist Leader Dr. Kurt] Schumacher in Germany, [President Dr. Karl] Renner and [Vice Premier Adolf] Schaerf in Austria, [Giuseppe] Saragat in Italy, and so on, who aim at hiding the true face of imperialism behind the mask of democracy and Socialist phraseology while in reality they serve as faithful toadies of the imperialists, bringing within the ranks of labor dissension and disruption and poisoning its conscience. It is not an accident that the imperialistic British foreign policy has found in the person of Bevin its most consistent and arduous spokesman.

In these conditions the anti-imperialistic democratic camp has to close its ranks and draw up and agree on a common platform to work out its tactics against the chief forces of the imperialist camp, against American imperialism, against its English and French allies, against the Right-Wing Socialists above all in England and France.

To frustrate those imperialistic plans of aggression we need the efforts of all democratic and anti-imperialistic forces in Europe.

The Right-Wing Socialists are the traitors in this common cause. With the exception of those countries of new democracy where the Communists and Socialists, together with other progressive parties have formed a common bloc in the face of imperialism, the Socialists in most other countries, and especially the French Socialists and the British Laborites—[French Premier Paul] Ramadier, M. Blum, Mr.

Attlee and Mr. Bevin—facilitate by their servile placidity the fulfillment of American capitalistic aims, encouraging it to blackmail, and pushing their own countries on the road to vassal-like dependence on the United States of America.

In this situation the Communist parties are faced with a particularly important problem. They must grasp in their hands the banner of national independence and sovereignty in their own countries. If the Communist parties stand fast on their outposts, if they refuse to be intimidated and blackmailed, if they courageously guard over the democracy, national sovereignty, independence, and self-determination of their countries, if they know how to fight against attempts at the economic and political subjugation of their countries and place themselves at the head of all the forces ready to defend the cause of national honor and independence, then and then only no plans to subjugate the countries of Europe and Asia can succeed.

The above is one of the fundamental aims of the Communist parties.

One should realize that between the imperialist desire to unleash a new war and the possibility of organizing a war, there exists a tremendous distance.

The nations of the world do not want war. The forces who align themselves with peace are so numerous and powerful that if they defend hard and without flinching the cause of peace, if they show perseverance and grit then the plans of the aggressors are doomed to bankruptcy.

We should not forget that the imperialist agents, through their clatter regarding the danger of war, try to intimidate vacillators and weaklings and thus gain through blackmail concessions for the aggressor.

The main danger for the working class at this moment lies in the underestimation of its own strength and overestimation of the force of the imperialist camp.

In the same way as the appeasement policy of Munich led to Hitler's aggression, today concessions to the United States of America and the imperialist camp may cause its instigators to grow even more shameless and aggressive.

In consequence the Communist parties should place themselves in the vanguard of the Opposition against the imperialistic plans of expansion and aggression in all its manifestation whether in the sphere of state administration, politics, economics or ideology and they should at the same time unite and coordinate their efforts on the basis of a common anti-imperialistic and democratic platform as well as gather around themselves all democratic and patriotic forces in their respective nations.

## 21. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

NOTE.—Andre Zhdanov is a leading member of the Politbureau, that is, of the top group of Communists who run the party in the Soviet Union. He was one of the delegates from the party in the Soviet Union to the conference that established the Cominform.

At this conference, late in September 1947, somewhere in Poland, Zhdanov delivered this address on the international situation. It is the most pretentious effort since the Comintern programme of 1928 to put the essentials of communism and of the world situation into one diagram. Stalin's speech of February 9, 1946, and Vishinsky's at the United Nations on September 18, 1947, implied that the

main body of Communist ideas was intact and had not changed in any fundamental way. Zhdanov leaves nothing to implication, reaffirming the class struggle, the contradictions of capitalism, the conflict between the two worlds, and the expectation of world revolution yet to come. It applies the same logic to European recovery today that Lenin applied to "the United States of Europe" slogan 32 years earlier.

### I. THE POST-WAR WORLD SITUATION

The end of the Second World War brought with it big changes in the world situation. The military defeat of the bloc of fascist states, the character of the war as a war of liberation from fascism, and the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in the vanquishing of the fascist aggressors sharply altered the alignment of forces between the two systems—the Socialist and the Capitalist—in favour of Socialism.

What is the essential nature of these changes?

The principal outcome of World War II was the military defeat of Germany and Japan—the two most militaristic and aggressive of the capitalist countries. The reactionary imperialist elements all over the world, notably in Britain, America and France, had reposed great hopes in Germany and Japan, and chiefly in Hitler Germany: firstly as in a force most capable of inflicting a blow on the Soviet Union in order to, if not having it destroyed altogether, weaken it at least and undermine its influence; secondly, as in a force capable of smashing the revolutionary labour and democratic movement in Germany herself and in all countries singled out for Nazi aggression, and thereby strengthening capitalism generally. This was the chief reason for the pre-war policy of "appeasement" and encouragement of fascist aggression, the so-called Munich policy consistently pursued by the imperialist ruling circles of Britain, France, and the United States.

But the hopes reposed by the British, French, and American imperialists in the Hitlerites were not realized. The Hitlerites proved to be weaker, and the Soviet Union and the freedom-loving nations stronger than the Munichists had anticipated. As the result of World War II the major forces of bellicose international fascist reaction had been smashed and put out of commission for a long time to come.

This was accompanied by another serious loss to the world capitalist system generally. Whereas the principal result of World War I had been that the united imperialist front was breached and that Russia dropped out of the world capitalist system, and whereas, as a consequence of the triumph of the Socialist system in the U. S. S. R., capitalism ceased to be an integral, world wide economic system, World War II and the defeat of fascism, the weakening of the world position of capitalism and the enhanced strength of the anti-fascist movement resulted in a number of countries in Central and Southeastern Europe dropping out of the imperialist system. In these countries new, popular, democratic regimes arose. The impressive lesson given by the Patriotic War of the Soviet Union and the liberating role of the Soviet Army were accompanied by a mass struggle of the freedom-loving peoples for national liberation from the fascist invaders and their accomplices. In the course of this struggle the pro-fascist elements, the collaborators with Hitler—the most influential of the big capitalists, large landowners, high officials and monarchist officers—were exposed as betrayers of the national interests. In the Danubian countries, liberation from German fascist slavery was accompanied

by the removal from power of the top bourgeoisie and landlords, compromised by collaborating with German fascism, and by the rise to power of new forces from among the people who had proved their worth in the struggle against the Hitlerite conquerors. In these countries, representatives of the workers, the peasants and the progressive intellectuals took over power. Since the working class had everywhere displayed the greatest heroism, the greatest consistency and implacability in the struggle against fascism, its prestige and influence among the people have increased immensely.

The new democratic power in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Albania, backed by the mass of the people, was able within a minimum period to carry through such progressive democratic reforms as bourgeois democracy is no longer capable of effecting. Agrarian reform turned over the land to the peasants and led to the elimination of the landlord class. Nationalization of large-scale industry and banks, and the confiscation of the property of traitors who had collaborated with the Germans radically undermined the position of monopoly capital in these countries and redeemed the masses from imperialist bondage. Together with this, the foundation was laid of state, national ownership, and a new type of state was created—the people's republic, where the power belongs to the people, where large-scale industry, transport and banks are owned by the state, and where a bloc of the labouring classes of the population, headed by the working class, constitute a leading force. As a result, the peoples of these countries have not only torn themselves from the clutches of imperialism, but are paving the way for entry onto the path of Socialist development.

The war immensely enhanced the international significance and prestige of the U. S. S. R. The U. S. S. R. was the leading force and the guiding spirit in the military defeat of Germany and Japan. The progressive democratic forces of the whole world rallied around the Soviet Union. The socialist state successfully stood the strenuous test of the war and emerged victorious from the mortal struggle with a most powerful enemy. Instead of being enfeebled, the U. S. S. R. became stronger.

The capitalist world has also undergone a substantial change. Of the six so-called great imperialist powers (Germany, Japan, Great Britain, the U. S. A., France and Italy), three have been eliminated by military defeat (Germany, Italy and Japan). France has also been weakened and has lost its significance as a great power. As a result, only two great imperialist world powers remain—the United States and Great Britain. But the position of one of them, Great Britain, has been undermined. The war revealed that militarily and politically British imperialism was not so strong as it had been. In Europe, Britain was helpless against German aggression. In Asia, Britain, one of the biggest of the imperialist powers, was unable to retain hold of her colonial possessions without outside aid. Temporarily cut off from colonies that supplied her with food and raw materials and absorbed a large part of her industrial products, Britain found herself dependent, militarily and economically, upon American supplies of food and manufactured goods. After the war, Britain became increasingly dependent, financially and economically, on the United States. Although she succeeded in recovering her colonies after the war, Britain



found herself faced there with the enhanced influence of American imperialism, which during the war had invaded all the regions that before the war had been regarded as exclusive spheres of influence of British capital (the Arab East, Southeast Asia). America has also increased her influence in the British dominions and in South America, where the former role of Britain is very largely and to an ever increasing extent passing to the United States.

World War II aggravated the crisis of the colonial system, as expressed in the rise of a powerful movement for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies. This has placed the rear of the capitalist system in jeopardy. The peoples of the colonies no longer wish to live in the old way. The ruling classes of the metropolitan countries can no longer govern the colonies on the old lines. Attempts to crush the national liberation movement by military force now increasingly encounter armed resistance on the part of the colonial peoples and lead to protracted colonial wars (Holland-Indonesia, France—Viet Nam).

The war—itself a product of the unevenness of capitalist development in the different countries—still further intensified this unevenness. Of all the capitalist powers, only one—the United States—emerged from the war not only unweakened, but even considerably stronger economically and militarily. The war greatly enriched the American capitalists. The American people on the other hand, did not experience the privations that accompany war, the hardship of occupation, or aerial bombardment; and since America entered the war practically in its concluding stage, when the issue was already decided, her human casualties were relatively small. For the U. S. A., the war was primarily and chiefly a spur to extensive industrial development and to a substantial increase of exports (principally to Europe).

But the end of the war confronted the United States with a number of new problems. The capitalist monopolies were anxious to maintain their profits at the former high level, and accordingly pressed hard to prevent a reduction of the wartime volume of deliveries. But this meant that the United States must retain the foreign markets which had absorbed American products during the war, and moreover, acquire new markets, inasmuch as the war had substantially lowered the purchasing power of most of the countries. The financial and economic dependence of these countries on the U. S. A. had likewise increased. The United States extended credits abroad to a sum of 19,000 million dollars, not counting investments in the International Bank and the International Currency Fund. America's principal competitors, Germany and Japan, have disappeared from the world market, and this has opened up new and very considerable opportunities for the United States. Whereas before World War II the more influential reactionary circles of American imperialism had adhered to an isolationist policy and had refrained from active interference in the affairs of Europe and Asia, in the new, post-war conditions the Wall Street bosses adopted a new policy. They advanced a program of utilizing America's military and economic might, not only to retain and consolidate the positions won abroad during the war, but to expand them to the maximum and to replace Germany, Japan and Italy in the world market. The sharp decline of the economic power of the other capitalist states makes it possible to speculate on their post-war economic difficulties, and, in particular, on the post-war economic difficulties of

Great Britain, which makes it easier to bring these countries under American control. The United States proclaimed a new frankly predatory and expansionist course.

The purpose of this new, frankly expansionist course is to establish the world supremacy of American imperialism. With a view to consolidating America's monopoly position in the markets gained as a result of the disappearance of her two biggest competitors, Germany and Japan, and the weakening of her capitalist partners, Great Britain and France, the new course of United States policy envisages a broad program of military, economic and political measures, designed to establish United States political and economic domination in all countries marked out for American expansion, to reduce these countries to the status of satellites of the United States, and to set up regimes within them which would eliminate all obstacles on the part of the labour and democratic movement to the exploitation of these countries by American capital. The United States is now endeavouring to extend this new line of policy not only to its enemies in the war and to neutral countries, but in an increasing degree to its wartime allies.

Special attention is being paid to the exploitation of the economic difficulties of Great Britain, which is not only America's ally but also a long-standing capitalist rival and competitor. It is the design of America's expansionist policy not only to prevent Britain from escaping from the vise of economic dependence on the United States in which she was gripped during the war, but, on the contrary, to increase the pressure, with a view of gradually depriving her of control over her colonies, ousting her from her spheres of influence, and reducing her to the status of a vassal state.

Thus the new policy of the United States is designed to consolidate its monopoly position and to reduce its capitalist partners to a state of subordination and dependence on America.

But America's aspirations to world supremacy encounter an obstacle in the U. S. S. R., the stronghold of anti-imperialist and anti-fascist policy, and its growing international influence, in the new democracies, which have escaped from the control of Britain and American imperialism, and in the workers of all countries, including America itself, who do not want a new war for the supremacy of their oppressors. Accordingly, the new expansionist and reactionary policy of the United States envisages a struggle against the U. S. S. R., against the labour movement in all countries, including the United States, and against the emancipationist, anti-imperialist forces in all countries.

Alarmed by the achievements of Socialism in the U. S. S. R., by the achievements of the new democracies, and by the post-war growth of the labour and democratic movement in all countries, the American reactionaries are disposed to take upon themselves the mission of "saviours" of the capitalist system from Communism.

The frank expansionist program of the United States is therefore highly reminiscent of the reckless program, which failed so ignominiously, of the fascist aggressors, who, as we know, also made a bid for world supremacy.

Just as the Hitlerites, when they were making their preparations for piratical aggression, adopted the camouflage of anti-Communism in order to make it possible to oppress and enslave all peoples and pri-

marily and chiefly their own people, America's present-day ruling circles mask their expansionist policy, and even their offensive against the vital interests of their weaker imperialist rival, Great Britain, by fictitious considerations of defence against Communism. The feverish piling up of armaments, the construction of new military bases and the creation of bridgeheads for the American armed forces in all parts of the world is justified on the false and pharisaical grounds of "defence" against an imaginary threat of war on the part of the U. S. S. R. With the help of intimidation, bribery and chicanery, American diplomacy finds it easy to extort from other capitalist countries, and primarily from Great Britain, consent to the legitimization of America's superior position in Europe and Asia—in the Western Zones of Germany, in Austria, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan, China, Japan and so forth.

The American imperialists regard themselves as the principal force opposed to the U. S. S. R., the new democracies and the labour and democratic movement in all countries of the world, as the bulwark of the reactionary, anti-democratic forces in all parts of the globe. Accordingly, literally on the day following the conclusion of World War II, they set to work to build up a front hostile to the U. S. S. R., and world democracy, and to encourage the anti-popular reactionary forces—collaborationists and former capitalist stooges—in the European countries which had been liberated from the Nazi yoke and which were beginning to arrange their affairs according to their own choice.

The more malignant and unbalanced imperialist politicians followed the lead of Churchill in hatching plans for the speedy launching of a preventive war against the U. S. S. R. and openly called for the employment of America's temporary monopoly of the atomic weapon against the Soviet people. The new warmongers are trying to intimidate and browbeat not only the U. S. S. R., but other countries as well, notably China and India, by libellously depicting the U. S. S. R. as a potential aggressor, while they themselves pose as "friends" of China and India, as "saviours" from the Communist peril, their mission being to "help" the weak. By these means they are seeking to keep India and China under the sway of imperialism and in continued political and economic bondage.

## II. THE NEW POST-WAR ALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL FORCES AND THE FORMATION OF TWO CAMPS: THE IMPERIALIST AND ANTI-DEMOCRATIC CAMP, AND THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST AND DEMOCRATIC ONE

The fundamental changes caused by the war on the international scene and in the position of individual countries has entirely changed the political landscape of the world. A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct become two major trends in post-war international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces operating on the international arena into two major camps; the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U. S. A. Allied with it are Great Britain and France. The existence of the Atlee-Bevin Labour Government in

Britain and the Ramadier Socialist Government in France does not hinder these countries from playing the part of satellites of the United States and following the lead of its imperialist policy on all major questions. The imperialist camp is also supported by colony-owning countries, such as Belgium and Holland, by countries with reactionary anti-democratic regimes, such as Turkey and Greece, and by countries politically and economically dependent on the United States, such as the Near-Eastern and South-American countries and China.

The cardinal purpose of the imperialist camp is to strengthen imperialism, to hatch a new imperialist war, to combat Socialism and democracy, and to support reactionary and anti-democratic pro-fascist regimes and movements everywhere.

In the pursuit of these ends the imperialist camp is prepared to rely on reactionary and anti-democratic forces in all countries, and to support its former adversaries in the war against its wartime allies.

The anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the U. S. S. R. and the new democracies. It also includes countries that have broken with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development, such as Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Indonesia and Viet Nam are associated with it; it has the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria. The anti-imperialist camp is backed by the labour and democratic movement and by the fraternal Communist parties in all countries, by the fighters for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies, by all progressive and democratic forces in every country. The purpose of this camp is to resist the threat of new wars and imperialist expansion, to strengthen democracy and to extirpate the vestiges of fascism.

The end of the Second World War confronted all the freedom-loving nations with the cardinal task of securing a lasting democratic peace sealing victory over fascism. In the accomplishment of this fundamental task of the post-war period the Soviet Union and its foreign policy are playing a leading role. This follows from the very nature of the Soviet Socialist state, to which motives of aggression and exploitation are utterly alien, and which is interested in creating the most favourable conditions for the building of a Communist society. One of these conditions is external peace. As embodiment of a new and superior social system, the Soviet Union reflects in its foreign policy the aspirations of progressive mankind, which desires lasting peace and has nothing to gain from a new war hatched by capitalism. The Soviet Union is a staunch of the liberty and independence of all nations, and a foe of national and racial oppression and colonial exploitation in any shape or form. The change in the general alignment of forces between the capitalist world and the Socialist world brought about by the war has still further enhanced the significance of the foreign policy of the Soviet state and enlarged the scope of its activity on the international arena.

All the forces of the anti-imperialist and anti-fascist camp are united in the effort to secure a just and democratic peace. It is this united effort that has brought about and strengthened friendly cooperation between the U. S. S. R. and democratic countries on all questions of foreign policy. These countries, and in the first place the new democracies—Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Albania, which played a big part in the war of liberation from fascism, as well as

Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and to some extent Finland, which have joined the anti-fascist front—have proved themselves in the post-war period staunch defenders of peace, democracy and their own liberty and independence against all attempts on the part of the United States and Great Britain to turn them back in their course and to bring them again under the imperialist yoke.

The successes and the growing international prestige of the democratic camp were not to the liking of the imperialists. Even while World War II was still on, reactionary forces in Great Britain and the United States became increasingly active, striving to prevent concerted action by the Allied powers, to protract the war, to bleed the U. S. S. R., and to save the fascist aggressors from utter defeat. The sabotage of the Second Front by the Anglo-Saxon imperialists, headed by Churchill, was a clear reflection of this tendency, which was in point of fact a continuation of the Munich policy in the new and changed conditions. But while the war was still in progress British and American reactionary circles did not venture to come out openly against the Soviet Union and the democratic countries, realizing that they had the undivided sympathy of the masses all over the world. But in the concluding months of the war the situation began to change. The British and American imperialists already manifested their unwillingness to respect the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries at the Potsdam tripartite conference, in July 1945.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries in these two past years has been a policy of consistently working for the observance of the democratic principles in the post-war settlement. The countries of the anti-imperialist camp have loyally and consistently striven for the implementation of these principles, without deviating from them one iota. Consequently, the major objective of the post-war foreign policy of the democratic states has been a democratic peace, the eradication of the vestiges of fascism and the prevention of a resurgence of fascist imperialist aggression, the recognition of the principle of the equality of nations and respect for their sovereignty, and general reduction of all armaments and the outlawing of the most destructive weapons, those designed for the mass slaughter of the civilian population. In their effort to secure these objective Soviet diplomacy and the diplomacy of the democratic countries met with the resistance of Anglo-American diplomacy, which since the war has persistently and unswervingly striven for the rejection of the general principles of the post-war settlement proclaimed by the Allies during the war, and to replace the policy of peace and consolidation of democracy by a new policy, a policy aiming at violating general peace, protecting fascist elements, and persecuting democracy in all countries.

Of immense importance are the joint efforts of the diplomacy of the U. S. S. R. and that of the other democratic countries to secure a reduction of armaments and the outlawing of the most destructive of them—the atomic bomb.

On the initiative of the Soviet Union, a resolution was moved in the United Nations calling for a general reduction of armaments and the recognition, as a primary task, of the necessity to prohibit the

production and use of atomic energy for warlike purposes. This motion of the Soviet government was fiercely resisted by the United States and Great Britain. All the efforts of the imperialist elements were concentrated on sabotaging this decision by erecting endless and fruitless obstacles and barriers, with the object of preventing the adoption of any effective practical measures. The activities of the delegates of the U. S. S. R. and the other democratic countries in the agencies of the United Nations bear the character of a systematic, stubborn day-to-day struggle for democratic principles of international co-operation, for the exposure of the intrigues of the imperialist plotters against the peace and security of the nations.

This was openly demonstrated, for example, in the discussion of the situation on Greece's northern frontiers. The Soviet Union and Poland vigorously objected to the Security Council being used as a means of discrediting Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, who are falsely accused by the imperialists of aggressive acts against Greece.

Soviet foreign policy proceeds from the fact of the co-existence for a long period of the two systems—capitalism and socialism. From this it follows that co-operation between the U. S. S. R. and countries with other systems is possible, provided that the principle of reciprocity is observed and that obligations once assumed are honoured. Everyone knows that the U. S. S. R. has always honoured the obligations it has assumed. The Soviet Union has demonstrated its will and desire for co-operation.

Britain and America are pursuing the very opposite policy in the United Nations. They are doing everything they can to renounce their commitments and to secure a free hand for the prosecution of a new policy, a policy which envisages not co-operation among the nations, but the hounding of one against the other, violation of the rights and interests of democratic nations, and the isolation of the U. S. S. R.

Soviet policy follows the line of maintaining loyal, good-neighbour relations with all states that display the desire for co-operation. As to the countries that are its genuine friends and allies, the Soviet Union has always behaved, and will always behave, as their true friend and ally. Soviet foreign policy envisages a further extension of friendly aid by the Soviet Union to these countries.

Soviet foreign policy, defending the cause of peace, discountenances a policy of vengeance towards the vanquished countries.

It is known that the U. S. S. R. is in favour of a united, peace-loving, demilitarized and democratic Germany. Comrade Stalin formulated the Soviet policy towards Germany when he said: "In short, the policy of the Soviet Union on the German question reduces itself to the demilitarization and democratization of Germany. The demilitarization and democratization of Germany is one of the most important guarantees for the establishment of a solid and lasting peace". However, this policy of the Soviet Union towards Germany is being encountered by frantic opposition from the imperialist circles in the United States and Great Britain.

The meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in March and April 1947 demonstrated that the United States, Great Britain and France are prepared not only to prevent the democratic

reconstruction and demilitarization of Germany, but even to liquidate her as an integral state, to dismember her, and to settle the question of peace separately.

Today this policy is being conducted under new conditions, now that America has abandoned the old course of Roosevelt and is passing to a new policy, a policy of preparing for new military adventures.

### III. THE AMERICAN PLAN FOR THE ENTHRALLMENT OF EUROPE

The aggressive and frankly expansionist course to which American imperialism has committed itself since the end of World War II finds expression in both the foreign and home policy of the United States. The active support rendered to the reactionary, anti-democratic forces all over the world, the sabotage of the Potsdam decisions which call for the democratic reconstruction and demilitarization of Germany, the protection given to Japanese reactionaries, the extensive war preparations and the accumulation of atomic bombs—all this goes hand in hand with an offensive against the elementary democratic rights of the working people in the United States itself.

Although the U. S. A. suffered comparatively little from the war, the vast majority of the Americans do not want another war, with its accompanying sacrifices and limitations. This has induced monopoly capital and its servitors among the ruling circles in the United States to resort to extraordinary means in order to crush the opposition at home to the aggressive expansionist course and to secure a free hand for the further prosecution of this dangerous policy.

But the crusade against Communism proclaimed by America's ruling circles with the backing of the capitalist monopolies, leads as a logical consequence to attacks on the fundamental rights and interests of the American working people, to the fascization of America's political life, and to the dissemination of the most savage and misanthropic "theories" and views. Dreaming about preparing for a new, a third world war, American expansionist circles are vitally interested in stifling all possible resistance within the country to adventures abroad, in poisoning the minds of the politically backward and unenlightened American masses with the virus of chauvinism and militarism, and in stultifying the average American with the help of all the diverse means of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist propaganda—the cinema, the radio, the church and the press. The expansionist foreign policy inspired and conducted by the American reactionaries envisages simultaneous action along all lines:

- 1) strategical military measures,
- 2) economic expansion, and
- 3) ideological struggle.

Realization of the strategical plans for future aggression is connected with the desire to utilize to the utmost the war production facilities of the United States, which had grown to enormous proportions by the end of World War II. American imperialism is persistently pursuing a policy of militarizing the country. Expenditure on the U. S. army and navy exceeds 11,000 million dollars per annum. In 1947-48, 35 per cent of America's budget was appropriated for the armed forces, or eleven times more than in 1937-1938.

On the outbreak of World War II the American army was the seventeenth largest in the capitalist world; today it is the largest one.

The United States is not only accumulating stocks of atomic bombs; American strategists say quite openly that it is preparing bacteriological weapons.

The strategical plans of the United States envisage the creation in peacetime of numerous bases and vantage grounds situated at great distances from the American continent and designed to be used for aggressive purposes against the U. S. S. R. and the countries of the new democracy. America has built, or is building, air and naval bases in Alaska, Japan, Italy, South Korea, China, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Greece, Austria and Western Germany. There are American military missions in Afghanistan and even in Nepal. Feverish preparations are being made to use the Arctic for purposes of military aggression.

Although the war has long since ended, the military alliance between Britain and the United States and even a combined Anglo-American military staff continue to exist. Under the guise of agreement for the standardization of weapons the United States has established its control over the armed forces and military plans of other countries, notably of Great Britain and Canada. Under the guise of joint defence of the Western Hemisphere, the countries of Latin America are being brought into the orbit of America's plans of military expansion. The United States government has officially declared that it has committed itself to assist in the modernization of the Turkish army. The army of the reactionary Kuomintang is being trained by American instructors and armed with American material. The military circles are becoming an active political force in the United States, supplying large numbers of government officials and diplomats who are directing the whole policy of the country into an aggressive military course.

Economic expansion is an important supplement to the realization of America's strategical plan. American imperialism is endeavouring like a usurer, to take advantage of the post-war difficulties of the European countries, in particular of the shortage of raw materials, fuel and food in the Allied countries that suffered most from the war, to dictate to them extortionate terms for any assistance rendered. With an eye to the impending economic crisis, the United States is in a hurry to find new monopoly spheres of capital investment and markets for its goods. American economic "assistance" pursues the broad aim of bringing Europe into bondage to American capital. The more drastic the economic situation of a country is, the harsher are the terms which the American monopolies endeavour to dictate to it.

But economic control logically leads to political subjugation to American imperialism. Thus the United States combines the extension of monopoly markets for its goods with the acquisition of new bridgeheads for its fight against the new democratic forces of Europe. In "saving" a country from starvation and collapse, the American monopolies at the same time seek to rob it of all vestige of independence. American "assistance" automatically involves a change in the policy of the country to which it is rendered: parties and individuals come to power that are prepared, on directions from Washington, to carry out a program of home and foreign policy suitable to the United States (France, Italy, and so on).

Lastly, the aspiration to world supremacy and the anti-democratic policy of the United States involve an ideological struggle. The prin-



cial purpose of the ideological part of the American strategical plan is to deceive public opinion by slanderously accusing the Soviet Union and the new democracies of aggressive intentions, and thus representing the Anglo-Saxon bloc in a defensive role and absolving it of responsibility for preparing a new war. During the Second World War the popularity of the Soviet Union in foreign countries was enormously enhanced. Its devoted and heroic struggle against imperialism earned it the affection and respect of working people in all countries. The military and economic might of the Socialist state, the invincible strength of the moral and political unity of Soviet society were graphically demonstrated to the whole world. The reactionary circles in the United States and Great Britain are anxious to erase the deep impression made by the Socialist system on the working people of the world. The warmongers fully realize that long ideological preparation is necessary before they can get their soldiers to fight the Soviet Union.

In their ideological struggle against the USSR, the American imperialists, who have no great insight into political questions, demonstrate their ignorance by laying primary stress on the allegation that the Soviet Union is undemocratic and totalitarian, while the United States and Great Britain and the whole capitalist world are democratic. On this platform of ideological struggle—on this defence of bourgeois pseudo-democracy and condemnation of Communism as totalitarian—are united all the enemies of the working class without exception, from the capitalist magnates to the Right Socialist leaders, who seize with the greatest eagerness on any slanderous imputations against the USSR suggested to them by their imperialist masters. The pith and substance of this fraudulent propaganda is the claim that the earmark of true democracy is the existence of a plurality of parties and of an organized opposition minority. On these grounds the British Labourites, who spare no effort in their fight against Communism, would like to discover antagonistic classes and a corresponding struggle of parties in the USSR. Political ignoramuses that they are, they cannot understand that capitalists and landlords, antagonistic classes, and hence a plurality of parties, have long ceased to exist in the USSR. They would like to have in the USSR the bourgeois parties which are so dear to their hearts, including pseudo-socialistic parties, as an agency of imperialism. But to their bitter regret these parties of the exploiting bourgeoisie have been doomed by history to disappear from the scene.

The labourists and other advocates of bourgeois democracy will go to any length to slander the Soviet regime, but at the same time they regard the bloody dictatorship of the fascist minority over the people in Greece and Turkey as perfectly normal, they close their eyes to many crying violations even of formal democracy in the bourgeois countries, and say nothing about the national and racial oppression, the corruption and the unceremonious abrogation of democratic rights in the United States of America.

One of the lines taken by the ideological campaign that goes hand in hand with the plans for the enslavement of Europe is an attack on the principle of national sovereignty, an appeal for the renouncement of the sovereign rights of nations, to which is opposed the idea of a world government. The purpose of this campaign is to mask the unbridled

expansion of American imperialism which is ruthlessly violating the sovereign rights of nations, to represent the United States as a champion of universal laws, and those who resist American penetration as believers in obsolete and selfish nationalism. The idea of a world government has been taken up by bourgeois intellectual cranks and pacifists, and is being exploited not only as a means of pressure, with the purpose of ideologically disarming the nations that defend their independence against the encroachments of American imperialism, but also as a slogan specially directed against the Soviet Union, which indefatigably and consistently upholds the principle of real equality and protection of the sovereign rights of all nations, big and small. Under present conditions imperialist countries like the USA, Great Britain and the states closely associated with them become dangerous enemies of national independence and the self-determination of nations, while the Soviet Union and the new democracies are a reliable bulwark against encroachments on the equality and self determination of nations.

It is a noteworthy fact that American military-political intelligence agents of the Bullitt breed, yellow trade union leaders of the Green brand, the French Socialists headed by that inveterate apologist of capitalism, Blum, the German social-democrat Schumacher, and Labour leaders of the Bevin type are all united in close fellowship in carrying out the ideological plan of American imperialism.

At this present juncture the expansionist ambitions of the United States find concrete expression in the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Although they differ in form of presentation, both are an expression of a single policy, they are both an embodiment of the American design to enslave Europe.

The main features of the Truman doctrine as applied to Europe are as follows:

1. Creation of American bases in the Eastern Mediterranean with the purpose of establishing American supremacy in that area.

2. Demonstrative support of the reactionary regimes in Greece and Turkey as bastions of American imperialism against the new democracies in the Balkans (military and technical assistance to Greece and Turkey, the granting of loans).

3. Unintermitting pressure on the countries of the new democracy, as expressed in false accusations of totalitarianism and expansionist ambitions, in attacks on the foundations of the new democratic regime, in constant interference in their domestic affairs, in support of all anti-national, anti-democratic elements within these countries, and in the demonstrative breaking off of economic relations with these countries with the idea of creating economic difficulties, retarding their economic development, preventing their industrialization, and so on.

The Truman doctrine, which provides for the rendering of American assistance to all reactionary regimes which actively oppose the democratic peoples, bears a frankly aggressive character. Its announcement caused some dismay even among circles of American capitalists that are accustomed to anything. Progressive public elements in the USA and other countries vigorously protested against the provocative and frankly imperialistic character of Truman's announcement.

The unfavorable reception which the Truman doctrine was met with accounts for the necessity of the appearance of the Marshall Plan

which is a more carefully veiled attempt to carry through the same expansionist policy.

The vague and deliberately guarded formulations of the Marshall Plan amount in essence to a scheme to create a bloc of states bound by obligations to the United States, and to grant American credits to European countries as a recompense for their renunciation of economic, and then of political, independence. Moreover, the cornerstone of the Marshall Plan is the restoration of the industrial areas of Western Germany controlled by the American monopolies.

It is the design of the Marshall Plan, as transpired from the subsequent talks and the statements of American leaders, to render aid in the first place, not to the impoverished victor countries, America's allies in the fight against Germany, but to the German capitalists, with the idea of bringing under American sway the major sources of coal and iron needed by Europe and by Germany, and of making the countries which are in need of coal and iron dependent on the restored economic might of Germany.

In spite of the fact that the "Marshall Plan" envisages the ultimate reduction of Britain and France to the status of second-rate powers, the Attlee Labour government in Britain and the Ramadier Socialist government in France clutched at the "Marshall Plan" as at an anchor of salvation. Britain, as we know, has already practically used up the American loan of 3,750,000,000 dollars granted to her in 1946. We also know that the terms of this loan were so onerous as to bind Britain hand and foot. Even when already caught in the noose of financial dependence on the USA, the British Labour government could conceive of no other alternative than the receipt of new loans. It therefore hailed the "Marshall Plan" as the way out of the economic impasse, as a chance of securing fresh credits. The British politicians, moreover, hoped to take advantage of the creation of a bloc of Western European debtor countries of the United States to play within this bloc the role of America's chief agent, who might perhaps profit at the expense of weaker countries. The British bourgeoisie hoped, by using the "Marshall Plan," by rendering service to the American monopolies and submitting to their control, to recover its lost positions in a number of countries, in particular in the countries of the Balkan-Danubian area.

In order to lend the American proposals a specious gloss of "impartiality," it was decided to enlist as one of the sponsors of the implementation of the "Marshall Plan" France as well which had already half sacrificed her sovereignty to the United States, inasmuch as the credit she obtained from America in May 1947 was granted on the stipulation that the Communists would be eliminated from the French government.

Acting on instructions from Washington, the British and French governments invited the Soviet Union to take part in a discussion of the Marshall proposals. This step was taken in order to mask the hostile nature of the proposals with respect to the USSR. The calculation was that, since it was well known beforehand that the USSR would refuse American assistance on the terms proposed by Marshall, it might be possible to shift the responsibility on the Soviet Union for "declining to assist the economic restoration of Europe," and thus incite against the USSR the European countries that are in need of

real assistance. If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union should consent to take part in the talks, it would be easier to lure the countries of East and South-East Europe into the trap of the economic restoration of Europe with American assistance. Whereas the Truman plan was designed to terrorize and intimidate these countries, the "Marshall Plan" was designed to test their economic staunchness, to lure them into a trap and then shackle them in the fetters of dollar "assistance."

In that case, the "Marshall Plan" would facilitate one of the most important objectives of the general American program, namely, to restore the power of imperialism in the countries of the new democracy and to compel them to renounce close economic and political co-operation with the Soviet Union.

The representatives of the USSR, having agreed to discuss the Marshall proposals in Paris with the governments of Great Britain and France, exposed at the Paris talks the unsoundness of attempting to work out an economic program for the whole of Europe, and showed that the attempt to create a new European organization under the aegis of France and Britain was a threat to interfere in the internal affairs of the European countries and to violate their sovereignty. They showed that the "Marshall Plan" was in contradiction to the normal principles of international co-operation, that it harboured the danger of splitting Europe and the threat of subjugating a number of European countries to American capitalist interests, that it was designed to give priority of assistance to the monopolistic concerns of Germany over the Allies, and that the restoration of these concerns was obviously designated in the "Marshall Plan" to play a special role in Europe.

This clear position of the Soviet Union stripped the mask from the plan of the American imperialists and their British and French coadjutors.

The all-European conference was a resounding failure. Nine European states refused to take part in it. But even in the countries that consented to participate in the discussion of the "Marshall Plan" and in working out concrete measures for its realization, it was not greeted with any especial enthusiasm, all the more so since it was soon discovered that the U. S. S. R. was fully justified in its supposition that what the plan envisaged was far from real assistance. It transpired that, in general, the U. S. government was in no hurry to carry out Marshall's promises. U. S. Congress leaders admitted that Congress would not examine the question of granting new credits to European countries before 1948.

It thus became evident that in accepting the Paris scheme for the implementation of the "Marshall Plan," Britain, France and other Western European states themselves fell dupes to American chicanery.

Nevertheless, the efforts to build up a western bloc under the aegis of America are being continued.

It should be noted that the American variant of the Western bloc is bound to encounter serious resistance even in countries already so dependent on the United States as Britain and France. The prospect of the restoration of German imperialism, as an effective force capable of opposing democracy and Communism in Europe, cannot be very alluring either to Britain or to France. Here we have one of the major contradictions within the Anglo-French-American bloc. Evi-

dently, the American monopolies, and the international reactionaries generally, do not regard Franco and the Greek fascists as a very reliable bulwark of the United States against the USSR and the new democracies in Europe. They are, therefore, staking their main hopes on the restoration of capitalist Germany, which they consider would be a major guarantee of the success of the fight against the democratic forces of Europe. They trust neither the British Labourites nor the French Socialists, whom, in spite of their manifest desire to please, they regard as "semi-Communists", insufficiently worthy of confidence.

It is for this reason that the question of Germany and, in particular of the Ruhr, as a potential war-industrial base of a bloc hostile to the USSR, is playing such an important part in international politics and is an apple of discord between the USA and Britain and France.

The appetites of the American imperialists cannot but cause serious uneasiness in Britain and France. The United States has unambiguously given it to be understood that it wants to take the Ruhr out of the hands of the British. The American imperialists are also demanding that the three occupation zones be merged, and that the political separation of Western Germany under American control be openly implemented. The United States insists that the level of steel output in the Ruhr must be increased, with the capitalist firms under American aegis. Marshall's promise of credits for European rehabilitation is interpreted in Washington as a promise of priority assistance to the German capitalists.

We thus see that America is endeavouring to build a "Western bloc" not on the pattern of Churchill's plan for a United States of Europe, which was conceived as an instrument of British policy, but as an American protectorate, in which sovereign European states, not excluding Britain itself, are to be assigned a role not very far removed from that of a "49th state of America". American imperialism is becoming more and more arrogant and uncereemonious in its treatment of Britain and France. The bilateral and trilateral, talks regarding the level of industrial production in Western Germany (Great Britain-USA, USA-France), apart from constituting an arbitrary violation of the Potsdam decisions, are a demonstration of the complete indifference of the United States to the vital interests of its partners in the negotiations. Britain, and especially France, are compelled to listen to America's dictates and to obey them without a murmur. The behaviour of American diplomats in London and Paris has come to be highly reminiscent of their behaviour in Greece, where American representatives already considering it quite unnecessary to observe the elementary decencies appoint and dismiss Greek ministers at will and conduct themselves as conquerors. Thus the new plan for the Dawesization of Europe essentially strikes at the vital interests of the peoples of Europe, and represents a plan for the enthrallment and enslavement of Europe by the United States.

The "Marshall Plan" strikes at the industrialization of the democratic countries of Europe, and hence at the foundations of their integrity and independence. And if the plan for the Dawesization of Europe was doomed to failure, at a time when the forces of resistance to the Dawes Plan were much weaker than they are now, today, in post-war Europe, there are quite sufficient forces, even leaving aside the Soviet Union, and if they display the will and determination they

can foil this plan of enslavement. All that is needed is the determination and readiness of the peoples of Europe to resist. As to the USSR, it will bend every effort in order that this plan be doomed to failure.

The assessment given by the countries of the anti-imperialist camp of the "Marshall Plan" has been completely confirmed by the whole course of developments. In relation to the "Marshall Plan", the camp of democratic countries have proved that they are a mighty force standing guard over the independence and sovereignty of all European nations, that they refuse to yield to browbeating and intimidation, just as they refuse to be deceived by the hypocritical manoeuvres of dollar diplomacy.

The Soviet government has never objected to using foreign, and in particular American, credits as a means capable of expediting the process of economic rehabilitation. However, the Soviet Union has always taken the stand that the terms of credits must not be extortionate, and must not result in the economic and political subjugation of the debtor country to the creditor country. From this political stand, the Soviet Union has always held that foreign credits must not be the principal means of restoring a country's economy. The chief and paramount condition of a country's economic rehabilitation must be the utilization of its own internal forces and resources and the creation of its own industry. Only in this way can its independence be guaranteed against encroachments on the part of foreign capital, which constantly displays a tendency to utilize credits as an instrument of political and economic enthrallment. Such precisely is the "Marshall Plan", which would strike at the industrialization of the European countries and is consequently designed to undermine their independence.

The Soviet Union unswervingly holds the position that political and economic relations between states must be built exclusively on the basis of equality of the parties and mutual respect for their sovereign rights. Soviet foreign policy and, in particular, Soviet economic relations with foreign countries, are based on the principle of equality, on the principle that agreements must be of advantage to both parties. Treaties with the USSR are agreements that are of mutual advantage to both parties, and never contain anything that encroaches on the national independence and sovereignty of the contracting parties. This fundamental feature of the agreements of the USSR with other states stands out particularly vividly just now, in the light of the unfair and unequal treaties being concluded or planned by the United States. Unequal agreements are alien to Soviet foreign trade policy. More, the development of the Soviet Union's economic relations with all countries interested in such relations demonstrates on what principles normal relations between states should be built. Suffice it to recall the treaties recently concluded by the USSR with Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. In this way the USSR has clearly shown along what lines Europe may find the way out of its present economic plight. Britain might have had a similar treaty, if the Labour Government had not, under outside pressure, frustrated the agreement with the USSR, the agreement which was already on its way to conclusion.

The exposure of the American plan for the economic enslavement of the European countries is an indisputable service rendered by the foreign policy of the USSR and the new democracies.

It should be borne in mind that America herself is threatened with an economic crisis. There are weighty reasons for Marshall's official generosity. If the European countries do not receive American credits, their demand for American goods will diminish, and this will tend to accelerate and intensify the approaching economic crisis in the United States. Accordingly, if the European countries display the necessary stamina and readiness to resist the enthralling terms of the American credit, America may find herself compelled to beat a retreat.

#### IV. THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN UNITING THE DEMOCRATIC, ANTI-FASCIST, PEACE-LOVING ELEMENTS TO RESIST THE NEW PLANS OF WAR AND AGGRESSION

The dissolution of the Comintern, which conformed to the demands of the development of the labour movement in the new historical situation, played a positive role. The dissolution of the Comintern once and for all disposed of the slanderous allegation of the enemies of Communism and the labour movement that Moscow was interfering in the internal affairs of other states, and that the Communist Parties in the various countries were acting not in the interests of their nations, but on orders from outside.

The Comintern was founded after the first world war, when the Communist Parties were still weak, when practically no ties existed between the working classes of the different countries, and when the Communist Parties had not yet produced generally recognized leaders of the labour movement. The service performed by the Comintern was that it restored and strengthened the ties between the working people of the different countries, that it elaborated theoretical questions of the labour movement in the new, post-war conditions of development, that it established general standards of propaganda of the ideas of Communism, and that it facilitated the preparation of leaders of the labour movement. This created the conditions for the conversion of the young Communist Parties into mass labour parties. But once the young Communist Parties had become mass labour parties, the direction of these parties from one centre became impossible and inexpedient. As a result, the Comintern, from a factor promoting the development of the Communist Parties began to turn into a factor hindering their development. The new stage in the development of the Communist Parties demanded new forms of contact among the parties. It was these considerations that made it necessary to dissolve the Comintern and to devise new forms of connection between the parties.

In the course of the four years that have elapsed since the dissolution of the Comintern, the Communist Parties have grown considerably in strength and influence in nearly all the countries of Europe and Asia. The influence of the Communist Parties has increased not only in Eastern Europe, but in practically all European countries where fascism held sway, as well as in those which were occupied by the German fascists—France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Finland, etc. The influence of the Communists has increased espe-

cially in the new democracies, where the Communist Parties are among the most influential parties in the state.

But the present position of the Communist Parties has its shortcomings. Some comrades understood the dissolution of the Comintern to imply the elimination of all ties, of all contact, between the fraternal Communist Parties. But experience has shown that such mutual isolation of the Communist Parties is wrong, harmful and, in point of fact, unnatural. The Communist movement develops within national frameworks, but there are tasks and interests common to the parties of various countries. We get a rather curious state of affairs: the Socialists, who stopped at nothing to prove that the Comintern dictated directives from Moscow to the Communists of all countries, have restored their International; yet the Communists even refrained from meeting one another, let alone consulting with one another on questions of mutual interest to them, from fear of the slanderous talk of their enemies regarding the "hand of Moscow." Representatives of the most diverse fields of endeavour—scientists, cooperators, trade unionists, the youth, students—deem it possible to maintain international contact, to exchange experience and consult with one another on matters relating to their work, to arrange international congresses and conferences; yet the Communists, even of countries that are bound together as allies, hesitate to establish friendly ties. There can be no doubt that if the situation were to continue it would be fraught with most serious consequences to the development of the work of the fraternal parties. The need for mutual consultation and voluntary coordination of action between individual parties has become particularly urgent at the present juncture when continued isolation may lead to a slackening of mutual understanding, and at times, even to serious bunders.

In view of the fact that the majority of the leaders of the Socialist parties (especially the British Labourites and the French Socialists) are acting as agents of United States imperialist circles, there has devolved upon the Communists the special historical task of leading the resistance to the American plan for the enthrallment of Europe, and of boldly denouncing all coadjutors of American imperialism in their own countries. At the same time, Communists must support all the really patriotic elements who do not want their countries to be imposed upon, who want to resist enthrallment of their countries to foreign capital, and to uphold their national sovereignty. The Communists must be the leaders in enlisting all anti-fascist and freedom-loving elements in the struggle against the new American expansionist plans for the enslavement of Europe.

It must be borne in mind that a great gulf lies between the desire of the imperialists to unleash a new war and the possibility of engineering such a war. The peoples of the world do not want war. The forces that stand for peace are so big and influential that if they are staunch and determined in defence of peace, if they display fortitude and firmness, the plans of the aggressors will come to grief. It should not be forgotten that all the hullabaloo of the imperialist agents about the danger of war is designed to frighten the weak-nerved and unstable and to extort concessions to the aggressor by means of intimidation.

The chief danger to the working class at this present juncture lies in underrating its own strength and overrating the strength of the enemy.



Just as in the past the Munich policy untied the hands of the Nazi aggressors, so today concessions to the new course of the United States and the imperialist camp may encourage its inspirers to be even more insolent and aggressive. The Communist Parties must therefore head the resistance to the plans of imperialist expansion and aggression along every line—state, economic and ideological; they must rally their ranks and unite their efforts on the basis of a common anti-imperialist and democratic platform, and gather around them all the democratic and patriotic forces of the people.

A special task devolves on the fraternal Communist Parties of France, Italy, Great Britain and other countries. They must take up the standard in defence of the national independence and sovereignty of their countries. If the Communist Parties firmly stick to their position, if they do not allow themselves to be intimidated and blackmailed, if they act as courageous sentinels of enduring peace and popular democracy, of the national sovereignty, liberty and independence of their countries, if, in their struggle against the attempts to economically and politically enthrall their countries, they are able to take the lead of all the forces prepared to uphold the national honour and independence, no plans for the enthrallment of Europe can possibly succeed.

## 22. THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTION

**NOTE.**—Molotov delivered this speech on November 8, 1947, the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. In it he emphasized the Communist doctrine that the foreign policy of the United States is typical imperialism, caused by capitalist concern about domestic economic difficulties. It ends with the boast that the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, together with the tactics of Lenin and Stalin, have guided the path of the Soviets through the troubles of 30 years. His statement concerning the atom bomb, to the effect that the "secret has long ceased to exist," produced discussion at the time. The excerpts given here are not the complete speech.

All real friends of peace—and they constitute the majority of people of any country—can rely on the fact that the Soviet Union will defend to the end the interests of universal peace.

In accordance with that peaceful policy, the Soviet Union stands for the all-embracing development of international cooperation.

Comrade Stalin profoundly elucidated our foreign policy in his talk with the well-known American, Harold Stassen. They (the Soviet Union and the United States) can, of course, cooperate with each other, said Stalin. The difference between them was not important as far as collaboration was concerned. The economic systems in Germany and the United States were alike, nevertheless war broke out between them.

The economic systems of the U. S. A. and the Soviet Union were different, said Stalin, but they did not fight each other but collaborated during the war. If two different systems could collaborate during the war why could they not collaborate in peacetime? Naturally, it should be understood that, provided there was the desire to collaborate, collaboration was perfectly possible with different economic systems. But if there was no desire to collaborate, then—even with economic systems which were alike—states and people might be fighting each other.

The Soviet Union has invariably carried out, and is carrying out, the policy of peace and international collaboration. Such are the relations of the Soviet Union with all the countries which evince a desire to collaborate.

The policy outlined by Comrade Stalin is opposed at present by another policy, based on quite different principles. Here we can talk first and foremost of the foreign policy of the United States, as well as that of Great Britain.

#### CALLS U. S. DICTATOR

Possibly there exists in the United States a program of economic development of the country for some period ahead. However, the press has not yet announced anything about this, although press conferences take place there quite frequently. On the other hand, much noise is being spread about various American projects, connected now with the Truman Doctrine, now with the Marshall plan.

Reading of all these American plans for aid to Europe, aid to China, and so on, one might think that the domestic problems of the United States have long ago been solved, and that now it is only a question of America's putting the affairs of other states in order, dictating its policy to them and even the composition of their governments.

In reality, matters are not like that. If the ruling circles of the U. S. A. had no cause for anxiety concerning domestic affairs, especially in connection with an approaching economic crisis, there would not be such a superfluity of economic projects of U. S. A. expansion, which in their turn are based on the aggressive military-political plans of American imperialism.

Now they no longer hide the fact that the United States of America, not infrequently together with Great Britain, is acquiring ever new naval and air bases in all parts of the globe, and even adapts whole states for such like aims, especially if closely situated to the Soviet Union.

Who does not complain about the pressure of American imperialism in that respect? Even if the governments of certain big states of Europe, Asia, and America preserve a kind of solid silence in regard to this matter, it is clear that certain small states are faced by an absolutely intolerable position. Denmark, for instance, cannot achieve the restoration of her national sovereignty over Greenland, which the Americans do not want to leave after the end of the war. Egypt legitimately demands the withdrawal of British troops from her territory. Britain refuses to do that, and America supports the British imperialists in these matters also.

It is, however, clear that the creation of military bases in various parts of the world is not designed for defense purposes, but as a preparation for aggression. It is also clear that if, up to now, the combined British-American General Staff, created during the second World War, has been maintained, this is not being done for peace-loving purposes, but for the purpose of intimidating with the possibility of new aggression.

It would be a good thing for all this to be known to the American people, for under the so-called Western freedom of the press, when

almost all newspapers and radio stations are in the hands of small cliques, the aggressive cliques of the capitalists and their servitors, it is difficult for the people to know the real truth.

It is interesting that in expansionists circles of the U. S. A. a new, peculiar sort of illusion is widespread—while having no faith in their internal strength—faith is placed in the secret of the atom bomb, although this secret has long ceased to exist.

Evidently the imperialists need this faith in the atom bomb which, as is known, is not a means of defense but a weapon of aggression. Many are indignant that the U. S. A. and Great Britain hamper the United Nations from adopting a final decision in the prohibition of atomic weapons. During this year British scientists have twice protested against this, having twice published statements in which they express dissatisfaction at the fact that Britain only says "ditto" to the United States in this matter.

And that is fully understandable, since the peoples of America and Britain, no less than other peoples, are interested in introducing both the prohibition of atomic weapons and the general reduction of armaments.

At the same time one should understand that the refusal to prohibit the atomic weapon covers the imperialists with shame and sets against them all honest people, all peoples.

Or take the question of the warmongers. Despite all the efforts of the American and other expansionists, the General Assembly unanimously decided to condemn propaganda for a new war. At the same time the discussion showed that it is necessary to strengthen still further the struggle against the warmongers and against their patrons who execute the will of the aggressive and greedy profiteers, the top capitalist multimillionaires, and who do not take the interests of their peoples into account.

#### DECLARES U. S. INDUSTRY PROFITED

It is well known that the industry of the United States of America in the period between the two world wars has grown, although its development proceeded extremely unevenly and twice fell considerably below the level of 1913. For all that, during the second World War American industry grew rapidly, became inflated and began to yield enormous profits to the capitalists and state revenues, which American state monopoly capitalism is putting into circulation and applying to exert pressure everywhere in Europe and China, in Greece and Turkey, in South America and in the Middle East.

Certainly there are not a few who like to make use of a war situation.

Successes in the utilization of the war situation are, of course, plentiful. But what has this to do with the interests of the people? The interests of the people are of course radically different from the interests of the instigators of a new world war. All these facts testify to the striving of American imperialism to take advantage of the post-war difficulties of certain states, to impose its will on them under the banner of unsolicited American guidance and to pave the way for the world domination of the United States of America.

This by no means justifies calculations on the possibility of avoiding growing internal difficulties, of averting the advance of a profound

economic crisis and the ever intensifying split of the U. S. A. into two main groupings: the imperialist grouping, which—at the moment—is making a lot of noise in the foreground, and the democratic grouping, which holds the future.

The appetites of the imperialists know no bounds. For the sake of achieving their narrow aims, they are ready to trample under foot democratic rights in their own country and also the rights and sovereignty of other states.

The lessons of the downfall of Fascist Germany, which trampled on the democratic forces and exceeded all bounds in its striving for world domination, as one can see, taught nothing to those who now, with such blindness, are tearing after the domination of the whole world.

#### PACT VIOLATIONS CHARGED

Today the ruling circles of the U. S. A. and Great Britain head one international grouping, which has as its aim the consolidation of capitalism and the achievement of the dominations of these countries over other peoples. These countries are headed by imperialist and anti-democratic forces in international affairs, with the active participation of certain Socialist leaders in several European states.

The policy of the Soviet Union is based on opposite principles, on the principle of respect for the sovereignty of all states, big and small, on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

Take, for example, the German question. If in the post-war period America and Britain had adhered to all the principles—let us say, for example, the democratic principles—of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences on the German question, which made possible and fruitful the collaboration of the great Allies against Hitlerite Germany, with the aim of liquidating the remnants of fascism, then collaboration between the Soviet Union, the U. S. A. and Britain would also today produce good results.

But the U. S. A. and Britain have departed from these democratic principles and have violated the decisions jointly taken. This can be said with regard to such radical questions as the democratization and demilitarization of Germany, and the payment of reparations to countries which suffered from German occupation.

As a result of post-war Anglo-American policy the British and American zones of occupation of Germany were united into a jointly administered bi-zonal territory—which has been given the name of "Bi-zonia" in the press—so that an Anglo-American policy could be unilaterally carried out there independently of the Control Council, in which representatives of all four occupying powers participate.

Our representatives in Germany are today virtually concerned only with the Soviet zone. A situation has arisen which cannot but produce alarm among the German people also, since, as the result of the Anglo-American policy, there exists the joint zone and other zones, but there is no Germany, no single German state.

The Soviet Union considers it necessary that the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences on the German question, decisions which provided for the restoration of Germany as a single, democratic state, should be put into effect. Moreover, in the Soviet Union

it is entirely understood that the joint zone is not Germany and that the German people has a right to the existence of its own state, which, it goes without saying, must be a democratic state and must not create the threat of new aggression for other peace-loving states.

### IMPLIES HITLERITES ARE USED

At the present time there exists the Anglo-American plan—by giving some alms to calm the population of the Anglo-American zone of Germany—for basing themselves here on the former capitalists who were recently the Hitlerite support, and for utilizing with their aid the joint zone with its Ruhr industrial basin as a threat against those countries which do not display slavish submissiveness with regard to the Anglo-American plans for domination in Europe.

But these adventurists' plans, based on Germany, will lead to nothing good and it goes without saying, will be rejected by democratic Europe.

From the example of the German question, one can see how widely present day Anglo-American principles diverge from the principles of the Soviet state, how Anglo-American principles are steeped in open imperialism, while the Soviet stands firmly on democratic positions.

The Soviet Union, in common with other democratic states, stands for peace and international collaboration on democratic principles. Under present conditions, this demands the uniting of all forces of the anti-imperialist and democratic camp in Europe and beyond the boundaries of Europe, so that an insurmountable barrier shall be created against imperialism, which is becoming more active, and against its new policy of aggression.

The rallying of democratic forces and courageous struggle against imperialism in its new plans for war adventures will unite the peoples into a powerful army, the equal of which cannot be possessed by imperialism, which denies the democratic rights of the people, infringing on the sovereignty of the nations and basing its plans on threats and adventures.

Uneasiness and alarm are growing in the imperialist ranks, since everybody sees that the ground is shaking under the feet of imperialism, while the forces of democracy and socialism are daily growing and consolidating.

What can the policy of imperialism offer people? Nothing but strengthening of oppression, the rebirth of the vestiges of hated fascism and imperialistic adventures.

### WOULD UNITE "DEMOCRATIC" FORCES

It is necessary to open the peoples' eyes and to unite all the democratic and anti-imperialistic forces in order to foil any plans for the economic enslavement of nations and any new adventures on the part of the imperialists.

The historic experience of the Soviet Union has confirmed the justice of the great Lenin's words on the invincibility of the people which took power into their hands. Lenin said: "One can never conquer a people where the majority of workers and peasants have realized, sensed and seen that they are upholding their own sovereign power, the power of the working people, the victory of whose cause, if upheld,

will secure for them and their children the possibility of enjoying all the benefits of culture, all the achievements of human labor."

The task of our time is to unite all the anti-imperialistic and democratic forces of the nations into one mighty camp, welded together by the unity of their vital interests against the imperialist and anti-democratic camp and its policy of enslavement of the peoples and new adventures.

A sober attitude to the matter shows simultaneously that in our time new imperialistic adventures constitute a dangerous game with destinies of capitalism.

Certain Ministers and Senators may fail to understand that. But if the anti-imperialist and democratic camp consolidates its forces and utilizes all its opportunities, it will force the imperialists to be wiser and to conduct themselves more calmly. It must be surmised that capitalism is not interested in speeding up its own collapse.

On entering that thirty-first year of the great October Socialist revolution we look back on the path traversed with satisfaction. The successes of the Soviet state are great. Socialism has deeply entered into our whole life. Under the conditions of Soviet power a new generation has already grown up which is beginning to spread its eagle wings. It must be recognized that the most important gain of our revolution is the new moral character and ideological growth of the people as Soviet patriots.

This relates to the entire Soviet people, in the towns and in the countryside, to the workers by hand and by brain. This is the really majestic success of the October Revolution of world historical importance.

The Soviet people now are no longer the same as they were thirty years ago. The moral character of modern Soviet people is to be seen above all in their conscious attitude to labor as a matter of social importance and a sacred obligation to the Soviet state. In our days there are Stakhanovite men and Stakhanovite women. Socialist emulation is in progress in all collective farms. Men and women workers, men and women collective farmers, office employees and the technical engineering staffs, people of art and science are drawn into the cause of emulation. The scope, breadth and content of emulation now determine the Communist attitude to labor here and there already reached among Soviet people. The universal character of emulation is the most important lever for raising the productivity of labor.

One cannot deny that the vestiges of capitalism are extremely persistent in people's consciousness, and therefore the party constantly reminds the Soviet people of the necessity of thoroughgoing criticism and self-criticism, directed toward the elimination of those harmful vestiges of the past. One cannot deny, on the other hand, that at present we have immense possibilities for waging a successful struggle for the elimination of these vestiges.

There is no other country in the world where the Soviet Union has not got numerous friends among the working class, the working peasants and in wide democratic circles—friends imbued with warm sympathy and faith in our cause.

That is why today, on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet revolution, our October banner waves so proudly, the victorious banner of Lenin and Stalin.

## TRACES RISE OF COMMUNISM

Thirty years have elapsed since the October events in 1917. Both then and subsequently our enemies from the bourgeois camp prophesied that the Soviet power would not hold power, that it was doomed to inevitable and early downfall. The Bolsheviks were not frightened by the prophecies and boldly moved into battle to seize power for the working class.

And, having broken down the oppression of the capitalist system, it has now for thirty years already been building the Socialist state with victorious success, building a new society on the basis of communism.

The path traversed by us should be divided into three periods: the first period is that from the victory of Soviet power to the beginning of the second imperialist war; the second period is that of the years of the great patriotic war; the third period is that which has only just begun, the years of post-war reconstructions.

Since the beginning of last year we have been working on the basis of the new post-war five-year plan. Comrade Stalin has outlined our new tasks. The basic tasks of the new five-year plan consist in the restoration of the districts which suffered from war, restoring the pre-war level of production and agriculture, and then surpassing that level to a more or less considerable degree.

The tasks put forward by the party and the Government, the restoration and raising of the national economy, have inspired our people to new heroic efforts and feats of labor.

The beginning of the new five-year plan was hard for our agriculture owing to the drought, which in the past year hit the most important agricultural districts.

However, our country's capacity to overcome the economic difficulties promptly it has to face is well known. It is again demonstrated by the fact that, thanks to the measures undertaken by the party and the Government, the gross grain harvest this year is 58 per cent more than last year.

During 1946, the first year of the post-war five-year plan, we had already witnessed a great growth in industrial production. However, last year's plan was fulfilled by industry only by 96 per cent, inasmuch as reconversion to work in peaceful conditions was not yet completed.

This year, on the other hand, Soviet industry is overfulfilling the plan. In the first three-quarters of the current year the nine months' plan was fulfilled by industry by 103 per cent.

All this gives ground to say that the underfulfilled part of the first year of the five-year plan, and thus the plan of the first two years of the five-year plan, will be completed as a whole by the end of the current year.

We are confidently moving forward in all spheres of industry and agriculture, as well as in transport, although before us is still a great deal of uncompleted work in repairing the wounds and damage inflicted by the war.

We are already extracting more coal than pre-war, but the restoration of metallurgy and oil-extraction is not yet up to the mark.

The restoration and development of all branches of industry which produce consumer goods and foodstuffs are proceeding.

We have no branch of industry which has not moved forward and has not its plan for an increase of its respective output over a period of several years.

Industrial output is rising with every month. Suffice it to say that in the month of October alone, which has only just ended, our gross output of big industry has already reached the average monthly output of 1940.

Thus the output of our industry has already reached the pre-war level.

We are not threatened by the economic crises—so ruinous for industry—without which not a single capitalist country can live. We have not, nor will we have, unemployment and the impoverishment of the population connected with it.

Today a new movement has become widespread, the distinctive feature of which is that individual workers undertake personally obligations to fulfill annual plans and the five-year plan ahead of schedule, which did not happen in the pre-war period.

This year, the fulfillment of the plan for grain deliveries is being achieved ahead of schedule. The state will receive approximately as much grain as in the best pre-war years, although the size of the sown area and technical equipment are still considerably lower than before the war.

These successes are being achieved thanks to the launching of Socialist emulation between republics, territories and regions, and particularly thanks to the active participation in emulation at all existing collective farms of many millions of men and women collective farmers.

#### ADMITS SOME FAVOR WEST

Bourgeois hacks abroad forecast during the war that the Soviet people, having acquainted themselves in their war campaigns with the system and culture of the West and having visited many towns and European capitals, would return home with a desire to establish the same system at home.

But what happened? Demobilized men and officers, after their return home, have set about with even greater ardor to strengthen collective farms, to develop Socialist emulation in factories and mills, placing themselves in the front ranks of Soviet patriots.

Not all our people have freed themselves from groveling and servility before the West, before capitalist culture.

Without freeing oneself from these vestiges, one cannot be a true Soviet citizen. That is why the Soviet people are imbued with such a resolute striving to do away more quickly with those vestiges of the past, to pass merciless criticism on every display of groveling and servility before the West and its capitalistic culture.

Like the sun on a clear day the ideas of Marxism-Leninism illuminated our path through all these thirty years. Our advance was based on the tactics of Lenin and Stalin. Our path has not been an easy one. The enemy operated from without and within. The enemy had its agents even in the Bolshevik party, in the shape of Trotskyists, right-wing and other traitors.

The Bolshevik party, created by Lenin and Stalin, emerged from all those trials strengthened, purged its ranks and became consolidated



as a great force which constitutes the highest expression of the moral-political unity of our people, marching confidently to Communist society, and which, under the leadership of the great Stalin, is now showing the path to universal peace, to liberation from sanguinary wars, the path to the overthrow of capitalist slavery and to the great progress of the peoples and all mankind.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF  
WORLD COMMUNISM

---

REPORT

SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 5  
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS  
HON. FRANCES P. BOLTON, Chairman

---

SUPPLEMENT II

OFFICIAL PROTESTS OF THE UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT AGAINST COMMUNIST  
POLICIES OR ACTIONS, AND RE-  
LATED CORRESPONDENCE

(July 1945–December 1947)



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1948



## FOREWORD

This is a compilation of United States protests against the actions of Communist-controlled governments. It covers 30 months, from July 1945 to December 1947. These 30 months cover the period from the Potsdam Conference to the last meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. This is the period of the transition from apparent loyalty and friendship between the wartime Allies to the present disturbed condition.

The collection given here is not intended as a definitive work on diplomatic history. Only those protests by the United States that have been made public are included.

The assemblage of these protests in one place, so that they can be readily examined all together, is meant to facilitate consideration of the range of subjects that have become bones of contention, of the tactics of Communists that have caused us to protest, and of the areas in terms of geography and the span in time in which such Communist activities have occurred. It will also provide a readier basis for any effort to assess the methods used by the United States in meeting Communist tactics.



## REFERENCE LIST OF PROTESTS

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(NOTE.—Each of the numbered items in this collection deals with a single incident or subject. In some cases two deal with the same subject, but at different times. Several documents may be included in a single numbered item, as in cases where both the United States protest and the reply are given.

The arrangement is by countries, with the countries listed in alphabetical order. Under each country the order is chronological.)

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# NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

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## 1. AMERICAN MISSION TO ALBANIA WITHDRAWN

[Released to the press November 8, 1946]

The proposal made by the United States Government on November 10, 1945 to recognize the Albanian regime headed by Col. Gen. Enver Hoxha specified as a condition that the Albanian authorities affirm the continuing validity of all treaties and agreements in force between the United States and Albania as of April 7, 1939, the date of the Italian invasion of Albania. The requirement of such an assurance from the Albanian regime as a prerequisite to United States recognition is in accord with the established practice of this Government to extend recognition only to those Governments which have expressed willingness to fulfil their international obligations. The Albanian regime on August 13, 1946, after a delay of nine months, indicated its acceptance of the multilateral treaties and agreements to which both the United States and Albania are parties, but it has failed to affirm its recognition of the validity of bilateral instruments between the United States and Albania.

In view of the continued unwillingness of the present Albanian regime to assume these bilateral commitments and obligations, which are in no instance of an onerous character and concern such customary subjects as arbitration and conciliation, naturalization, extradition, and most-favored-nation treatment (see the appended list), the United States Government has concluded that the American Mission can no longer serve any useful purpose by remaining in Albania. This decision has been notified to General Hoxha by the Acting American Representative in Tirana, George D. Henderson, in a letter of November 5, the text of which is as follows:

Since arriving in Tirana on May 8, 1945 to survey conditions in Albania in connection with the question of United States recognition of the existing Albanian regime, the informal United States Mission has sought to bring about mutual understanding and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Governments of the United States and Albania. Despite United States endeavors in this regard, and in the absence of a satisfactory response from the Albanian Government to the offer of recognition which was tendered by the United States Government in November 1945, the Mission has been unable to achieve the purposes for which it was originally sent to Albania.

In the circumstances, although my Government retains its sentiment of warm friendship for the Albanian people, it does not feel that there is any further reason for the Mission to remain in Albania. The United States Mission is accordingly being withdrawn. (Bulletin, November 17, 1946, p. 913.)



## 2. REGARDING CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATY WITH RECOGNIZED DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF BULGARIA

### STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

[Released to the press August 18, 1945]

With regard to the provisions of paragraph X of the report on the Berlin Conference concerning the conclusion of a peace treaty with a recognized democratic government of Bulgaria, and having in mind the elections now scheduled to be held there on August 26, 1945, the Department has instructed the United States Political Representative in Bulgaria to convey to the Bulgarian Government the following views of the United States Government:

The United States Government has been desirous of recognizing and establishing diplomatic relations with a provisional Bulgarian government which would be representative of all important elements of democratic opinion and which would arrange for free and untrammelled elections under conditions which would safeguard the free expression of political views and the free exercise of political rights.

The information available to the United States Government has not satisfied it that the existing provisional Bulgarian Government is adequately representative of the important elements of democratic opinion or that the existing government has arranged for the scheduled elections to take place under conditions which will allow and insure the effective participation therein, free from the fear of force and intimidation, of all democratic elements.

In the opinion of the United States Government the effective participation of all important democratic elements in the forthcoming election is essential to facilitate the conclusion of a peace treaty with a recognized democratic government. The will of the majority of the people can be determined only if all the people are able to vote free from force and intimidation (Bulletin, August 19, 1945, p. 274).

## 3. BULGARIAN ELECTIONS

### COMMUNICATION FROM UNITED STATES POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVE

[Released to the press November 16, 1945]

*The United States Political Representative in Bulgaria, Maynard Barnes, has transmitted the following communication to the Bulgarian Government:*

As the Bulgarian Government is aware the United States Government desires to conclude a treaty of peace with Bulgaria with the least possible delay and with that end in view has hoped to be able to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with an appropriate provisional Bulgarian Government at an early date. It is essential that such a Bulgarian Government be adequately representative of the important elements of democratic opinion and that arrangement be made for free elections in which all democratic elements of the country may effectively participate, free from the fear of force and intimidation, in order that the will of the majority of the people can be determined and the pledge given to them at Yalta be fulfilled.

The announced object of the recent visit of Mr. Mark Ethridge, the special representative of the Secretary of State, was in fact to investigate this situation. Mr. Ethridge's findings have been made known to the Bulgarian Government as well as to the signatories of the Yalta agreement.

Since the postponement of the elections originally scheduled for August 26, 1945, an opportunity has been given for freer political expression. However, no steps have been taken since August to reorganize the present Bulgarian Government to make it truly representative of democratic opinion. From the elections now scheduled for November 18, 1945, important democratic elements are excluded through the operation of a single list of candidates. Moreover, there are indications that the free expression of popular will is being further restricted by threats of coercion and later reprisals. There is no reason to believe the results of an election conducted under such conditions will reflect the Bulgarian people's choice of a representative democratic Government (Bulletin, November 18, 1945, p. 791).

#### 4. U. S. URGES INCLUSION OF OPPOSITION PARTIES IN BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT

[Released to the press March 5, 1946]

*Text of an aide-mémoire handed by Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State, to Lt. Gen. Vladimir Stoichew, Bulgarian Representative in Washington, on February 22*

In view of the misunderstanding which appears to exist in certain quarters in Bulgaria as to the position of the United States Government in regard to the decisions concerning Bulgaria taken at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December, 1945, the United States Government desires that the following statement of its views in the matter, which have been made known to the Soviet and British Governments, be brought to the attention of the Bulgarian Government:

It is the United States Government's interpretation of the Moscow decision that the Bulgarian Government and opposition should be urged to find a mutually acceptable basis for the participation in the present Bulgarian Government of two truly representative members of the opposition parties. It was never the understanding of the United States Government that pressure was to be exerted on the opposition to nominate two candidates for *pro forma* inclusion into the Government without regard to the conditions of their participation. Although the Moscow agreement did not set forth any specific conditions for the inclusion of the two representatives of the opposition, it did, in the view of the United States Government, anticipate that the participation of these representatives would be on the basis of conditions mutually agreeable to both the Bulgarian Government and the opposition.

It was and is the earnest hope of the United States Government that, meeting in a spirit of conciliation, representatives of the Bulgarian Government and of the opposition could and would agree to work together on a mutually acceptable basis which would enable two truly representative members of the opposition parties to participate in the Government (Bulletin, March 17, 1946, p. 447).

## 5. REPLY TO SOVIET INQUIRY ON UNITED STATES AIDE-MEMOIRE TO BULGARIA

[Released to the press March 11, 1946]

*Note from the Secretary of State to the Soviet Embassy in Washington delivered on March 10, 1946*

I acknowledge the receipt of your communication of March 7, 1946 with reference to an *aide-mémoire* delivered by this Government to the Political Representative of Bulgaria in the United States on February 22, 1946.

I have taken note of the comments of your Government in this connection, particularly the charges that this action by the United States Government is in violation of the decision in regard to Bulgaria taken by the three Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December 1945, and that the United States Government is encouraging the representatives of the Bulgarian opposition "to resist" the Moscow decision. The Soviet Government also states that the presentation of that *aide-mémoire* was a unilateral step taken without prior coordination with other interested Governments which participated in the Moscow Decision.

As indicated in the *aide-mémoire* under reference, the United States Government was motivated in this matter by a desire to correct a misunderstanding which appeared to exist in various quarters in Bulgaria as to the position of the United States Government in regard to the Moscow decision concerning Bulgaria. The Moscow Agreement provided for procedures looking toward inclusion of two representatives of other democratic groups in the Bulgarian Government. These were to be truly representative of the parties not included in the Government, and to be really suitable and work loyally with the Government. It did not occur to the Government of the United States, nor does it now seem conceivable, that such participation would be or should be on terms other than those mutually acceptable to the participants. Otherwise the participation would be upon a basis acceptable only to the participants on one side. Plainly the participation was not to be *pro forma* or created by pressure. It was and is the earnest hope of the United States Government that, meeting in a spirit of conciliation, the Bulgarian Government and the opposition would be able to find a mutually acceptable basis for the implementation of the Moscow Decision.

It is therefore with considerable surprise that the United States Government learns that its statement to the Bulgarian Government of so fundamental and simple a proposition is regarded by the Soviet Government as a departure from the agreement. As understood by this Government that statement is the very essence of the agreement.

With reference to the Soviet Government's contention that this step was taken unilaterally and without prior coordination with other interested Governments, the United States Government desires to call the attention of the Soviet Government to the conversations held in London on February 16, 1946 between Mr. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State, and Mr. Vyshinski, Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. On that occasion Mr. Cohen on instructions informed the Soviet Government of the views of the United States Government in this matter as subsequently set forth in the *aide-*

*mémoire* of February 22. Similar conversations were held by Mr. Cohen in London with the British Government.

Concerning the statement by the Soviet Government that the United States Government's *aide-mémoire* constitutes encouragement to the representatives of the Bulgarian opposition "to resist" the Moscow Decision and that the same tendency has previously been shown by the United States Representative in Bulgaria, the United States Government has at no time taken any action in this matter which could be interpreted as inconsistent with the friendly spirit of cooperation which motivated its agreement to that decision. The activities of the United States Representative in Bulgaria have been under the instructions he has received from his Government directed toward impressing upon all parties in Bulgaria the need for this same spirit of cooperation. It is the sincere desire of the United States Government that in this spirit an implementation of the Moscow Agreement regarding Bulgaria will be achieved (Bulletin, March 17, 1946, p. 485).

## 6. U. S. EFFORTS TO SECURE FREE ELECTIONS IN BULGARIA

### NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO BULGARIAN PRIME MINISTER <sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press October 21]

*September 24, 1946.*

Since our conversation on August 27 about political conditions in your country and the problem those conditions create for the United States in signing peace with Bulgaria, I have given considerable thought to Bulgaro-United States relations.

I had hoped that implementation of the program set forth in the aide memoire handed by you to Mr. Barnes on August 31 for my information would go far to dissipate the problems that I discussed with you. As I told you, it is my belief that implementation of the Moscow Agreement to enlarge the basis of the Bulgarian Government by the inclusion of two representative leaders of the Opposition before the elections on October 27 for the Grand National Assembly would be the most effective means of assuring widespread acceptance of election results. While I have as yet perceived no signs of an effort on the part of the Bulgarian Government since your return to Sofia to put the Moscow Agreement into effect before the elections, I still hope that such efforts will be made.

I have decided to follow up our conversation in Paris with this letter because of my sincere desire to do everything possible myself to assure in the case of Bulgaria fulfillment of the hopes that were entertained and expressed by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill, the representatives of the three great Allies at Yalta. I feel that I should also tell you that I have instructed General Robertson to request of the Acting President of the Allied Control Commission that all party leaders in Bulgaria be heard by the Commission on the subject of the forthcoming elections for the Grand National Assembly and general political conditions in the country. General Robertson will request a special meeting of the Allied Control Commission to consider what steps along the following lines

<sup>1</sup> Kimon Georgiev. (All footnotes herein are taken without alteration, as given in sources.)

might be taken by the Commission further to assure free elections for the Grand National Assembly:

- (1) freedom of press, radio, and assembly for the Opposition;
- (2) non-interference of the militia, either with candidates or voters, except to maintain law and order;
- (3) release of political prisoners, or open formulation of charges against them;
- (4) elimination of any possible threat of post-election retaliation for political reasons.

I am sure you will understand my motives in writing you as frankly as I have and that in this connection you will recall my words on the subject of the difficulty that present-day conditions in your country present to the United States with respect to the resumption and development of friendly relations between our two peoples and Governments.

#### REPLY FROM THE BULGARIAN PRIME MINISTER <sup>2</sup>

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 24. I am especially grateful for the solicitude which you have shown in the interest of a solution that would clear the way to the renewal and development of friendly relations between the Governments of the United States and Bulgaria, as well as between the Bulgarian people and the noble people of the United States toward whom we have always entertained deep gratitude and respect.

I am able to make the following explanatory comment on the contents of your letter:

On August 27 in the conversation which we had, I explained to you orally the impediments to the realization in practice of the Moscow Agreement for the enlargement of the Bulgarian Government by the inclusion of two representative leaders of the opposition. I confirm anew that the responsibility does not rest with the Government. As it was then, so is it now. There are no factors in the situation that might combine to the realization of the Moscow Agreement.

Because of this, in its intention to normalize its relations with the opposition, especially after your conversation with President V. Kolaroff, the Government decided to seek a solution in another direction; namely through holding elections for the Grand National Assembly, the date of which has been set for October 27. These elections will permit the entire Bulgarian people, Government and opposition, to send representatives to the Constituent Assembly. The results of these elections will determine the composition of the future government and will indicate the manner of settlement of relations between the Government and the opposition.

The Bulgarian Government, which has enjoyed popular support since September 9, has decided to hold entirely free elections, which are to reflect the true will of the people. With regard to this, it has taken dispositions calculated fully to realize the measures which you also recommend in your letter to me. In connection with these recommendations, I should point out the following:

*One.* Freedom of the press in our country within the limits of existing law is fully assured. At this moment three opposition newspapers

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the Bulgarian.

appear without hindrance as the organs of three opposition parties, namely newspapers *Narodno Zemedelsko Zname*, *Svoboden Narod*, and *Zname*. In these newspapers expression is freely given to opposition views and to fairly exacting criticism of the Government.

The Government has given its agreement that all political parties, including the opposition, may expound their election platforms over the state radio.

As concerns the right of assembly of the opposition, they have never been forbidden to gather or assemble, and such meetings are held throughout the country. In this period of the electoral campaigns these meetings are primarily private, but in several localities public gatherings have already been held, and the possibility of holding such gatherings elsewhere is assured.

*Two.* All basic laws, and especially the electoral law, forbid the militia in our country interfering or exerting influence in the choice of candidates for popular representatives, or in the exercise of the electoral rights of Bulgarian citizens. In addition, the Government has made clear through its most authorized representatives to all officials of the militia and the administration and to the whole country that the militia will have only one obligation before and during elections; namely, to assure order and freedom for every citizen to vote as he chooses.

*Three.* In good time the Government, immediately after the proclamation of the Peoples Republic, with a view to creating the indispensable psychological conditions for free exercise of the electoral right of Bulgarian citizens, liberated all persons detained on political grounds and against whom there was no basis for formulation of charges of infringement of existing laws. Simultaneously about 1,700 persons who had been condemned by the Peoples Courts for Fascist activities up to September 9, 1944 were released from prison, and sentences of all remaining ones were considerably reduced. I informed you of the achievements in this direction in my letter of September 21.

At present 737 persons in all are interned in the labor-educational institutions of the entire country. Of these only 6 percent, around 45 persons, are adherents of opposition parties, Agrarians (Petkov), Socialists (Lulchev), Democrats (Mushanov), Anarchists (Girginov).

Their detention is not political abuse but is due to the accusations formulated against them for infringement of the administration laws as well as regulations in connection with the conditions for applying the armistice agreement. The remaining 94 are persons with Fascist tendencies, morally depraved persons, and idlers detained on basic existing laws.

*Four.* All of the measures mentioned up to this point which the Bulgarian Government undertook to assure order and freedom in the forthcoming elections, as well as all further measures that will be undertaken in this same direction, such as the creation of electoral control and supervisory committees with the participation of the opposition parties, to which the opposition has already consented, will constitute sufficient guarantee for the removal of any menace whatever of post-election reprisals on political grounds.

Proof of this sufficiency of guarantee is also the fact that the opposition parties have registered lists of candidates throughout the country.

Official data show that parties of Fatherland Front have posted 99 lists, united opposition parties, Agrarians and Socialists, 18 lists, Democrats 35 lists. Besides another eight lists have been posted by other opposition groups, which facts lead to the conclusion that political conditions are favorable for a free electoral contest.

In advising you of the above I thank you once again, Your Excellency, for the frankness with which you bring up and discuss questions that interest and concern me as well, and I take this opportunity to assure you with the same frankness that I and the Bulgarian Government will do everything necessary so that the Bulgarian people may freely express their will on October 27.

**LETTER FROM MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON TO COLONEL GENERAL  
BIRYUSOV<sup>1</sup>**

I have been directed by the United States Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, to request a special meeting of the Allied Control Commission to consider what steps along the following lines might be taken by the Commission further to assure free elections for the Bulgarian Grand National Assembly on October 27: (1) Freedom of the press, radio and assembly for the opposition; (2) non-interference of the militia either with candidates or voters except to maintain law and order; (3) release of political prisoners or open formulation of charges against them; (4) elimination of any possible threat of post election retaliation for political reasons. I am also instructed to request that all political leaders in Bulgaria be heard by the Commission on the subject of the forthcoming elections.

In view of the importance of the subject and the urgency of early action, I request that the regular plenary session of the Commission scheduled for October 3 be converted into a special session with yourself presiding. I have conferred with General Oxley who is agreeable to the postponement of the agenda for that meeting to some later date. I have been requested by Mr. Byrnes to keep him informed telegraphically of developments. Under these circumstances, I feel that I must inform him at once as to whether you are agreeable to convoking a special meeting on October 3 in place of the regularly scheduled plenary meeting.

**REPLY FROM COLONEL GENERAL BIRYUSOV**

I am very much surprised at your request of calling a special meeting of the Allied Control Commission for discussing the measures which should be taken, according to your opinion, by the Commission for the guarantee of free elections to the Grand National Assembly scheduled for October 27, 1946.

It should be known to you that the guarantee of free elections is the prerogative of the Bulgarian Government which in that respect has done everything necessary, which is attested in particular by the decision of opposition parties, published on September 14 and 19, who boycotted elections of November 18 last year, in regards to participation in the election to the Grand National Assembly.

<sup>1</sup> Major General Robertson is American representative on the Allied Control Council. Colonel General Biryusov is Soviet representative and acting chairman of the Council.

Therefore, the discussion of questions raised by you in the Commission and even more, the taking of any kind of measures by the Commission would be in violation of these prerogatives and a rude interference in the internal affairs of Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Commission cannot consider these questions, as they do not come under its jurisdiction, as determined by the Armistice Agreement with Bulgaria.

REPLY FROM MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

I have just received your letter No. 3316, October 4, 1946, in reply to mine (No. A-834, October 1, 1946) requesting a special meeting of the Allied Control Commission to consider means of assuring free elections for the Grand National Assembly on October 27. I cannot agree with any of the conclusions arrived at in your letter. I am therefore telegraphing the contents of your letter to Mr. Byrnes with the request that he take such steps in the circumstances as he may consider necessary (Bulletin, November 3, 1946, p. 818).

7. VIEWS EXPRESSED ON ARREST OF BULGARIAN OPPOSITION LEADER

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Released to the press August 26, 1947]

*Note concerning the case of Nikola Petkov delivered on August 23  
by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Office\**

My Government has instructed me to bring to your attention, as a matter of urgency, the importance which the United States Government and world public opinion attaches to the case of Mr. Nikola Petkov, the opposition leader in the Bulgarian Parliament who was recently sentenced to death in Bulgaria.

My Government has instructed me to inform you that it cannot accept the position taken by the Soviet Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria to the effect that it was not possible for the Commission to interfere in Mr. Petkov's case on the allegation that it is a purely internal Bulgarian affair. It is the firm belief of my Government that the sentencing to death of the duly elected leader of the Bulgarian opposition is a most grave matter, which if carried out will jeopardize the establishment of a representative democratic government in Bulgaria. The establishment of such a representative democratic government in Bulgaria and other countries was the primary objective of the declaration on liberated Europe agreed to by the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union at Yalta. Therefore, my Government is of the opinion that the Soviet Chairman of the Allied Control Commission disregarded the obligations assumed by the Soviet Government in the Yalta Agreement when he refused to consult with the United States and British representatives in Bulgaria in order to reach concerted policies in regard to the case of Nikola Petkov. •

In view of the inability of the United States and United Kingdom representatives in Bulgaria to reach a concerted policy with their

\* For exchange of notes between U. S. and Soviet Representatives on Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria, see Bulletin of Aug. 31, 1947, p. 429.



Soviet colleague in regard to this case, the world wide interest which this case has received, and particularly the obligations assumed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in the declaration on liberated Europe, my Government requests that immediate consultations take place at a governmental level among the Three Yalta Powers in order that they may reach concerted policies in regard to the matter.

The United States representative in Sofia also has emphasized to the Bulgarian Government the importance which the United States Government attaches to this case and has informed the Bulgarian Government that pending agreement of the Three Powers the United States Government expects that the sentence passed on Mr. Petkov will not be executed. It is hoped that the Soviet Government will make similar representations to the Bulgarian Government.

I should appreciate receiving an urgent reply indicating the Soviet Government's consent to the Three Power consultations proposed by my Government.

*Substance of Soviet reply delivered to the American Embassy at Moscow on August 25*

It is impossible to agree with the appraisal contained in your note of the acts of the Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission who refused consideration of the proposition brought up by Maj. Gen. Roberts and Col. Greene to the effect that the Bulgarian Government be directed to delay execution of the sentence in the matter of Nikola Petkov until such time as the ACC could consider the matter. Such a statement of the question is incorrect and inadmissible, since the Control Commission in Bulgaria has no right to review judicial matters decided by Bulgarian court or to give the Bulgarian Government any directives whatsoever in such matters. Such acts by the Control Commission would constitute interference in Bulgarian internal affairs and would be direct infringement of the state sovereignty of Bulgaria.

As regards the proposition of the Government of the United States of America which was contained in your note, immediately to begin governmental consultations between the three powers which took part in the Yalta Conference in order to work out concerted policy regarding the matter of Nikola Petkov, the Soviet Government, for the reasons set forth above, does not see any possibility of agreement with indicated proposal. The Soviet Government has an attitude of full respect and confidence toward the Bulgarian court set up by the Bulgarian people as a guardian of justice (Bulletin, September 7, 1947, p. 481).

## 8. EXECUTION OF NIKOLA PETKOV DECLARED TRAVESTY ON JUSTICE

[Released to the press September 23, 1947]

The Department of State has received confirmation from the Acting Political Representative in Sofia that Nikola Petkov was executed on September 23.

Mr. Petkov was one of the four Bulgarian signers of the Bulgarian armistice. As the leader of the Agrarian Party, the largest political party in Bulgaria, he played an active and leading role in the establishment of a coalition government in September 1944, following the overthrow of the Bulgarian Nazi regime. Subsequently, in July 1945,

Mr. Petkov and the majority of his party withdrew from the minority-controlled organ which that Government became. Since July 1945 he has been the acknowledged leader of the opposition. He was arrested on charges of conspiracy against the government on June 8, 1947.

Mr. Petkov's trial was a travesty on justice. Two of the attorneys selected by Petkov were seized by the militia. The court refused to permit the appearance of numerous witnesses requested by the defense. The court likewise denied a request by the defense for a postponement to permit study of the pre-trial record. The presiding judge actively participated in the prosecution. On August 16, 1947, the court pronounced Mr. Petkov guilty of "having inspired certain Bulgarian Army officers to found a military union which conspired to overthrow the Fatherland Front government," et cetera. Mr. Petkov was sentenced to death.

Mindful of its obligations under the Yalta agreement in regard to assisting the peoples of the former Axis satellite states to solve by democratic means their pressing political problems, the United States Government requested the Soviet acting deputy chairman of the Allied Control Commission to instruct the Bulgarian Government, without prejudice to the right of Mr. Petkov to appeal, to suspend the sentence passed upon him until the Commission had had full opportunity to review the case. This and subsequent approaches to the Allied Control Commission were rejected by the Soviet acting deputy chairman on the grounds that such review would constitute "interference in Bulgarian internal affairs". On August 23 the American Embassy at Moscow informed the Soviet Foreign Office that the United States Government could not accept the position taken by the Soviet Representative on the Allied Control Commission and requested immediate consultation at a government level among the three Yalta Powers in order that they might reach concerted policies in regard to the matter. This approach and a later one of August 30 to the Soviet Foreign Office were likewise rejected on similar reasoning. The United States Government also communicated its views concerning the Petkov case to the highest Bulgarian authorities.

The timing and conduct of the trial and its relationship to other repressive measures undertaken by the Bulgarian authorities make it abundantly clear that the trial constituted but one of a series of measures undertaken by the Communist-dominated Fatherland Front government to remove from the Bulgarian scene all save a purely nominal opposition and to consolidate, despite its professions to the contrary, a totalitarian form of government. The trial of Nikola Petkov recalls to memory another trial which occurred in Leipzig 14 years ago. In that earlier trial a Bulgarian defendant evoked world-wide admiration for his courageous defiance of the Nazi bully who participated in his prosecution. Today that defendant has assumed another role, and it is now the courage of another Bulgarian whose steadfast opposition to forces of oppression has evoked world-wide admiration. In bringing Nikola Petkov to trial the Bulgarian regime placed itself on trial in the minds of many Bulgarians and of freedom-supporting peoples outside Bulgaria. In the court of world opinion that regime has shown itself wanting with respect to elementary principles of justice and the rights of man (Bulletin, October 5, 1947, p. 702).

## 9. INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES IN MANCHURIA

## UNITED STATES VIEWS EXPRESSED TO CHINESE AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS

[Released to the press March 5, 1946]

*Presented to the Chinese Government and the Government of the U. S. S. R., respectively, through the American Embassies in Chungking and Moscow, on instruction of February 9 of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes*

Current reports of discussions between officials of the Chinese Government and the Russian Government with regard to the disposition and control of industrial enterprises in Manchuria give concern to this Government.

The Sino-Soviet Treaty and agreements signed August 14, 1945 provide for joint Sino-Soviet control over certain trunk railways in Manchuria, but these agreements exclude reference to any similar control over industrial enterprise in Manchuria.<sup>5</sup> It is the understanding of the United States Government, which was kept informed of the course of negotiations which led up to the agreements of August 1945 and which has accepted those agreements, that exclusive Sino-Soviet governmental control over Manchurian enterprise would be limited to the railways dealt with in the aforesaid agreements. It is therefore disturbing to this Government to receive reports that discussions are under way which might result in the establishment of exclusive Sino-Soviet control over industrial enterprises in Manchuria. Under present conditions, when free access to Manchuria is not open to nationals of other powers and equality of opportunity in seeking participation in the economic development of Manchuria is denied Americans and other Allied nationals, it is felt that negotiation of agreements between the Chinese and Russian Governments with regard to industries in Manchuria would be contrary to the principle of the Open Door, would constitute clear discrimination against Americans who might wish an opportunity to participate in the development of Manchurian industry, and might place American commercial interests at a distinct disadvantage in establishing future trade relations with Manchuria.

Directly related to this matter of the industries in Manchuria is the matter of reparations policy for Japan, because the major portion of the industries of Manchuria were Japanese-owned prior to the defeat of Japan. This Government considers that the ultimate disposition of Japanese external assets, such as the industries in Manchuria, is a matter of common interest and concern to those Allies who bore the major burden in defeating Japan. This Government is now preparing a general policy outline for consideration by the concerned governments with regard to Japanese reparations. It will be suggested that an Inter-Allied Reparations Commission for Japan be established, and that one of the primary functions of this Commission will be the final allocation of Japanese external assets among the various claimant nations. It would seem, therefore, most inappropriate at this juncture for any final disposition to be made of Japanese

<sup>5</sup> Bulletin of Feb. 10, 1946, p. 201.

external assets in Manchuria either by removal from Manchuria of such industrial assets as "war booty" or by agreement between the Russian and Chinese Governments for the control of ownership of those assets.

The Government of the United States desires to be cooperative with the Chinese and Soviet Governments in seeking a solution of the problems outlined above and it hopes that the other two Governments are animated by a similarly cooperative spirit. It would therefore appreciate being informed of any discussions which the two Governments may be having or may plan to have or any action they may have taken, in regard to the disposition or control of industrial enterprises in Manchuria and we would welcome full and frank discussion of the general problem (Bulletin, March 17, 1946, p. 448).

#### 10. UNITED STATES POSITION ON CONTROL OF DAIREN

##### NOTES TO SOVIET AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS

[Released to the press January 6, 1947]

*Text of note delivered by the American Embassy in the Soviet Union on January 3, 1947 to the Soviet Foreign Office. A similar note has also been delivered by the American Embassy in China to the Chinese Foreign Office.*

The American Government considers it desirable that the current unsatisfactory situation with regard to the status and control of the port of Dairen be promptly considered by the Chinese and Soviet Governments with a view to the implementation of the pertinent provisions of the Soviet-Chinese agreement of August 14, 1945, in regard to Dairen.<sup>6</sup> This Government perceives no reason why there should be further delay in reopening the port, under Chinese administration, to international commerce as contemplated in the aforementioned agreement.

The Government of the United States, while fully appreciating that this is a matter for direct negotiation between the Chinese and Soviet Governments, feels that it has a responsibility to American interests in general to raise the question with the two directly interested Governments. It hopes that the abnormal conditions now prevailing at Dairen may be terminated at an early date and that normal conditions may be established which will permit American citizens to visit and reside at Dairen in pursuit of their legitimate activities.

In the foregoing connection this Government also wishes to express the hope that agreement can be reached soon for the resumption of traffic on the Chinese Changchun Railway.

It is believed that prompt implementation of the agreements with regard to Dairen and the railway would constitute a major contribution to the reestablishment of normal conditions in the Far East and the revival of generally beneficial commercial activity. This Government therefore would be glad to have the assurance of the Chinese and Soviet Governments that all necessary steps to this end will be taken in the near future (Bulletin, January 19, 1947, p. 127).

<sup>6</sup> Bulletin of February 10, 1946, p. 205.

# 11. UNITED STATES REQUESTS ACTION TO HALT HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION

[Released to the press July 27, 1946]

In the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe, the heads of government of the U. S. S. R., Great Britain, and the United States undertook "to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems".

In following closely the economic-recovery problems of the countries of Europe, the United States Government became seriously concerned several months ago over the alarming deterioration of the Hungarian economy. This concern has mounted in the intervening months, during which the Hungarian economic situation has become progressively worse, culminating in the present chaotic inflation.

Since December 1945 the United States Government has taken the initiative in proposing that the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States consider means whereby the three powers, as contemplated in the Crimea Declaration, could assist Hungary to rebuild its shattered economy. These proposals, however, have been rejected by the Soviet Government.

In a meeting of the Allied Control Commission in Budapest in December 1945 the United States Representative recommended the establishment of a subcommittee of the Control Commission to consider questions of Hungarian industry, finance, and economics. This approach was unavailing.

Subsequently, in a note to the Soviet Government on March 2, 1946, this Government again raised the issue by reviewing the grave economic plight of Hungary, by calling attention to the over-burdening of that country with reparations, requisitions, and the costs of maintaining large occupation forces, and by requesting the Soviet Government to instruct its Representatives in Hungary to concert at an early date with the United States and British Representatives there in devising a program which would bring to an end the process of disintegration in Hungary and at the same time provide a framework within which the rehabilitation of the country and its reintegration with the general European economy might be accomplished.

In a reply dated April 21<sup>7</sup> A. Y. Vyshinski, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, rejected the United States proposal on the ground that the working out of an economic-rehabilitation plan for Hungary fell within the competence of the Hungarian Government. Mr. Vyshinski also denied that the cost to Hungary of Soviet reparations and occupation was in any way responsible for the deterioration of economic conditions in Hungary and alleged that the failure of the United States to return to Hungary from the U. S.-occupied zones in Germany and Austria displaced property estimated in value at \$3,000,000,000 was one of the principal reasons for Hungary's present economic difficulties.

In connection with this exchange of notes concerning the economic situation in Hungary, the American Ambassador in Moscow, upon

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

instructions from this Government, had now delivered a further note to the Soviet Government under date of July 23, 1946, the text of which is as follows:

*July 23, 1946.*

His Excellency V. M. MOLOTOV,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R.*

EXCELLENCY: My Government has directed me to communicate to you the following reply to Mr. Vyshinski's letter of April 21, 1946, relating to the economic situation of Hungary:

My Government is unable to agree with the Soviet Government that "the fulfillment by Hungary of its reparations obligations and the presence of occupation troops in Hungary do not and cannot exercise any serious influence on the economic situation of the country".

My Government wishes to bring to the attention of the Soviet Government the fact that half of the current output of Hungarian manufacturing industry, which is operating at only one-third of the pre-war level, is absorbed by reparations and other requirements of the occupying power. In the case of heavy industry, coal, iron, metal and machine production, which is very urgently required for Hungary's rehabilitation, reparations alone absorb between 80 and 90 percent of the current output. Except for some bridge and railway construction necessary to facilitate the movement of goods, Hungarian heavy industry is producing practically nothing for domestic requirements.

With reference to the economic burden placed upon Hungary by the Soviet occupation forces, I am instructed to inform the Soviet Government of reliable information in the possession of my Government to the effect that 4,000,000 tons of wheat, rye, barley, corn and oats were taken by the Red Army in Hungary in 1945, mostly during the first six months. This figure may be compared with 1938 Hungarian production of approximately 7,189,000 tons of these foodstuffs. Of stocks of food available for the support of the Hungarian urban population in the second half of 1945, the Red Army absorbed nearly all of the meats, one-sixth of the wheat and rye, more than a quarter of the legumes, nearly three-quarters of the lard, one-tenth of the vegetable oil, and one-fifth of the milk and dairy products. According to the most recent reports received, extensive requisitioning of foodstuffs was taking place as late as April, 1946. My Government finds it impossible to reconcile this information with the statement of the Soviet Government that "the Soviet Command in Hungary has neither carried out nor is carrying out any requisitions".

My Government has noted that in the opinion of the Soviet Government "the real reasons for the severe economic and financial situation in Hungary are the expenditures incurred by her in the war against the United Nations and the ravaging of the country by the Germans and the former Hungarian rulers". I am instructed to mention for the information of the Soviet Government that, on the basis of reliable estimates, it has been calculated that the total war damage to Hungarian manufacturing industry, including removals, amounted to \$345,000,000, of which \$124,200,000 was due to removals by Soviet forces.

Note has also been taken of the view of the Soviet Government that "one of the main reasons for the difficult economic situation in Hungary is the fact that a large quantity of Hungarian property and

valuables continues to this day to remain in the American zone of occupation on the territory of Austria and southern Germany where this property was shipped by the Salaszy Government during the period of the advance of the troops of the Red Army." The Soviet Government mentions a figure of about three billion dollars as the estimated value of this property.

In connection with this estimate I am instructed to direct the attention of the Soviet Government to official Hungarian statistics, which estimate all Hungarian war damages attributed to Germans and Nyilas, including destruction within the country and removals from the country, and including damage to real estate, at \$1,250,000,000. Since the property removed from Hungary is only a part of this total, and since only a part of the removed property ever reached the American zones, it is clear that the estimate cited by the Soviet Government is grossly exaggerated. This conclusion is indicated also by the fact that the Hungarian Government's estimate of total national wealth in 1943, excluding houses and buildings, amounted to only \$4,400,000,000.

Since the Hungarian Government is only now, at the request of my Government, in the course of preparing complete lists of Hungarian property believed to be located in the American zones of Germany and Austria, my Government is not yet in a position accurately to determine the total value of such property. The most important single item of Hungarian property in the American zones appears, however, to be the gold which was removed from Hungary to Austria by former officials of the Hungarian National Bank, and which the United States Government understands amounts to approximately \$32,000,000.

With respect to the status of Hungarian property located in the American zones of Germany and Austria, the Soviet Government will be interested to learn that my Government has notified the Hungarian Government of its intention to return to Hungary the looted gold in its custody, and to expedite restitution of identifiable looted property. Restitution of commercial inland water craft on the Danube will be deferred pending the outcome of discussions between the United States military authorities and the Soviet authorities in Vienna with a view toward establishing principles of freedom of movement of vessels on the Danube under the flags which they now fly without danger of seizure. This program of restitution is in accordance with and in implementation of the statement made by the Secretary of State to the Hungarian Premier in Washington.

As pointed out in the original letter of March 2, 1946, the United States Government, at the time of the signing of the Hungarian Armistice, reserved the right to reopen the question of Hungarian reparations. My Government agreed to the Armistice as a means of facilitating the speedy termination of hostilities. It believed that with careful management, Hungary might have been able to pay \$300,000,000 in reparations. It did not foresee that Hungary's production capacity and national income would be cut to half or less in the space of a few months, and that the reparations payable by Hungary in 1945, for example, would equal 24 percent of the national income. Likewise it did not foresee that Hungary would be required to surrender large quantities of goods and services over and above its reparations obligations.

My Government has noted the position taken by the Soviet Government with respect to the formulation by the Soviet Union, the

United Kingdom, and the United States, of a program which would assist the rehabilitation of Hungary and its reintegration with the general economy of Europe. The Soviet Government may be assured that it is not the policy of the Government of United States to force acceptance by Hungary of any economic program. The United States, in proposing tripartite discussion of an economic program for Hungary, had in mind the discussion of aid and assistance which the three powers could give to Hungary, once the economic obligations of that country were carefully defined and scheduled so as to permit their discharge without depriving the people of Hungary of their means of livelihood. The United States has no desire to impose a plan for Hungary's economy, but does desire to lend assistance to Hungary through a concert of policies such as was envisaged in the declaration made by the three powers at the Crimea Conference.

Hungarian Government officials have, in fact, requested such assistance of the three powers. The Hungarian Finance Minister submitted to the Soviet economic adviser of the Control Commission a report on the Hungarian economic and financial situation under date of December 3, 1945. This report concluded with the following statement:

The only way that we can see out of our serious financial and economic difficulties is a plan of reconstruction, to be carried out with the assistance of the Allied Powers, the objective of which would be to raise production to a substantially higher level than at present, and restore equilibrium in the country's economic and financial affairs.

Since, however, we cannot work out a plan of reconstruction until it is known what support we may count upon from the Allied Powers, there is an urgent necessity that the Allied Powers should send a commission which, with the cooperation of the Hungarian Government, would examine the economic and financial situation of the country and the methods by which assistance could be given. We should expect from the work of the commission a statement of what measures and what foreign assistance is necessary, in the present economic state of the country, with its present burdens and requirements, in order that the country may recover economically and be able to meet the triple obligation arising from reparations, other obligations under the Armistice Agreement and pre-war foreign debts.

The Soviet Chairman of the Control Commission refused to accept or to consider this report, nor would he agree to a proposal of the United States representative that there be established a subcommittee of the Control Commission to discuss questions of Hungarian industry, finance, and economics.

In view of the position taken by the Chairman, my Government cannot conclude that the willingness of the Soviet Chairman

to acquaint himself with such considerations as may be advanced by the representatives of the United States . . . concerning Hungary's economic situation

constitutes a satisfactory procedure for the solution of these problems.

I am instructed again to call attention to the obligation freely undertaken by the Soviet Union at the Yalta Conference in which the three heads of state agreed

to concert the policies of their three Governments in assisting . . . the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

Pursuant to this agreement, the United States Government again requests that instructions be sent to the Soviet representative in Hungary to concert with the American and British representatives



there in halting the present economic disintegration and to provide a framework within which the rehabilitation of that country, and its early reintegration with the general economy of Europe, will be possible. Finally, an immediate consideration is that the prompt issuance of such instructions would have a salutary effect on the financial stabilization program which the Hungarian Government is initiating on August 1, and in the interest of which the United States Government is returning to Hungary monetary gold reported to be valued at about \$32,000,000.

W. BEDELL SMITH.

(Bulletin, August 4, 1946, p. 229.)

#### SOVIET REPLY TO UNITED STATES NOTE ON HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC SITUATION

*Text of a note<sup>a</sup> from the Soviet Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, V. G. Dekanozov, to the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith*

July 27, 1946.

In connection with your letter of July 22, 1946 addressed to Minister of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov regarding the economic situation of Hungary and the payment by Hungary of reparations to the Soviet Union,<sup>b</sup> I consider it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that the data cited in your letter and the conclusions which you draw on the basis of this data do not correspond to reality.

In your letter you maintain that the difficulties observed at present in the economic life of Hungary are allegedly the result of the fact that the bulk of the current production of Hungarian industry is being consumed by reparations and by the satisfaction of other demands, as you express it, of the occupying power. You assert, moreover, that reparations consume from 80-90 percent of the production of heavy industry, including the production of iron, metal and machines. You add, that, moreover, from the supplies of the urban population the Red Army allegedly received from Hungary during the first months of 1945

almost all the supplies of meat, one sixth of the wheat and rye, more than one quarter of the vegetables, almost three quarters of the supply of lard

etc., and that thus reparations paid by Hungary, on the one hand, and the above withdrawals for the supply of the Red Army on the other hand, are the cause of the grievous economic situation of Hungary. The unfoundedness of such an assertion cannot fail to strike any unprejudiced person, particularly if one takes into account the fact that the entire sum of Hungarian reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union for 1945 did not exceed \$10,000,000, that is, constitutes a quite insignificant sum. This fact alone is sufficient to demonstrate the complete lack of foundation of the assertion in your letter that the bulk of Hungarian production is being consumed by reparations.

The extent of the unfoundedness of these assertions is apparent from the fact that the Hungarian Government addressing on May 28 of this year, a request to the Soviet Government to fix a plan for reparations deliveries for 1946-53 itself fixed the amount of these deliveries for 1946 as \$21,800,000. Under these circumstances the statement to the

<sup>a</sup> Translation by the American Embassy in Moscow.

<sup>b</sup> For text of U. S. note, see Bulletin of August 4, 1946, p. 229.

effect that the reparations obligations of Hungary are excessive, "crushing" and so on is deprived of any foundation.

The Soviet Government, taking into account the economic difficulties of Hungary, already a year ago made considerable concessions to the Hungarian Government, extending the term of reparation deliveries to eight years from six years, prescribed by the armistice agreement. The Soviet Government fully satisfied also the above request of the Hungarian Government for further concessions to Hungary regarding reparations, fully accepting the plan proposed by the Hungarian Government on May 28 for further reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union. According to this plan, reparations deliveries for 1946 are fixed at a sum of \$21,800,000; for 1947 23,000,000; for 1948, 25,000,000; for 1949-53, 30,000,000 annually. At the same time the Soviet Government released Hungary from payment of a fine of 6,000,000 for non-fulfillment on time of reparations deliveries in the first year in which the reparations agreement was in force. To the above must be added, that according to the Soviet-Hungarian trade agreement, Hungary received from the Soviet Union in the past year 1945, goods to the amount of \$6,300,000, while at the same time Hungary itself delivered to the Soviet Union goods only to the amount of \$26,600. If, thus, there are taken into account goods received by Hungary from the Soviet Union to the value of 6,300,000 then, in the account, it turns out that all Hungarian deliveries for the Soviet Union do not exceed \$3,700,000.

In your letter you state that the American Government agreeing to the conditions of the armistice with Hungary did not foresee that

the productive power of Hungary and its national income would be reduced by half or even more in the course of a few months and that, for example, reparations subject to payment by Hungary in 1945 would equal 24 percent of the national income.

For a statement of this sort there are no foundations of reality. The above cited data prove fully convincingly that the extent of reparations pointed out in your letter, subject to delivery by Hungary in 1945 to no extent correspond to the real scope of these deliveries, constituting an entirely insignificant amount.

This is the real state of affairs regarding taking of reparations from Hungary for the benefit of the Soviet Union.

The situation also is the same with regard to the data on the supplying the Red Army at the expense of the Hungarian economy cited in your letter, particularly the data regarding wheat, rye, oats, meats, etc. All these data are entirely incorrect. In reality the Soviet forces received not more than three percent of the total amount of these cultures of the 1945 harvest and of fats not more than eight percent by head of swine. The Hungarian Government did not make deliveries of industrial products for the Red Army, with exception of fuel and a certain amount of commissary supplies.

Citing its data, the Government of the US made use of clearly incorrect information which can only create confusion.

It is impossible not to note the quite arbitrary characterization contained in your letter of the economic *situation* of Hungary. The data at the disposal of the Soviet Government do not confirm this characterization. In reality the capacity of the industrial enterprises of Hungary curtailed as the result of the war to 60 percent of

the prewar level, had by the middle of July 1946 risen to 70-85 percent in the production of pig iron, steel, rolled metal and machine building and to 85-90 percent in light industry. If the output of industrial production in Hungary in 1945 constituted 30-35 percent of the prewar level at the present time, the output of production has been brought to 60 percent of the prewar level. Thus, despite the existing difficulties, Hungary, since the termination of the war, has increased the productive capacity of its industry by 20-25 percent and by 25-30 percent the output of industrial production. These successes have been achieved despite the fact that the Germans and the followers of Szalshai carried off to Germany a large quantity of the most valuable industrial equipment and raw materials which, like the removed Hungarian gold, fell into the hands of the American Government and to the present time has still not been returned to Hungary. Such a situation, deriving from the policy carried out by the American authorities creates extremely difficult economic conditions for Hungary and is in complete contradiction with the statements of the US Government regarding the necessity of accelerating the economic restoration of Hungary. In your letter of July 22 it is stated that the information regarding the amount of Hungarian property carried off by the Germans and the followers of Szalshai which is already for the second year in the American zone of occupation is exaggerated. But the American Government, as you state, is still preparing lists of Hungarian property plundered and carried away to Germany and Austria and has still not determined the value of this property. The Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy in his statement in Parliament on February 7 of the present year declared that the Hungarian Government had registered the property located in the American zone of occupation of Germany and Austria at more than 2 billion. Besides this, the Hungarian Prime Minister added that as the property which had been carried away came to light this sum would reach about 3 billion. This fully corresponds to the figure of 3 million indicated in the note of the Soviet Government of April 21, 1946.

Speaking of the economic situation of Hungary, it is impossible not to note that despite the difficulties existing in this sphere, a number of new factory shops and plants have also been restored and reequipped. It is worth noting such facts as the construction of a new plant for the production of machine tools, the new "Reniks Electric Resistance Plant", and a number of shops for the production of automobile pistons, the reconstruction of the tractor shop in the "Hoferstrans" plant, the restoration and reequipping of various shops in the "Rossman", "Kozma", and other plants. The expansion of the aluminum rolling and wares plant, large scale work on the reequipping of the "Hans" electro mechanical plant. All these facts indicate that the process of the restoration of industry is proceeding in Hungary and that the reparations obligations in Hungary are in no way hindering this process. In the same way is refuted the assertion contained in your letter that the bulk of Hungarian production of current output is allegedly being consumed by reparations and that nothing remains for the restoration of Hungarian economy and for the internal needs of Hungary. Such an assertion is refuted also by the fact that during the second half of

1945 almost 50 percent of the entire rolled metal output went to the needs of Hungarian economy.

In your letter of July 22 there is contained the entirely incorrect assertion that the Soviet authorities have allegedly removed in Hungary industrial equipment in the amount of \$124,000,000. Such statements do not have any foundation and only elicit surprise with regard to the sources of the information which has been utilized in this connection. The Soviet forces removed from Hungary as trophy equipment certain military enterprises of a value not exceeding \$11,000,000.

With regard to the proposal of the American Government that the representatives of the Soviet Union, US and Great Britain in the Control Commission jointly work out a plan for the economic restoration of Hungary, the Soviet Government as before, considers this proposal not acceptable inasmuch as was pointed out in the letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 21, the working of such a plan belongs exclusively to the competence of the Hungarian Government (Bulletin, August 11, 1946, p. 263).

## 12. ECONOMIC SITUATION IN HUNGARY

### United States assistance toward rehabilitation of Hungary

[Released to the press September 24, 1946]

On March 2, 1946 the Government of the United States in a note to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics asked for tripartite consideration of the economic situation in Hungary in accordance with the obligation undertaken by the heads of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the Crimea Conference. In a reply of April 21, A. Y. Vyshinsky rejected this proposal. The United States made a further approach in a note of July 22. V. G. Dekanozov, Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a note of July 27<sup>10</sup> again rejected the proposal of the United States for tripartite consideration of the economic situation in Hungary, but no reference was made to the obligation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Crimea Declaration.

Notwithstanding the failure of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to agree to tripartite cooperation in assisting Hungary, the United States has undertaken, within limits imposed upon it by the lack of such cooperation, to render such assistance as might be effective toward the rehabilitation of Hungary. The Government of the United States has already voluntarily returned to Hungary gold valued at approximately \$32,000,000. The Government of the United States has also granted Hungary a long-term credit amounting to \$15,000,000 for the purchase of surplus property. In addition, the United States commanders in Germany and Austria have been instructed to restitute identifiable displaced property removed under duress from Hungary.<sup>11</sup> Despite the United States' endeavors to expedite action in this matter, return of such property to Hungary from Germany has been delayed by failure to obtain quadripartite approval of the restitution program

<sup>10</sup> Bulletin of August 11, 1946, p. 263.

<sup>11</sup> Bulletin of June 30, 1946, p. 1120.

in the Allied Control Council, Berlin, and the Soviet Government is one of the governments whose approval of this measure intended to help Hungarian economy has not been readily forthcoming. This concrete affirmative aid by the United States is designed to assist Hungarian rehabilitation directly; on the other hand Soviet aid mentioned in the Soviet Government's note of July 27 consists principally of partial postponement of economic drains on the Hungarian economy in the form of reparations. Meanwhile it is understood that requisitions and removals by the Soviet Army are, in practice, continuing.

#### FURTHER URGING OF TRIPARTITE COOPERATION ON HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

In view of this obviously unsatisfactory state of affairs and in order to fulfil the obligations which it shares with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom under the Crimea Declaration, the United States has instructed its representative in Moscow to communicate a further note to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding tripartite cooperation in assisting Hungary to solve its pressing economic problems. The text of the note follows:

Moscow, September 21, 1946.

His Excellency VICTOR GEORGE DEKANOZOV,  
*Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,*  
*Moscow.*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor under instructions from my Government to communicate to you the following:

The Soviet Government in its note of July 27, 1946 regarding the economic situation in Hungary has disputed the facts contained in the note of July 22, 1946, which was sent on instructions of my Government. I have been instructed by my Government to state that it cannot accept the statements set forth in the Soviet Government's note of July 27, 1946, as a refutation of the facts contained in the United States' note of July 22, 1946, which were based on careful study. I have also been instructed to say that my Government not only reaffirms those facts as presenting an accurate account of the economic situation in Hungary but that they have been confirmed, to the satisfaction of my Government by information obtained subsequent to the delivery of the United States' note of July 22, 1946.

My Government has regretfully concluded that it will be impossible to obtain agreement between our two Governments as to the exact situation now existing in Hungary and as to the causes of that situation, and accordingly my Government considers that no useful purpose will be served by further assertions and denials.

On the other hand, there can be no question of the fact that assistance is required by Hungary if that country is to solve its pressing economic problems and contribute to the general economic recovery of Europe. As pointed out in the United States' note of July 22, 1946, the Hungarian Government had requested the assistance of the Allied Powers in solving the serious financial and economic difficulties facing that country during its period of rehabilitation.

In short, the need of Hungary for assistance to facilitate its economic recovery is not only obvious to all, but is emphasized by representatives of the Hungarian Government itself.

In the circumstances, my Government must again draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the undertaking entered into by the President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, at the Crimea Conference, when they jointly declared "their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting . . . the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems." This is an obligation which my Government cannot ignore. My Government does not believe that the Soviet Government will wish to deny that the situation existing in Hungary today is just such a one as was envisaged by the declaration quoted above.

Reference was made to this undertaking, entered into by the Soviet Government at Yalta, in the notes of March 2, 1946, and July 22, 1946, to the Soviet Government, but the notes of the Soviet Government of April 21, 1946, and July 27, 1946, have not been responsive on this point. It is a matter of regret to the United States Government that the Soviet Government not only has refused to implement the undertaking freely assumed by it at the Crimea Conference, but moreover has failed to indicate its reasons for so refusing.

Despite the unwillingness heretofore shown by the Soviet Government in this regard, the American representative on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary stands ready at any time to consult with his Soviet and British Colleagues to implement the obligation assumed by the three governments at Yalta by assisting Hungary to stabilize its economy and by providing a framework within which the rehabilitation of that country and its early integration with the general economy of Europe will be possible.

Please accept [etc.]

ELBRIDGE DUBROW

*Chargé d' Affaires ad interim*

(Bulletin, October 6, 1946, p. 637.)

### 13. UNITED STATES OPPOSES INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY BY SOVIET HIGH COMMAND

[Released to the press March 6, 1947]

The Government of the United States, in keeping with its undertakings as a signatory of the Yalta Declaration, its responsibility under the armistice as a participant in the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, and its determination to assist the Hungarian people toward the establishment of democratic independence as envisaged in the peace treaty with Hungary, is impelled at this time to express its feeling of concern at the political crisis which has now been precipitated in Hungary. The pattern of recent political developments in Hungary appears to threaten the right of the people to live under a government of their own free choosing, for it involves foreign inter-

ference in the domestic affairs of Hungary in support of repeated aggressive attempts by Hungarian minority elements to coerce the popularly elected majority.

Unable to achieve their political ends through normal constitutional processes, the Hungarian Communists, together with other members of the Leftist bloc, have endeavored to implicate a number of representatives of the majority Smallholders Party in a recently revealed plot against the Republic and, by demanding the withdrawal of parliamentary immunity from Smallholders deputies, to weaken the parliamentary position to which that party was duly elected by the Hungarian people. Simultaneously, police and administrative authorities responsive to the dictates of these minority elements have utilized their powers of investigation of the conspiracy not toward the expeditious judicial resolution of a threat against the state but to conduct a general campaign against their political opponents.

The Soviet High Command in Hungary has now, by direct intervention, brought the situation to a crisis. Following the refusal of the Smallholders Party to abrogate, in connection with the investigation of the conspiracy, the parliamentary immunity of Deputy Béla Kovács, until recently Secretary General of the Smallholders Party, Soviet occupation forces have arrested Mr. Kovács. The grounds given for that arrest are allegations that he "actively participated in the formation of subversive and anti-Soviet terror groups" and "in organizing espionage directed against the Soviet Union". Despite the importance of this step, this Soviet action has been taken unilaterally without prior discussion with the United States and United Kingdom representatives on the Allied Control Commission. On the basis of its present information, the United States Government believes these grounds and the charges are unwarranted.

These developments, in the opinion of the United States Government, constitute an unjustified interference in Hungarian internal affairs, the effect of which will be to support the efforts of a small group in Hungary to substitute a minority dictatorship for a responsible administration representative of the will of the Hungarian people as expressed in free and untrammelled elections. The United States Government is opposed to this attempt to nullify the electoral mandate given by the Hungarian people.

In these circumstances, the United States Government requests that the Soviet and British representatives on the Allied Control Commission be instructed by their respective governments to join with the United States representative on the Allied Control Commission in examining, in cooperation with the Hungarian Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, Minister of Justice, and President of the National Assembly, the facts of the present situation, including the case of Mr. Kovács and the conspiracy, and in making recommendations to the Hungarian Government as to steps which should be taken for an orderly solution. The United States Government also requests that the Soviet authorities take no further measures without consulting the United States and United Kingdom representatives on the Allied Control Commission.

The above views of the United States Government have been communicated to the Soviet Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary and to the Hungarian, Soviet, and British Governments (Bulletin, March 16, 1947, p. 495).

# 14. UNITED STATES REITERATES POSITION ON SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN HUNGARY

EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE ON ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION FOR HUNGARY AND THE SOVIET ACTING CHAIRMAN

[Released to the press March 17, 1947]

*Text of a communication<sup>12</sup> which Brig. Gen. George H. Weems, United States Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, has addressed to Lt. Gen. V. P. Sviridov, Soviet Acting Chairman of the Commission, under date of March 17, 1947, in reply to the latter's communication of March 8*

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of March 8, 1947, in reply to the note which I addressed to you on March 5<sup>14</sup> concerning political developments in Hungary and, on instructions from my Government, to transmit the following comment of the United States Government thereon.

The United States Government has carefully considered the Soviet views set forth in your communication. However, it is noted that your letter fails to take account of the following circumstances alluded to in my note of March 5.

(1) Investigation of the plot against the state has to date been conducted only by Communist-dominated police organs. While the Smallholders Party has endeavored to obtain agreement to a Parliamentary investigation, on an inter-Party basis, of allegations concerning the involvement in the conspiracy of members of the National Assembly, the Communists have declined to accept such a procedure;

(2) Of four representatives of political parties who, with a jurist chairman, comprise the people's court, which is now conducting trials of certain individuals alleged to have been involved in this plot, three are representative of parties aligned in a minority bloc as against one selected by the majority Smallholders;

(3) Concerning the arrest of Béla Kovács, although normal arrests by occupation forces for the purpose of maintaining the security of such forces could not of course be objected to on the grounds of unwarranted intervention, the arrest of Mr. Kovács by the Soviet authorities cannot, on the face of it, be considered of such a nature. It is noted that the arrest was not made until the Hungarian Communist Party had, without avail, resorted to numerous stratagems to obtain the waiver of Mr. Kovács' Parliamentary immunity and his arrest by the political police. During that period there was no indication that he might be suspected of activities against the Soviet occupation forces.

In the circumstances, the United States Government cannot, in the light of all the information available, agree with the interpretation of Hungarian political developments contained in your communica-

<sup>12</sup> The full text of the new U. S. note to the Soviet Acting Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, made public on March 17, was broadcast twice in the Hungarian language on March 18 between 12:30 and 1 p. m., and from 3:45 to 4 p. m., from the New York studios of the Voice of the United States of America, operated by the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State. Reports from Hungary indicate that, although the full text of the note has been made available to the Hungarian press by the U. S. Information Service at Budapest, it has not yet been published in Hungary. Should the note not be published in Hungary during the next few days, the full text will be repeated by voice short-wave broadcast in Hungarian at the two transmission times. A summary of the note was broadcast in the Russian language at 1 p. m. on March 18.

<sup>14</sup> Bulletin of March 16, 1947, p. 495.



tion under acknowledgement. It seems clear to the United States Government that minority groups under the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party are attempting to seize power through resort to extra-constitutional tactics. In the opinion of the United States this clearly threatens the continuance of democracy in Hungary. In such a situation, the United States Government considers that the powers signatory to the agreement concluded at Yalta in regard to liberated Europe are obligated to undertake concerted action to investigate political conditions in Hungary. The need for such consultation and investigation becomes all the more imperative because of the fact that there is disagreement between the Soviet and United States Governments on a matter of so basic importance to Hungary. In my Government's view it cannot be contended that such an investigation would, as you suggest, improperly impair the legal rights of the Hungarian courts or that my Government's concern with regard to the case of Béla Kovács constitutes an infringement of the right of the Soviet occupation authorities to take reasonable measures for the maintenance of the security of the occupation forces.

*Text of translation of note dated March 8 from Lt. Gen. V. P. Sviridov, Soviet Acting Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, to Brig. Gen. George H. Weems, United States Representative on the Commission*

In reply to your letter of March 5 of this year in which you put forth the point of view of your Government in regard to the latest political events in Hungary, I have the honor to inform you of the following:

The democratic regime and the Hungarian Government were threatened by an anti-constitutional and anti-republican conspiracy and not by the minority parties, there being no basis for the accusation that they strive to deprive the Smallholder Party of their legal power and to establish a dictatorship of the minority, because they stand on the basis of the Hungarian Constitution.

The existence of an anti-constitutional plot and the threat that it represented to the young Hungarian democracy is not denied even by the Smallholder Party itself. Concerning this they have made announcements many times in press as well as in many appearances of their leader Ferenc Nagy. The fact that among the plotters were to be found many representatives of the Smallholder Party and among the Smallholder members of the Parliament is not the fault of the police or the parties of the leftist bloc. The Smallholder Party itself admitted the guilt of these plotters, members of this party, and has voluntarily agreed to deprive them of their parliamentary immunity and to turn them over to the Government. Therefore, your statement, Mr. General, that the minority parties attempted to involve representatives of the Smallholder Party in the plot appears to be without proof and without foundation.

The investigations on the subject of the plot, as is known, have already been completed by the Hungarian authorities and the case of the plotters is at present being investigated by the Independent Democratic Court of the Hungarian Republic. On this basis I cannot agree to your proposal for a mutual investigation of the present situation and the plot because this would appear to be an open intervention into the internal affairs of the Hungarian Republic and a rude violation of the legal rights of the Hungarian Peoples Court.

Your intervention in the case of Béla Kovács I cannot regard otherwise than as an attempt to infringe on the legal rights of the Soviet occupation authorities to defend their armed forces located on Hungarian territory and I, therefore, cannot agree to such intervention on the part of the Government of the United States of America. The arrest of Béla Kovács for crimes directed against the Soviet occupation armies cannot be regarded as an intervention on the part of the Soviet occupation authorities into the internal affairs of Hungary.

I am sending this letter simultaneously to the Chief of the British Mission on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, General Edgumbe (Bulletin, March 30, 1947, p. 583).

#### 15. PROTEST OF ARREST OF HUNGARIAN SMALLHOLDERS PARTY LEADER

NOTE FROM U. S. REPRESENTATIVE ON ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION FOR HUNGARY TO SOVIET ACTING CHAIRMAN

[Released to the press June 11, 1947]

*The United States Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, Brig. Gen. George H. Weems, was instructed to deliver the following note to Lt. Gen. V. P. Sviridov, Soviet Acting Chairman of the ACC. Copies of this note were also furnished the Hungarian Government through the Legation at Budapest and the British and Soviet Governments through the Embassies at London and Moscow*

On instructions from my Government, I addressed you two communications, on March 5,<sup>13</sup> and March 17,<sup>14</sup> regarding developments in Hungary, including the arrest on February 25 by the Soviet occupation forces of Béla Kovács, a parliamentary deputy of the majority Smallholders Party and a former Secretary General of that party. On both occasion I proposed the establishment of a commission, composed of representatives of the three powers on the Allied Control Commission, to investigate the situation created by that action and by the large-scale apprehension, by the Hungarian police, of other representatives of the majority party on charges of complicity in a conspiracy against the authority of the Hungarian state. My Government considered and continues to consider the effect of these actions as threatening the continuance of democratic processes in Hungary

In reply you stated that the arrest of Kovács was the exclusive concern of the Soviet occupation forces because he was charged with crimes against those forces. Hence, you contended, his arrest could not be regarded "as an intervention on the part of the Soviet occupation authorities in the internal affairs of Hungary." You argued further that a three-power investigation of the arrests of other members of the Smallholders Party by the Communist-controlled Ministry of Interior would be an interference with the internal affairs of Hungary and therefore was refused. Thus, it appeared that to investigate the arrest of alleged Smallholder Party members charged with conspiracy against the state would interfere with Hungarian affairs, while for the occupation forces to arrest one of the most important alleged plot-

<sup>13</sup> Bulletin of March 16, 1947, p. 495.

<sup>14</sup> Bulletin of March 30, 1947, p. 583.

ters was not such interference by the simple process of charging him with another offense.

It now develops, however, that his offense was the same conspiracy which could not be investigated by three powers but which has in fact been investigated by one and which has led to a most flagrant interference in Hungarian affairs. Information relating to Hungarian political affairs, alleged to have been elicited from Béla Kovács during his detention incommunicado by the Soviet occupation forces, has been furnished by the Soviet authorities to the Communist Deputy Prime Minister of the Hungarian Government in such circumstances as to force the resignation of the Hungarian Prime Minister and other important leaders of the majority Smallholders Party and to bring about the reorganization of the Hungarian Government. The United States and United Kingdom members of the Allied Control Commission have been kept in ignorance of this information in clear violation of paragraph 6 (c) of the statutes of the Allied Control Commission which provides that the United States and United Kingdom representatives on the Allied Control Commission shall have the right "to receive copies of all communications, reports and other documents which may interest the governments of the United States and United Kingdom". My Government has taken note that this action has resulted in the realignment of political authority in Hungary so that a minority which obtained 17 percent of popular support in the last free election has nullified the expressed will of the majority of the Hungarian people, a situation which has apparently been admitted by the leader of the Communist minority, Rákosi, who is reported to have taken public satisfaction that his "iron-fisted" party, "conscious of its aims", has thus been able to take over control of Hungary.

My Government protests this unilateral action in violation of the Yalta agreements and this Soviet interference in Hungarian political affairs in derogation of the continued exercise of democratic rights in that country and of the freely expressed will of the Hungarian people and again requests, as a member of the Allied Control Commission, the expeditious establishment of a three-power commission to examine the situation as a matter of urgency. Unless this or some equally effective action to bring about adequate investigation is agreed upon, my Government, conscious of its obligations under the Yalta declaration, as a signatory of the armistice with Hungary, and as a member of the United Nations, will consider such further action as may be appropriate in the circumstances.

#### REPLY FROM SOVIET ACTING CHAIRMAN TO U. S. NOTE ON HUNGARY

*Translation of General Sviridov's reply of June 14 to General Weems' note of June 11*

Confirming receipt of your letter of 11 June this year, I have honor to inform you that I cannot agree with the evaluation of the political situation in Hungary given in your letter. Your assertion of some change in the political power in Hungary, the nullification of the will of the majority of the Hungarian people and also of establishment of some kind of control over Hungary by the minority appears to be unfounded fiction.

It is known to all that the governmental crisis in Hungary was caused by the refusal of former Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy to re-

turn to the country notwithstanding the suggestion of Hungarian Government and leadership of the independent Smallholders Party, and his voluntary resignation which followed later.

This crisis was solved through efforts of all parties of coalition government in strict conformity with constitutional standards.

The new Hungarian Government headed by Prime Minister Lajos Dinnyes retained the previous distribution of portfolios among the coalition parties and remained basically the same as in the previous body. Towards this government was expressed the confidence of the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian people, which fact is attested by the declaration of national committee, signed by President of the Republic and leaders of all coalition parties, as well as unanimous decision of confidence and granting of authority to the government by Hungarian Parliament.

All these facts have been widely publicized and undoubtedly are known to you; therefore after I had acquainted myself with your letter I could not help but notice in it attempts, under the disguise of defense of Hungarian democracy, to render support to separate individuals who have entangled themselves with conspirators, fled abroad from their people.

As far as concerns your statement of violation by me of paragraph 6 (c) of the statutes of the Allied Control Commission, in connection with turning over depositions in case of Béla Kovács to Hungarian Government, in conformity with request of Ferenc Nagy, this statement is based on a misunderstanding since these documents, as I have already notified you in my letter of 9 June, have no relation whatsoever to the activities of the Allied Control Commission.

Based on the foregoing I decline your protest as completely baseless since I cannot, from my point of view, see any unilateral actions which violate the Yalta Agreement; and also consider as fiction the statement of Soviet interference in Hungarian political affairs.

Taking the above into consideration I cannot agree with your proposal to establish a three-power commission to investigate the situation in Hungary, since I do not see any necessity for it and consider that this would be a rude interference in Hungarian internal affairs, which is not permissible (Bulletin, June 22, 1947, p. 1215).

#### 16. AMERICAN CITIZEN ARRESTED IN HUNGARY ON CHARGE OF "ANTI-DEMOCRATIC UTTERANCES"

##### UNITED STATES SUBMITS VIGOROUS PROTEST

[Released to the press August 5, 1947]

Stephen T. Thuransky, an American citizen, was arrested in Balasagyarmat, Hungary, on the night of August 1 by political police. He was brought to the public prosecutor's prison at Budapest on August 2. On the night of August 2 Harrison Lewis, Secretary of the American Legation, went to see him at the Hungarian police jail (Nepugyészeg) and to demand his delivery into the custody of the American Legation. Mr. Lewis asked a police captain to deliver Mr. Thuransky to him, which request was refused. Mr. Lewis then started out to seek Ferenc Tibor, Deputy Supreme Prosecutor, found Mrs. Thuransky outside the jail, and took her with him in the Legation car. Mr. Tibor was not found at home. Mr. Lewis returned to the jail and left Mrs. Thuransky in the car. Mr. Lewis then demanded that he

see Mr. Thuransky and that Mr. Thuransky be delivered to the American Legation on the ground that, since the peace treaty was not ratified, the American Legation had the right to demand that an American citizen held by the Hungarian authorities for an alleged political offense be delivered to it.

After further delay Mr. Lewis again demanded that permission for delivery to the custody of the Legation be obtained by phone from a proper authority no matter how high. While he was still waiting to see Mr. Thuransky, he heard Mrs. Thuransky crying his name from the car outside where he had left her. Mr. Lewis and the Legation driver ran out of the room, down the hall, and out the entrance to the street. Mr. Lewis found a man on the floor in the back of the Legation car with his feet hanging out of the open door. He crawled in and recognized him as Mr. Thuransky. He seemed to be hurt and unconscious. Mr. Lewis folded Mr. Thuransky's legs in and closed the door. There were a number of guards and other people present, but nobody attempted to interfere nor did anyone speak to Mr. Lewis. As the man was apparently in immediate danger, Mr. Lewis ordered the driver to drive off and brought Mr. Thuransky and his wife to the Chancery for safety.

The American Legation was unable, despite repeated efforts, to get in touch on August 3 with any person in authority in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Interior or the Prime Ministry. On August 5 the American Minister, Selden Chapin, had an interview with Acting Foreign Minister Erno Mihalyfi, strongly protested the arrest of Mr. Thuransky, and left him with an *aide-mémoire*. Mr. Mihalyfi disclaimed all knowledge of the incident, assured Minister Chapin of the Hungarian Government's intention to observe the letter and spirit of the armistice, and promised immediate investigation and prompt reply to his representations.

#### EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND HUNGARY

[Released to the press August 5, 1947]

*The American Minister in Budapest delivered the following aide-mémoire to the Acting Foreign Minister of Hungary on August 4* <sup>15</sup>

At approximately 8:30 on the evening of August 1, the State Defense Section of the Hungarian Police arrested Stephen T. Thuransky, an American citizen and the bearer of a valid American passport, in the town of Balassagyarmat, where Mr. Thuransky was at the time residing. Mr. Thuransky's status as an American citizen was known to the police authorities of Balassagyarmat. According to the arresting authorities, Mr. Thuransky was taken into custody under authority of Act 7 of 1946, otherwise known as the Defense of the Republic Act, under charges of "anti-democratic utterances".

The arrest by Hungarian authorities on purely political charges of a citizen of the United States of America, which the Hungarian Government is reminded is one of the signatories, in the capacity of a victorious power, of the Armistice Agreement with Hungary, is absolutely inadmissible.

That a Government which by its own admission is not in possession of full sovereignty should so overstep its competence and so violate

\* Printed from telegraphic text.

courtesy customary in relations between states as to even contemplate police action on political charges against a citizen of the United States, a power represented on the Allied Control Commission, is wholly without precedent and is just cause for vigorous protest.

Despite repeated attempts on August 2 and 3 by the Legation to reach appropriate officials of the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior, the Hungarian Government has still not officially notified the American Legation of the arrest of this individual or replied to the Legation's inquiries. Furthermore, officials of the Ministry of Interior approached in this matter have been uncooperative to the extreme and in some cases inadmissibly insolent. The Legation takes a most serious view of this incident and deems that such action as this, without (1) suitable apology, (2) immediate assurances from the Hungarian Government that such incidents will not occur in the future, and (3) assurances that any property belonging to Mr. Thuransky which may have been removed by Hungarian Government authorities from his person or his residence will be immediately returned, will be cause for most serious concern to the Government of the United States. The United States Government is being kept fully informed of this incident.

*The Hungarian Acting Foreign Minister replied on August 4 as follows*<sup>15</sup>

With respect to the aide-memoire handed over on August 4, 1947, the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs got at once in touch with the Hungarian Minister of the Interior and on the basis of the latter's information communicates to the Legation that within twenty-four hours the minutes of Mr. Stephen Thuransky's affair will be at his disposal, of which the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs will send a detailed account to the Legation of the United States.

However, on the basis of the information obtained, the Minister for Foreign Affairs is already able to inform the Legation of the United States that Mr. Stephen Thuransky was arrested by the Hungarian authorities, a consequence of his revolting and scandalizing vilifications in public at Balassagyarmat as to the person of the President of the Hungarian Republic and several members of the Hungarian Government, thus committing an offense against the laws valid equally for everybody.

At the same time, the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, has the honor to call to the attention of the Legation of the United States in Budapest to the fact that at the very moment when the above named Stephen Thuransky was accompanied to the criminal court for his hearing, he was carried away by unknown individuals who pushed him into a car just driving up and bearing an American tag and dashed off.

The Hungarian Government was compelled to notify the incident to the Allied Control Commission.

The American Minister is being instructed to inform the Hungarian Foreign Minister that the Hungarian attitude in this matter is unsatisfactory. The United States Representative on the Allied Control Commission has also approached the Soviet Chairman of that body in connection with this case (Bulletin, August 17, 1947, p. 330).

<sup>15</sup> Printed from telegraphic text.

## 17. AMERICAN PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM IRAN

[Released to the press November 26, 1945]

The American Ambassador in Moscow, acting under instructions from the Secretary of State, delivered a note to the Soviet Government on November 24 concerning the situation in Iran. The proposal concerning withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran contained in this note has also been made simultaneously to the British Government.

The note to the Soviet Government reads textually as follows:

The Government of Iran has informed the Government of the United States that armed uprisings have taken place in areas of northern Iran where Soviet troops are stationed; that the Iranian Government has directed certain of its armed forces to enter those areas for the purpose of reestablishing internal security and its own authority; that Soviet military commanders have refused to permit these forces to proceed; and that consequently the Iranian Government has not been able to carry out its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order in Iranian territory.

It will be recalled that on December 1, 1943, Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt signed in Tehran a declaration in which they stated that their Governments were "at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran." This Government has entire confidence that the Governments of the Soviet Union and Great Britain are just as zealous as the Government of the United States meticulously to abide by the assurances contained in this declaration. In the view of this Government the fulfillment of these assurances requires that the Government of Iran should have full freedom, without interference from Soviet, British, or American military or civil authorities, to move its armed forces through Iran in such a manner as it may consider necessary in order to preserve its authority and to maintain internal security.

The Government of the United States realizes that any Soviet commanders in the area concerned who may have prevented the free movement of Iranian forces may have been acting without the sanction of the Soviet Government. If the Soviet commanders have been acting without instructions in this matter, it is assumed that the Soviet Government is issuing to them instructions in keeping with the declaration referred to above. In any event the situation which has arisen has convinced the American Government that it would be in the common interest for all Soviet, British, and American troops to be withdrawn immediately from Iran. As long as any of these troops remain in the territory of a friendly government, incidents and misunderstandings are likely to occur. The Government of the United States has already reduced its forces in Iran during the present year from a maximum strength of approximately 28,000 to less than 6,000. There are no American combat troops in Iran. Those who remain are engaged in activities exclusively of a service nature connected with the liquidation and disposal of military supplies and the operation of certain important communications connected with demobilization. While the immediate withdrawal of these troops will cause considerable inconvenience to this Government, nevertheless, instructions are being issued to the American military authorities in Iran to take immediate steps to effect the complete withdrawal of all American forces from Iran by January 1, 1946. This Government proposes that the British and Soviet Governments issue similar instructions to their commanders and that arrangements be made immediately for the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran by January 1, 1946. Immediate steps to effect such withdrawal would dispel any doubt regarding the intentions of the three Governments to carry out the assurances given by them. In making this suggestion the Government of the United States is aware that no undertaking has been given that these troops are to be removed from Iran before March 2, 1946. On the other hand, now that hostilities have ceased, it sees no compelling reason for them to remain until that date. It is of the opinion that immediate steps to effect withdrawal by January 1, not only would obviate possible misunderstandings but would also be a fitting recognition of the notable contributions which Iran, a member in good standing of the United Nations, has made to the common war effort.

Nations such as Iran were encouraged at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco to place full trust in the friendly intentions and good will of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Government of the United States is confident that the Soviet Union and Great Britain are no less anxious than the United States, in dealing with nations such as Iran, to follow a line of action which will make it clear that the trust of these nations in the permanent members of the Security Council has not been misplaced.

Similar proposals are being made to the British Government.

(Bulletin, December 2, 1945, p. 884.)

SOVIET REPLY TO AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM  
IRAN

[Released to the press December 8, 1945]

*Translation of note addressed by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Embassy of the United States at Moscow on November 29, 1945, referring to the Embassy's note of November 24.*

The statement made in that communication concerning the armed uprising in northern Iran does not, according to information at the disposal of the Soviet Government, correspond to reality. The events which have taken place in recent days in Iran not only do not constitute an armed uprising but also are not directed against the Shahkin Shakh Government of Iran. Now that the declaration of the Popular Assembly of Northern Iran has been published, it is evident that this is a matter of aspirations with respect to the assurance of the democratic rights of Azerbaijanian population of northern Iran which is seeking national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian state and which has its own particular language, different from the Persian language. It is also apparent from the contents of the above-mentioned declaration of the Popular Assembly which took place in Tabriz November 20 to 21 that the Popular Assembly addressed the expression of its wishes to the Shah, the Majlis, and the Government of Iran, basing itself in this on the Iranian Constitution. The undesirable incidents which have taken place in conjunction with these recent events at various points of northern Iran have been caused by reactionary elements which have opposed the extension of national rights to the populations of northern Iran, although there is nothing in these desires of the local population which is unusual for a democratic state.

As far as the Soviet military command is concerned it has not hindered, and is not hindering, the movements of the Iranian military forces and the gendarme police units which are in the districts of northern Iran. According to information at the disposal of the Soviet Government there are in these districts of Iran one infantry regiment, two infantry brigades, two regiments of gendarme police units, the presence of which can assure order and calm in these parts. The Soviet Government opposed the dispatch of new Iranian troops to northern districts of Iran and informed the Iranian Government that the dispatch of further Iranian forces to northern Iran could cause not the cessation but the increase of the disorders and likewise bloodshed, which would compel the Soviet Government to introduce into Iran further forces of its own for the purpose of preserving order and of assuring the security of Soviet garrison. In as much as the Soviet Government considers the further introduction of Soviet forces into Iran undesirable, it took the position that the introduction of



new Iranian forces into the northern province of Iran at the present time would serve no useful purpose.

As to the reference in the communication of the Government of the United States to the Three Power declaration concerning Iran December 1, 1943, the Soviet Government as far as it is concerned must state that it adheres unwaveringly to the principles of that declaration. The declaration in question, however, does not affect questions of the number of Soviet armed forces in Iranian territory just as it does not affect the question of the period of the stationing of Soviet troops in Iran. This latter is determined by another document, namely the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Tripartite Treaty of 1942, and in connection with the stationing of its troops in Iran notwithstanding the fact that the right of introduction of Soviet troops into the territory of Iran was envisaged by the Soviet-Iranian treaty of February 26, 1941. Furthermore, as the Government of the United States is aware, the question of the time for the removal of Soviet and British troops from Iran was subject of consideration at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London as little as two months ago and was decided by exchange of letters between the Soviet and British representatives which was brought to the attention of the above-mentioned Council of Ministers and which did not find objection in any quarters. In connection with the above it should also be noted that the British Government, in its note on the Iranian question, received by the Soviet Government on November 25, does not raise the question of the removal of Soviet troops from Iran.

On the strength of the consideration set forth above the relation to Soviet troops, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not see grounds for renewed consideration of the question of the time limit for the removal of these forces from Iran (Bulletin, December 9, 1945, p. 934.)

## 18. UNITED STATES POSITION ON SOVIET TROOPS IN IRAN

### NOTE SENT TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT

[Released to the press March 7, 1946]

*Text of note delivered by the American Chargé d'Affaires, George F. Kennan, upon the instruction of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, to the Soviet Government at Moscow, March 6, 1946*

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I have been instructed by my Government to deliver to the Government of Soviet Union the following message:

The Government of the United States has been informed that the Government of the Soviet Union has decided to retain Soviet troops in Iran after March 2, 1946, that this decision was taken without the consent of the Iranian Government, and that Soviet troops continue to remain on Iranian territory in spite of the protests of the Iranian Government.

It will be recalled that in reply to a note addressed on November 24, 1945, by the Government of the United States to the Government of the Soviet Union suggesting the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran, the Soviet Government on November 29 stated that the period of the stationing of Soviet troops in Iran was governed by the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of January 29, 1942.<sup>18</sup> The Government of the United States understood from this statement

<sup>18</sup> Bulletin of December 9, 1945, p. 934; for United States note to Soviet Government see Bulletin of December 2, 1945, p. 884.

that it was the intention of the Government of the Soviet Union that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Iran not later than March 2, 1946, six months after the date of the signing of the instrument of surrender with Japan on September 2, 1945. This understanding was based upon Article Five of the Tripartite Treaty referred to above which states:

"The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier."

So far as the Government of the United States is aware, this commitment was not questioned at the recent meeting of the Security Council in London which agreed that the Soviet Union and Iran should seek a solution of their differences by direct negotiation.

The decision of the Soviet Government to retain Soviet troops in Iran beyond the period stipulated by the Tripartite Treaty has created a situation with regard to which the Government of the United States, as a member of the United Nations and as a party to the Declaration Regarding Iran dated December 1, 1943, can not remain indifferent. That Declaration announced to the world that the Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom were "at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran". In the opinion of the Government of the United States, the maintenance of troops in Iranian territory by any one of the three signatories to that Declaration, without the consent and against the wishes of the Government of Iran, is contrary to the assurances contained in that Declaration. Furthermore it was generally accepted during the various discussions which took place at the meeting of the Security Council in London that the retention by a member of the United Nations of its troops in the territory of a country which is also a member of the United Nations, without the consent of the Government of that country, is not in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and that the withdrawal of such troops should not be made contingent upon other issues.

The Government of the United States, in the spirit of the friendly association which developed between the United States and the Soviet Union in the successful effort against the common enemy and as a fellow member of the United Nations, expresses the earnest hope that the Government of the Soviet Union will do its part, by withdrawing immediately all Soviet forces from the territory of Iran, to promote the international confidence which is necessary for peaceful progress among the peoples of all nations.

The Government of the United States trusts that the Government of the Soviet Union, no less than itself, appreciates the heavy responsibility resting upon the great powers under the Charter to observe their obligations and to respect the sovereign rights of other states.

The Government of the United States requests that it be promptly advised of the decision of the Government of the Soviet Union which it hopes will be in accord with the views herein expressed.

(Bulletin, March 17, 1946, p. 435.)

## 19. SOVIET-IRANIAN MATTER FOR SECURITY COUNCIL AGENDA

LETTER HANDED TO MR. LIE BY ALGER HISS <sup>17</sup>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

March 20, 1946.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: I have received your letter of March 19th informing me of the action of Iran in filing with you the two letters of March 18, copies of which you enclosed.

Under instructions from my Government, I wish to inform you that when the Security Council reconvenes I shall move:

(1) That consideration of the letters filed by Iran be placed at the head of the agenda of the Security Council.

<sup>17</sup> Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State.

(2) That, in connection with the consideration of these letters, Iran and the U. S. S. R. be requested to report upon the negotiations which may have taken place between them in accordance with the Resolution of the Council adopted January 30, 1946.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, Jr.,  
*United States Representative to the United Nations*

20. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN LT. GEN. JOHN R. HODGE, COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA, AND GUARD COL. GEN. I. M. CHISTIakov, COMMANDING GENERAL, SOVIET FORCES IN NORTH KOREA, MAY 9, 1946—FEBRUARY 28, 1947

A. GENERAL HODGE TO GENERAL CHISTIakov (EXCERPT)

*May 9, 1946.*

The Americans stand ready and willing to continue the work of the Commission in carrying out fully the Moscow Decision upon one day notice. All accommodations used by the Soviet Delegation remain open for their use.

If there remain any other issues to be cleared up before the Commission reconvenes, I suggest that we meet for a personal conference at such place and time as you request. I will gladly come to Pyongyang for such a meeting, or I will be delighted if you would accept my long standing invitation to visit with me in the Korean metropolis of Seoul.

B. GENERAL HODGE TO GENERAL CHISTIakov (EXCERPT)

*June 15, 1946.*

Although it has been more than one month since I wrote you suggesting we meet to discuss and clear up between us any misunderstood points of difference between our two delegations on the US-Soviet Joint Commission, I have not had the honor of a reply.

As indicated in my letter, the American Command stands ready to resume negotiations in the Joint Commission at anytime you suggest, in order fully to carry out the Moscow decision in accordance with the principles of freedom of expression as enunciated in the Atlantic Charter to which both of our governments have adhered. Therefore, I reiterate the invitation indicated in my letter of May 9, that you return your delegation to Seoul at an early date to resume negotiations for the complete fulfillment of the terms of the Moscow decision in the cooperative spirit in which that decision was made.

Should you decide to accept this invitation, I request advance notice of arrival of the Soviet Delegation in order to rearrange for their housing and messing.

I will appreciate an early reply.

C. GENERAL CHISTIakov TO GENERAL HODGE

*August 6, 1946.*

I have received your letter of 15 June 1946 pertaining to reconvening the Soviet-American Joint Commission in Seoul.

Having studied the material of the work of the Soviet-American Joint Commission, I have come to the conclusion that the stand taken

by the Soviet Delegation in its negotiations, which took place in Seoul, was correct.

The Soviet Delegation was motivated by the necessity for the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision of three Foreign Ministers on Korea, the only document in which is laid out the program of the Allies, foreseeing the creation of a democratic government in Korea and also the measures of assistance for developing Korea on democratic principles and the establishment of an independent Korean State.

As you know, the break in the work of the Joint Commission, fulfilling this decision, came about on the initiative and suggestion of the American Delegation.

Regrettably, your letter did not state whether the American Delegation in the Joint Commission will uphold the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and consult only with those parties and organizations and their representatives which fully, without any reservations, support this decision and did not compromise themselves by active opposition to this decision.

Upon receiving your consent to resume negotiations on the basis of the above mentioned, I am ready at any time to send a representative of the Soviet Command to the city of Seoul for conducting negotiations in the Soviet-American Joint Commission for the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

#### D. GENERAL HODGE TO GENERAL CHISTIAKOV

*August 12, 1946.*

This is in answer to your letter of 6 August 1946 in regard to resumption of negotiations by the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission in Korea.

I note with interest your statement that the Soviet Delegation is motivated by the necessity for the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. I take this opportunity to state that the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision is and always has been the mission of the American Delegation, and is exactly what it will try to accomplish when the Commission reconvenes.

However, there are certain factors in this connection that I am impelled to point out. These are:

a. There is nothing the U. S. Delegation can read into the Moscow Decision that requires or implies that only those parties and organizations are to be consulted by the Joint Commission which fully, without any reservations, support this decision and did not compromise themselves by active opposition to this decision. Reading this interpretation into the Moscow Decision is purely unilateral.

b. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision or in the general usage of the word "democratic" throughout the world that restricts its application only to organizations or parties belonging to schools of social thought favoring certain classes in the community over others, which seemed to be the interpretation given in practice to the word by the Soviet Delegation. The American Delegation can apply the word "democratic" only as it is applied in common usage throughout the world, which normally would exclude only parties or organizations opposed to popular rule by elected representatives and to equal rights for all classes of the people.

c. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that prohibits Koreans in conferences with the Commission or elsewhere from expressing freely their wishes and desires in formation of their own government.

d. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that makes any pre-determination of the terms or nature of the Four-Power Trusteeship beyond the one provision imposing a limit of five years' duration. On the contrary, the Moscow Decision states positively that "The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Four Powers for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship for Korea for a period of up to five years." I see no reason for the Joint Commission or the Korean people to enter into commitments concerning a Four-Power Trusteeship before the Korean Provisional Government is formed.

In view of the Soviet Delegation's interpretation of the Moscow Decision during the sessions last spring, that Delegation might wish to restudy the Decision in the light of the views expressed above.

Since the Moscow Decision was made by our Foreign Ministers in good faith and is the only legal vehicle for setting up the independence of Korea, the U.S. Delegation has no alternative but to carry it on exactly and in full, and has no intention of making changes in the Decision or of asking for any repudiation. However, I can assure you that the U.S. Delegation cannot be a party to any arbitrary, exclusive or punitive tactics in dealing with the accredited representatives of the Korean people on grounds not specifically stated in the Moscow Decision itself, and inconsistent with the world-accepted definition of the word "democratic."

On the basis given above, I not only welcome but invite the Soviet Delegation to return to negotiations of the Joint Commission and suggest that you send your representative to Seoul at an early date to make preliminary arrangements.

E. GENERAL CHIISTIAKOV TO GENERAL HODGE

*October 26, 1946.*

In your letter of August 1, 1946 concerning the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, you, speaking of the intentions of the American delegation to resume the discussions of the Joint Commission, at the same time have advised the Soviet delegation to restudy its position.

In answer to this, I must declare that the Soviet delegation is guided in its work by the terms of the Moscow decision of the three Foreign Ministers on Korea and intends to steadfastly adhere to this decision.

I again assure you that the Soviet delegation is always ready to resume the work of the Joint Commission on the basis of strict fulfillment of the Moscow decision on Korea.

As far as the question of the discontinuing of the work of the Joint Commission is concerned, as you will know it was the American delegation itself which after a time in the course of the discussions suggested that the work of the Joint Commission be suspended, and finally at its suggestion the work of the Commission was suspended May 5, 1946. In your letter you stated that "the exact fulfillment of the Mos-

cow decision is and always has been the mission of the American delegation."

I must, however, note that during the work of the Joint Commission the American delegation did not, in fact, evidence such a readiness and many times even declared that it did not quite understand the Moscow decision on Korea.

Your assertion that the Soviet delegation allegedly interprets unilaterally the Moscow decision concerning the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the consultation on the subject with Korean political parties and social organizations is unfounded.

In the decision on Korea reached by the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers, a series of measures were laid out which aim at the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for the development of the country on democratic principles and the speedy liquidation of the ruinous after-effects of long Japanese domination in Korea. Therefore, the Soviet delegation, being guided by the aims and spirit of the Moscow decision, deems that it would not be right to consult on the question of methods of fulfilling the Moscow decision with those parties and those, who for tactical considerations, although declaring their support of the decision, at the same time make such stipulations which convert their statement of support of the Moscow decision into an empty declaration.

In regard to that part of your letter concerning the definition of the word *democratic*, the Soviet delegation would like to point out that in this question it is necessary to consider not the declarative announcements of the party, and not the names of separate parties and organizations, but the actual policies pursued by a given party.

In as much as the Moscow decision has outlined the necessary measures for the democratic reconstruction of Korea, it is the opinion of the Soviet delegation that the attitude of different parties and groups toward the Moscow decision is the most important criterion of their true democratic nature and of their striving to see Korea a democratic state.

Thus, the position of the Soviet delegation on the question of consultation of the Joint Commission with the Korean democratic parties and organizations fully corresponds to the Moscow decision.

At the same time it is impossible not to note that there is an obvious contradiction between the interpretation in your letter of the word *democracy* and the actual position which the American delegation assumed during the period of the work of the Joint Commission.

It is well known that the American delegation has included in the list of political parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission on the question of the creation of the provisional Korean democratic government, all political parties and organizations which had voiced their opposition against the Moscow decision and only three democratic parties which upheld the Moscow decision. It is completely obvious that the American delegation, when it excluded from participation in consultation with the Joint Commission such democratic parties and organizations of mass character as the Korean national revolutionary party, the all-Korean Confederation of Labor, the all-Korean Women's Union, the all-Korean Youth Union, the all-Korean Farmers Union and a number of other organizations, guided by other than their democratic principles.

As regards the freedom for the Koreans to express their position toward formation of the Korean Government or the realization of the Moscow decision on Korea, the Soviet delegation has never anywhere made proposals directed against the freedom of expression by the representatives of Korean parties and organizations, wherever they may be, and it is accordingly understood that any part or group as well as any individual Korean citizen can express similar ideas or present them to the Joint Commission.

I cannot agree with the interpretation set forth in your letter on the question of trusteeship because such an interpretation actually places in doubt the decision of the Moscow Conference on this question, as it is known the Moscow decision states: "it shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Government and of the Korean democratic organizations to also work out measures for helping and assisting (non-trusteeship) the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea."

Thus, among the tasks of the Joint Commission is included the preparation of proposals dealing with the establishment of a trusteeship in regard to Korea with the stipulation that these proposals relating to Korea for a period up to five years, will, after consultation with the Provisional Korean Government be submitted for joint consideration to the governments of the four powers.

From the above it is clear that the question of the establishment of the trusteeship as a measure which must aid in the democratic transformation of Korea has been definitely decided by the Moscow Conference and on this basis there must be prepared concrete proposals for the eventual working out of the agreement of trusteeship.

During the interruption in the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission many events have occurred in South as well as in North Korea. All these events testify that the Korean people are striving to unit their country, to have a democratic government and to carry out their democratic transformation.

It is the opinion of the Soviet delegation that the delay in the formation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government impedes the so necessary unification of Korea into a single state; it is having a negative effect on the economic and political situation of the Korean people and is holding back the realization of democratic transformation in all Korea.

The Soviet delegation is greatly concerned that the negotiations of the Joint Commission, interrupted on the initiative of the American Delegation in May 1946 have not yet been resumed and wishes to resume those negotiations as soon as possible on the basis of exact fulfilment of the Moscow decision.

If after taking this into account, along with the foregoing statement, you will express your consent to resume the work of the Joint Commission, the Soviet delegation will always be ready to resume the work.

## F. GENERAL HODGE TO GENERAL CHISTIAKOV

*November 1, 1946.*

DEAR GENERAL CHISTIAKOV: I thank you for your letter of October 26, 1946, and agree with you that the continuation of the division of Korea into two parts works great hardship on the Korean people. It also weakens the prestige of two great Allies who cooperated so fully to bring a victorious end to the bitterest war in history. Each added month of this division tends to make more difficult the implementation of the Moscow decision on Korea made by the Foreign Ministers of the Allies last December.

For the purposes of reconciling the differences between the United States and the U.S.S.R. delegations, which are not fully resolved in your letter, I propose that the following basis of agreement for reconvening the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission be accepted by both the Soviet and American delegations with view to the early resumption of the sessions of the Joint Commission. It is agreed to interpret paragraphs Two and Three of the declaration in communiqué no. 5 of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission dated April 17th, 1946, to mean that such individuals, parties and social organizations shall not foment or instigate mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow decision. Those individuals, parties, and social organizations which do foment or instigate such opposition shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties, and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.

In consideration of this interpretation of the declaration established in communiqué no. 5 of the Joint Commission, dated April 17th, 1946, both delegations agree that they will not oppose consultation with any individual, political party, or social organization which subscribes to and abides by the declaration published in joint communiqué no. 5.

In order to eliminate any possible future misunderstanding, I believe it is advisable briefly to restate the position of the United States at this time.

(A) The United States has always favored the exact fulfillment of the Moscow decision by the Joint Commission. This decision obviously includes the preparation of proposals "for the working out of an agreement concerning a Four Power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years" which "shall be submitted for the joint consideration" of the Four Powers "following consultation with the provisional Korean Government". However, there is nothing in the Moscow decision which predetermines the terms or nature of a Four Power trusteeship except that it shall be a method "for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government, and the establishment of the national independence of Korea" to be worked out "with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government," and a limitation placed upon its duration.

(B) The United States has always favored the exercise of freedom of speech in Korea. The United States believes that all Korean



democratic parties and social organizations should be permitted to make known their desires in the formation of their own government. The representatives of the United States see a great difference between (1) the instigation of mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission and the fulfillment of the Moscow decision, and (2) the proper exercise of freedom of expression by Korean individuals, democratic parties, and groups concerning their wishes and desires in the formation of their own government.

On the basis of the United States' position herein stated and the suggested interpretation of paragraphs Two and Three of the declaration in communiqué no. 5 to the Joint Commission which is approved for the United States delegation, the American Command proposes that the Joint Commission resume its work without delay and I again cordially invite Soviet delegation to return to Seoul at an early date for the purpose of resuming negotiations. I shall be pleased to hear from you as early as possible in order that the necessary preliminary arrangements can be effected.

G. GENERAL CHIISTIAKOV TO GENERAL HODGE

*November 26, 1946.*

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated November 1, 1946.

It is with regret that I have to conclude that the conditions upon which you propose to renew the negotiations of the Joint Soviet-American Commission in substance do not differ from the position laid down in your previous letter, which, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation is in contradiction to the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Actually, you propose that the Joint Commission should consult with any person, political party or social organization which adheres to and abides by the declaration published in communiqué number 5, moreover, such persons, parties or social organizations must not and will not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

Thus, according to this formula, the Joint Commission must consult not only with democratic parties and social organizations which uphold the Moscow Decision, but also with those parties and organizations which are hostile to this Decision. Furthermore, these latter parties and organizations are even given an opportunity to continue these activities directly against the Moscow Decision with the exception that they should not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

The acceptance of such proposal would appear, rather as call to reactionary parties and groups not to retreat from their hostile position towards the Moscow Decision, but merely to curtail temporarily their activities directed against this Decision so that they may have an opportunity to take part in the consultations with the Joint Commission. I must remind you that it was precisely in such manner that these parties accepted your public announcement of April 27, 1946 which contained an analogous interpretation of the agreement embodied in communiqué number 5.

The result was that the parties and organizations which had voiced their opposition to the Moscow Decision agreed to sign the declaration,

but on the very second day after the termination of the work of the Joint Commission, prominent leaders of these parties and organizations again returned to an active fight against the Moscow Decision and its supporters.

There is no doubt that participation by those elements in the consultations would be utilized by them with the aim of sabotaging the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and would only facilitate their activities in that direction. I must again declare that if we are aiming at actual and complete realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea, then, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, it is impossible to consult on the question of methods of fulfilling this Decision with those persons, parties and organizations who voice opposition to the above mentioned Decision and who are aiming at sabotaging its fulfillment, whom, for tactical considerations, may for the period of consultation with the Joint Commission temporarily and in part limit their activities directed against the Moscow Decision in order that they may renew these activities in full force as soon as consultation with Joint Commission is terminated.

The foregoing in no way limits the freedom of Korean democratic parties, social organizations or individuals to express their position regarding the formation of the Korean Government or other questions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

In my previous letter I have already directed your attention to the fact that the Soviet delegation has never made proposals directed against the freedom of individuals, parties or organizations to express anywhere their views on these questions and it is accordingly understood that any party or social organization as well as an individual Korean citizen can express similar views or present them to the Joint Commission.

Desiring to fulfill the Moscow Decision on Korea speedily and as definitely as possible, the Soviet side advances the following proposals as basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission.

1. The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea.

2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case such parties and social organizations, by mutual agreement of both delegations, will be excluded from further consultations with the Joint Commission.

In the event you should agree to the foregoing proposals the Soviet delegation is prepared, without delay, to arrive in Seoul for the resumption of the negotiations of the Joint Commission.

CHISTIAKOV.

## II. GENERAL HODGE TO GENERAL CHISTIakov

*December 24, 1946.*

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 26, 1946.

I have had attached to this letter a copy of your letter of November 26, 1946 with paragraphs numbered to facilitate reference. (Paragraph numbers follow paragraphs of letter as passed by you.)

From a careful reading of Paragraphs II to VIII, both inclusive, the impression I receive is that the Soviet delegation believes that proposals previously submitted by the United States delegation appear to encourage "reactionary parties and groups" to continue hostile opposition to the Moscow Decision. I assure you that the United States delegation has no such intention and desires to cooperate with you in preventing such hostile opposition. Paragraphs IX and X of your letter guarantee on the part of the Soviet delegation complete freedom of expression to Korean political parties, social organizations and individuals "regarding the formation of the Korean Government and other questions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea". The views expressed in these paragraphs are identical with the position assumed by the United States delegation.

The last three paragraphs of your letter numbered 1 to 3, although apparently in conflict with paragraphs IX and X nevertheless provide a basis for further discussion.

In view of the closeness of our position, I suggest that your proposals and the following modifications be made the basis for reconvening the Joint Commission.

Proposal number 1 to be interpreted as follows: Signing the Declaration in communique number 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation.

Proposal number 2, I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views of the implementation of the Moscow Decision. However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission may, after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

Proposal number 3, it is suggested that it be reworded as follows: "Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission shall not after signing the declaration contained in communique number 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in communique number 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission".

I trust that the basis proposed above will be acceptable to you and trust you will notify me so that I may make the necessary preliminary arrangements for reconvening the Joint Commission.

HODGE

I. GENERAL CHISTIakov TO GENERAL HODGE

*February 28, 1947.*

Confirming the receipt of your letter of December 24, 1946, it is with satisfaction I note that as a result of our correspondence the positions of both sides have actually drawn closer together.

1. I take note of your declaration that you are ready to accept as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission, the proposals set forth in my letter dated November 26, 1946. I agree with your interpretation of proposal number 1, bearing in mind that the matter may not and must not be confined merely to expressions of good intentions to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on the part of those parties and organizations which will sign the declaration contained in Communiqué Number 5. Subsequent action of these parties and organizations who have signed the above mentioned declaration, and consequently have accepted the obligation to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea, likewise must be consonant with that obligation.

2. In reference to paragraph number 2 of my proposals, I should like to explain that the Soviet Delegation considers it expedient that parties and organizations which will take part in consultation with the Joint Commission be informed beforehand that they must not designate for consultation such representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

Bearing this in mind, and taking into consideration your observations, I propose the following wording for paragraph number 2: "A party or organization signatory to the declaration contained in Communiqué Number 5 has the right to appoint such a representative who in its opinion can best present to the Joint Commission its views regarding the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, and who has not compromised himself by activity voicing opposition to that decision. However, if the appointed representative, for completely valid reasons, be considered antagonistic toward the fulfillment of the Moscow decision or toward either of the Allied powers, then the Joint Commission, following mutual agreement, may demand that the party having made such a statement (declaration) should designate another representative in his place."

3. I agree with your wording of proposal number 3. I assume, however, that by the concept "individuals" shall be understood representatives of parties and social organizations invited to participate in consultations in accordance with the provisions set forth in paragraph number 2 above.

I would deem it more expedient to substitute for the word "individuals" the words "and their representatives" with the result that the first sentence of your third proposal would be worded as follows: "Parties and social organizations and their representatives invited for consultations," etc. According to the text.

The remainder of the wording of this proposal is accepted by me without change.

4. Concerning your observations regarding the alleged existence of conflicts between paragraphs 9 and 10 of my letter, and the proposals set forth in that letter, I must say that I do not discern any such conflict.

I hope that agreement by us on the conditions of consultation will assure a speedy and successful resumption of the work of the Joint Commission (Korea's Independence, pp. 22-32).

## 21. EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, APRIL 8, 1947-MAY 12, 1947

### A. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*April 8, 1947.*

I wish to call your attention to the situation in Korea. The representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States on the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission in Korea have been unable to make progress toward the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government. It has been nineteen months since the Japanese surrender, yet Korea has profited little. The country is divided into two zones. The Soviet Commander in Northern Korea has refused to permit freedom of movement and free economic exchange between these zones. This has precluded freely chosen political amalgamation of the Korean people and has resulted in grave economic distress.

The policy of the United States toward Korea has the following basic objectives:

(1) To assist in the establishment as soon as practicable of a self-governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations.

(2) To insure that the national government so established shall be representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

(3) To aid the Koreans in building a sound economy as an essential basis for their independent and democratic state.

The United States, in the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, declared its determination that in due course Korea should become free and independent. The United Kingdom and the Republic of China were parties to the same declaration. The Cairo Declaration was specifically reaffirmed by the Three Powers in the Potsdam Declaration, which defined terms for the Japanese surrender. The U.S.S.R. in its declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945, declared its adherence to these declarations.

Upon the surrender of Japan, United States and Soviet forces accepted the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea in the areas respectively south and north of a line arbitrarily assigned for this purpose, the thirty-eighth degree parallel. This line of demarcation became in effect a boundary between zones of occupation. At the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. in Moscow in December, 1945, the serious consequences of the bizonal division of Korea were discussed and an agreement regarding Korea was reached and published in part three of the communiqué of the confer-

ence. The Republic of China subsequently subscribed to this agreement.

On March 20, 1946, the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission appointed under the terms of the Moscow Agreement met and began its task, as outlined in the agreement, of assisting in the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government as a first step in assuring the establishment of an independent and sovereign Korean nation.

It was the hope of the Government of the United States that speedy action would be taken by the Joint Commission, a provisional Korean government would rapidly be established, the unfortunate results of the line of demarcation between the United States and the Soviet forces would be overcome and Korea could be started on the way to attaining an independent and democratic government.

Unfortunately the work of the Joint Commission became stalemated after a short time through the failure to agree on the definition of the word "democratic" as it pertained to the representatives of the parties and social organizations mentioned in the Moscow Agreement to be consulted by the Joint Commission in its task of assisting in the formation of a provisional government. As it became evident that no agreement could be reached at the time, the Joint Commission adjourned *sine die* on May 8, 1946.

The United States Commander in Korea has several times suggested to the Soviet Commander that the Commission reconvene and get on with its work.

However, the Soviet Commander has insisted on a formula which would result in eliminating the majority of representative Korean leaders from consultation as representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and has reiterated this position in a letter to the American Commander as recently as February 28, 1947. It has therefore been impossible to agree upon a basis for reconvening the Commission.

Now in April 1947, almost sixteen months since the agreement pertaining to Korea was reached in Moscow, there has still been no real progress made toward the implementation of that agreement.

In fulfillment of the intent of the Agreement and Declaration made at Moscow in December 1945, the Government of the United States desires to further the work of establishing a free and independent Korea without additional delay.

To this end I ask that our Governments agree to instruct our respective Commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible and charge it with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion. I further suggest that a mutually acceptable date during the summer of 1947 be fixed for a review by the two Governments of the progress made to that date by the Joint Commission. In the meantime, the United States, mindful of its obligations under the Moscow Agreement, sees no alternative to taking without further delay such steps in its zone as will advance the purposes of that agreement.

I am furnishing copies of this letter to the British and Chinese Governments.

## B. THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

*April 19, 1947.*

DEAR MR. MARSHALL: In reply to your letter of April 8 on the question of Korea, I am communicating the following:

At the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom in December 1945, an agreement was reached which determined the policy of the three powers with respect to Korea. A basis for this agreement were the proposals of the Soviet Government, to which the Government of the U. S. A. also agreed, having consequently abandoned its first intention not to establish a National Korean Government in Korea. The Moscow Agreement held the establishment of a provisional democratic Korean Government which could take all the necessary measures for the development of Korean industry, transport, agriculture and the national culture of the Korean people, to be a problem of primary importance.

Having made these proposals, the Soviet Government deemed that the unification of Korea under the leadership of the Korean National Government was the most important prerequisite for the restoration of Korea as an independent state and the establishment of bases for the development of the country on democratic principles.

The Soviet Government continues to adhere to this point of view and insists on a steadfast implementation of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, being certain that, on the basis of the execution of this agreement Korea would be successfully developed along democratic principles and would become an independent and prosperous state and an equal member of the United Nations.

However, the legislative program provided for Korea by the Moscow Agreement has not yet been carried out. A provisional democratic Korean Government has not been established. The work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, established for the purpose of collaborating in the establishment of a provisional democratic Korean Government was suspended as a result of the fact that the American delegation on this Commission took a stand contrary to the Moscow Agreement on Korea. Furthermore, the American Command in southern Korea did not agree to a serious consideration of the proposals by the Soviet Command in northern Korea on the question of an economic exchange between the two zones, which made it impossible to reach an agreement on this question.

In the course of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission during the period from March to May, 1946, the Soviet delegation made every effort to effect the execution of the aforementioned agreement on Korea and, first of all, provide for a prompt establishment of a provisional democratic Korean Government and for the unification of Korea under its leadership. However, the Soviet delegation met only with difficulties in this connection, but also with direct counteraction on the part of the American delegation. Basing itself on the agreement on Korea, which provides that the Joint Commission, in formulating its proposals, should consult Korean democratic parties and social organizations, the Soviet delegation insisted on a wide-scale attraction of such parties and organizations to consultation with the Commission. The American delegation excluded participation by a whole series of large democratic organizations in southern Korea and

insisted on consultation with groups which had taken a stand in opposition to the Moscow Agreement, consultation with which, naturally could not facilitate the execution of this agreement. The American delegation included in the list of parties and organizations submitted by it for consultation with the Joint Commission, seventeen political parties and social groups of southern Korea which took a stand against the Moscow Agreement, and only three democratic parties which supported the agreement. The American delegation excluded such large democratic parties and social organizations as the All-Korean Labor Confederation, the All-Korean Peasant Union, the Korean National Revolutionary Party, the All-Korean Youth Union, etc., from participation in consultation. Deeming it impossible to agree to this position of the American delegation, the Soviet delegation nevertheless did its utmost to find a way to reach an agreed decision. This, however, appeared impossible and the work of the Commission, on the suggestion of the American delegation, was curtailed.

The intolerance of the resulting situation is evident. As a result of this, as you know, it was necessary to take new measures in endeavoring to find a way out of such a situation.

The Soviet Commander in his relations with the American Commander endeavored to find a basis for the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission. As a result of an exchange of letters, there has been a considerable *rapprochement* of the points of view of both sides, which fact was noted by both commanders. It was expected that an agreement would soon be reached and the Joint Commission would begin its work very shortly. However, no reply has been received to date from the American Commander to the last letter of February 28, from the Soviet Commander and the proposed agreement was not reached. Disagreement of action was a serious obstacle for the opportune fulfillment of the program of measures proposed in the Moscow Agreement of Korea as a whole.

In connection with northern Korea, during the period beginning with the capitulation of Japan, considerable progress was made in the field of democratization, and also with respect to the restoration of national economy and culture. Wide democratic reforms have been made which guarantee political freedom and raise the standard of living of the population. I have in mind, first of all, the introduction of an over-all electoral right; a law on equal rights for women; the establishment of local authority agencies and the People's Committee of Northern Korea on the basis of free democratic elections; land reform, as a result of which 725,000 landless peasant farmers and those having little land received more than 1 million hectares of free land, which formerly belonged to Japanese colonists and their accomplices in Korea; the nationalization of former Japanese industries, the 8 hour work-day, safeguarding of labor and social insurance; public educational reform, as a result of which the Korean language has been reestablished, the net work of schools was increased and the number of students was increased, etc. However, such wide democratic reforms have been carried out only in northern Korea, where there is only two-fifths of the population of Korea.

The Soviet Government, closely adhering in their policy toward Korea to the program planned in the Moscow Agreement, believes the following to be points of primary importance:



1. The establishment of a provisional democratic Korean Government on the basis of a wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, in order to expedite the political and economic unification of Korea as a self-supporting state independent of foreign interference, which would do away with the division of the country into two zones.

2. The establishment of democratic authority agencies throughout Korea by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electoral right.

3. The aiding of Korean people in the restoration of Korea as an independent democratic state and in the development of its national economy and national culture.

In conformity with the steadfast aspiration on the part of the Soviet Government for the prompt restoration of Korea as a united sovereign state and elimination of difficulties arising from the fact that Korea to date has not been unified and does not have a national government, I propose that the Joint Soviet-American Commission resume its work on May 20 of the current year in the city of Seoul, on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, and that the Commission present the result of its work on the elaboration of recommendations with respect to the establishment of a provisional democratic Korean Government for consideration by the two governments in July and August 1947.

I am sending copies of the present letter to Mr. Bevin and to the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow.

I beg you [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

C. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*May 2, 1947.*

DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: I have considered your letter of April 19, 1947 in which you accept our proposal to reconvene the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission and suggest that the Commission resume its work on May 20 of this year. I have also noted your statement that resumption of the Commission's work shall be "on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea."

In order to avoid any future misunderstanding with respect to the phrase "exact execution" I wish to make clear my interpretation of the phrase. In my letter to you of April 8 I stated that the Joint Commission should be charged with expediting "its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion." In making this statement I had and have in mind the well-known position of the Government of the United States that Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a provisional Korean government because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission.

You mention three points which the Soviet Government believes to be of primary importance in its policy towards Korea. Your statement concerning the importance of establishing a provisional democratic Korean government on the basis of wide-scale participation of

Korean democratic parties and social organizations has from the beginning been accepted by the United States Government as basic to its policy of assisting in the establishment of a self-governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations.

I interpret your second point with respect to the establishment of "democratic authority agencies" throughout Korea as referring to local, provincial and national government agencies chosen, as you state, by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electoral right.

I welcome the assurance contained in your third point with regard to the importance you attach to aiding in the restoration of Korea as an independent democratic state and in the development of its national economy and national culture. The United States Government has under consideration a constructive program for the rehabilitation of the economy of Korea and for its educational and political development.

In order that I may direct the United States Commander in Korea to make preparations for opening the sessions of the Joint Commission in Seoul on May 20, 1947, may I receive an early confirmation that we are mutually agreed as to the basis on which the Commission shall resume its important work?

I am furnishing copies of this letter to the Governments of China and the United Kingdom.

Please accept [etc.]

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

D. THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

*May 7, 1947.*

DEAR MR. MARSHALL: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 2 concerning the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea.

Your proposal, as I understand it, is to the effect that before the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission an agreement should be reached concerning the conditions for consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations.

This question was the subject of an exchange of correspondence between the Soviet and American Commanders in Korea as a result of which, as I already answered in my previous letter, the points of view of the two sides were brought considerably closer.

The Soviet Commander in his letter of November 26, 1946 advanced the following proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:

1. The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow decision on Korea.

2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow decision.

3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to Moscow decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case such parties and social organizations by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.

The American Commander in his letter of December 24, 1946 agreed to accept these proposals of the Soviet Commander with the following

changes as the basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:

Proposal number 1 to be interpreted as follows: signing the declaration in communiqué number 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation.

Proposal number 2, I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow decision.

However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow decision or to either of the Allied powers, the Joint Commission may, after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

Proposal number 3, it is suggested that it be reworded as follows: individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission should not after signing the declaration contained in communiqué number 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow decision.

Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in communiqué number 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.

The decision excluding such individuals, parties, and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.

With a view to expediting the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission and the creation of a temporary Korean democratic government, I am prepared to accept the amendments set forth above proposed by the American Commander. I hope that there will thus exist no further reasons for postponing the convocation of the Joint Commission.

In your letter you state that the Government of the United States is at the present time considering a constructive program for the reconstruction of Korean economy and its cultural and political development. I presume that the Joint Commission, in accordance with the Moscow Agreement on Korea, after the completion of the work connected with the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government should consider with the participation of this government proposals from the American and Soviet sides concerning measures of aid and assistance for the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic autonomy, and the establishment of the state independence of Korea and present agreed recommendations on these questions.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China.

Please accept [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

E. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*May 12, 1947.*

MY DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: I have received your letter of May 7, 1947 and am pleased to note the agreement of your Government to the reconvening of a Joint Commission on the basis of the proposals made in the American Commander's letter of December 24, 1946 to the Soviet Commander in Korea. Those proposals were authorized by this Government and are identical in purpose to the statement contained in the second paragraph of my letter of May 2, 1947.

I am instructing the American Commander in Korea to make immediate preparations for reconvening the Commission in Seoul. A copy of this letter has been sent to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China.

I convey [etc.]

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

EXCHANGES OF NOTES BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE (AND ACTING SECRETARY) AND THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AUGUST 11, 1947-SEPTEMBER 17, 1947

A. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*August 11, 1947.*

DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: In your letter of April 19, 1947, you suggested that the Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea resume its work on May 20 in Seoul "on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea" and that the Commission should present the result of its work for the consideration of the Soviet and United States Governments in July and August, 1947. According to all reports received from the American delegation to the Joint Commission, it has been impossible for the two delegations to agree on the issue of broad consultation with Korean political parties and social organizations. This situation has continued without material change for more than one month and is a matter of great concern to the government of the United States.

You will recall that in my letter to you of May 2, I referred to your statement that the work of the Commission should be "on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement" and that in order to avoid future misunderstanding I made clear my interpretation of that phrase. I pointed out that it had been the consistent and well-known position of the United States Government that "Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a provisional Korean government because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission". In your reply of May 7 you did not take exception to this position. You accepted as a basis for reconvening the Commission the suggestion outlined by General Hodge in his letter to General Chistiakov of December 24, 1946, which was in accordance with the United States position described above. In furtherance of this policy the American delegation to the Joint Commission has maintained that there should be the widest possible participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and that in such participation there shall be no restriction on freedom of expression and opinion by all Koreans. In an effort to expedite matters the United States delegation has several times offered to limit oral consultation to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000, or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet delegation. This proposal, however, has not been accepted by the Soviet delegation.

The United States Government believes that, in justice to the Korean people whose hopes of independence have been so long postponed, there cannot be further delay. It is the desire therefore of this Gov-

ernment that by August 21, 1947, the Joint Commission report the status of its deliberations so that each government may immediately consider what further steps may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely the establishment of an independent, united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations.

I am providing copies of this message to the Governments of China and the United Kingdom.

I have [etc.]

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

B. THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

*August 23, 1947.*

DEAR MR. MARSHALL: I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 12, 1947, on the question of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission.

As is known, the work of the Joint Commission was resumed on the basis of the three conditions for consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which were textually set forth in my letter of May 7, 1947, and accepted by you in a letter of May 13. The Soviet Delegation was instructed to be guided in questions of consultation specifically by these conditions. In accordance with these conditions the Joint Commission should consult with those democratic parties and social organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision on Korea.

However, applications to participate in the consultations were also submitted by parties and organizations belonging to the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

The Soviet Government considers that the admittance of such parties and organizations to the consultations could take place only in the event that these parties and organizations officially break with the above-mentioned Committee and announce their withdrawal from the Committee, without which consultations with them should not be carried on.

The Soviet Government, standing on the position of wide consultation with Korean democratic parties and organizations, does not consider that the Joint Commission should consult with such organizations as have in their ranks only tens or hundreds of persons. Such organizations exist in large number and consultation with them would not be effective in view of their lack of authority. Furthermore, consultation with such small groups would drag out the work of the Joint Commission for many months, and would lead to the postponement of the creation of a Government of Korea for a long time. The Soviet Government considers that consultation can be conducted with parties and organizations whose members number more than 10,000 persons.

With reference to your observation that in conducting consultations there should be no restriction on freedom of speech and opinion, this should be extended in the first place to parties and organizations which are assisting in carrying out the Moscow Decision. Furthermore, recently the parties and organizations of Southern Korea which support the Moscow Decision are being subjected on the part of the American authorities in Southern Korea to the severest restrictions

and cruelest persecutions, which contradicts democratic principles and is entirely out of accord with the decision of the Moscow Conference. The premises of such parties and organizations are being seized by the police authorities; their leaders and members are being arrested; their press organs are being closed. The Soviet Government considers such a situation abnormal and inadmissible, excluding the possibility of the correct fulfillment of the decision of the Moscow Conference of the three Ministers on Korea, provided these persecutions of democratic organizations and individuals in Southern Korea do not immediately and completely cease.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary that the American Delegation in the Joint Commission receive appropriate instructions for the fulfillment of the agreement reached between the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in April of this year, and does not object to your proposal that the Joint Commission report on the status of its work in order that each Government may immediately consider what steps could be usefully undertaken for the fulfillment of the objectives of the Moscow Decision.

The Soviet Delegation has been instructed in the above sense.

Copies of this letter are being sent by me simultaneously to the Governments of Great Britain and China.

Accept [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

C. THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*August 26, 1947.*

DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: In your letter of August 23, 1947 to Secretary Marshall the position of the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission has been set forth in terms which corroborate a recent report received by this Government from the United States Delegation to the Joint Commission. The report of the United States Delegation was in compliance with the desire of Secretary Marshall as set forth in his letter to you of August 12 that a report from the Joint Commission should be submitted by August 21 in order that our governments might immediately consider what further steps may be useful to achieve the long-delayed unification and independence of Korea. The report of the United States Delegation makes it clear that the Joint Commission has been unable to reach agreement regarding the basis on which representatives of democratic Korean parties and social organizations shall be consulted by the Joint Commission. The United States Delegation also reports that it has been unable to obtain the agreement of the Soviet Delegation to any alternative method of completing the task of the Joint Commission.

As pointed out in your letter it was agreed in the interchange of correspondence in May of this year that "the Joint Commission should consult with those democratic parties and social organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision on Korea". You will, however, recall that in your letter of May 7 you expressly agreed to the interpretation of the above phrase as proposed by the United States Commander in Korea that "signing the declaration in Communiqué No. 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation". The parties

and organizations mentioned by you as belonging to the Anti-Trusteeship Committee did sign Communiqué No. 5 and are, in the opinion of the United States Government, eligible for initial consultation. Your letter of May 7 also provided that any decision excluding individuals, parties and social organizations for active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission "shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission". Accordingly, the United States Delegation has repeatedly, but without success, attempted to obtain from the Soviet Delegation agreement to criteria for consultation with Korean parties and social organizations applying for such consultation in accordance with the terms embodied in your letter. The Soviet Delegation has insisted on the unilateral right to exclude parties which have expressed distaste for "trusteeship", even though such parties have declared and reiterated their intention fully to support the Joint Commission and have in fact, since signing the declaration not instigated active opposition to the work of the Commission. The Soviet position is not only contrary to the specific terms of the agreement between you and Secretary Marshall, it is also contrary to the democratic principle of freedom of opinion.

In Secretary Marshall's letter to you of August 11, 1947 reference was made to the fact that the United States Delegation has several times offered to limit oral consultations to parties and organizations with membership in excess of one thousand, or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet Delegation. The United States Delegation reports, however, that when the Soviet Delegation proposed limiting consultation to parties of 10,000 or more, the Soviet Delegation submitted a list which omitted 24 such parties which claimed total membership of 15,200,000 and refused to consider any other list or alternative proposal.

The United States Government denies categorically that there has been oppression or persecution of Korean parties or individuals in the United States zone as charged in your letter. The arrests which you mention have been necessary to control subversive activities aimed at the destruction of constituted government and law and order in the American zone. United States forces are charged with the responsibility for maintaining law and order in south Korea without interference with democratic rights. That they have done so successfully is amply proven by the freedom with which all shades of political opinion are expressed and respected in the United States zone.

It is noted that you have no objection to the proposal that the Joint Commission furnish an agreed report to our two governments. The United States Delegation has accordingly been instructed to take immediate steps to reach agreement on a joint report of the status of the deliberations of the Joint Commission. In view of the position set forth in your letter and the report already rendered by the United States Delegation, however, it is apparent that a joint report can accomplish little other than a formal delineation of the issues which have prevented the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement.

For almost two years the Government of the United States has devoted its utmost efforts to carrying out the terms of the Moscow Agreement on Korea. The present stalemate in the Joint Commission negotiations and the failure of that Commission to accomplish even the first task of its mission have made it abundantly clear to all that bilateral negotiations on the subject of consultation with Korean

political parties and organizations will only serve to delay the implementation of this agreement and defeat its announced purpose of bringing about early independence for Korea. The United States Government cannot in good conscience be a party to any such delay in the fulfillment of its commitment to Korean independence and proposes that the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement meet to consider how that agreement may be speedily carried out.

The United States Government therefore submits for the consideration of your government the enclosed outline of proposals designed to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement on Korea. The United States Government proposes that these suggestions be considered at an early date by the powers adhering to that Agreement. It is therefore hoped that the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires at Washington or an authorized deputy may be designated to participate in four-power conversations on this problem at Washington beginning on September 8, 1947.

It is believed that the Joint Commission's report on the status of its deliberations might be helpful in consideration of the United States proposals during these four-power conversations. The United States Delegation has accordingly been instructed to endeavor to reach agreement with the Soviet Delegation on a joint report to be submitted not later than September 5, 1947.

Copies of this letter are being transmitted to the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and China together with invitations to participate in the four-power conversations referred to above.

Please accept [etc.]

ROBERT A. LOVETT

#### UNITED STATES PROPOSALS REGARDING KOREA

1. In both the U. S. S. R. and U. S. zones of Korea there shall be held early elections to choose wholly representative provisional legislatures for each zone. Voting shall be by secret, multi-party ballot on a basis of universal suffrage and elections shall be held in accordance with the laws adopted by the present Korean legislatures in each zone.

2. These provisional zonal legislatures shall choose representatives in numbers which reflect the proportion between the populations of the two zones, these representatives to constitute a national provisional legislature. The legislature shall meet at Seoul to establish a provisional government for a united Korea.

3. The resulting Provisional Government of a united Korea shall meet in Korea with representatives of the four Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement on Korea to discuss with them what aid and assistance is needed in order to place Korean independence on a firm economic and political foundation and on what terms this aid and assistance is to be given.

4. During all the above stages the United Nations shall be invited to have observers present so that the world and the Korean people may be assured of the wholly representative and completely independent character of the actions taken.

5. The Korean Provisional Government and the Powers concerned shall agree upon a date by which all occupation forces in Korea will be withdrawn.

6. The provisional legislatures in each zone shall be encouraged to draft provisional constitutions which can later be used as a basis for the



adoption by the national provisional legislature of a constitution for all of Korea.

7. Until such time as a united, independent Korea is established, public and private Korean agencies in each zone shall be brought into contact with international agencies established by or under the United Nations and the presence of Korean observers at official international conferences shall be encouraged in appropriate cases.

D. THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

*September 4, 1947.*

DEAR MR. MARSHALL: In acknowledging receipt of Mr. Lovett's letter of August 26, 1947, I consider it necessary to draw to your attention that the preliminary elaboration of measures to assist the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government, in accordance with the decision of the Moscow Conference of the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs, is to be carried out by the Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the Soviet Command in northern Korea and of the United States Command in southern Korea. For the consideration of the four Governments, including the British and Chinese Governments, according to the Moscow decision, there should be submitted the recommendations worked out by the Joint Commission prior to adoption of a final decision. Furthermore, the Governments of Great Britain and China will take part, together with the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., in the consideration of the proposals worked out by the Joint Soviet-American Commission concerning measures for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government, and the establishment of the national independence of Korea, in order to work out an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship with relation to Korea.

The task of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, as is known, is to render assistance in the formation of a single provisional democratic government for all Korea.

The Joint Commission has still, in fact, done little in this direction, but this situation is primarily the result of the position adopted by the American delegation on the question of consultation of the Commission with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, as was pointed out in my last letter to you. If the American delegation had shown the necessary desire to render assistance in the creation of a really democratic government in Korea, the work of the Joint Commission would have been more successful, the task laid upon it would have been fulfilled, and there would not be that stagnant situation in the work of the Joint Commission which in Mr. Lovett's letter is called an *impasse*.

As you know, the Soviet delegation, wishing to resolve the situation which had been created in the Joint Commission and seeking to expedite the work of creating a provisional Korean democratic government, agreed with the proposal of the American delegation not to carry on oral consultations with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and on August 26, 1947 introduced a new proposal for the establishment of a consultative organ—the provisional general

Korean peoples' assembly of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of all Korea. This proposal in our opinion should meet no objection on the part of the American delegation in as much as it might remove the difficulties which the Joint Commission has encountered.

I consider it necessary to add to the above that the successful realization of the measure set forth in the proposal of the Soviet delegation is possible only on the basis of free and unfettered activity of the democratic parties and organizations, representatives of which at the present time in southern Korea are subjected to arrests and other repressions, which is incompatible with the principles of democracy and legality and also with the obligations which the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. took upon themselves with respect to Korea.

In connection with the assertions contained in Mr. Lovett's letter concerning the position of the Soviet delegation to the Joint Commission, the sense of which is that the Soviet delegation does not display sufficient understanding of the proposals of the American delegation, I see no necessity for stopping on these assertions in view of their obvious unsoundness.

At the same time I cannot fail to express regret concerning unilateral acts undertaken by you such as the despatch of an invitation to the Governments of Great Britain and China to take part in the discussion of this question, fixing the place and date for the conference.

The Soviet Government considers inexpedient your proposal to submit the question of the establishment of a provisional Korean democratic government to the consideration of the Governments of the four countries in as much as the Joint Commission is still far from exhausting all its possibilities for working out agreed recommendations, which is entirely possible. The "United States proposals concerning Korea" set forth in Mr. Lovett's letter are also unacceptable.

These proposals cannot fail to entail the further division of Korea in as much as they envisage the establishment of separate provisional legislative assemblies in the south and in the north of Korea (in the Soviet and American zones) whereas the vital task is to achieve as rapidly as possible the establishment of a single, even though provisional, organ of authority—the General Korean Provisional Democratic Government. The American proposal does not correct the situation now existing in Korea—the division of the country into two zones, to the liquidation of which all efforts should be directed—but on the contrary consolidates this abnormal situation.

Having in mind that the proposal for the consideration of the question of Korea in a joint conference of the representatives of the four powers does not stem from the Moscow decision of the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs concerning Korea, and taking into consideration the views set forth above, the Soviet Government sees no possibility of accepting the proposals advanced in Mr. Lovett's letter.

Copies of this letter are being sent by me to the Governments of Great Britain and China.

Please accept [etc.]

V. M. MOLOTOV.

E. THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*September 17, 1947.*

DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: The decision of the Soviet Government as conveyed in your letter of September 4, not to participate in Four Power discussions of proposals of the United States Government designed to achieve the speedy realization of the aims of the Moscow Agreement on Korea is deeply regretted. For almost two years the United States Government has been faithfully endeavoring to reach agreement with the Soviet Government to carry out the terms of the Moscow Agreement but with no appreciable success. It has even proved impossible for the Soviet and United States Delegations on the Joint Commission in Korea to agree upon a joint report of the status of their deliberations up to the present. There is no sign of the early setting up of a Korean Provisional Government. Korea remains divided and her promised independence unrealized.

The United States Government believes that this situation must not be permitted to continue indefinitely. In view of the fact that bilateral negotiations have not advanced Korean independence and that the Soviet Government does not agree to discussions among the powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement, there is but one course remaining. It is the intention therefore, of my Government to refer the problem of Korean independence to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is suggested that the members of the Joint Commission hold themselves in readiness to give such aid and assistance to the General Assembly as may be required during the Assembly's consideration of this problem.

It is the hope of my Government that consideration of this problem by the General Assembly may result in bringing about the early restoration of freedom and independence to the long suffering people of Korea.

Copies of this letter have been furnished to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT A. LOVETT  
*Acting Secretary of State*

22. U. S. HOLDS KOREAN INDEPENDENCE A UNITED NATIONS PROBLEM

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

[Released to the press October 20, 1947]

*October 9, 1947*

DEAR MR. MARSHALL: The position taken by the U. S. Delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission at Seoul provides evidence that the U.S.A. Delegation does not wish to continue the work of the Joint Commission with a view to reaching, on the basis of an exact observance of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, agreed decisions on questions connected with the establishment of a provisional Korean democratic government.

In violation of the Moscow Agreement on Korea and the understanding reached between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in May 1947 concerning the conditions for resuming the work of the Joint Commission, the U.S.A. Delegation insists that not only demo-

cratic parties and groups in northern and southern Korea which have signed the declaration of support for the aims of the Moscow Agreement and are loyally carrying out the conditions of this declaration, but also such reactionary groups which, having signed this agreement, are carrying on a struggle against the Moscow Agreement and are continuing to comprise the so-called "Anti-trusteeship Committee", which contradicts the above-mentioned understanding between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., shall take part in the formation of the Korean Government. The Soviet Delegation, consistently defending the principles of the Moscow Agreement, obviously cannot agree with this.

The position of the U.S.A. Delegation has made impossible the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government in accordance with the Moscow Agreement, which hinders the re-establishment of Korea as a united democratic state.

In view of the situation which had been created the Government of the U.S.S.R. instructed the Soviet Delegation to introduce in the Joint Commission at Seoul a new proposal, namely: To give to the Koreans the possibility of forming a government themselves, without aid and participation on the part of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, on condition that American and Soviet troops be withdrawn from Korea. If the Government of the U.S.A. should agree to the proposal for the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops at the beginning of 1948, the Soviet troops would be ready to leave Korea simultaneously with the American troops.

Notwithstanding the fact that this proposal was introduced by the Soviet Delegation at the session of the Joint Commission on September 26, the U.S.A. Delegation has unfortunately not replied to date, which cannot fail to delay the solution of the Korean question.

With reference to the consideration of the Korean question at the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization, which was proposed in Mr. Lovett's letter of September 17,<sup>18</sup> the position of the Soviet Government on this question, as you know, has already been set forth by the Soviet Delegation to the General Assembly.

Copies of this letter are being sent by me to the Governments of Great Britain and China.

Please accept [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

DEAR MR. MOLOTOV:<sup>19</sup> In your letter of October 9, 1947, you state that the position taken by the United States Delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission at Seoul has delayed a decision on the Korean question and you refer to the proposal made by the Soviet Delegation in Seoul on September 26, 1947, for the immediate simultaneous withdrawal of the United States-Soviet occupation forces to which you state no reply has been received.

The Secretary of State announced on September 17<sup>20</sup> that the problem of setting up an independent Government for a unified Korea would be presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations and on September 23 the General Assembly voted to place this question on

<sup>18</sup> Bulletin of September 28, 1947, p. 623.

<sup>19</sup> Note delivered to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Moscow on October 18.

<sup>20</sup> Bulletin of September 28, 1947, p. 618.

its agenda. In the opinion of the United States Government the question of withdrawal of occupation forces from Korea must be considered an integral part of the solution of that problem.

The United States Delegation to the General Assembly meeting in New York City has now had circulated to the various delegations for their consideration a proposed resolution which is designed to bring about the early establishment of an independent Korean Government representative of the will of the Korean people, and the consequent speedy withdrawal of all occupation forces.<sup>21</sup> In submitting this proposal to the Secretary General, specific attention was called to the Soviet proposal for the simultaneous withdrawal of troops with the statement of the United States' hope that having both proposals before it the General Assembly would be able to recommend a solution of the problem. A copy of the United States proposals was delivered to the Soviet Delegation in New York prior to its being communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmission to the other delegations.

In view of the continued inability of the Soviet and United States Delegations in the Joint Commission to agree on how to proceed with their work and the refusal of the Soviet Government to participate in discussions on this problem with the other Governments adhering to the Moscow Agreement on Korea, the United States Government considers it is obligated to seek the assistance of the United Nations in order that, as the Secretary of State said on September 17, "the inability of the two powers to reach agreement" should not further delay the early establishment of an independent, united Korea.

Copies of this letter have been furnished to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT A. LOVETT

(Bulletin, November 2, 1947, p. 867.)

## 23. VIEWS ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR POLISH ELECTIONS

### NOTE TO THE POLISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

[Released to the press August 20, 1946]

*Text of a note delivered by the American Ambassador to Poland, Arthur Bliss Lane, to the Polish Foreign Office on August 19*

I have been instructed by my Government to inform you that it has been glad to learn of the announcement that the Polish Provisional Government intends to promulgate electoral laws during the month of August and to hold elections early in the month of November. My Government is deeply conscious of the grave responsibility which it assumed, together with the British and Soviet Governments, by the decisions taken at the Crimea and Potsdam conferences with respect to the holding of free and unfettered elections in Poland. During the conversations which were held in Moscow in June 1945 the Polish leaders agreed to the acceptance of the principles formulated at Yalta. Accordingly, the Polish Government which was then functioning in Poland was reorganized and there was created the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, with which

<sup>21</sup> Bulletin of October 26, 1947, p. 821.

the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States established diplomatic relations.

In departing from its traditional policy by assuming responsibilities in connection with the internal affairs of another State, my Government was motivated by the feeling that as one of the principal powers engaged in liberating the peoples of Europe from the yoke of Nazi aggression, it had a special responsibility to assist in giving the Polish people who had suffered so greatly from Nazi occupation an opportunity freely to choose the government under which they would live. My Government feels, therefore, that it has both the right and the duty to bring the following to the attention of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

The United States Government considers that it had no responsibilities in connection with the referendum held in Poland on June 30. Nevertheless, as the Polish Ambassador in Washington informed my Government on April 24, 1946, this referendum was a measure preparatory to the election and the methods by which it was held bear a relation to the preparations for holding the election itself.<sup>22</sup> The official representatives of the United States Government in Poland have reported that the voting in the referendum appeared to have been generally carried out in a correct and fair manner but that the methods used in tabulating the ballots and reporting the vote have given rise to charges of serious irregularities, including removal of ballot boxes from polling places in contravention of the referendum law.

It has also been brought to the attention of my Government that the Polish Labor Party charges that it was not allowed to hold its party congress and that as a result of this and administrative persecution of the party by arrests, censorship restrictions, administrative interference and other oppressive acts which have prevented normal democratic political activity, the Central Committee of the Labor Party has requested the membership of that party to suspend all political activity until such time as the attitude of the Polish Provisional Government toward the Labor Party has changed. The Polish Provisional Government is, of course, aware that one of the essential elements in the agreement for the holding of free elections in Poland is that all democratic, anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. To this end it is necessary that all democratic parties be free to engage in political activity in the period preceding the elections.

Furthermore, my Government has learned with great regret that steps have been taken depriving the Polish Peasant Party of its right to assemble and to perform normal party functions at numerous points within Poland. According to reliable information the facilities which other parties enjoy in publishing electoral or party material, in using the radio for propaganda purposes and the ability to make known the views of the party through public posters and other forms of advertisement are, through censorship or other means, either denied to the Polish Peasant Party or restricted to a degree less than that accorded the parties adhering to the so-called government bloc.

In view of the foregoing, my Government wishes to emphasize its belief that *inter alia* it is essential for the carrying out of free elec-

<sup>22</sup> Bulletin of May 5, 1946, p. 762.

tions that (1) all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall be allowed to conduct election campaigns freely without arrest or threat of arrest. The parties recognized as "democratic and anti-Nazi parties" include the following: The Polish Workers Party (PPR), the Democratic Party (SD), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the Peasant Party (SL), and the Labor Party (SP); (2) all such parties shall be represented on all electoral commissions and ballots be counted in presence of representatives of all such parties; (3) results shall be published immediately by local districts; and (4) there shall be an adequate system of appealing election disputes.

My Government is confident that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity will take into account the views presented above in making arrangements for the elections (Bulletin, September 1, 1946, p. 422).

## 24. UNITED STATES POSITION ON POLISH NATIONALIZATION DEVELOPMENTS

[Released to the press November 9, 1946]

*Text of a note of October 30, 1946 on nationalization, delivered by Gerald Keith, counselor of the United States Embassy in Poland, to the Polish Foreign Office, October 31.*

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have been instructed by my Government to communicate to Your Excellency's Government the following observations relative to the steps which have recently been taken by the Provisional Government of National Unity with a view to implementing the provisions of the law of January 3, 1946, regarding the nationalization of the basic branches of the Polish national economy.<sup>23</sup>

1. The Government of the United States desired to recall to the Government of Poland the provisions of numbered paragraphs 4 and 5 of the notes exchanged between the two Governments at Washington on April 24, 1946, which specifically provide: (a) that the Government of the United States and the Provisional Government of Poland will make both adequate and effective compensation to nationals and corporations of the other country whose properties are requisitioned or nationalized, and (b) that the Provisional Government of Poland and the Government of the United States agree to afford each other adequate opportunity for consultation concerning the subjects touched upon in the exchange of notes, and including that mentioned under (a) above.<sup>24</sup>

2. The Government of the United States desires once again to bring to the attention of the Provisional Government of National Unity the inadequateness of the time allowed in paragraph 28 of the order of the Council of Ministers of April 11, 1946, for foreigners to protest the nationalization of their property or to file claims under articles 2 and 3 of the nationalization law, especially in view of the provisions to be found in paragraph 75 of the order of April 11, 1946, which

<sup>23</sup> For an article on the Polish Nationalization Law see Bulletin of October 13, 1946, p. 651.

<sup>24</sup> Bulletin of May 5, 1946, p. 761.

require the foreign firm or person concerned to choose a place of residence within Polish territory for the receipt of official documents or to appoint an attorney with residence in Poland and in view of the fact that many weeks will unavoidably be required to identify and notify persons or firms in the United States owning or having an interest in undertakings in Poland affected by the Polish Government's nationalization program.

3. The Government of the United States desires to point out that the Polish Government has not yet announced the procedure to be followed in the processing of claims for compensation in the case of properties destined for nationalization in accordance with the provisions of article 3 of the nationalization law of January 3, 1946. The Government of the United States wishes in this connection to bring again to the attention of the Provisional Government of National Unity the fact that foreign persons and firms, whose interests are affected by the operation of the nationalization law of January 3, 1946, will require sufficient time and the accordance of adequate facilities to enable them to prepare and to present their claims for compensation, once definite notice of expropriation is received. The Government of the United States feels certain that the Polish Government will agree that a proper valuation can, in most instances, only be determined after a thorough examination of the property in question, and that, to prepare the data necessary to such a proper valuation, adequate time is needed for the actual physical examination of the property, together with complete freedom of access to all of the plans and records. The Government of the United States desires to emphasize the reasonableness of its views in this respect, and to insist upon the granting of all examination privileges which the representatives of the American interests affected may find necessary to enable them to arrive at a proper valuation of the property concerned.

4. The Government of the United States refers to the proposal contained in the note of January 17, 1946, from its Embassy in Warsaw relative to the establishment of a mixed commission, composed of an equal number of representatives of each Government, with a view to reaching a decision concerning which assets, of those subject to nationalization under the provisions of the nationalization law of January 3, 1946, are owned by nationals of the United States, the amount of the compensation to be paid for each such holding nationalized by the Government of Poland, the means by which the compensation is to be paid, and concerning such related matters as may mutually be agreed upon between the two Governments. The Government of the United States wishes to reiterate the proposal contained in the note of January 17, 1946, to which reference has just been made, and to state that it regards it as of the greatest importance that the mixed commission be appointed at an early date to the end that agreements may be reached in principle on the various subjects within its competence before properties in which there is an American interest have been nationalized. The Government of the United States recalls that, in the note which the Polish Embassy in Washington addressed to the Department of State on April 24, 1946, the Polish Government expressed its willingness to begin discussions such as those referred to in the note addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American Embassy in War-



saw on January 17, 1946, although it held that the time for such discussions was then somewhat premature." The Government of the United States, in the light of the steps recently taken by the Polish Government looking toward the realization of its nationalization program, feels that the Provisional Government of National Unity may, since April of 1946, have made such progress in its reconstruction planning that the holding of such discussions as those proposed in the note of January 17, 1946, may now be regarded as opportune. I should be grateful if Your Excellency would be so good as to inform me as soon as may be possible, in view of the urgency of the matter under discussion, of the views of the Polish Government with respect to the observations contained herein so that I may, in turn, inform my Government in Washington.

I avail [etc.]

(Bulletin, November 17, 1946, p. 912).

## 25. UNITED STATES POSITION ON POLISH ELECTIONS

[Released to the press November 25, 1946]

*Text of note delivered by the American Chargé d'Affaires in Poland, Gerald Keith, to the Polish Foreign Office on November 22*

EXCELLENCY: I have been instructed to inform you that my Government has taken note of the announcement that the Polish Government of National Unity has fixed January 19, 1947 as the date on which general elections will be held in Poland. In this connection, my Government recalls that Ambassador Lange's note of April 24, 1946 stated that in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945, which provided that elections would be held as soon as possible, elections would take place this year. Although my Government is surprised that the Polish Government would fail, without explanation, to fulfill this formal assurance, its chief concern is not with any particular date but with the discharge of its responsibility under the decisions taken at the Crimea and Potsdam conferences with respect to the holding of free elections in Poland.

The importance which the United States Government attaches to the carrying out of these decisions has repeatedly been brought to the attention of the Polish Government. In his note of August 19, 1946, to which no reply has been received, Ambassador Lane outlined certain points which the United States Government considers essential for the carrying out of free elections. In view of the disturbing reports which it has received concerning the preparations for the elections, my Government has instructed me again to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United States expects that equal rights and facilities in the forthcoming election campaigns and in the elections themselves will be accorded to all democratic and anti-Nazi parties in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. My Government could not otherwise regard the terms of the Yalta and Potsdam decisions as having been fulfilled (Bulletin, December 8, 1946, p. 1057).

\* Bulletin of April 21, 1946, p. 670.

## 26. UNITED STATES POSITION ON POLISH ELECTIONS

NOTES DELIVERED TO THE BRITISH, SOVIET, AND POLISH GOVERNMENTS

[Released to the press January 7, 1947]

*Text of note regarding the forthcoming Polish elections delivered on January 5, 1947 to Lord Inverchapel, British Ambassador in Washington*<sup>26</sup>

EXCELLENCY: The Government of the United States,<sup>27</sup> as a signatory of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, with particular regard to those sections of the two agreements which deal with the establishment of a representative government in Poland through the instrumentality of free and unfettered elections, wishes me to inform you of the concern with which it views the pre-election activities of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. My Government is especially perturbed by the increasingly frequent reports of repressive measures which the Polish Provisional Government has seen fit to employ against those democratic elements in Poland which have not aligned themselves with the "bloc" parties.

According to information reaching my Government from various authoritative sources, these repressive activities on the part of the Provisional Government have now increased in intensity to the point where, if they do not cease immediately, there is little likelihood that elections can be held in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam Agreement which call for free and unfettered elections "on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and put forward candidates."

On December 18, 1946, Vice Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk addressed a communication to the American Ambassador in Warsaw in which he called attention to the reprehensible methods employed by the Provisional Government in denying freedom of political action to the Polish Peasant Party. This communication pointed out *inter alia* that the methods used by the Government in its efforts to eliminate the participation by the Polish Peasant Party in the elections include political arrests and murders, compulsory enrollment of Polish Peasant Party members in the "bloc" political parties, dismissal of Polish Peasant Party members from their employment, searches of homes, attacks by secret police and members of the Communist Party on Polish Peasant Party premises and party congresses, suspension and restriction by government authorities of Polish Peasant Party meetings and suspension of party activities in 28 Powiats, suppression of the party press and limitation of circulation of party papers, and arrest of the editorial staff of the Party Bulletin and of the *Gazeta Ludowa*. Authoritative reports from other quarters in Poland serve to substantiate the charges brought by Mr. Mikolajczyk in the communication cited. It is understood that copies of this communication were also delivered to the Soviet and British Ambassadors at Warsaw as representatives of the other two Yalta powers.

<sup>26</sup> A similar note was delivered on Jan. 5, 1947 to Andrei Vyshinsky, Deputy Minister of the Soviet Union, by U. S. Ambassador W. Bedell Smith.

<sup>27</sup> In the note to the Soviet Union, "my Government" is substituted for "the Government of the United States".

In the view of my Government, what is involved here is the sanctity of international agreements, a principle upon which depends the establishment and maintenance of peace and the reign of justice under law. The obligations with respect to the Polish elections which my Government assumed at Yalta and reiterated at Potsdam, together with the Soviet and British Governments, and the obligations subsequently assumed by the Polish Government and frequently reiterated, provide for the conduct of free and unfettered elections of the type and in the manner described above. It is of no significance that the subject matter of this international agreement relates to elections in Poland. The essential fact is that it constitutes an international agreement on the basis of which all four nations concerned have acted. Therefore, my Government believes that, for any of the parties to this agreement to refrain from the most energetic efforts to see to its proper execution would be to fail in a most solemn obligation. For this reason, it is my Government's view that it is both a duty and a right for the three Powers who are parties to the Yalta and the Potsdam Agreements to call to the attention of the Polish Government in a most friendly but in a most insistent manner the failure of the Polish Government to perform its obligations.

It is a source of regret to my Government that its own efforts in this direction have not resulted in any change in the course which the Polish Provisional Government has pursued in connection with pre-election political activities. My Government feels that it would be failing in its duty if it did not make further efforts prior to the elections to ameliorate the conditions under which certain democratic elements of the Polish population are now struggling in an effort to take their rightful part in the national elections. It intends, therefore, in the immediate future again to approach the Polish Government with a reminder of its obligations in connection with the elections and again to call upon it to provide those conditions of security which will enable all democratic and anti-Nazi parties to take full part in the elections. I hardly need add that my Government is interested only in seeing that the Polish people have the opportunity to participate in a free and unfettered election and that my Government does not regard the results of such an election as being a proper concern of anyone other than the Polish people themselves.

It is the hope of my Government that the British Government,<sup>28</sup> as a party to the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, will associate itself with the American Government in this approach to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

A similar communication is being addressed simultaneously to the Soviet Government.<sup>29</sup>

Accept [etc.]

<sup>28</sup> In the note to the Soviet Union, "the Soviet Union" is substituted for "the British Government".

<sup>29</sup> In the note to the Soviet Union, "British Government" is substituted for "Soviet Government".

[Released to the press January 9, 1947]

*Text of a note delivered on January 9 at 12:15 p. m., Warsaw time, by Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane to the Polish Foreign Office*

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's notes of Aug. 19<sup>30</sup> and Nov. 22, 1946<sup>31</sup> regarding the Polish National elections, to which no reply has yet been received, and pursuant to instructions from my Government to inform Your Excellency, as a signatory of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, with particular regard to those sections of the two agreements which deal with the establishment of a government in Poland, through the instrumentality of free and unfettered elections, of my Government's continued concern over the pre-election activities of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. My Government is especially perturbed by the increasingly frequent reports of repressive measures which the Polish Provisional Government has seen fit to employ against those democratic elements in Poland which have not aligned themselves with the "bloc" parties.

It is a source of regret to my Government that its previous efforts to call the attention of the Polish Provisional Government to its failure to perform its obligations under the agreements cited have not resulted in any change in the course which that Government has pursued in connection with pre-election political activities. According to information reaching my Government from various authoritative sources, these repressive activities on the part of the Provisional Government have now increased in intensity to the point where, if they do not cease immediately, there is little likelihood that elections can be held in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam agreement which call for free and unfettered elections "on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and put forward candidates."

It is the view of my Government that this matter involves the sanctity of international agreements, a principle upon which depends the establishment and maintenance of peace and the reign of justice under law. The obligations with respect to the Polish elections which my Government assumed at Yalta and reiterated at Potsdam, together with the Soviet and British Governments, and the obligations subsequently assumed by the Polish Government and frequently reiterated, provide for the conduct of free and unfettered elections of the type and in the manner described above. The fact that the subject matter of these agreements relates to elections in Poland is incidental. The essential fact is that they constitute an international agreement under which all four nations concerned have assumed obligations. I need hardly say that my Government is interested only in seeing that the Polish people have the opportunity to participate in a free and unfettered election and that my Government does not regard the results of such an election as being a proper concern of anyone other than the Polish people themselves.

My Government would be failing in its duty if it did not again point out that the continuation of the present policy of suppression, coercion, and intimidation as applied to political opposition in Poland constitutes a violation of the letter as well as the spirit of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements (Bulletin, January 19, 1947, p. 26).

<sup>30</sup> Bulletin of September 1, 1946, p. 422.

<sup>31</sup> Bulletin of December 8, 1946, p. 1037.

REPLY FROM UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO UNITED STATES NOTE  
ON POLISH ELECTIONS

[Released to the press January 16, 1947]

*Translation of substance of Soviet note on Polish elections. The note, dated January 13, 1947 and signed by Foreign Minister Molotov, was delivered to the American Embassy at Moscow on January 14, 1947*

In connection with your note of January 5, 1947, regarding the impending elections in Poland, I consider it necessary to inform you of the following:

The Soviet Government cannot agree with the accusations contained in the note under reference against the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity of violating the obligations imposed on it by the decisions of the Yalta and Berlin conferences envisaging the holding in Poland of free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage, by secret ballot, in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties will have the right to take part and put forward candidates.

The Government of the United States of America advancing in its note of January 5,<sup>32</sup> a series of accusations against the Polish Government, states that the basis therefor are reports coming to the American Government, and makes reference to the sole source of the information received—to the communication of the Vice Premier of the Polish Government, S. Mikolajczyk, who transmitted to the American Ambassador in Warsaw reports of the above character, which the American Government considered possible to reproduce in its note.

In the note are repeated the accusations against the Polish Provisional Government contained in Mikolajczyk's statement of repressive measures directed against certain members of the party he represents. In this connection, however, there are completely ignored widely known facts concerning the participation of certain of the members of Mikolajczyk's party in the activities of underground organizations, who resort to every kind of threat, to violence, and to murder in order to interfere with the normal conduct of the electoral campaign for the Sejm.

Among other things, numerous facts are known concerning bandit attacks on electoral districts, terrorization of electors with threats in respect of adherents of the government and of the democratic bloc and even a whole series of murders of members of the electoral commissions.

In this situation, the Polish Government cannot remain indifferent and not undertake decisive measures with respect to the criminal elements who are endeavoring to disrupt the free and unfettered elections for the Sejm, even though certain members of Mikolajczyk's party should be guilty in this.

As is known, Poland suffered grievous years of German occupation, the consequences of which are still apparent at the present time both in the difficult economic conditions as well as in the difficulties in overcoming the remnants of the banditry generated in the period of occupation of Polish territory by German troops.

It is impossible also to ignore the criminal activities of fascist emigre circles endeavoring to base themselves on their underground organizations in Poland, particularly, having in view the connection

<sup>32</sup> Bulletin of January 19, 1947, p. 134.

of these underground organizations with the bandit elements who avail themselves of every kind of violence, even of murder of representatives of the Polish authorities and leaders of the democratic parties. In these circumstances the Polish Government would not be fulfilling its duty to the people if it did not take measures against these criminal elements to assure the conditions necessary for the holding of free democratic elections. To interfere with the carrying out of such measures would be inadmissible particularly on the part of foreign governments.

In view of the foregoing, the Soviet Government does not perceive any basis for the taking of any such steps, as the Government of the United States of America proposes, with respect to the Polish Government in connection with the impending elections in Poland and thereby in this fashion bringing about interference in the internal affairs of Poland on the part of the powers who signed the Yalta and Berlin agreements (Bulletin, January 26, 1947, p. 164).

## 27. U. S. POSITION ON CONDUCT OF RECENT POLISH ELECTIONS

[Released to the press January 28, 1947]

On January 19 a general election was held in Poland, the results of which are expected to be announced shortly. The United States Government has followed closely the developments leading up to this event in accordance with the commitments it accepted at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. On numerous occasions it has expressed its concern over the course of events in Poland, which increasingly indicated that the election would not be conducted in such manner as to allow a free expression of the will of the Polish people. On August 19<sup>33</sup> and November 22,<sup>34</sup> 1946, formal notes were addressed to the Polish Provisional Government on this subject. On January 5<sup>35</sup> this Government brought the situation in Poland to the attention of the British and Soviet Governments and expressed the hope that those Governments would associate themselves with the Government of the United States in an approach to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Government.<sup>36</sup> On January 9<sup>37</sup> this Government delivered a further note to the Polish Provisional Government which stated among other things that if the repressive activities on the part of the Provisional Government did not cease immediately there was little likelihood that elections could be held in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam agreement. The British Government has also protested to the Polish Provisional Government the violation of its election pledges.

The reports received from the United States Embassy in Poland in the period immediately prior to the elections as well as its subsequent reports based upon the observations of American officials who visited a number of Polish voting centers confirmed the fears which this Government had expressed that the election would not be free. These reports were corroborated by the general tenor of the dispatches from foreign correspondents in Poland. It is clear that the Provisional Government did not confine itself to the suppression of the so-

<sup>33</sup> Bulletin of September 1, 1946, p. 422.

<sup>34</sup> Bulletin of December 8, 1946, p. 1057.

<sup>35</sup> Bulletin of January 19, 1947, p. 134.

<sup>36</sup> Bulletin of January 26, 1947, p. 164.

<sup>37</sup> Bulletin of January 19, 1947, p. 135.

called "underground" but employed wide-spread measures of coercion and intimidation against democratic elements which were loyal to Poland although not partisans of the Government "bloc". In these circumstances the United States Government cannot consider that the provisions of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements have been fulfilled.

The United States Government has made it clear that it has no desire to intervene in the internal affairs of Poland. By virtue of the responsibility which devolved upon it as one of the principal powers engaged in liberating the countries of Europe from Nazi occupation it undertook, together with the British and Soviet Governments, to secure for the long-suffering Polish people the opportunity to select a government of their own choosing. It was in connection with this undertaking that this Government agreed to the decisions respecting Poland that were taken at the Yalta Conference, including the decision to recognize the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. These decisions with respect to Poland, which were accepted by the Polish Provisional Government in their entirety, formed part of a series of agreements between the United States, British, and Soviet Governments. The United States Government considers that the Polish Provisional Government has failed to carry out its solemn pledges.

The United States Government intends to maintain its interest in the welfare of the Polish people. While retaining full liberty of action to determine its future attitude toward the government of Poland, this Government will continue to keep itself informed of developments in Poland through its diplomatic mission in Warsaw.

#### PRESENTATION OF LETTERS OF CREDENCE BY POLISH AMBASSADOR

[Released to the press February 4, 1947]

*The remarks of the newly appointed Ambassador of Poland, Jozef Winiewicz, upon the occasion of the presentation of his letters of credence, February 4, 1947, follow:*

MR. PRESIDENT: It is for me indeed a great honor that I have been called upon and designated to represent my country with the Government of the United States. Every Pole feels the greatest admiration as well as a sincere friendship toward the great and splendid country of George Washington. In the heart of every Pole are deeply and lastingly engraved memories of facts and persons, which have been immortalized on those pages on which the history of the United States and that of Poland are sometimes so closely interwoven.

Two great Poles, Kosciuszko and Pulaski, fought for the high ideals of democratic government and the democratic way of life on the battlefields of both Poland and America. The names of those Poles have passed into the history of the United States. The regaining of our independence and the rebirth of our national life after the first World War is irrevocably connected with the great name of Woodrow Wilson. In the most difficult days of the second World War the name of Franklin Delano Roosevelt was on the lips of every Pole as the name of one of the great leaders of the United Nations fighting against German aggression.

After the first World War the help given by the United States saved thousands of Polish children from death by hunger, and the

financial assistance of your country was of great help to us in rebuilding our life from ruins. Once more, when after the second World War Poland was faced with the enormous task of reconstruction and rehabilitation, the help of the United States, coming mainly through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, assisted us to rebuild the foundations for a peaceful development of our national life. I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that my Government and every one of my compatriots remembers this and is grateful for the help of your great Nation.

It is also the sincere desire of my Government that the relations between our two countries shall be of the best, that they remain true to a long tradition of uninterrupted friendship and cordiality rare in the history of nations. I also will regard it as my solemn duty to continue and develop these traditions of the past.

Poland is still continually struggling with the difficult task of rebuilding its life after the terrible destruction of war, which does not have its equal in modern history. The proud capital of my country was almost razed to the ground. Thousands of villages and towns lay in ruins. At the time when the hostilities ceased, several million Poles, displaced by war, were looking for new homes on their liberated soil. Despite that, though slowly and with difficulty, but gradually and systematically, life returns to its normal course.

Poland was given also new boundaries and within these new boundaries had to carry out the transfer of several million persons in order to populate her new western territories, to restart their industry and agriculture, and thus to contribute also to the rebuilding of the entire European economy. At the same time, Poland had to heal the psychological wounds inflicted by the war upon her population, and to stabilize her political life, unbalanced by the violent shock of war.

However, Poland does not isolate herself within her own circle of affairs, but desires to take her share in all international efforts aiming at the creation for humanity of a better future and democratic foundations and of a sincere and loyal cooperation of all the peace-loving nations. In these our efforts we count on the sincere understanding of your country, Mr. President, and on its friendly help.

In this spirit, the President of the National Council of Poland has instructed me to extend his warmest wishes to yourself personally and to the people of the United States. These wishes are accompanied by the sincerest feeling of friendship of the entire Polish Nation for your country, Mr. President, and for your countrymen.

I am glad, and it is for me a great honor, that I have been chosen to express these sentiments to you.

I now present to you, Mr. President, the letter of recall of my distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Dr. Lange, and my letter of credence as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Poland.

*The President's reply to the remarks of Ambassador Winiewicz follows:*

MR. AMBASSADOR: I accept your letters accrediting you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Poland and the letters of recall of your predecessor, Ambassador Lange.



The American people are also deeply aware of the bond of sympathy that has existed between them and the Polish people from the earliest days of this Republic, based on their common love of freedom. They will long remember the heroic and tragic role of the people of Poland in the recent war against the evil forces of aggression. I can assure you that the American people have followed with greatest interest the efforts of the Polish people to meet the urgent task of reconstruction and to reestablish their national life. The Government of the United States gave expression to this interest in the Polish people when it joined with the British and Soviet Governments in the important decisions concerning Poland that were taken at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. One of these decisions provided for the holding of a free election and the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity pledged itself to carry out this decision. It is a cause of deep concern to me and to the American people that the Polish Provisional Government has failed to fulfill that pledge.

The Government of the United States has not lost interest in the welfare of the Polish people. It is with this in mind that I offer to you the cooperation of the officials of this Government.

## 28. POLAND OPPOSES INDUSTRIAL PLAN FOR GERMANY ON GROUNDS OF "UNILATERAL ACTION"

### EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE POLISH AMBASSADOR AND THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

[Released to the press September 30, 1947]

*September 14, 1947.*

SIR: In connection with the conversations held in London by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France, concerning the raising of German industrial production, at the conclusion of which a plan of industrial production in the Anglo-American Zone has been made public in Berlin on August 29, 1947, I have been instructed to present to you the following viewpoint of the Polish Government regarding this matter:

1) The Polish Government is of the opinion that the plan for German industrial production made public in Berlin on August 29, 1947, being in complete contradiction with the Potsdam Agreement which sets forth that any decision regarding Germany will be taken by the four Great Powers, unilaterally raises the level of German industrial production above the established German needs.

2) The Polish Government is of the opinion that the implementation of this plan would have as result the restoration of the German industrial power, thus creating a threat to the security of Europe, especially to countries neighboring Germany.

3) The program for the increase of German industrial production agreed upon during the London conversations is contradictory to the principle of priority for the reconstruction of countries devastated by German aggression, as well as to the principle not to exceed in Germany the average of the standards of living of European countries.

4) This plan represents a unilateral attempt toward a revision of the program of reparations to be paid by Germany to the victorious countries, and among them to Poland. This plan, contradictory to

the most vital interests of Poland, has evoked a determined and unanimous protest of Polish public opinion.

The Polish Government in presenting the above observations cannot refrain from stating that the realization of these aims would not comply with the fundamental motives which animated all the Allied Nations in their endeavor to abolish German aggression and its sources; it would also not contribute to the task of consolidation of peace and security in Europe, in which task Poland is deeply interested.

Accept [etc.]

JOZEF WINIEWICZ

EXCELLENCY: <sup>38</sup> I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of September 14, 1947, regarding the discussions in London between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France concerning the level of industry and the Ruhr area in Germany, and setting forth the views of the Polish Government with respect to the decisions reached in those discussions.

The United States Government has always agreed that decisions dealing with Germany as a whole can only be taken by agreement between the four occupying powers. The United States Government is, however, unable to accept the interpretation placed by the Polish Government on the recent agreements relating to Germany as expressed in your note under reference.

As this Government informed the Soviet Government in a note from the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy dated August 29, 1947, the United States Government has sought persistently for over two years to reach agreements on matters affecting Germany as a whole and to implement the provisions of the Berlin Agreement of 1945 which state that Germany should be treated as a single economic unit and that to this end certain common policies should be established. The level of industry for Germany as a whole adopted on March 27, 1946, was in fact expressly based on the assumption that Germany would be treated as an economic unit. Pending achievement of this goal, the United States Government has been called upon, at great expense to the American public, to sustain on a minimum subsistence basis a non-self-supporting area of Germany. The American people have been extremely patient in submitting for so long to this situation, which would not have persisted if Germany had been treated as an economic entity. It became clear during the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow this year that the economic unity of Germany would again have to be postponed and that there was little prospect of an early solution. Faced with that situation, it was imperative that steps be taken in the United States and British Zones with the object of relieving as soon as possible the tremendous financial burden on the two governments which their responsibilities in those deficit areas entailed.

In the note to the Soviet Embassy cited above, the Soviet Government was informed that "the United States Government is unable to accept the thesis that nothing can be done to alleviate the financial burden of the United States or to develop within the framework of the Berlin Agreement the contribution of the western zones of Germany to the

<sup>38</sup> Delivered to the Polish Ambassador at Washington on September 30, 1947.

economic reconstruction of Europe until the consent of the Soviet Government has been obtained. Pending the fulfillment of quadripartite agreement, the United States feels justified in pursuing objectives which have been commonly agreed and making arrangements for that purpose with any other occupying power willing to work toward the common end."

I should like to mention here that at the last Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting all four ministers agreed that the level of industry for Germany should be raised appreciably above the plan of March 27, 1946. No formal decision to do so was taken, however, because of lack of agreement on other issues, but the fact remains that there was general concurrence that any agreement to treat Germany as an economic unit would require raising the level of industry. If this was required under the favorable conditions of economic unity, it was all the more necessary to put such measures into effect where possible under the less favorable conditions of a Germany economically divided. I can assure you in any case that, in working out the new plan for the United States and British Zones, the United States Government has observed the main objectives in the Berlin Agreement of eliminating German war potential, developing Germany's agriculture and peaceful industries, and enabling Germany to maintain itself without external assistance.

In the communiqué of August 28, 1947, outlining the decisions reached in London, it was specifically stated that "the measures about to be taken should not result in priority being given to the rehabilitation of Germany over that of the democratic countries of Europe" and that "German resources should contribute to the general rehabilitation of Europe." The Polish Government cannot fail to be aware of the importance of German production to the economic rehabilitation of Europe.

The adjusted level of industry plan undoubtedly will have some effect on the reparations program, and this consideration was carefully weighed before the plan was adopted. It is hoped and expected that this effect will in the long run be more than offset by the benefits derived from an earlier resumption of normal trade relations with Germany. While it would have been preferable to have worked out this plan, and other arrangements for Germany, on a quadripartite basis, I believe I have made it clear in the preceding paragraphs why action in the United States and British Zones could no longer be postponed.

As for the opinion expressed in your note to the effect that the adjustment of the level of industry in Germany will result in the creation of a threat to the security of Europe, I wish to call to your attention the fact that in the United States Zone of Germany the occupying authorities have destroyed all first priority military installations. Of all military installations other than fortifications and defense works, 91 per cent have been destroyed, and 100 per cent of naval and armored equipment have been likewise disposed of. As of May 1, 1947, of 105 industrial plants listed for demilitarization, 74 had been wholly dismantled, and 29 had been partially dismantled. Work on the remainder of these plants is progressing steadily. This record does not substantiate the Polish Government's allegation, as expressed in your note, that the decisions taken at London are not in accord with the

principles which animated the allied nations "in their endeavor to abolish German aggression and its sources".

In this connection, the Polish Government is undoubtedly aware that the United States Government has made repeated proposals for negotiation of a treaty with the United Kingdom, France, and the U.S.S.R., which would guarantee the security of Europe against the revival of militarism in Germany for a period of 40 years. The United States proposal, which was put forward more than a year ago and is still open, has been accepted as a basis for agreement by the United Kingdom and by France but not by the U.S.S.R. This proposal is indisputable evidence of the determination of the people and the Government of the United States that Germany shall never again be a dominant military power in Europe.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

NORMAN ARMOUR

(Bulletin, October 12, 1947, p. 743.)

## 29. RECOGNITION OF RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT

[Released to the press February 5, 1946]

In accordance with the agreement in regard to Rumania reached by the Foreign Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States at their meeting in Moscow from December 16 to December 26, 1945, a commission comprised of A. Y. Vyshinsky, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, and Sir. A. Clark Kerr has consulted with King Michael and members of the present Government of Rumania in Bucharest. As a result of these discussions and in fulfillment of the provisions of the Moscow Agreement, (1) representatives of the National Peasant Party and the Liberal Party have been included in the Rumanian Government; (2) the Government thus reorganized has declared that free and unfettered elections in which all democratic and anti-Fascist parties will have the right to take part and put forward candidates will be held as soon as possible on the basis of universal and secret ballot; and (3) the Government has also given assurances concerning the grant of freedom of the press, speech, religion, and association.

In the circumstances, the United States Political Representative in Rumania, acting under instructions of the Secretary of State, on February 5, 1946 transmitted to the President of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian Government the following note:

The Government of the United States of America has taken note of the communication of January 8, 1946, addressed to Ambassador William Averell Harriman by the President of the Council of Ministers, Dr. Petru Groza, enclosing a declaration of the Rumanian Government, made at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on January 8. According to this declaration the Council of Ministers considered it indispensable that—

*One.* General elections should be held in the shortest time possible.

*Two.* The freedom of these elections shall be assured. They shall be held on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot with the participation of all democratic and anti-Fascist parties which shall have the right to present candidates.

*Three.* Freedom of the press, speech, religion and assembly shall be assured.

The Government of the United States has been advised of the conversation which took place on January 9th between the President of the Council of Ministers, and the American and British Ambassadors. It has taken note of the

oral explanation of the aforementioned declaration which the President of the Council of Ministers made to the American and British Ambassadors in this conversation to the effect that:

*One.* All political parties represented in the Rumanian Government shall have the right to participate in the elections and to put forward candidates.

*Two.* The examination of the balloting procedure and counting of the ballots shall take place in the presence of representatives of all the political parties represented in the Government.

*Three.* All political parties represented in the Government shall be accorded equitable broadcasting facilities for the presentation of their political views.

*Four.* All political parties represented in the Government shall have equal rights to print, publish and distribute their own newspapers and political publications. Newsprint shall be distributed to them on a fair and equitable basis.

*Five.* All political parties represented in the Government shall have the right to organize associations and hold meetings. They shall be allowed premises for this purpose.

*Six.* The Council of Ministers will consult with the representatives of the political parties in order to reach agreement concerning the grant of freedom of the press and speech as well as on questions relating to the drafting of the electoral law and the conduct of the elections.

The Government of the United States has taken note of the statement contained in the declaration of the Rumanian Government that the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Cults and Propaganda will be charged with the implementation of the decisions contained in the declaration. It understands from the statement of the President of the Council that these Ministries will not act on their own responsibility but under the close control of the Government as a whole. Although these Ministries will be charged with the technical implementation of these decisions, the Rumanian Government as reconstituted will bear the primary responsibility for their fulfillment and for safeguarding the interests of all the participating parties.

As for the decision to hold elections in the shortest time possible, the Government of the United States confidently expects that arrangements will be undertaken with despatch and would hope that it may be possible to hold the elections at the end of April or early in May of this year.

On the basis of the assurances contained in the declaration of the Rumanian Government and on the understanding that the oral statement of the President of the Council of Ministers, as set forth above, reflects the intentions of the Rumanian Government, the Government of the United States is prepared to recognize the Government of Rumania.

(Bulletin, February 17, 1946, p. 257.)

### 30. PROTEST TO RUMANIA AGAINST NON-FULFILMENT OF ASSURANCES TO TRIPARTITE COMMISSION

[Released to the press June 1, 1946]

*On Monday, May 27, the Representative of the United States in Rumania, Burton Y. Berry, delivered to the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs a note of protest against the non-fulfilment of the assurances given by the Rumanian Government in January of this year to the Tripartite Commission which was sent to Bucharest pursuant to the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, December 1945, with regard to Rumania. The text of the note is as follows:*

Upon instructions from my Government, I wish to draw to your Government's attention two aspects of political life in Rumania that are giving concern to the Government of the United States. First, the fact that no election law has been promulgated or date set for the elections, and, secondly, the abuses of the freedoms and particularly the increasing frequency of actions of violence which mock at the application of the freedoms guaranteed by the Rumanian Government through its acceptance of the Moscow decisions.

It is now more than four months since the reorganization of the Government and not only has no date been fixed for the elections but no electoral law for such elections has been promulgated. This situation, incompatible with the Moscow decisions, gives the impression that the Government is procrastinating in the fulfilment of its promise.

While a measure of free expression has been provided by the authorization of the National Peasant and National Liberal Parties to publish newspapers, the exercise of censorship has in certain notable instances prevented the free dissemination of public announcements, and the suspension or suppression of papers has restricted the free expression of political views. Thus a form of censorship prevented the prompt and full distribution of the address of the United States Secretary of State on February 28. Important passages were also deleted by censorship from the address of Senator Vandenberg on February 27. In addition to such official impediments to the free dissemination of news, I have been informed of cases where the printers union has exercised an effective censorship and of others where an unequal distribution of newsprint acts as a means of censorship.

Access to the state broadcasting facilities, according to my information, remains a monopoly of certain parties within the Government contrary to the Government's commitments under the Moscow decisions.

An increasing number of instances have been brought to the attention of this Mission where organized bands of hooligans have broken up meetings called by the National Peasant and National Liberal parties or interfered with movements of members of those parties when going to attend such meetings. While there is little point in listing all such instances, I do desire to state that a sufficient number of them have been investigated or witnessed by American officers to establish beyond any doubt the fact that political violence is on the increase.

The legal proceedings against the National Peasant and National Liberal Party members charged as being responsible for incidents on November 8 are continuing, according to Bucharest newspapers dated April 15, in spite of the Prime Minister's assurance to Ambassador Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr that they would be dismissed.

The Ministers of State representing the National Peasant and National Liberal Parties have not been given opportunity to cooperate fully with the Government. Full cabinet meetings are rarely called and important pending legislation frequently is not discussed in them; in many instances Ministers are not given adequate time to study draft laws and in some other important cases decree laws are published without having been submitted to these Ministers for their study.

In bringing these matters to your attention, it is my purpose to point out that a definite impression is being created abroad concerning the present Rumanian Government. The impression is that through the Government's actions and inactions, while trying to give the appearance of carrying out the assurances of the Moscow decisions, it is in reality circumventing commitments which it has made. My Government, being a party to the Moscow Agreement, has an interest in seeing that this impression is dispelled. I therefore urge you to take the necessary steps without delay to see that it be dispelled.

Accordingly, it is believed that a different impression will be attained through prompt action on the part of the Rumanian Government in implementing the assurances given the Allied Commission in January by promulgating an electoral law and setting a date for elections, at the same time taking adequate measures during this period prior to elections that all democratic parties may put forward their candidates with the assurance that the freedoms set forth in the Moscow decisions apply equally to members of all such parties (Bulletin, June 9, 1946, p. 1007).

RUMANIAN REPLY TO UNITED STATES NOTE ON GENERAL ELECTIONS AND  
PUBLIC LIBERTIES

[Released to the press June 7, 1946]

*The following note from the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs was received by the United States representative in Bucharest on June 3, 1946 and has now been released for publication by the Rumanian Government:*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note dated May the twenty-seventh and at the same time to forward you the Rumanian Government's reply thereto.

From the contents of your note it follows that the anxiety expressed by the United States Government is caused, first, by the non-fixation of the date for the general elections and, secondly, by the manner in which the Moscow decisions concerning public liberties are being carried out.

The Rumanian Government are eager to effect the general elections as speedily as possible. To this end they have, after laborious study, set up the provisional draft of the electoral law, which they have submitted to public discussion, in their desire to win the assent of the entire public opinion to the final wording of that law. After the law's promulgation the Government will proceed without delay to the establishing of the electoral lists and then, after that procedure will have been accomplished, they will consult the electorate. With regard to the public liberties, guaranteed by the Moscow decisions, the Rumanian Government have taken all measures to ensure their exercise.

The Rumanian Government wish to implement the Moscow decisions in their entirety, yet with constant mindfulness to defend the rule of public order and security necessary for the fulfillment of the obligations which they have assumed under the Armistice Agreement as well as for the realization of the commandments of the States' permanent interests.

At present the opposition parties have at their disposal 16 newspapers, wherein the free expression of opinion is complete, bordering as it does on license, through their violence of language. On February the twenty-second last, the President of the Council of Ministers, wishing to take cognizance personally of the complaints of the press, called a conference of representatives of all newspapers in the country, including opposition newspapers. No complaint whatever was raised at that conference by the representatives of the opposition newspapers in connection with the action of the services of censorship. The directives of the Allied Control Commission aiming to prevent the diffusion of polemics between the Allies have but rarely been applied to certain statements from abroad.

According to regulations in force, broadcasting facilities are and remain available only to persons with official responsibilities in the performance of their governmental or administrative duties, yet not to persons without responsibility.

The political violence which at times manifests itself at public meetings and demonstrations is due, for the most part, to the campaigns of agitation and hatred that have been launched lately by the opposition parties against the Government and its members, and the responsible authorities are making all efforts to hamper it and to maintain public order and tranquillity.

The legal proceedings against the authors of the incidents of November 8 have been continued only in regard to those who, at the time of the governmental statement, were under inquiry for offense against common law and were found in a position of obvious and legally ascertained guilt, as the application of the law cannot be suspended in favor of any citizen.

The ministers representing the National Liberal Party under the leadership of Mr. Dinu Bratianu and the National Peasant Party under the leadership of Mr. Iulius Maniu have participated and are still participating in all cabinet meetings, where they mean, however, to exercise, according to their initial statements, only the function of observers, not that of collaborators.

Thus the impressions abroad, to which your note refers, can only be the consequence of a certain propaganda that aims to misrepresent the acts of the Government and to ignore realities in our country.

Very truly yours,

G. TATARESCU

*Vice President of the Council of Ministers,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Bulletin, June 16, 1946, p. 1048.)

### 31. FURTHER PROTESTS TO RUMANIA ON ELECTION MATTERS

#### EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUMANIAN GOVERNMENTS

[Released to the press June 17, 1946]

*Text of note delivered by the United States representative in Rumania, Burton Y. Berry, to the Rumanian Foreign Minister on June 14:*

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of June 3, 1946 in reply to my communication of May 27 setting forth the views of the United States Government with respect to the non-fulfillment by the Rumanian Government of the assurances which it gave in accepting the decisions of the Moscow Conference.<sup>99</sup>

Notwithstanding the comments of your note concerning elections, my Government observes that no dates have been fixed for consideration by the Rumanian Government of the draft electoral law to which you allude or for the promulgation of an electoral law. Moreover, no steps have been taken for the registration of the electorate, and still no date has been set for elections.

<sup>99</sup> For text of U.S. communications, see Bulletin of June 9, 1946, p. 1007.



With regard to the other matters in question, my Government considers that the reply of the Rumanian Government presents a wholly inadequate account of the actual situation and contains a number of inaccuracies.

In the circumstances, therefore, my Government has instructed me to inform you that it regrets to find the response of the Rumanian Government unsatisfactory, and that it earnestly hopes that the Rumanian Government will see fit to take appropriate steps effectively to implement the assurances it has given.

[Released to the press June 19, 1946]

*The following is a translation of a note received on June 17 by the United States representative in Rumania, Burton Y. Berry, from the Rumanian Foreign Minister:*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of June the fourteenth whereby you are notifying me upon instructions received the reply of the United States Government to the Rumanian Government's note of June 3.<sup>49</sup>

The Rumanian Government regret that the account and statements contained in that note have failed to satisfy the United States Government.

They regret even more the appreciation made of the explanations and statements that have been presented. Since these explanations and statements are based exclusively upon facts which have been scrupulously ascertained and verified, the Rumanian Government find themselves obliged not to retain the appreciation formulated in your note.

On the other hand, the Rumanian Government in receiving this new note of the United States Government cannot refrain from observing that the Moscow decisions have been the result of discussions and of decisions arrived at jointly by the governments of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States and Great Britain. Therefore, the Rumanian Government must assume that any observatory act destined to control and to direct the implementation of the Moscow decisions cannot be the work of the signatory governments individually but the collective work of these governments.

The Rumanian Government, however, have not received from the government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics any objection or any observation regarding the implementation of the Moscow decisions and they cannot therefore disregard this situation.

In formulating this observation the Rumanian Government are prompted only by the determination to implement within the scope of a unitary conception and action all obligations they have assumed towards the three governments that are parties to the Moscow decisions. General elections which will be held as soon as possible and not later than September as the President of the Council has specified in his repeated statements to the internal and foreign press, will provide the most important implementation of these obligations, the total fulfillment of which remains the constant purpose of their internal policy (Bulletin, June 30, 1946, p. 1125).

<sup>49</sup> For text of Rumanian communication, see Bulletin of June 16, 1946, p. 1048.

## 32. ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS IN RUMANIA

## UNITED STATES VIEWS STATED IN NOTE TO RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT

[Released to the press October 29, 1946]

*Text of note delivered by Burton Y. Berry, the representative of the United States in Rumania, to G. Tatarescu, the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on October 28*

I have been instructed to inform you that, subsequent to its notes of May 27<sup>41</sup> and June 14<sup>42</sup> and the Rumanian Government's replies thereto, my Government has taken cognizance of the promulgation by the Rumanian Government of an electoral law, of the steps taken for registration of the Rumanian electorate, and of the announcement of a firm date for general legislative elections.

It is, however, a matter of concern to my Government that, according to information at its disposal which it regards as reliable, certain aspects of the electoral preparations in Rumania suggest that these elections may not be of the free and equitable character assured by the Rumanian Government in its acceptance of the Moscow Conference decisions nor result in the choice of a Government responsive to the will of the people as envisaged in the Crimean Conference agreement.

Specifically, my Government observes the following apparent contraventions of the assurances which it received in January 1946 from the Rumanian Council of Ministers and its President:

(1) The freedom of participation in the elections promised in January appears to be seriously endangered in the case of those outside the present governmental electoral Bloc, by various acts of discrimination involving restrictions on registration and by the intimidation of individuals.

(2) The participating parties outside the governmental electoral Bloc have been wholly denied the use of broadcasting facilities, although they were promised equitable use of such facilities to present their views and although they are subjected to constant attack by the Bloc parties through this medium.

(3) The rights assured in January to print, publish and distribute their political publications is still greatly restricted in the case of parties outside the Bloc by direct and indirect means.

(4) Participating parties outside the governmental electoral Bloc continue to encounter major impediments and violent opposition to the right which was assured them to organize associations, hold meetings, and be allowed premises for this purpose.

Mindful of its undertakings under the Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow Conference agreements, the Government of the United States takes this occasion, in anticipation of the announced elections, to recall the assurances communicated to it by the written declaration of the Council of Ministers and by the oral statement of the President of the Council, which formed a basis for recognition of the Rumanian Government by the Government of the United States (Bulletin, November 10, 1946, p. 851).

<sup>41</sup> For Rumanian reply, see Bulletin, June 9, 1946, p. 1007, and June 16, 1946, p. 1048.

<sup>42</sup> Bulletin of June 30, 1946, p. 1125.

## 33. UNITED STATES REITERATES POSITION ON ROMANIAN ELECTIONS

[Released to the press November 15, 1946]

*Text of note which the United States Representative in Rumania has been authorized to deliver to the Rumanian Government in reply to its note of November 2 to the United States Government*

I have been instructed to express to you my Government's disappointment with the Rumanian Government's reply of November 2 to its note of October 28 concerning the forthcoming elections in Rumania. My Government deeply regrets that the Rumanian Government did not see fit to consider the substance of its comments on the electoral preparations, but instead sought to avoid a discussion of these observations on the excuse that they did not represent the collective views of the powers signatory to the Moscow Conference Agreement.

My Government has taken note, however, that the Rumanian Government has again expressed an intention to implement fully all the obligations which it assumed following the Moscow Conference Agreement, to the end that the elections may freely express the will and aspirations of the Rumanian people, and must therefore assume that the Rumanian Government shares the view expressed in my note of October 28 that all parties represented in these elections should participate on equal terms.

Because of the obligations which my Government assumed at Yalta to assist in bringing about the establishment of a government of free men in Rumania, any suggestion that my recent note was "incompatible with the attributes of a free and sovereign state" is in my Government's view wholly inadmissible. I am constrained to believe that the Rumanian people if they could freely express themselves would regard my Government's interest in this matter as a compliance with its obligations under the Yalta Agreement and a welcome manifestation of general American interest in Rumania's welfare and progress. My Government desires to assure the Rumanian Government that it will not fail in its support for the democratic principles of liberty, freedom and justice by which the United States endeavors to live and upon which it is convinced, the future peace and welfare of the world depend (Bulletin, November 24, 1946, p. 967).

## 34. CONCERN OVER DRASTIC DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN ROMANIA

NOTE FROM ACTING UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE AT BUCHAREST TO ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

[Released to the press June 25, 1947]

*Text of a note which the Acting United States Representative at Bucharest, Roy M. Melbourne, was instructed to deliver to the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Gheorghe Tatarescu. The message was delivered on June 24 to the Secretary-General of the Foreign Office.*

I have been instructed to convey to you my Government's serious concern over the drastic deprivation of civil liberties to which the Rumanian people are being subjected, by or with the acquiescence of the Rumanian authorities, in particular the arbitrary arrest without warrant or charge of hundreds of Opposition Party and non-party

persons and the indefinite detention of such individuals in prisons and concentration camps under reportedly deplorable conditions.

While the communiqué of May 6, 1947 issued by the Rumanian Minister of Interior suggests that the Rumanian Government proposes to justify these measures as necessary to the preservation of internal order in the face of provocative or subversive activities, they seem rather to represent a deliberate effort at the suppression or terroristic intimidation of democratic elements of the Rumanian population who oppose the present regime.

My Government is following closely these developments which appear to contravene formal and informal assurances given by officials of the Rumanian Government on several occasions to Representatives of the United States with reference to specific public liberties as well as professions of the Rumanian Government's adherence to principles of freedom and justice. Moreover, such evident deprivation of the most elemental human rights and fundamental freedoms is in conflict with Article Three of the Peace Treaty which the Rumanian Government has signed and whose terms will obligate the Rumanian Government to secure to all persons under Rumanian jurisdiction the enjoyment of such rights and freedoms. My Government is deeply concerned that the fulfillment of these treaty provisions not be prejudiced by actions anticipating the coming-into-force of treaty which effectively nullify the Rumanian Government's undertakings with respect thereto.

My Government considers that the obligations of Article Three of the Peace Treaty are unequivocal and that the rights therein assured to the Rumanian people cannot be denied or modified by domestic legislation or judicial process.

#### EXCERPT FROM RUMANIAN TREATY

ARTICLE 3. 1. Roumania shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Roumanian jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, or religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting.

2. Roumania further undertakes that the laws in force in Roumania shall not, either in their content or in their application, discriminate or entail any discrimination between persons of Roumanian nationality on the ground of their race, sex, language or religion, whether in reference to their persons, property, business, professional or financial interests, status, political or civil rights or any other matter.

(Bulletin, July 6, 1947, p. 38.)

### 35. CONCERN CONTINUES OVER SUPPRESSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN RUMANIA

#### OFFENSES CULMINATE IN ARREST OF LEADER OF NATIONAL PEASANT PARTY

[Released to the press August 6, 1947]

The Department of State is still seriously concerned with the continuing suppression of civil liberties in Rumania, culminating in the arrest of Mr. Maniu and the suppression by the Government of the National Peasant Party, of which he is the leader. Mr. Maniu and his colleagues in the historical Peasant Party played an outstanding role during the war in the efforts of the Rumanian liberals to make

peace with the Allies. Mr. Maniu's attachment to democratic ideals and his struggle for the retention of civil liberties in Rumania are well known to the American people.

The United States Government has found unsatisfactory the reply of the Rumanian Government to its note of June 24 protesting against the widespread arbitrary arrests of the members of the opposition party and expressing concern over the drastic deprivation of civil liberties to which the Rumanian people are presently being subjected.<sup>43</sup> This Government called attention to the provision of article 3 of the peace treaty, whereby Rumania undertakes to secure to all persons under its jurisdiction fundamental freedoms.

The Rumanian Government in its reply of July 12 has alleged that it cannot accept as valid the legal grounds for this Government's intervention as provided for in the terms of the peace treaty. It states that, because the Rumanian Government is unable to take into consideration observations and recommendations which would constitute acts of interference in its internal policy, it could not accept the United States note.

#### MESSAGE OF AUGUST 5 TO RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT

[Released to the press August 6, 1947]

The Acting United States Representative in Bucharest, Roy M. Melbourne, has delivered to the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Gheorghe Tatarescu, the following further communication:

On instructions from my Government, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of July 12, 1947, rejecting the representations transmitted to you in my note of June 24, 1947 concerning arbitrary actions, in the guise of measures of public security, being perpetrated in Rumania contrary to explicit undertakings of the Rumanian Government in regard to the assurance of basic human rights to the Rumanian people.

The United States Government rejects the interpretation of the Rumanian Government concerning the rights of the United States under the Treaty of Peace and the charge that the United States note transmitted to you on June 24, 1947 constitutes unwarranted intervention in Rumanian internal affairs.

The United States Government has taken due note of the attitude displayed by the Rumanian Government in this connection and of subsequent developments in Rumania involving the arrest of additional prominent opposition leaders. The United States Government has also taken note of the fact that this same Rumanian Government professes its ability and willingness to fulfill its international obligations and to assure its people the free exercise of fundamental freedoms.

#### TRANSLATION OF RUMANIAN NOTE OF JULY 12

*July 12, 1947.*

The Rumanian Government regrets that the considerations of fact and of law set forth in the note of June 24 do not permit it to take into consideration the intervention contained in that note.

This intervention refers, in fact, to acts of government and to acts performed by internal administrative organs of the State, and the Rumanian Government has already been placed in the position of communicating to the United States Government that it cannot accept such interference in the internal affairs of Rumania.

<sup>43</sup> Bulletin of July 6, 1947, p. 38.

In its note presented on November 2, 1946 the Rumanian Government declared:

In principle it (the Rumanian Government) cannot take into consideration observations and recommendations which would constitute acts of interference in its internal policy and which would thus be incompatible with the attributes of a free and sovereign state.

These considerations have a permanent character, and on these grounds the Rumanian Government cannot proceed to an examination of the contents of the note of June 24, 1947.

Besides, the Rumanian Government cannot accept as valid the legal basis for the intervention contained in the aforesaid note, which invokes Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Paris on February 10, 1947 between Rumania and the Allied and Associated Powers.

In fact, this treaty does not accord to any signatory state the right of intervention in the internal affairs of Rumania.

Rumania will fulfill this treaty completely and loyally, but none of the obligations assumed can establish in favor of any state the right of control and intervention. The execution of certain definite clauses of the treaty may constitute a subject for discussion, but only on the basis of precise stipulations and the special procedure written into the text of the treaty itself.

In fact and in law the Rumanian Government finds itself unable to accept the note of the United States Government dated June 24, 1947 (Bulletin, August 17, 1947, p. 329).

### 36. ANSWER TO CHARGES THAT AMERICANS WERE IMPLICATED IN CONSPIRACY AGAINST RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT

NOTE FROM UNITED STATES MINISTER TO RUMANIA TO RUMANIAN MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

[Released to the press November 19, 1947]

*On Friday, November 14, 1947, Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, United States Minister to Rumania, delivered the following note to the Rumanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs*

I have been directed by my Government to communicate to you the following:

It has come to the attention of the United States Government that the indictment of the leaders of the National Peasant Party of Rumania recently tried includes charges that former representatives of the United States in Rumania or American members of their missions were implicated in an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the Rumanian Government by force and violence. The Government of the United States has taken note of these accusations, not only as to their substance but also as to their character and as to the manner in which they have been put forward, which in itself affords eloquent commentary on their political motivation and insincerity.

The United States Government deems it unnecessary and inappropriate to dignify by specific refutation charges presented in this fashion which falsely insinuate that the Government of the United States through its representatives has advocated or lent support to a contemplated attempt at overturning the Rumanian Government by force.

By virtue of United States participation in the agreements of Yalta, Potsdam and Moscow and in the exercise of United States prerogatives as an Armistice Power, American representatives, for legitimate purposes, have maintained associations with representatives of all significant political elements in Rumania. Such associations have been known to all and have properly been questioned by none.

The United States has never condoned the unrepresentative character of the present Rumanian Government nor the methods by which it attained and has perpetuated its authority. The views and efforts of the United States, in conformity with its responsibilities to assist Rumania in obtaining a broadly representative Government responsive to the will of its people, are a matter of public record. So also are the views of the United States Government concerning the denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms to large segments of the Rumanian population in contravention of international commitments made by the Rumanian Government.

The Rumanian people as well as free people everywhere will know how to assess the kind of implications directed against the Government of the United States which have been brought forward in this devious fashion (Bulletin, November 30, 1947, p. 1057).

### 37. SOVIET PRESS CHARGED WITH "LIBELOUS ATTACK" ON THE PRESIDENT EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN U. S. AMBASSADOR AND SOVIET MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

[Released to the press September 29, 1947]

*Text of a note dated September 25 from Ambassador Bedell Smith to the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov*<sup>15</sup>

During the year and a half that I have resided in the Soviet Union I have been obliged with the deepest regret to witness in the Soviet press an increasing flood of half truths, distortions of truth and utter falsehoods about my country and my government. I have tried to overlook this incendiary press campaign, feeling that to take issue with a myriad false or incorrect statements would simply be adding fuel to the flame of hatred toward my country which the Soviet press has apparently undertaken to kindle in the hearts of the Soviet people.

However, an occasion has now arisen when I must break this self-imposed rule. An article by one Boris Gorbatov just published in *Literary Gazette* No. 39 is so wantonly libelous in its personal attack on the President of the United States that I cannot permit it to pass without the strongest protest. It has thoroughly shocked me.

As I have told you personally on several occasions, I believe that I have a duty to the Soviet Government as well as to my own, and that this duty is to inform the Soviet Government as honestly and frankly as possible of the beliefs and opinions of the people of my country. This being the case, I must assure you in the most solemn terms that every fair-minded American citizen, regardless of his political opinions, will be deeply affronted by this article and will feel that he in some way shares the personal insult thus gratuitously offered to President Truman.

<sup>15</sup> Printed from telegraphic text

I cannot recall that Dr. Goebbels, of unsavory memory, at the height of our common struggle against Nazi Germany ever stooped to greater ridicule and vituperation against the head of an enemy country than has Mr. Gorbatov against the chief executive of a friendly and allied state. In this connection, I would never have believed that a Soviet writer would permit himself, or be permitted, to draw an analogy between the President of the United States and our recent common enemy, Hitler. Mr. Gorbatov goes so far as to imply criticism of President Truman for associating with the President of Brazil, our faithful and devoted ally in the recent war, to whom is unwarrantably imputed some prior association with the axis powers. Any unprejudiced observer, familiar with the course of history since 1939, would agree that such criticism comes with extraordinarily bad grace from a Soviet writer.

I cannot believe that Mr. Gorbatov's article represents the opinion of the Soviet Government, and I therefore request that it be officially disavowed and if, contrary to my belief, it has the approval of the Soviet Government, I would appreciate a statement to that effect.

*Text of Mr. Molotov's reply to Ambassador Smith's note of September 25*

Acknowledging the receipt of your letter of September 25, I must state that I do not consider it possible to enter into a discussion with you of the article of the writer B. Gorbatov in *The Literary Gazette*, as the Soviet Government cannot bear the responsibility for this or that article and, so much the more, cannot accept the protest you have made in that connection.

However, inasmuch as in your letter you decided to undertake a general evaluation of the Soviet press and from it is obtained a completely perverted picture of the situation, I must state my disagreement with your point of view on the Soviet press.

Despite your allegation, the Soviet press more than the press of any other country whatsoever, especially aims to elucidate broadly as possible the actual situation and true facts of the life of other countries, attaching special significance to the strengthening of friendly relations between peoples. This applies in full measure also to the United States of America, so that any move or approach of the government and statesmen of the United States of America directed toward the strengthening of normal relations between countries and toward the support of universal peace invariably encounters warm support in the Soviet press, and this is so generally known that it need no reaffirmation whatsoever. It is by no means possible to say regarding that American press which is so widely encouraged by the most reactionary circles in the U.S.A. and which not only from day to day inserts lying and slanderous articles regarding the U.S.S.R. and its statesmen, but also inflames hostility between peoples, and which does not meet with any serious support whatsoever in the U.S.A., which is of course, Mr. Ambassador, well known to you regarding which there are not two different opinions in international democratic circles (Bulletin, October 12, 1947, p. 743).



## 38. RELATING TO THE PROBLEM OF THE TURKISH STRAITS

THE SOVIET CHARGÉ AT WASHINGTON TO THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE <sup>44</sup>

[Translation]

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

*Washington, D. C., August 7, 1946.*

SIR: By direction of the Soviet Government I have the honor to communicate to you the following:

As is known, the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers on the question of the Montreux Convention adopted a resolution, whereby the three governments declared that the said convention should be revised, since it does not correspond to present conditions. At the same time the three governments agreed that this question was to be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three powers and the Turkish Government. In accordance with this, the Soviet Government on August 7 of this year addressed to the Turkish Government a note which is transcribed below:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. has the honor to inform the Turkish Government of the following:

Events which occurred during the past war clearly indicated that the regime of the Black Sea Straits, established by the Straits Convention, signed in 1936 at Montreux, does not meet the interests of the safety of the Black Sea Powers and does not insure conditions under which the use of these Straits for purposes inimical to the Black Sea Powers would be prevented.

It will suffice to mention a series of incidents during this war, when the Axis Powers directed their warships and auxiliary craft through the Straits into the Black Sea and out of the Black Sea, which in its turn gave rise to the corresponding steps and protests registered by the Soviet Government with the Turkish Government.

On July 9, 1941, the German command sent the German patrol boat *Seefalke* through the Straits into the Black Sea, which was a gross violation of the Straits Convention and called forth a protest to the Turkish Government on the part of the Soviet Government.

In August 1941, Turkish authorities gave the Italian auxiliary war vessel *Tarvisio* permission to pass through the Straits into the Black Sea, which likewise called forth a representation on the part of the Soviet Government, calling to the attention of the Turkish Government the fact that the passage of the Italian auxiliary vessel into the Black Sea would appear to be a violation of the Straits Convention.

On November 4, 1942, the Soviet Government again called to the attention of the Turkish Government the fact that Germany planned to send to the Black Sea through the Straits auxiliary warships under the guise of merchant vessels with a total displacement of 140,000 tons. These vessels were intended for the transfer of military forces and war materials of the Axis countries into the Black Sea. In its representation, the Soviet Government emphasized the fact that "the admission of the aforementioned vessels through the Straits into the Black Sea would be an obvious violation of the Convention regarding the regime of the Straits concluded in Montreux, inasmuch as these vessels are left at the disposal of the German Government and are in reality auxiliary warships."

In June, 1944, the Soviet Government registered a protest against the fact that toward the end of May and early in June of 1944 there took place a series of passages through the Straits from the Black Sea into the Aegean Sea of German warships and auxiliary warships of varying tonnage of the *Eme* (8 vessels) and *Kriegstransport* (5 vessels) types, which had taken part in the naval operations in the Black Sea.

<sup>44</sup> This note, which was presented to the Turkish Government in Ankara, was also transmitted to the United States Government and to the Government of the United Kingdom.

It is obvious from the aforementioned facts that at the time of the past war with Germany and her allies, the Straits Convention did not prevent the enemy powers from using the straits for military purposes against the U.S.S.R. and other allied powers, with the Turkish Government not being able to escape the responsibility for this situation.

In view of this, the Soviet Government suggested to the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers—Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which took place in July and August 1945, to discuss the question that the regime of the Straits, established by the Montreux Convention, does not conform to present conditions and that it is necessary to establish a new regime of the Straits. As is known, the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers adopted a resolution consisting of the following:

a) The three governments declared that the Convention regarding the Straits, concluded in Montreux, should be revised, as it does not meet the conditions of the present time;

b) The three governments agreed that as the proper course the said question would be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three powers and the Turkish Government.

The Soviet Government is also acquainted with the contents of the note of November 2, 1945, of the Government of the United States of America and with the note of the British Government of November 21, 1945 addressed to the Government of Turkey on this question.

For its own part, the Soviet Government proposes to establish for the Straits a new regime, proceeding from the following principles:

1) The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.

2) The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers.

3) Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.

4) The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers.

5) Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea powers.

The Soviet Government is informing the governments of the United States of America and Great Britain regarding the present declaration.

The Soviet Union has directed me to bring this to the knowledge of the Government of the United States of America.

Accept [etc.]

FEDOR OREKHOV

Acting Secretary of State DEAN ACHESON,  
*Department of State, Washington.*

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET CHARGÉ AT WASHINGTON <sup>45</sup>

*August 19, 1946.*

SIR: I acknowledge receipt of your note of August 7, 1946 which sets forth the text of the note addressed on the same day by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the Republic of Turkey and express the appreciation of this Government for the courtesy of the Soviet Government in making this information available.

<sup>45</sup> Copies of this note have also been transmitted to the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, which were among the signatories of the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936.

It will be recalled that the American Embassy in Moscow made available to the Soviet Government in November 1945 a copy of the note which the American Embassy in Ankara delivered to the Turkish Government on November 2, 1945.

This Government has given careful study to the views expressed by the Soviet Government in its note to the Turkish Government. It would appear from a comparison of this Government's note of November 2, 1945 with the Soviet note to the Turkish Government of August 7, 1946 that the views of the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union, while not in entire accord, are in general agreement with regard to the three following proposals set forth in the Soviet note:

1. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.
2. The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers.
3. Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.

The fourth proposal set forth in the Soviet note does not appear to envisage a revision of the Montreux Convention as suggested in our note to the Turkish Government of November 2, 1945, but rather the establishment of a new regime which would be confined to Turkey and the other Black Sea powers. It is the view of this Government that the regime of the Straits is a matter of concern not only to the Black Sea powers but also to other powers, including the United States. This Government cannot, therefore, agree with the Soviet view that the establishment of the regime of the Straits should come under the competence of the Black Sea powers to the exclusion of other powers.

The fifth proposal set forth in the note of the Soviet Government was that Turkey and the Soviet Union should organize joint means of defense of the Straits. It is the firm opinion of this Government that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations.

It is observed that the note of the Soviet Government contains no reference to the United Nations. The position of the Government of the United States is that the regime of the Straits should be brought into appropriate relationship with the United Nations and should function in a manner entirely consistent with the principles and aims of the United Nations.

The Government of the United States reaffirms its willingness to participate in a conference called to revise the Montreux Convention. Accept [etc.]

DEAN ACHESON  
*Acting Secretary of State*

MR. FEDOR T. OREKHOV,  
*Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.*

*The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Soviet Commissioner of Foreign Affairs*

*Presented October 9, 1946.<sup>46</sup>*

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government has studied carefully the contents of the note of the Soviet Union to Turkey of September 24 relating to the regime of the Straits.

In pursuance of its policy of making clear to all interested parties its views on matters relating to the Straits, my Government has instructed me to inform you that after examining the note referred to above it continues to adhere to the position outlined in its note of August 19, 1946 to the Soviet Government.

It will be recalled that in the Protocol of the proceedings of the Potsdam Conference, signed by the U. S. S. R., Great Britain and the United States, the three Governments recognized that the Convention on the Straits concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions. It was further agreed in the Protocol that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government.

It has been the understanding of my Government that the three Governments, in agreeing with one another that the regime of the Straits should be brought into accord with present-day conditions by means of a revision of the Montreux Convention, mutually recognized that all three signatories of the Protocol have an interest in the regime of the Straits and in any changes which might be made in that regime. My Government furthermore informed the Soviet Government in its note of August 19, that in its view the regime of the Straits is a matter of concern not only to the Black Sea powers but also to other powers, including the United States. The Soviet Government, nevertheless, in its note of September 24, apparently continues to take the position set forth in its note of August 7 to Turkey that

"the establishment of a regime of the Straits . . . should come under the competence of Turkey and the other Black Sea powers".

My Government does not consider that it was contemplated at the Potsdam Conference that the direct conversations which might take place between any one of the three signatory governments and the Turkish Government with regard to the regime of the Convention of the Straits concluded at Montreux should have the effect of prejudicing the participation of the other two signatory powers in the revision of the regime of the Straits. On the contrary, my Government considers that the Potsdam Agreement definitely contemplated only an exchange of views with the Turkish Government as a useful preliminary to a conference of all of the interested powers, including the United States, to consider the revision of the Montreux Convention. As stated in its note of August 19, my Government stands ready to participate in such a conference.

My Government also feels that it would be lacking in frankness if it should fail to point out again at this time, in the most friendly spirit, that in its opinion the Government of Turkey should continue

<sup>46</sup> Copies of this note were distributed on Oct. 10, 1946 to the representative in Washington of the following signatories to the Montreux Convention: France, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits and that should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor, the resulting situation would be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations (The Problem of the Turkish Straits, Department of State, p. 47).

### 39. RECOGNITION OF NEW YUGOSLAV REGIME

#### INSTRUCTION SENT TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN BELGRADE

[Released to the press December 22, 1945]

The Yugoslav Ambassador on December 10 transmitted to the Secretary of State the following communication:

The Ambassador of Yugoslavia presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to notify the Government of the United States of America that the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly in the session of the 29th of November 1945, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the peoples of Yugoslavia, in the name of the people and in the name of the legal decisions taken by both houses of the Constituent Assembly, proclaimed Democratic Federative Yugoslavia a people's republic with the name "Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia". By the same decision the monarchy has been abolished and Peter Karadjordjevic together with the entire Karadjordjevic dynasty deprived of all rights previously vested in him and in his dynasty.

On the 1st of December, 1945, the Constituent Assembly enacted the law of the Presidium of the Constituent Assembly. Under this law the Presidium of the Constituent Assembly is elected by both houses and consists of one president, six vice presidents, two secretaries and a maximum of thirty members. According to paragraph three of said law the Presidium, among other executive functions, represents inside and outside the country, the sovereignty of the people and of the state as the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The Presidium appoints the ambassadors, plenipotentiary ministers and extraordinary envoys to foreign countries at the proposal of the Federative Government. The Presidium receives the credentials of the diplomatic representatives of foreign countries. According to paragraph six, when the Constituent Assembly becomes the regular Assembly the Presidium of the Constituent Assembly *ipso facto* becomes the Presidium of the regular Assembly. This law became effective on adoption by the Constituent Assembly the 1st of December, 1945.

In accordance with this law, the Presidium of the Constituent Assembly was elected as follows: President: Ivan Rybar, former president of the Provisional Assembly; Vice Presidents: Mosa Pijade, Filip Lakus, Josip Rus, Djuro Pucar, Dimitri Vlahov and Marko Vujacic; Secretary: Mile Perunicic.

The following reply dated December 22 has now been communicated to the Ambassador:

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Yugoslavia and has the honor to inform the Ambassador that the United States Government, having taken note of the contents of the Ambassador's communication no. A. Br. 1070 of December 10, 1945, recognizes the changes which have taken place in the constitution of Yugoslavia and the establishment of a republic under the name "Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia" in accordance with decisions of the Constituent Assembly referred to therein.

It is assumed that, pursuant to international custom, the new Yugoslavia Government will, as a member of the family of nations and as one which has subscribed to the principles of the Declaration by the United Nations, accept responsibility for Yugoslavia's international obligations, and be disposed to confirm its continued recognition of the existing treaties and agreements between the United States and Yugoslavia. Upon receipt of assurances in this sense, the United States Government is prepared to proceed with the issuance of appropriate letters of credence accrediting the United States Ambassador in Belgrade to the new Yugoslav regime.

Mindful of the obligations which it assumed at Yalta, the United States Government has consistently made known its attitude that the people of Yugoslavia are entitled to expect the effective implementation of the guarantees of personal freedom, freedom from fear, liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, liberty of the press and freedom of assembly and association contained in the agreement between Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic underlying the Yalta Declaration and to have an opportunity to express their will in a free and untrammelled election. In view of conditions existing in Yugoslavia, it cannot be said that those guarantees of freedom have been honored nor that the elections conducted on November 11 provided opportunity for a free choice of the people's representatives. In the circumstances the United States Government desires that it be understood that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the present regime in Yugoslavia should not be interpreted as implying approval of the policies of the regime, its methods of assuming control or its failure to implement the guarantees of personal freedom promised its people. You should make it quite clear to the authorities and people of Yugoslavia that we entertain only the friendliest sentiments toward the peoples of the country and that it is our anticipation that the evolution of events will provide developments which will make possible those relations—both political and economic—between the peoples of Yugoslavia and the United States which we on our part most urgently desire to see (Bulletin, December 23, 1945, p. 1020).

#### 40. U. S. NOTE ON THE CAPTURE OF GENERAL MIKHAILOVICH

[Released to the press April 2, 1946]

*Text of a note sent by the American Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to the Yugoslav Foreign Office on March 30, 1946*

Note has been taken by the Government of the United States of the March 24 official announcement broadcast by Radio Belgrade regarding a statement to the Yugoslav Assembly by Minister of Interior Rankovic reporting the capture of General Draja Mikhailovich on March 13.

When, in 1941, the Germans overran Yugoslavia, it will be recalled that General (then Colonel) Mikhailovich organized and led important resistance forces against the occupiers. Following his promotion, in 1941, to the rank of General, Draja Mikhailovich was appointed Minister of War in the Royal Yugoslav Government-in-exile but remained in his native land and without adequate supplies and fighting under the greatest hardships contributed with his forces materially to the allied cause so heroically participated in by Yugoslavia. General Mikhailovich continued as Commander of the Yugoslav Army and as Minister of War until May 1944. Since that time he has been on the political plane a controversial figure.

As the Yugoslav authorities are no doubt aware, United States Army personnel in an allied liaison capacity were attached to General Mikhailovich's headquarters during most of the period of his military activity. They must also be aware of the fact that many United States airmen were rescued and returned to allied lines through the undaunted efforts of General Mikhailovich's forces. A number of

these individuals and others in the United States who were closely associated with General Mikhailovich possess first hand evidence which cannot but have a bearing upon the charges of enemy collaboration which the Yugoslav authorities have indicated they will bring against General Mikhailovich.

The United States Government, in the circumstances, is confident that in the interests of justice the Yugoslav Government will wish to make suitable arrangements whereby the evidence of any such persons who may so desire may be presented in connection with the trial, said to be contemplated, of General Mikhailovich. An urgent expression of the views of the Yugoslav authorities in this connection will be appreciated by the United States Government together with an indication of the place and time of trial and the steps the Yugoslav Government is prepared to take to facilitate the presentation of evidence of this nature (Bulletin, April 14, 1946, p. 634).

#### YUGOSLAV REPLY TO UNITED STATES NOTE ON GENERAL MIKHAILOVICH

[Released to the press April 12, 1946]

The Department of State has received a telegram dated April 5 from the American Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, Mr. Harold Shantz, transmitting the text of a note from the Yugoslav Foreign Office, dated April 4 and received by Mr. Shantz on April 5. The note was in reply to the note of the United States Government of March 28<sup>47</sup> delivered by the Chargé on the same date.

#### *Text of Note*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federative Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia present their compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and with reference to latter note of March 28 last, have the honour to state as follows:

The Government of the FPRY regret that they are unable to comply with the desire of the Government of the USA that officers of the American Army who had been at headquarters of Draza Mikhailovich should, as witnesses, participate in the investigations and on the trial in the case of the traitor Draza Mikhailovich. It is solely up to the Military court, which will deal with this case, to summon any witness whom it might deem necessary, and the Government of the FPRY are not entitled to exercise any influence upon the court.

Furthermore, the Government of the FPRY cannot agree with the contents of the note denying the treacherous attitude of Draza Mikhailovich during the war. It is most surprising that after all that has up to now been published and ascertained of the treason and collaboration of Draza Mikhailovich with the Germans in committing number of crimes upon our people, the note is overlooking these facts, and expressed an opinion which is not correct, since on the numerous trials of Draza Mikhailovich treacherous officers' evidence was given, absolutely freely, confirming all those documents on the treason of Draza Mikhailovich which are in possession of the Government of FPRY. This treason is being confirmed by tens of thousands of fighting men of the Yugoslav Army. This treason is being confirmed by tens of thousands of living witnesses whose relatives or goods perished

<sup>47</sup> Bulletin of April 14, 1946, p. 634.

by action of Draza Mikhailovich and his men. After all, this treason confirms Draza Mikhailovich himself, too.

Besides it would be a great historical mistake to carry on declaring that Draza Mikhailovich started the National Resistance against the Germans in Yugoslavia in 1941 as it is stated in the note. He, it is true, organized in 1941 his bands, but—with a small exception—looked until November 1941 passively at the fight of the partisans against the Germans when, on November 2, 1941, he openly attacked the forces of the National Resistance—the partisans, and collaborated since then until the end directly or indirectly, without interruption, with the Germans, Italians and Ustashis against the Partisans respectively against the National Liberation Army. Today it is doubtlessly proved, whereof there are living witnesses, that Draza Mikhailovich [garbled *reps or, met*] the German Command for the first time in August 1941 in an armoured train in the vicinity of the small town of Ljig where the collaborating [ion] against the National Liberating movement was discussed.

The appointment of Draza Mikhailovich, General and War Minister by the Emigrant Government in London changed in no way the facts; it is known that the Government made this appointment just for the purpose of thus enabling Draza Mikhailovich to have more success in his fight against the National Liberation movement, respectively for the purpose of enabling him to mobilize forces against the National Liberation Army.

It is exactly known to the Government of the FPRY that ever since 1941 a British Military mission was with Draza Mikhailovich, and that this mission left Draza Mikhailovich in 1944. We have seen the whole world had already knowledge of Draza Mikhailovich's collaboration with the Germans. After the departure of the British Military mission, as far as it is known to the Government of the FPRY, a military mission of the American Army arrived in August 1944 at the headquarters of Draza Mikhailovich, which fact raised in the ranks of the National Liberation movement a considerable dissatisfaction.

On the protest lodged by the Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Army, the Allied Command replied that mission had only the task of receiving crashed airmen.

The Government of the FPRY admit and believe that Draza Mikhailovich assumed the appearance as though he had a loyal attitude towards America, and that a number of American airmen forced to land on territory under his control were saved. But could he do otherwise—the more because he expected assistance in food and weapons for this favour? On this occasion the Government of the FPRY have to remind that forces of the National Liberation Army rescued, often not sparing their own lives, about two thousand Allied airmen most of them Americans. They considered that their duty towards their commandants in arms.

The crimes of the traitor Draza Mikhailovich against the people of Yugoslavia are far too big and horrible that it could be or should be allowed to be discussed whether he is guilty or is not.

The Government of the FPRY assure the Government of the USA that full defendants' rights will be granted during the investigations as well as on the trial of the case.



The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avail themselves of the opportunity to renew to the Embassy the assurance of their high consideration (Bulletin, April 21, 1946, p. 669).

#### 41. REQUEST TO YUGOSLAVIA FOR SUBMITTING TESTIMONY IN TRIAL OF GENERAL MIKHAILOVICH

[Released to the press May 14, 1946]

*Note delivered to the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 7 by the American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Belgrade, Yugoslavia*

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and under instructions from its Government has the honor to transmit the following reply to the Ministry's note No. 3663 of April 4, 1946.<sup>48</sup>

On March 30, 1946, the United States Government informed the Yugoslav Government that a number of persons in the United States who were closely associated with General Draza Mikhailovich possess first-hand knowledge of his activities during the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia which would appear to be material to judicial determination of General Mikhailovich's case.<sup>49</sup> The United States Government stated that it would appreciate an indication of the place and time of trial of General Mikhailovich and of the steps the Yugoslav Government was prepared to take to facilitate the presentation of such evidence by persons who might so desire.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia replied to that communication under date of April 4, 1946, stating that it regretted that it is unable to comply with the desire of the United States Government and that it is

solely up to the military court, which will deal with this case, to summon any witness whom it might deem necessary and the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia are not entitled to exercise any influence upon the court.

The Yugoslav Government's reply also contained the statement which the United States Government has difficulty reconciling with the principle of judicial determination of culpability,

that the crimes of General Mikhailovich against the people of Yugoslavia are far too big and horrible that it could be or should be allowed to be discussed whether he is guilty or is not.

Meanwhile, representations have been made to the United States Government by various individuals and groups in the United States who have emphasized their readiness to testify on behalf of General Mikhailovich. A large majority of such persons are United States aviators who were shot down over Yugoslavia and were rescued and returned to Allied lines by Mikhailovich's forces. As an example, a group of 20 United States airmen who thus parachuted into Yugoslavia between January and December 1944 have called personally at the Department of State and have expressed their desire to make available the information they possess either by attending the trial in person or by submitting testimony in writing if considered appro-

<sup>48</sup> Bulletin of April 21, 1946, p. 669.

<sup>49</sup> Bulletin of April 14, 1946, p. 634.

priate. Numerous approaches to the same end have also been made by mail.

In the circumstances, the United States Government desires to renew its request to the Yugoslav Government that arrangements be made whereby the evidence of such persons may be presented in the trial of General Mikhailovich and that the United States Government be informed as a matter of urgency concerning those arrangements.

The Embassy of the United States of America takes the opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia the assurances of its highest consideration (Bulletin, May 26, 1946, p. 909).

#### 42. PROTEST AGAINST YUGOSLAV OBSTRUCTION TO ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Released to the press August 19, 1946]

*Text of a note delivered by the American Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, Harold Shantz, to the Yugoslav Foreign Office on May 20, 1946, in reply to a Yugoslav note of March 27, 1946, protesting the Allied administration of Venezia Giulia*

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency<sup>50</sup> that I have been instructed by my Government to transmit to you the following communication:

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom<sup>51</sup> have taken note of the Yugoslav Government's communication of March 27, 1946, which is but last in a series of unwarranted protests by the Yugoslav Government, which have at the same time been accompanied by an anti-Allied propaganda campaign recently culminating in a wholly unfounded charge by Marshal Tito in his speech of April 1, 1946, that twelve trains and seventy trucks full of armed fascists were brought into Zone A with the approval of the Allied authorities.

As the Yugoslav Government is well aware, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom are jointly responsible for the maintenance of the Allied Military Government in Zone A until the future disposal of the territory is decided.<sup>52</sup> They have endeavored to govern the area in a spirit of trusteeship in such a way as to ensure equal treatment for all inhabitants without distinction of race or political adherence. To this end, they have established a democratic system of administration based upon the Italian prefectorial system purged of all measures inspired by fascist ideology. They have allowed the Yugoslav system of local government by committee, which was imposed by the Yugoslav army during its occupation of the area, to remain in existence despite refusal of such committees from the outset to cooperate with the Allied Military Government, or to participate in the administration established under General

<sup>50</sup> Stanoje Simic, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>51</sup> The note presented by the British Chargé d'Affaires, George Clutton, at the same time was identical except for the opening and closing sentences and for minor changes in wording and spelling occasioned by language differences.

<sup>52</sup> For text of agreement between the U. S., British, and Yugoslav Governments, see BULLETIN of June 10, 1945, p. 1050. For letter from the Yugoslav Foreign Minister to the American Ambassador on signing of Agreement on Military Occupation and Administration of Venezia Giulia, see BULLETIN of June 17, 1945, p. 1098.

Order no. 11. They have established a civil police, members of which have been carefully examined to prevent inclusion of individuals with pro-fascist sympathies or tendencies, and this police force has shown courage and patience in the face of provocation and slander. They have re-established Slovene schools suppressed by the Mussolini Government and have taken pains to ensure provision of liberal education free of ideological prejudice to both Italian and Slovene children.

As promised in their notes of September 17 and 19 last, the United States and the United Kingdom have proceeded with arrangements to hold local elections in Venezia Giulia, and electoral lists are at present in the course of preparation. Finally, they have allowed access to Zone A by representatives of all nations and have permitted the Yugoslav Government to maintain a force of 2,000 men in the area, whereas no facilities remotely comparable have been given for inspection by other interested parties of the administration which the Yugoslav Government has set up in Zone B.

In spite of sincere efforts to ensure impartiality and in spite of the known fact that the Allied Military Government will remain only until the decision about the future sovereignty of the territory has been ratified, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom regret to say that they have not received from the Yugoslav Government that cooperation in their tasks which they had a right to expect from an Ally. On the contrary, the Yugoslav Government has, by every means in its power, and in particular by a provocative campaign in the press and over the radio, encouraged the pro-Yugoslav population in Trieste and throughout Zone A, both Slovene and Italian, to obstruct the Allied Military Government in the performance of its duties, to promote industrial discontent, to hinder the educational program, and to intimidate those inhabitants of the area who are not in favor of its incorporation into Yugoslavia.

In support of the foregoing, I am instructed to mention the following provocative Yugoslav actions and to emphasize that this list is by no means complete:

1. *Subornation of press:* Pro-Slav propagandists in Zone A have on more than one occasion openly acknowledged their subservience to Ljubljana and Belgrade in such matters as allocation of newsprint and release of articles on local events.

2. *Attempts to discredit public order forces:* Investigation of accusation by P.N.O.O. (National Liberation Committee of the Slovene Littoral) and the pro-Slav press that 38 armed members of police were fascists disclosed only six doubtful cases, of which three may lead to dismissal. Thirteen cases did not exist.

3. *Propaganda attacks against the Allied Military Government:* False and inflammatory statements by the pro-Slav newspaper "Lavoratore" in one instance led to the fining and conviction of the Director by the Allied Military Government court on March 29, 1946.

4. *Incitement to unrest:* Yugoslav authorities have brought into Zone A armed pro-Slav groups from Zone B for pro-Slav demonstrations, such as those at Gorizia on March 2 and 27, 1946, and at Trieste on March 26, 1946. A resident of Zone B who was arrested in Trieste on March 26 for carrying firearms made a voluntary signed statement that he and two others had been given arms by Zone B authorities and sent across the Morgan Line to demonstrate. Other residents of Zone

B arrested in Trieste have stated that they were warned to participate in demonstrations and were furnished motor transport as far as the Morgan Line. Six shiploads of demonstrators from Zone B were brought to Trieste on April 2, 1946, despite specific assurance that no persons from Zone B would participate.

5. *Intimidation of the local population:* On March 10, 1946, a known extremist action squad leader, with ten men, left P.N.O.O. headquarters in Trieste and went to Servola where he directed a demonstration. During the general strike in Trieste on March 11, 1946, action squads wearing a red star compelled shopkeepers to close their shops. On numerous occasions action squads from communist cultural clubs have beaten up pro-Italians; one such club was raided on March 30, 1946, and arms were found, leading to the arrest of 25 persons.

6. *Intimidation of local officials:* Nine specific cases have been reported in which members of civil police have received threats to themselves or their families in Zone B in an attempt to induce them to leave the force or act as pro-Slav agents. On March 14, 1946, a delegation representing 42 Slovene teachers requested Allied Military Government protection as they were constantly being threatened by pro-Yugoslav elements and feared abduction, and felt that they must resign from their schools unless assured of Allied Military Government protection.

7. *Fomenting industrial unrest and impeding production:* Political strikes and work stoppages fomented by a pro-Slav organization have occurred in Zone A this year on January 25, 26, 29, 30, February 16, March 11, 12, 26, and April 1. *Sindicati Unici* constantly hold political meetings in industrial plants during working hours. On January 8, Radich, *Sindicati Unici* leader, called a meeting in *Fabrica Lacchipe* in violation of express Allied Military Government orders, and was arrested therefor. Pro-Slav elements in shipyards have misappropriated large quantities of paints and other materials for propaganda use.

8. *Usurping functions of the government:* The Allied Military Government on April 23, 1946, was finally compelled to give public warning that persons and organizations attempting to usurp the powers of government, and persons obeying orders issued in such attempts, would be prosecuted. At Sesana, P.N.O.O. had on March 20, 1946, issued orders to teachers in three Slovene communes to send pupils to work on reforestation during school hours. Other instances of P.N.O.O. attempts to usurp government authority include collections of taxes and excise, appointment of school inspectors and of courts to settle land disputes, and interference with educational, agricultural, public works and reconstruction policies, including reconstruction of damaged Slovene villages. The action committee which superseded the strike committee directing the strike on March 11 and 12 was dissolved by the Allied Military Government for also attempting to usurp government functions.

9. *Criminal and terrorist activities:* Members of the Yugoslav army and para-military organizations such as KNOJ and OZNA have been arrested while abducting civilians and engaged in other criminal acts. Four of these have volunteered signed statements that they were sent on their missions by their superiors in Yugoslavia and Zone B.

As will be evident from the above instances, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have been forced to conclude

that the provocative activities of the P. N. O. O. and other pro-Yugoslav organizations have been encouraged and directed by Yugoslav officials from within Yugoslavia. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom request to be informed at the earliest opportunity whether such officials acted with the knowledge and authority of the Yugoslav Government and precisely what relations the Yugoslav Government considers to exist between itself and the P. N. O. O. and similar organizations in Zone A.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have shown themselves fully prepared to examine all justified complaints of the Yugoslav Government as, for example, complaints of unauthorized flights over Yugoslav territory which, although greatly exaggerated, have been shown to possess some foundation. They have shown themselves equally ready to take all necessary steps to remove the grounds for such complaints as is shown by the fact that strict instructions have been given to avoid any further unauthorized flights over Yugoslavia and Zone B, and that in accordance with the Yugoslav Government's request, measures have been taken to round up any members of the Ustasha movement and other Yugoslav quislings who might be at large in Zone A. They are forced, however, to conclude from the manner in which such complaints have been made public that they are part of a concerted campaign in which the most trivial incident is used in an attempt to discredit the Allied Military Government in Zone A. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have, for example, noted with regret that His Excellency Marshal Tito is reported in a speech on April 1, 1946, to have described the unauthorized flights over Zone B as a danger to peace and that the Yugoslav Minister of Information is similarly reported to have referred at a press conference to the possibility of raising the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. Reference to such a possibility appears unnecessary and indeed frivolous in view of the fact that the matter is under discussion through ordinary diplomatic channels.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom earnestly trust that they will in the future receive from the Yugoslav Government the cooperation they are entitled to expect in their task of administering Zone A in a fair and impartial manner until its disposal is finally decided. They wish, however, to make it clear that despite all difficulties placed in their way by the Slovene population with official Yugoslav encouragement, they proposed to continue such fair and impartial administration upon the lines laid down by the Allied Military Government until the task which they have undertaken is completed (Bulletin, September 1, 1946, p. 409).

#### 43. PROTEST AGAINST ENTRY OF YUGOSLAV FORCES INTO ZONE A

[Released to the press August 19, 1946]

*Text of note delivered by the Chargé d'Affaires of the American Embassy at Belgrade, Harold Shantz, to the Yugoslav Foreign Office, on August 15*

This Government emphatically rejects the Yugoslav protest of July 16, which is apparently based upon distortion of evidence available to Yugoslav as well as United States military authorities regarding the incident of July 12.

The facts of the incident are as follows: At 6:00 p.m. on July 12 in the area of Ursina, 5.2 kilometers east southeast of Caporetto, three Yugoslav soldiers were seen in Zone A and a United States patrol was sent to investigate. This United States patrol was fired upon by Yugoslavs and the fire was returned. One Yugoslav soldier was killed. A second United States patrol of platoon strength was sent out and a Yugoslav patrol of 10 to 15 men was encountered. Once again the Yugoslavs opened fire, which was again returned by the United States patrol. It was not known at this time that there was any casualty among the Yugoslav forces, who withdrew.

The point at which the first Yugoslav patrol was encountered is some 900 yards northeast of Ursina and is about 300 yards within Zone A. Neither of the United States patrols therefore crossed the Morgan Line.

On the morning of July 13 a Yugoslav machine gun post was discovered to have been set up near the point where the second Yugoslav patrol had been seen the previous day, but this post was later withdrawn. Subsequently, the incidents were settled between the United States and Yugoslav local commanders, at which time the Yugoslav Commander stated that a second soldier had also been killed.

This Government naturally regrets Yugoslav losses in the above-mentioned encounters, but must at the same time make it clear that United States forces began firing in self defense only after Yugoslav forces had first opened fire. The Yugoslav Government must also be aware that in addition to the unwarranted entry of Yugoslav forces into the Zone cited above, 12 Yugoslav soldiers crossed the Morgan Line on June 19 and entered the village of Prebenico, and that on June 30 a British patrol in the same village was surrounded by 25 armed Yugoslavs under the command of a sergeant major who stated that his instructions were to set up a post in Prebenico, and who confirmed by telephone, presumably with a higher Yugoslav command, that such were his orders. This Yugoslav patrol was only recently withdrawn from Prebenico, although there could have been no doubt that it was well to the west of the Morgan Line.

This Government must, therefore, protest in strongest terms the unwarranted entry of Yugoslav forces into Zone A, the hostile attitude shown by Yugoslav troops at Prebenico towards British troops of Allied forces in Venezia Giulia, and the opening of fire without provocation by Yugoslav forces against United States troops. (Bulletin, September 1, 1946, p. 414.)

#### 44. PROTEST AGAINST YUGOSLAV ATTACK ON AMERICAN PLANE AND DETENTION OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL

##### NOTE TO YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT

[Released to the press August 20, 1946]

*The American Ambassador in Belgrade, Richard C. Patterson, has been instructed to deliver to the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note along the following lines:*

Reference is made to previous representations with regard to alleged violations of Yugoslav territory by United States aircraft and the forcing to the ground by Yugoslav aircraft of an American C-47 air transport on August 9. United States authorities in Austria and Italy

have now reported the results of their investigation in this connection from which it appears that on August 9 airplane no. 43-15376 of the C-47 type, while on a regular flight from Vienna to Udine encountered bad weather over Klagenfurt and was engaged in an effort to find its bearings when at approximately 1300 it was attacked by Yugoslav fighters. The attackers fired repeated bursts at the aircraft as a result of which one passenger was seriously wounded and the plane forced to crash land, wheels retracted, in a field near Kranj twelve kilometers from Ljubljana. As for other "violations" of Yugoslav territory referred to in the Foreign Office's note of August 10, alleged to total 172 between July 16 and August 8, United States authorities in Austria and Italy report that only 74 flights have taken place between those dates and that operations officers at Hoersching and Tulln airfields have thoroughly briefed all crews to use approved routes avoiding Yugoslavia.

It would be assumed that the authorities of Yugoslavia would wish to render a maximum of assistance and succor to aircraft of a friendly nation when the latter are forced by the hazards of navigation in bad weather over dangerous mountain barriers to deviate from their course and seek bearings over Yugoslav territory. On the contrary, Yugoslav fighter aircraft have seen fit without previous warning to take aggressive action against such a United States transport plane, the identification of which was clearly apparent from its markings, and have forced it to crash land after wounding one of its passengers. Subsequently, Yugoslav authorities have detained the plane, its crew and passengers and refused to permit American consular officers access to the plane or personnel until specific representations were made by the United States Embassy to the latter effect. Finally, no reply has been forthcoming to the Embassy's requests that the crew, passengers and plane be released from detention and the personnel permitted to depart from Yugoslavia without delay. Meanwhile, it is reported from Trieste that a second United States plane en route to Italy from Austria is missing after having last reported itself under machine gun attack.

The Embassy is instructed to protest most emphatically against this action and attitude of the Yugoslav authorities, to renew the United States demand for immediate release of the passengers and crew now able to travel, and in conclusion to request an urgent Yugoslav statement whether in the future the United States Government can expect that the Yugoslav Government will accord the usual courtesies, including the right of innocent passage over Yugoslav territory, to United States aircraft when stress of weather necessitates such deviation from regular routes. The Yugoslav authorities have already received United States assurance that United States planes will not cross Yugoslavia without prior clearance except when forced to do so by circumstances over which they have no control. The United States Government, pending receipt of detailed information regarding injury to persons on these two planes and the cost of repairing planes, fully reserves its position in matter of claims for compensation.

#### REPORT OF AMERICAN CONSUL IN ZAGREB

United States personnel said they were getting best treatment and affected being under close guard. The co-pilot told Consul that

aircraft which appeared in front of plane bore marking resembling British so he thought they were over Udine and did not understand signal of other plane, but United States plane rocked wings in reply. The co-pilot thought only two planes attacked.

Assistant Military Attaché's report on interview states aircraft fired on by Yugoslav fighter planes, fire continued during descent, last burst just prior to crash landing. None hurt except Turk who had bullet through wrist and body near heart. Aircraft had no mail or official cargo. All personal papers, baggage and ship's log taken by Yugoslavs.

Consul and Assistant Military Attaché were refused permission to see plane and told that this and question of release of men would be decided in Belgrade, so they returned to Zagreb and Belgrade respectively. Our notes to Foreign Office August 13 and 16 requested release but these and our oral protests from August 12 up to today have not yet brought any reply. United States civil passenger was Richard M. Blackburn, father of Charles Blackburn, Clayton, Ohio, R. F. D. 1.

On August 12 Hohenthal and British Military Attaché saw plane lying in small field near hills but were stopped fifty yards away. British Military Attaché said pilot deserves high praise for excellent landing in difficult spot.

#### REPORT OF CAPTAIN WILLIAM CROMBIE <sup>53</sup>

Left Vienna at 11:40 for Udine. The weather was pretty bad but we were able to fly contact half way to Graz. As the weather got bad, we climbed up to 15,000 feet and flew on instruments. We saw Klagenfurt through a hole in the overcast so we then took a heading of 280 degrees (at Klagenfurt, we asked Udine for a QDM but were refused). We continued on this heading for about 15 minutes and then headed south. (We thought we would be north of Udine.) We finally broke out of the clouds and realized we were not over Udine. About that time, a plane (pursuit type) passed us and we all thought it was British. Then two other aircraft passed us and we saw they were Yugoslav. They flew around us a couple of times and one time they wagged their wings. I was trying to orient myself and at the same time trying to find a field to set down on, an airport. About that time, I saw a tracer fire go by right underneath the cockpit. A minute or so later, one of the crewmen came up and said one man was hit. I was about 6,000 feet and I started to find a field to set down in. I then received another burst of fire (I could feel it hit the aircraft). I told everybody to prepare for crash landing and I set the plane down in a small cornfield (wheels up). The landing was rather smooth but both props were thrown off. We pulled the wounded man out and rendered him first aid. The time was about 1400 (our time).

People started collecting and Army officials soon came up. We had to leave our baggage in the plane and were taken into town.

<sup>53</sup> At the request of correspondents Acting Secretary Acheson on Aug. 20 authorized the release of these reports of American Consul Theodore J. Hohenthal in Zagreb and of the pilot of the C-47 forced down in Yugoslavia Aug. 9, Capt. William Crombie. Both reports are dated Aug. 19 and were released to the press on Aug. 20, 1946.



## NOTE TO YUGOSLAV CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES

[Released to the press August 21, 1946]

*Acting Secretary Acheson handed the following note to the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Sergije Makiedo, on August 21*

SIR: The American Embassy in Belgrade has informed me of the contents of the message received from the Yugoslav Foreign Office on August 20. The replies of the Yugoslav Government to our inquiries are wholly unsatisfactory to the government and shocking to the people of the United States.

Your government expresses regret because of what you call an unhappy "accident." Your government is aware that this was no accident; that a fighter plane of your government deliberately fired upon a passenger plane of the United States Government. Your government states that one reason for the "accident" was that since August 10th there have been forty-four instances where American planes flew over Yugoslav territory. The records show that since August 10 the total number of flights scheduled for that route was only thirty-two. These flights were made under instructions to avoid flying over Yugoslav territory and if in any instance a plane was over Yugoslav territory it was only because the pilot was forced by bad weather outside of the corridor.

But this attack of August 19th was not the first. On August 9 a United States passenger plane while in the vicinity of Klagenfurt was fired upon by a fighter plane of the Yugoslav Government. It was forced to make a crash landing. When it landed, the crew and passengers were taken into custody by Yugoslav authorities and are still held as prisoners of the Yugoslav Government.

For some days the representative of the United States Government was unable to communicate with these American citizens. Finally he was permitted to do so but only in the presence of the military authorities of Yugoslavia. Twelve days have passed and these American citizens are still held by Yugoslavia.

The message now received from our representative indicates that on the 19th of August when this second passenger plane was fired upon, some, if not all, of the occupants were killed. They met their death not by "accident" but by the deliberate acts of Yugoslav authorities. The excuse given for taking the lives of these American citizens is that the plane in which they were travelling was a few kilometers inside of Yugoslav territory. Your government asserts that for twelve minutes prior to the attack the pilot of the plane was "invited" to land. At the time you claim the pilot was "invited" to land the records at Klagenfurt show the pilot advised the Klagenfurt station that he was over Klagenfurt, which is well outside of Yugoslav territory, and was all right.

These outrageous acts have been perpetrated by a government that professes to be a friendly nation. Until we have had opportunity to confer with the survivors of these two attacks and we receive such other evidence as is available, we make no statement as to the exact location of the two planes when they were attacked.

Regardless of whether the planes were a short distance within or without the corridor, they were unarmed passenger planes en route to Udine, in Italy. Their flight in no way constituted a threat to the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. The use of force by Yugoslavia under

the circumstances was without the slightest justification in international law, was clearly inconsistent with relations between friendly states, and was a plain violation of the obligations resting upon Yugoslavia under the Charter of the United Nations not to use force except in self-defense. At no time did the Yugoslav Government advise the United States Government that if one of its planes should, because of weather conditions, be forced a mile or two outside of the corridor or, because of mechanical troubles, should find itself outside of that corridor, the Yugoslav Government would shoot to death the occupants of the plane. The deliberate firing without warning on the unarmed passenger planes of a friendly nation is in the judgment of the United States an offense against the law of nations and the principles of humanity.

Therefore the Government of the United States demands that you immediately release the occupants of these planes now in your custody and that you insure their safe passage beyond the borders of Yugoslavia.

The Government of the United States also demands that its representatives be permitted to communicate with any of the occupants of the two planes who are still alive.

If within forty-eight hours from the receipt of this note by the Yugoslav Government these demands are complied with, the United States Government will determine its course in the light of the evidence then secured and the efforts of the Yugoslav Government to right the wrong done.

If, however, within that time these demands are not complied with, the United States Government will call upon the Security Council of the United Nations to meet promptly and to take appropriate action.

#### MESSAGES FROM AMERICAN AMBASSADOR

[Released to the press August 24, 1946]

*August 22, 9:00 p. m.*

Tito received me today in friendly manner accompanied by Colonels Partridge and Stratton and Fraleigh. Two hour conference covered both protest on planes and other points at issue. Regarding planes, I read the Department's August twenty-first note. Tito replied occupants of the first plane were released today and already on way to Trieste; said occupants of second plane have not yet been found. Plane burned in air and very doubtful now that two men parachuted out. Search parties are still out and our request to send representatives with them was granted. Tito also promised to give us remains of planes and allow communication with any survivors. He gave personal account of forcing down of first plane; promised written account from Fourth Army regarding the second plane. Tito said incidents were not result of any special order and emphatically not retaliation for Yugoslavs shot by American border patrol. Crossing of border by air was infringement of Yugoslav sovereignty and Yugoslav fighters were acting in normal defense of frontier. He had warned repeatedly against continuation of unauthorized flights over Yugoslav territory. He refuted Department's figures of authorized flights as not including frequent unscheduled excursions of military aircraft from Allied fields near Morgan Line.

He said such flights numbered in thousands and were deliberate flaunting of Yugoslav sovereignty and attempt to impress Yugoslavs with Allied strength. Nevertheless, he deplored loss of lives and has now given orders that no foreign planes are to be shot at under any circumstances. Incidents will not be repeated, Marshal said, Yugoslavia will always accept planes forced off course by weather trouble, loss of direction or mechanical difficulties in reasonable numbers and suggested means for signalling distress by such planes be worked out. In reply our statement that at the time allegedly invited to land the second plane reported itself over Klagenfurt, Marshal said thousand people witnessed incident well inside Yugoslav territory. First plane was not "a few kilometers inside Yugoslavia but fifty kilometers". Tito emphasized he is extremely sorry for what happened; promised written confirmation; promised answer other issues raised. In later conferences he agreed to meet demands in our note.

PATTERSON

*Undated.*

With two Yugoslav officers detailed to assist us we spent today searching for August 19th wreck and bodies in mountains northwest of Bled. By making two hour drive and four hour hike we found wreck smashed and burned on wooded hillside. Peasants there guided us to remains of bodies buried in church yard at Koprivnik village, one hour hike from wreck. Remains were gathered August 20, buried same day by Yugoslav militia patrol. We found patrol leader who told us two bodies were burned in parachutes inside plane. These and fragments of other bodies pointed to "five or six killed". This contradiction of Tito's statement to us yesterday and tonight (see following telegram) that occupants not yet found is perhaps due to bad staff work.

We are informing Tito of our discoveries and requesting Yugoslav Air Force guard of honor and if Department approved, burial in American Military Cemetery, Belgrade, with full military honors on part of Yugoslavia. We conclude there are no survivors. Plane total loss. Graves registration examining wreck and disinterring remains.

Tomorrow we will see August 9th crash and Turkish passenger in hospital.

Fraleigh and Assistant Military Attache Stratton will return Bled to complete our investigation and I will return to transport bodies to Belgrade by Embassy plane Monday.

PATTERSON

*Twenty-third, midnight.*

Following is text of letter to me from Tito delivered at 2000 hours Greenwich time tonight, replying Department's note 21st. Letter merely confirms oral statement at our conference yesterday.

**EXCELLENCY:** With reference to our yesterday conversation have the honor to advise you as follows:

Regarding the factual state I have nothing to add to the note of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 9860 of August 20, but solely that subsequent reports do not confirm the first ones according to which two members of the crew would have bailed out in parachutes. It appears now that the parachuting object eye-witnesses mistook for occupants of the plane might have been two gasoline barrels wrapped in two sheets. Investigation still being carried out.

It is not possible for the moment to produce a definite detailed report of what had happened apart from that I can on this occasion emphasize only once again the statements of the Ministry's note quoted above which correctly described the circumstances which were causing this regrettable occurrence. In connection with the statements put forth during our conversation yesterday, I have first to point out that it is not correct that the plane had only been a mile or two within Yugoslav territory in the moment when forced down. The plane was 50 kilometers from the nearest point on the frontier. Further I have to underline once more that the Yugoslav fighters were, during almost a quarter of an hour time, inciting the plane to land. They also wanted to show the route to the airport only three miles far away but the aircraft definitely refused compliance with the landing order. Accordingly it does not correspond with the facts the Yugoslav fighters had not warned the plane nor is it correct that the plane had been forced because of weather conditions to deviate from its course. It is notorious in the country where the accident took place that the day was absolutely clear and of perfect visibility.

As for the occupants of the plane forced down August 9, once the investigation got terminated the Yugoslav Government suspended on August 21 any movement limitation imposed upon the persons concerned. During, and for the purpose of the investigation itself, Mr. Hohenthal, the American Consul, was informed thereof and at 730 hours on August 22 he took over. It is evident that they are allowed to leave Yugoslavia whenever they want to. Your Government may also, of course, dispose at any time over the aircraft question.

As for the occupants of the plane which crashed on August 19, as already mentioned, none has been found so far. The Yugoslav Government will be only glad to permit the representative of your Government to communicate with any of them who might have survived.

Respectfully yours,

August 23

J. B. TITO.

PATTERSON.

The messages received from Ambassador Patterson indicate that the demands presented to the Yugoslav Government by the United States Government have been complied with.

As stated in the note of August 21, in this situation the United States Government will determine its course in the light of the evidence secured and the efforts of the Yugoslav Government to right the wrong done. Full reports as to the foregoing, including the reports of the survivors of the attack of August 9th, which will be made directly to the Secretary of State and Senator Connally in Paris, have not yet been received in Washington.

No further announcement will be made as to the attitude of the United States Government until such reports have been received and examined (Bulletin, September 1, 1946, p. 415).

#### FACTS RELATING TO FLIGHTS OF AMERICAN PLANES OVER YUGOSLAV TERRITORY

#### Reply from Acting Secretary Clayton to the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires<sup>54</sup>

[Released to the press September 3, 1946]

SIR: I refer to a note dated August 30, 1946 which you left at the Department of State in regard to alleged flights of United States planes over Yugoslav territory. In your note you refer to several notes of protest to the United States Government requesting that flights over Yugoslav territory be stopped and that inquiries be un-

<sup>54</sup> This note was handed to the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires, Sergije Makiedo, on September 3. For texts of other notes to Yugoslavia on the flight of American planes over Yugoslav territory and on the Yugoslav attack on American planes, see Bulletin of September 1, 1946, p. 415.

dertaken toward establishing those responsible. You state that your Government did not receive a satisfactory reply and that measures were not undertaken to prevent the flights. Your note states furthermore that your Government received no satisfactory answer to its last two notes—that of August 10, 1946 in regard to the forced landing of an American military transport plane in Yugoslavia on August 9 and that of August 20 concerning the flight of a second American transport over Yugoslav territory on August 19, "whose crew unfortunately met a tragic end that might, in any case have been avoided had the crew obeyed the invitation to land".

In your note of August 30 you state that neither of these two American planes flew over Yugoslavia in an emergency caused by bad weather. Your note further states that your Government "cannot be held responsible for the victims" of the plane which was shot down on August 19 "as it had undertaken everything possible to avoid such results in similar flights which had taken place, and which might easily occur at a border where our army, like that of every independent country is charged with guarding the integrity of our territory and the sovereignty of our country".

Your note of August 30 states that your Government again requests that the United States Government reply concerning the steps it has taken to end "the unauthorized and intentional flights over Yugoslav territory". You further state that unauthorized flights over Yugoslav territory have occurred again in the same region even after the "incident" of August 19. Your note states that "on August 23 there were flights by three bombers, three fighters and one transport; August 24, eight planes flew over—three bombers, three fighters and two transports; August 25, three planes, two fighters and one transport; August 26, nine planes, seven fighters, one transport and one bomber; August 27, nine planes, five bombers, two transports and two fighters". Your note goes on to state that it is obvious that all of these cases "could not be the result of emergency or bad weather; but that in most cases the flights over our territory were intentional".

Your note concludes by referring to the statement of Marshal Tito to Ambassador Patterson that "he has forbidden the shooting at planes that might fly over Yugoslav territory; presuming that for its part the Government of the United States of America would undertake the steps necessary to prevent these flights, except in the case of emergency or bad weather, for which arrangements could be made by agreement between American and Yugoslav authorities".

In a conversation with Ambassador Patterson in Belgrade on August 31, Marshal Tito stated that he was going to say that far from increasing, unauthorized flights over Yugoslav territory continued in increasing numbers every day. He stated that on August 28 four fighters and two bombers were sighted over Yugoslav territory; on August 29 he asserted 20 planes, 14 bombers, 2 transports and 4 fighters flew over Yugoslav territory without authorization. Presumably, although this is not completely clear from Ambassador Patterson's telegram reporting the conversation, Marshal Tito believed that all of these planes were American planes.

In this same conversation with Ambassador Patterson on August 31, Marshal Tito, after referring to your note of August 30 to the Department of State, stated that he was now asking for three things: (1)

an official guarantee that violations of Yugoslav territory would stop; (2) that pilots and others responsible for future violations would be punished and (3) an agreement on signals for pilots in difficulty to communicate with Yugoslav pilots and ground forces for assistance.

In order that I may deal comprehensively with the alleged violations of Yugoslav territory by American planes, perhaps it would be well if I recapitulated briefly statements contained in the notes of your Government in regard to such alleged violations. Your Government's note of August 10 alleged 172 violations of Yugoslav territory and gave 97 examples of such violations on seven specified dates between July 16 and August 8. The examples cited comprised 61 bombers, 15 fighters, 1 transport and 20 unidentified aircraft.

A further note from your Government dated August 20 alleged 44 violations of Yugoslav territory by unauthorized aircraft from August 10 to August 20. These 44 violations were alleged to have taken place on seven specific dates during the period and to have consisted of 27 bombers, 12 fighters, 4 transports and one unidentified aircraft.

The violations of Yugoslav territory alleged to have taken place in your note of August 30 are set forth in the third paragraph of this note and those mentioned by Marshal Tito in conversation with Ambassador Patterson on August 31 are set forth in the fifth paragraph of this note.

In summary, the Yugoslav Government has alleged that over the period from July 16 to August 29 278 unauthorized flights were made over Yugoslav territory, a high proportion of those flights being by bombers and fighters.

The United States Government has made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of these alleged flights over Yugoslav territory. In the course of this investigation the records of the various military headquarters and establishments of the United States in Europe were checked and the whereabouts of every American military plane in Europe during the period July 16 to August 29, inclusive was established. As a result of this exhaustive investigation, I am now in a position to provide you with the facts in regards to flights of American planes.

During the period July 16 to August 8, 1946, there were only 10 American military aircraft which made flights which were anywhere near Yugoslav territory. Of these flights, 9 were made by unarmed transports and one by a bomber, a B-17. No other American military planes were near enough to Yugoslav territory for it to have been possible for them to fly over the territory of your country. According to the records of the United States Army Air Force, the 10 flights of United States planes during this period did not take place over Yugoslav territory. These planes were, however, near Yugoslav territory, and it is conceivable that there might have been brief moments when, due to weather conditions, one or more of the planes was in fact over Yugoslav territory, but so far as the United States Government is aware, and according to the records of the United States Army Air Force, this did not actually take place. I would call your attention to the fact that during this period of July 16 to August 8 your Government alleges that there were violations of Yugoslav territory by 61 bombers, 15 fighters, one transport and 95 unidentified planes, and again remind you that of the American planes which could have possi-

bly been over Yugoslav territory at any time during this period there were only 9 American unarmed transports and one bomber; this is to be compared with the 172 violations your Government alleges. I can only conclude that violations of Yugoslav territory by the planes set forth in your Government's note of August 10 must have been made by planes other than United States planes.

As regards the period August 10 to August 20, dealt with in your Government's note of August 20, the facts are that on the dates specified during this period United States military aircraft performed only 30 flights in areas close enough to Yugoslav territory for it to have been possible for any of these planes to fly over Yugoslav territory. All of these United States planes were unarmed transport aircraft except for one bomber, a B-17. Twenty-two of the alleged 44 violations, "3 fighters, 1 transport aircraft and at least 18 bombers", took place on August 13 according to the Yugoslav Government. On that day only three American military aircraft performed flights close enough to Yugoslav territory for it to have been possible for a violation of Yugoslav territory to have occurred; these three planes were unarmed transports. It is within the bounds of possibility that some of the 30 United States aircraft which flew during this period were inadvertently over Yugoslav territory due to weather conditions. This, however, is not shown in the records of the United States Army Air Force. I would call your attention to the fact that during this period your Government alleges that there were violations of Yugoslav territory by 27 bombers and 12 fighters. During that period no American fighter and only one American bomber was close enough to Yugoslav territory for it to have been possible, even inadvertently, for it to have flown over Yugoslav territory. I am therefore forced to conclude that the violations of Yugoslav territory set forth in your Government's note of August 20 must have been made by planes other than American planes.

As regards the alleged violations of Yugoslav territory set forth in your note of August 30 and recapitulated in the third paragraph of this note, I may say that the facts as regards American planes are as follows: All flights over the Vienna-Udine route were stopped on August 20. On August 25 orders were given for the resumption of this service with armed B-17 bombers. The orders provided that each plane was to proceed as far as Klagenfurt, Austria, and thence to Udine without crossing Yugoslav territory provided the weather was satisfactory. If the weather was unsatisfactory and there was danger that the plane might inadvertently get over Yugoslav territory, the plane was to return to Vienna. The B-17 bomber which was to inaugurate this service on August 25 did in fact return to Vienna after reaching Klagenfurt because of weather conditions. For the remainder of the period covered by your note of August 30 there were three flights of American military planes over that route under the instructions set forth above. These three flights were made by armed B-17 bombers. I can state categorically that not one of these planes violated Yugoslav territory and that there were no other American military planes in the air on the five specific dates mentioned in your note of August 30 which were close enough to Yugoslav territory for it to have been possible for them even through inadvertence to fly over Yugoslav territory. Therefore, I am forced to the conclusion that all of the 36 violations

alleged to have occurred in your note of August 30 must have been made by planes other than American planes.

Concerning the flights alleged by Marshal Tito in his conversation with Ambassador Patterson mentioned in the fifth paragraph of this note, there were two flights of American aircraft, under identical instructions, both by B-17 bombers, on August 28. One of these was from Vienna to Udine and the other on the same route in the opposite direction. On August 29, one American bomber, a B-17, flew from Udine to Vienna. I can similarly state that none of these planes violated Yugoslav territory. Thus I am likewise forced to the conclusion that the 26 violations alleged by Marshal Tito to have taken place on August 28 and 29 must also have been caused by planes other than American.

No American planes have flown over Yugoslavia intentionally without advance approval of Yugoslav authorities unless forced to do so in an emergency. I presume that the Government of Yugoslavia recognizes that in case a plane and its occupants are jeopardized, the aircraft may change its course so as to seek safety even though such action may result in flying over Yugoslav territory without prior clearance.

Two unarmed American transport planes have been shot down by Yugoslav fighters. The first incident occurred on August 9th. The pilot of this plane was specifically instructed to fly over Klagenfurt to Udine via Tarvisio, carefully avoiding Yugoslav territory. The weather information available to this pilot was inaccurate and he encountered heavy clouds, icing and high winds on his route. When he emerged into clear weather he believed that his plane was northwest of Udine in Italy. Actually, while under instrument flight conditions he had drifted off his course into Yugoslavia. The plane was then approached by three Yugoslav fighters. These fighters made no signal which could be interpreted as a landing signal. They did wobble their wings which, according to United States practice is the accepted signal to attract attention to the plane making the signal. The Yugoslav fighters then attacked without any warning whatsoever. The transport plane then descended rapidly in an effort to land but was fired on during the descend. After the plane landed the passengers and crew were held from August 9 to August 22 by the Yugoslav authorities. During this period the passengers and crew were questioned frequently and the Yugoslav questioners attempted to persuade individuals to delete from their statements any reference to the bad weather they had encountered and were asked to include statements as to the satisfactory care afforded. The foregoing statements are taken from the report of the pilot and crew of the plane made after their release by Yugoslav authorities.

On August 19 an unarmed American transport aircraft left Vienna for Italy. In accordance with standard practice, the pilot was carefully instructed as to his route. These instructions included a directive to avoid Yugoslavia. It is impossible to give complete information as to what occurred on this flight. The pilot and crew of this unarmed American transport are dead, shot down by Yugoslav armed aircraft.

The Yugoslav Government has already received assurances from the United States Government that the United States planes will not cross Yugoslav territory without prior clearance from Yugoslav authorities



except when forced to do so by circumstances over which there is no control such as bad weather, loss of direction, and mechanical trouble. Assurances along these lines were repeated in the note which the American Ambassador gave the Yugoslav Government on August 21, 1946. Standing orders in this sense governing the activities of American planes have been enforced throughout the period referred to in the several recent notes from the Yugoslav Government alleging violations of Yugoslav territory by American planes. These orders have, in fact, been carried out at all American air stations in central, southern and eastern Europe from which American planes fly in the vicinity of Yugoslavia, and will continue to be carried out in the future.

I do not believe that it would serve a useful purpose for me to add to the views which were expressed in the note which the Acting Secretary of State handed you on August 21 last in regard to the action of the Yugoslav Government in shooting down the two American transport planes on August 9 and August 19. Marshal Tito in his conversation with Ambassador Patterson on August 22 expressed his regret at the loss of American lives. I have noted the efforts of the Yugoslav authorities in the search for the bodies of the five crew members and the honors shown the remains which were recovered. Marshal Tito further informed Ambassador Patterson of his order recited in your note of August 30 that Yugoslav planes should not fire on planes that might fly over Yugoslav territory.

The Yugoslav Government has released the crew and passengers of the transport plane which was forced down on August 9 with the exception of the wounded Turkish officer who was a passenger on the plane and is still in the hospital. I have been informed that the Yugoslav Government has advised the Turkish authorities that this Turkish officer is free to leave Yugoslavia when he is able to travel and that your Government has expressed its regrets concerning his injury.

The United States Government was glad to receive the assurances contained in Marshal Tito's note dated August 31st to Ambassador Patterson. The full text of that note reads as follows:

Belgrade, August 31, 1946.

No. 10381

*Excellency:* With reference to our conversation in Bled on August 22, 1946, as well as to the statements I made on that occasion on behalf of the Government of the Federative Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, not all of which have been laid down in my written reply of August 23, I have to confirm herewith:

(One) The Government of the Federative Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia regrets indeed that American pilots lost their lives at the accident of August 19, near Bled, when an American military transport plane crashed after disobeying signals to land;

(Two) As I already stated both orally and in writing to Anglo-American correspondents, I have issued orders to our military authorities to the effect that no transport planes must be fired at any more, even if they might intentionally fly over our territory without proper clearance, but that in such cases they should be invited to land; if they refused to do so their identity should be taken and the Yugoslav Government informed hereof so that any necessary steps could be undertaken through appropriate channels.

I also confirm my statement made on that occasion, on behalf of the Government of the Federative Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia that I consider objectless the American Government's note which was, to our surprise, unnecessarily and without reason too strong towards an Allied country as is Yugoslavia; the Government of the Federative Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia had ordered 24 hours prior to the handing over of the said note that the crew of the plane be released and that they be allowed to leave this country. The crew had been

taken over by Mr. Hohenthal, the American Consul at 7:30 hours of August 22, i.e. full 8 hours before the note in connection with that crew was handed over.

Respectfully yours,

TITO MP

With reference to Marshal Tito's proposal for an agreement on signals, United States military representatives would welcome a discussion of this question and are prepared to meet Yugoslav military representatives at such time and place as your Government may designate, in order to reach an agreement regarding the signals to be employed.

I am constrained to advise you that the United States Government has confidently expected that expressions of Yugoslav regrets respecting the loss of members of the crew, who were killed as a consequence of the action of Yugoslav armed forces, would be accompanied by an offer to make suitable indemnification to the families and dependents of the unfortunate victims of such Yugoslav action. My Government expects that such indemnification will be made by the Yugoslav Government, as well as compensation for the destruction of and damage to the United States planes and other property caused by the two Yugoslav attacks.

Accept [etc.]

WILLIAM L. CLAYTON

*Acting Secretary*

(Bulletin, September 15, 1946, p. 505.)

#### 45. REPLY TO YUGOSLAV NOTE ALLEGING IMPROPER TREATMENT OF YUGOSLAVS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

[Released to the press September 20, 1946]

*There follows the text of a note delivered September 17, 1946 by Ambassador Patterson to the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs:*

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the latter's notes Nos. 8515 of July 26 and 9659 of August 14, 1946, alleging improper treatment of Yugoslav officers and men in zone A of Venezia Giulia.

In the first of these notes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alleges that on June 30, 1946 the civil and Allied military police in Trieste made no attempt to prevent an attack upon the premises of the Yugoslav War Booty Commission, and while taking no action against persons who attacked this building, arrested Yugoslav officers and men. In making this allegation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has placed an entirely false interpretation upon the facts of the matter. Investigation has shown that the attack upon the premises of the Yugoslav War Booty Commission was one of a number of sporadic outbreaks of violence occurring simultaneously and provoked both by pro-Slav and pro-Italian elements. The civil police were ordered to the spot, and were able to minimize the property damages which might otherwise have resulted. One Yugoslav officer and two Yugoslav soldiers were arrested. As they admitted that they had fired on the crowd, thereby fatally injuring a civilian, there can be no doubt that their arrest was abundantly justified. There is no foundation whatever in the Ministry's allegation that members of the civil police insisted under threat of using firearms, that the door of the Commission's premises should be opened. In written statements one of the

two arrested Yugoslav soldiers has testified that a civil policeman "asked admittance"; the other testified that three or four minutes after the firing of shots by members of the Commission "the civil police arrived and protected us until the arrival of the American MP's".

In the same note the Ministry mentions six other instances of alleged failure of the civil and Allied military police to protect the persons and property of Yugoslav citizens in Trieste. Of this number, three were not reported to any Allied authority until the delivery of the note under reply, a procedure which renders difficult any adequate investigation. The fullest investigation possible in the circumstances has, however, failed to reveal any independent evidence that these allegations are well founded. The remaining three allegations have proved on investigation to be false in part and exaggerated throughout.

In the second note under reference the Ministry states that no satisfactory answer has been given to a number of the Ministry's notes alleging that other similar attacks upon Yugoslav persons and property in zone A of Venezia Giulia had been condoned by the Allied military authorities, and in general implying that those authorities are prejudiced against Yugoslav interests. In point of fact, the Embassy's note of May 20, 1946 clearly indicates the attitude which the United States Government has been forced to adopt towards these and other such complaints received from the Yugoslav Government. That note records several examples of important administrative measures undertaken by the Allied military authorities which were obviously inspired by the firm intention to maintain an impartial administration. It also cites numerous instances of the measures taken by pro-Slav elements to obstruct the Allied military administration and to intimidate the local population, thus indicating the provocative attitude of those elements. The United States Government considers that its note answered the complaints put forward by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and made it clear that it could not regard such complaints as being justified. The Embassy has nevertheless been instructed to inform the Ministry that the attempt on the life of Major Cundar (the subject of the Ministry's note No. 2894 of March 20, 1946) and the murder of Major Ravnihar (the subject of the Ministry's note No. 5228 of May 10, 1946), have been investigated with the utmost care by the Allied authorities concerned. The fact that these investigations have so far failed to result in the apprehension of the assailants is certainly not to be ascribed to any lack of energy on the part of the Allied authorities. Indeed, as the Ministry is aware, the failure of these investigations in the case of Major Ravnihar is largely to be ascribed to the failure of Major Ravnihar's companions to inform the police or any allied authority of the assault upon him until several days had passed.

In its note No. 9659 the Ministry also alleges that on August 9, 1946, a Major Despot, the political commissar of a Yugoslav detachment in zone A, together with another Yugoslav officer and a soldier, was assaulted by Allied military police, and was not protected from further assault by "Fascist mobs". The facts of the matter are as follows: On August 9, 1946, attempts by pro-Slav elements to interfere with an authorized Italian demonstration in Gorizia resulted in two hand grenades being thrown by unknown persons presumed to be pro-Slav

and in the infliction of several casualties. Shortly after this incident a Yugoslav staff car in which Major Despot and another Yugoslav officer were riding was stopped and menaced by Italian demonstrators. Members of the civil police, followed shortly afterwards by Allied military police, intervened in order to escort the two officers to safety. Both officers resisted violently and the driver of the car threatened the police and the crowd with a hand grenade. A search was then undertaken by the police, revealing several more grenades in the car and a loaded pistol in the driver's pocket. The crowd, observing this, adopted a hostile attitude and endeavored to assault the Yugoslav officers, with the result that further Allied military police arriving on the scene had considerable difficulty in escorting them to safety.

The findings of the court of inquiry disclosed that a member of the civil police struck the second Yugoslav officer in the belief that the latter was about to attack him, and that in the general confusion Major Despot was also struck by an unidentified member of the police. In view, however, of the gross provocation offered by Major Despot and his companions, both in deliberately and in unnecessarily interfering in an area of disturbance, and more particularly in threatening the police and the crowd with a hand grenade, and in resisting all attempts by the police to conduct them to safety, the United States Government cannot admit that any blame whatever attaches to the members of the civil police concerned. Moreover, Major Despot acknowledged that the Allied military police concerned were endeavoring to bring him to safety and that on no occasion was he struck by them. The Embassy has in fact been instructed to lodge the most vigorous protest against the behavior of Major Despot and his companions. Major Despot in addition to the provocative actions recorded above, and the possession of prohibited weapons, conducted himself in the most offensive manner towards the General officer commanding the 88th Division, and has in consequence been ordered to leave zone A of Venezia Giulia.

As stated in the fourth paragraph of the present note, the United States Government considers that the instances given in the Embassy's note of May 20 for the obstructive and terroristic activities of pro-Slav elements in zone A constitute in themselves a reply to many of the complaints leveled by the Yugoslav Government. Since that date numerous further instances of such activity have come to the notice of the United States Government. In particular, on July 21, 1946, a Yugoslav known to be a political opponent of the present Yugoslav Government was shot dead in the streets of Trieste by the occupants of a motor car in motion, which bore a zone B registration plate. On July 26, 1946, an attempt to kidnap another Yugoslav of similar political opinion was prevented by an Allied soldier. The car used in this operation subsequently crashed while attempting to escape, and the driver, who was arrested, was discovered to be a resident of Fiume and to be employed by an office of the Yugoslav security organization. The upholstery of the vehicle was found to be heavily bloodstained, and two pairs of handcuffs were discovered in it, circumstances which lead to overwhelming suspicion that it had been used in other criminal activities by pro-Slav elements.

The Ministry cannot suppose that activities of this nature can be undertaken by pro-Slav elements without provoking serious reaction from the local population, and the United States Government is

forced to point out that it is such activities and other forms of provocation offered by members of the Yugoslav detachment in zone A which are directly responsible for many of the attacks upon Yugoslav persons and property of which the Yugoslav Government has complained. Although the Allied military authorities will continue to do all in their power to suppress such attacks, the remedy for this situation lies largely in the hands of the Yugoslav Government itself. In its note of May 20, 1946 the Embassy expressed the firm intention of the United States Government to maintain to the utmost of its power a fair and impartial administration in zone A in Venezia Giulia, so long as the obligations which have been undertaken in that area continue. The Embassy is instructed to emphasize once again that the United States Government will not be deflected from this course. At the same time it must once again deplore in the strongest terms the failure of the Yugoslav Government to accord in this task the cooperation to which the United States Government believes itself entitled.

The Embassy takes this occasion to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurance of its high consideration (Bulletin, September 29, 1926, p. 579).

#### 46. FURTHER PROTEST TO YUGOSLAVIA AGAINST DISREGARD FOR ALLIED MILITARY REGULATIONS IN ZONE A

[Released to the press September 30, 1946]

*Text of a note from Acting Secretary Clayton, delivered to Sava N. Kosanovic, Ambassador of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Washington, on September 27, 1946*

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Ambassador of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, and has the honor to inform His Excellency that a full report has now been received from the American military authorities in Venezia Giulia regarding the arrest of six Yugoslav soldiers and the alleged detention of Captain Segota and his escort at Trieste on September 9, 1946, as set out in His Excellency's note Nov. Br. 1326 of September 16, 1946.

This report confirms that six soldiers from the Yugoslav Train Detachment, used for guarding UNRRA supplies, were arrested by American Military Police at 3:25 a. m. on September 9 at a point in Trieste near which a large explosion had just occurred.

These soldiers were searched and found to be carrying hand grenades concealed in their clothing, contrary to standing instructions that UNRRA guards were not to be armed, and were therefore handed over to custody of the Venezia Giulia Civil Police. Further investigation showed that the Yugoslav soldiers were apparently not connected with the large explosion, near the scene of which they had been arrested, and they were therefore escorted to Headquarters of the Yugoslav Detachment on September 11, with instructions that they be sent out of Zone A for violation of the standing orders against carrying weapons.

The Government of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia must have been aware, at the time its protest was addressed to this Government, that the six Yugoslav soldiers had been released to the Yugoslav military authorities in Zone A, despite their violation of

Allied military orders, and this Government is therefore unable to see any basis for a Yugoslav protest in this case. Instead, it appears that this Government must protest once again the disregard shown by officers and men of the Yugoslav Detachment in Zone A for Allied military regulations in that area.

As regards the alleged arrest of Captain Segota and his escort, the Acting Secretary is pleased to inform His Excellency that as a result of Captain Segota's protest to XIII Corps Headquarters, the Commanding General, 88 Division, United States Army, appointed a Board of Officers to investigate the incident. This Board of Officers has ascertained that Captain Segota, accompanied by four Yugoslav soldiers, arrived at the American Military Police Station in Trieste at about 4:00 a. m. September 9 to demand the release of the six Yugoslav soldiers who had been arrested. He was informed at once that the six soldiers were in custody of the Venezia Giulia Civil Police. In the ensuing discussion, made difficult by the lack of a common language and the absence of an interpreter, the American Desk Sergeant, who was alone in the room at the time of Captain Segota's arrival, became apprehensive when the attitude of Captain Segota became menacing and the latter's escort surrounded the Desk Sergeant. He therefore drew his pistol and held the group under guard while he telephoned for the American Provost Marshal of Trieste. Meanwhile, the Desk Sergeant called other Military Police sleeping in an adjoining room, and with their assistance Captain Segota and his escort were searched and their documents checked. The Provost Marshal arrived at about this time, and after further discussion informed Captain Segota that the six soldiers could not be released but that he and his escort were of course free to leave at any time they wished.

In its findings, the Board of Officers held that disrespectful remarks or profane language had not been used against the Yugoslav military personnel, and that certain statements quoted by both Americans and Yugoslavs could not have been known positively because of the language barrier. The Board also held that under normal conditions the acts of the American Military Police would have been improper, but that against the background of the wounding of seven of their number by a hand grenade explosion on the previous day and the discovery during the preceding hour that Yugoslav soldiers in Trieste were illegally armed with hand grenades, and in the light of the Desk Sergeant's apprehensions over the suspicious behavior of Captain Segota's escort and the inability of the two groups to understand one another, the detention under armed guard of the Yugoslav group until the arrival of a superior officer was justified. The Board recommended that no disciplinary action be taken, and that constant instructions be given to Military Police to be firm but fair in all of their dealings in an endeavor to avoid similar incidents in the future. The findings and recommendations of the Board of Officers have the full support of this Government, which is confident that if Yugoslav military personnel in Zone A will evince an attitude of loyal cooperation towards their Allied comrades in arms in Venezia Giulia they will meet with a most full and friendly response on the part of American military personnel.

At the same time, this Government desires the Yugoslav Government to know that it resents the charges that Allied military authorities took no steps in this matter and that they inspired a "fascist"

press to give a "false" account of the incident, and that it rejects these charges as mischievous propaganda without any foundation in fact (Bulletin, October 13, 1946, p. 676).

#### 47. UNITED STATES CONDEMNS YUGOSLAV USE OF AMERICANS FOR SLAVE LABOR

[Released to the press October 18, 1946]

*Text of a note delivered to the Yugoslav Foreign Office on October 18 by Richard C. Patterson, American Ambassador at Belgrade*

My Government has fully considered the views expressed in the Embassy's note of August 28, 1946, protesting against the treatment given to Kristian Hegel in respect to his confinement in concentration camp since November 26, 1944 and the hiring of him at forced labor to private employer. The view expressed in the Foreign Office note of September 7 to the effect that "persons being detained may be let work in an appropriate way" is in full harmony with the laws and customs of other civilized peoples has been noted.

The Government of the United States has received from other sources information in which it is impelled to place confidence indicating that in many other cases the following practices have been and are being followed by the Yugoslav Government in dealing with persons having a valid claim under the laws of the United States to be considered American citizens.

It appears that these individuals, who have been convicted of no crime whatever, have been confined in camps under the administration of the Yugoslav Government; that some of them have died as result of conditions and treatment in these camps; and that survivors are being hired out by the Yugoslav State to private individuals for farm labor, factory labor and other forms of hard labor for which they personally receive no remuneration whatever. It further appears that sums of from fifteen dinars to fifty dinars per day are received by the Yugoslav Government from the employers of these persons. No benefit therefrom accrues to the American citizen concerned. The unfortunate victims of this practice receive from their employer only such shelter and food as the latter deems fit to give them and are compelled by him to work for as many as twelve hours daily.

The United States Government states its abhorrence and condemnation of the practices described above. They are violations of established principles of international law governing the protection of foreign subjects, constituting involuntary or forced labor in denial of the natural rights of human beings and possessing no features distinguishable from slave labor. International tribunals have repeatedly held that such treatment of a nation's citizens abroad is in disregard of civilized standards of justice and that it engages the responsibility of the State to the full extent of the damages suffered by the individuals concerned. Nor has the fact that nationals are given the same treatment ever been regarded as excusing the international delinquency. The United States Government rejects the protest of the Yugoslav Foreign Office, in its note of September 7, against the characterization of this practice as slave labor and denies that the practice is, as stated by the Yugoslav Foreign Office, in full harmony with the laws and customs of civilized peoples.

Even so far as concerns prisoners of war captured in the heat of battle between States, the relevant international convention signed at Geneva on July 27, 1929 provided in Article 3 for the retention of individual civil rights and respect of the personality of the individual prisoner of war. Provision is made in Section 3 of that Convention for forced labor but only in terms consonant with enlightened labor practices involving the full responsibility of the detaining Power for the proper feeding, clothing and shelter of the prisoners of war, for their proper treatment, and for the reasonable regulation of their working hours. Thus the practice of the nations in respect to the soldiers of a belligerent Power captured in the heat of battle while bearing arms is superior to the practice of the Yugoslav Government with respect to individuals claiming the nationality of a friendly Power which contributed materially to the liberation of Yugoslavia from enemy occupation and subsequently contributed in terms of goods and assistance to the reconstruction of Yugoslav economy.

The United States Government deplores the attitude of the Yugoslav Government as evinced in its notes of September 7 and August 13 regarding the rights of American citizens who without any legal procedure are being deprived of their natural rights as human beings in the manner outlined above and expects that remedial measures will promptly be taken, and that these American citizens will be released and permitted to leave Yugoslavia without delay.

*Text of a note delivered to the Yugoslav Foreign Office on August 28, 1946*

No. 412

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to bring to the Ministry's attention the case of Kristian Hegel, an American citizen, who it is noted had been confined in a concentration camp since November 26, 1944.

It has furthermore been brought to the attention of the Embassy that Mr. Hegel has been sold out at forced labor and subjected to every type of hardship, privation and persecution since his arrest and detention.

So far as the Embassy is aware, no charges have been preferred against Mr. Hegel. Mr. Hegel filed an application for passport on August 24, 1946. His application has been approved and a passport valid for his immediate return to the United States prior to October 14, 1946 has been issued to him in accordance with standing instructions. It is understood that Mr. Hegel will apply for an exit visa within the next few days.

The Embassy is completely at a loss to understand on what grounds Mr. Hegel has been held since November 26, 1944 in a concentration camp and under what provisions of international law he, an American citizen, has been forced to work as a slave laborer.

The Embassy expects the Ministry immediately to inform the Embassy why Mr. Hegel has been held for almost two years, why he has been sold out as a slave laborer, and to issue the necessary instructions to the appropriate authorities to permit Mr. Hegel to avail himself of the opportunity accorded to him by the United States Government of returning to the United States prior to October 14, 1946.

It may be added that the American Government has been fully informed of the facts and will continue to be informed of any further



persecutions inflicted upon American citizens contrary to all recognized precepts of international law and in direct violation of the treaties in force between the United States and Yugoslavia, the validity of which was confirmed by the Yugoslav Government on April 18, 1946.

*Text of reply dated September 7, 1946*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia present their compliments to the American Embassy and with reference to the Note of the Embassy No. 412 of August 28, 1946 have the honor to state that details of the case of Kristian Hegel have been requested from the competent Authorities, and that the Ministry will supply all useful information in the premises as soon as details are available.

In the meantime the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have to protest most energetically against the contents of the aforesaid Note which states that "Mr. Hegel has been sold out at forced labor and subjected to every type of hardship, privation and persecution since his arrest and detention" as well as that he has been "forced to work as a slave laborer".

For the moment still missing the precise details of Mr. Kristian Hegel's case the Ministry have to refuse any insinuation that "slave labor" exist in Yugoslavia and that in this country people were being "sold out at and forced to slave labor".

According to the Law and in full harmony with Laws and customs of other cultural peoples of the world, persons being detained may be let work in an appropriate way. This is by no means inhuman or humiliating—as it is hinted in the Embassy's Note. On the contrary a detention without any occupation appears far more pressing and demoralizing.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs have to point out that this is not the first time that allegations in Embassy Notes are such that the Ministry must reject them and lodge a protest against such a way of making Notes. It is reminded hereby to the Embassy's Note No. 381 of August 10 and to the Ministry's reply No. 9610 of August 14.

The Ministry have further to reject as unnecessary and being without any reason the last statement of the Embassy's Note of August 28 No. 412. The Ministry do not object to the Embassy exercising its rights to be fully informed of American citizens.

In a separate Note the Ministry will put forth their view in the matter of Yugoslav citizens whom the American Embassy considers claimants to American citizenship.

*Text of a note delivered to the Yugoslav Foreign Office on August 10, 1946*

No. 381

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to bring to the Ministry's attention the case of Anton Klancar, who, according to information received from the Department of State at Washington has a justifiable claim to American citizenship by virtue of birth at Cleveland, Ohio, on November 28, 1919, and who, it is reported, is about to be transported for enforced labor to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Ministry is requested to inform the Embassy immediately whether there is any truth in the report received from the American

Government and, if so, to take immediate steps to prevent his deportation to the USSR.

Mr. Klancar was lastly reported to be residing at Gorenja Vas 62, Postasmarjeta Prinovem Mestu, Slovenia, with his sister, Mary Klancar, who also has a justifiable claim to American citizenship by virtue of birth at Cleveland, Ohio, on March 28, 1922.

The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign Office the expression of its high consideration.

*Text of reply dated August 13, 1946*

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia present their compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and in connection with the latter's Note no. 381 regarding the alleged transportation for enforced labor to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of a certain Anton Klancar, find themselves obliged to state the following:

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia reject strongly the allegation brought forward in the aforesaid note based on vague and untrue informations regarding the transportation of *Yugoslav citizens* for enforced labor to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and protest energetically against such a way of acting of the United States Embassy in Belgrade.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs will look through the usual channels to establish the real citizenship of the said Anton Klancar, according to existing Yugoslav laws which are the only relevant in this case.

*Text of a note delivered to the Yugoslav Foreign Office on July 26, 1946.*<sup>55</sup>

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with reference to its note No 277 of June 27, 1946, and to previous notes concerning difficulties being encountered by American citizens in obtaining exit visas, has the honor to state that it has been instructed to transmit to the Ministry the text of the following press notice which was released by the Department of State on July 24, 1946:

The Department of State understands that claimants to American citizenship in Yugoslavia are being prevented by local authorities from presenting themselves to the American Embassy at Belgrade and that some have been deprived of their identifying documents. Some such persons who were previously inmates of concentration camps have been threatened with deportation to an unknown destination.

To assist the Department of State in rendering protection to American citizens in Yugoslavia it is urgently requested that persons having knowledge of the presence of such citizens in that country communicate promptly with the Department of State by mail stating:

- (a) Name of person with alternative spellings if any exist.
- (b) Place and date of birth with copy of birth certificate if native American citizen.
- (c) Place and date of naturalization with number of naturalization certificate if naturalized American citizen.
- (d) Last known address in Yugoslavia and date when last heard from.

A revised list of American citizens awaiting exit visas is enclosed. As the Ministry is aware, many of the persons listed have been the

<sup>55</sup> No reply to this note has been received.

subject of previous communications, both written and oral. One example is Spasia Chetkovich who was granted an American passport on April 16, 1946, and concerning whom the Embassy addressed the Ministry on July 6. The Embassy has received no reply to its notes of June 18, July 5, and July 25 on the case of Lillian Spengler who was granted an American passport on April 19, 1946. As the Ministry is also aware, conversations have been held in a vain attempt to arrive at an arrangement whereby claimants for American citizenship now in concentration camps could be permitted to come to the Embassy to establish their rights to such citizenship. In view of the fact that these efforts to assist and protect American citizens have met with little success, the Department of State had no alternative but to issue the notice quoted above.

The Embassy takes this occasion to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurances of its high consideration (Bulletin, October 27, 1946, p. 761).

#### 48. DENIAL OF MISCONDUCT BY U. S. MILITARY FORCES IN YUGOSLAVIA

##### EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

[Released to the press September 24, 1947]

##### *Text of the Yugoslav note of September 22*

P. No. 1200

The Ambassador of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia presents his compliments to the Honorable, The Secretary of State and has the honor to inform of the following:

1. On the occasion of the withdrawal from the demarcation line in the Julian March and shortly before their departure, the American occupational troops committed serious attacks against the property in the region which was taken over by the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia. On the night of September 15-16, American soldiers demolished a hospital in Sezana and removed all of the valuable articles.

2. Along the whole demarcation line American troops burned or destroyed other-wise practically all of the barracks. Such action on the part of American soldiers increased the tension on the demarcation line and could have caused undesired incidents. Besides that, American troops displayed a hostile attitude towards the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia.

3. The American soldiers tried to provoke incidents and made physical attacks upon the Yugoslavs. On September 15, on the road between Tolmin and Kobarid, American soldiers physically attacked and beat Yugoslav telephone workers who were working on a telephone line. On September 15, on the road St. Lucia-Kozariste, American soldiers distributed Anti-Yugoslav leaflets.

Moreover, Italians exercised moral pressure on the population in the territory which was to belong to the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia so that they would move out.

In the region of Kobarid American soldiers, during their withdrawal, fired three artillery shots on the territory of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia. They tried to provoke incidents by firing from infantry arms. Such action by the American occupa-

tion forces may have left the population of the territory in question with the impression that the American authorities are hostile and in that way incite incidents which would make difficult or even impossible the peaceful "taking over" of the territory.

The attitude of the American occupational authorities, before the carrying out of the Peace Treaty, made it possible for followers of Fascist organizations to provoke incidents, attack property and make physical attacks on the Yugoslav population and even upon the Yugoslav citizens in the Italian territory or on the Free territory of Trieste.

During the night of September 14-15, a mine was laid in the building of the "Trimorski dnevnik" in Gorica. It was a fortunate incident that the mine was found and removed by Yugoslav citizens and therefore its explosion was prevented. A Yugoslav automobile with license plate TP was burned the same night by an organized group in Gorica.

On September 14 at 2 p. m. members of the Organization "Divisione Gorizia" destroyed the restaurant belonging to a Slovene—Polde Cesut—injured him and stole 19,000 lire. In the same manner the restaurants of Petar Kralj, Petrovic Makso and Gifl were attacked and Marcija Butinjolija was seriously wounded. At 8:00 p. m. of the same evening, the Library of "Ljudska Zalozba" was attacked and 30,000 Slovene books were destroyed.

On the night of September 13-14 in Gorica, organized groups attacked the houses of Gorica citizens who did not want to display Italian flags. In these attacks three grenades were thrown.

Attention should be drawn to the fact that the Organization "Divizione Gorizia" is organized under the same principles as the Fascist Squadristi and that the majority of the members are former members of the Fascist party.

On September 15, in Trieste, the head of the Yugoslav border commission, Colonel Kilibarda and Major Altarac were attacked. Fifteen members of the civilian police, who were present, did not intervene and did not protect the above mentioned official representatives of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia. On that occasion the automobile of Colonei Kilibarda was damaged.

The Ambassador of Yugoslavia, would, at the same time, like to mention that the American occupation authorities, before the Peace treaty came into effect, allowed, between September 13-14, the entry of Italian troops and carabinieri into Gorica.

The American occupational authorities are responsible for the criminal activities of the members of the above named organizations because they are in charge of the maintenance of Law and order, and with the protection of personal integrity and property on the territories in question.

The Government of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia wishes to express its dissatisfaction for the incorrect stand of the American soldiers and commander and reserves itself the right to seek compensation for the damages incurred by American soldiers.

The Yugoslav Ambassador takes this opportunity to renew to the Honorable the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *September 22, 1947.*

*Text of the United States reply of September 23 to the Yugoslav note of September 22*

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency The Ambassador of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Ambassador's note P. No. 1200 of September 22, 1947, detailing numerous alleged instances of misconduct by United States military forces during their withdrawal from territory ceded to Yugoslavia under the Treaty of Peace with Italy.

These charges have been determined upon investigation to be wholly without foundation in fact and are rejected by the Government of the United States as unworthy of comment.

SUMMARY OF ANSWERS TO YUGOSLAV CHARGES <sup>56</sup>

[Released to the press September 24, 1947]

**CHARGE 1:** American Occupation Forces committed numerous insolent attacks against our populace, property and citizens at the moment of withdrawal from Istria.

**ANSWER:** The withdrawal of the American and British troops from Pola, at the end of the Istrian Peninsula, was made in good order and without attacks of provocation against anybody, and without any harm to property of any kind. The American officer in command at Pola states that all property was left in excellent condition.

**CHARGE 2:** Between night 15-16 September soldiers demolished hospital in Sesana and plundered everything of value. Between Tolmino and Caporetto. American soldiers attacked and injured many of our workers who were working on telephone lines there.

**ANSWER:** No acts of looting or plunder on the part of American troops occurred at any place along the Morgan Line. On the contrary the withdrawal took place in good order, and without incident. No American soldier attacked or injured or otherwise molested any Slovenes in any way.

**CHARGE 3:** On road St. Lucci-Kozarsche American soldiers threw leaflets from jeep with Italian written on them. They pressed the inhabitants of this region to leave territory.

**ANSWER:** This preposterous statement has no basis in fact.

**CHARGE 4:** During the night 13-14 September American authorities allowed units of the Italian army and Carabinieri to enter Gorizia before coming into force of Peace Treaty and at same time prevented our authorities from entering Zone A territory falling to Yugoslavia.

**ANSWER:** Units of Italian Army and OS carabinieri were allowed to come forward to the treaty line at R minus one, in order that an orderly hand-over to the representatives of the two nations could be made on the treaty line.

**CHARGE 5:** At several places American soldiers either destroyed or set fire to barracks.

**ANSWER:** Such barracks as the American soldiers occupied in Zone A were improved during their occupation, and were not injured in any way upon withdrawal therefrom.

<sup>56</sup> Made by Maj. Gen. T. S. Airey (U. K.), Commander, U. S.-U. K. Zone, Free Territory of Trieste, on Sept. 20, 1947. Printed from telegraphic text.

**CHARGE 6:** During withdrawal American military units fired 3 artillery shots at Caporetto in our territory and attempted to provoke incidents by shooting infantry weapons.

**ANSWER:** No American unit or soldier fired a single shot during the entire operation, prior to, during, or after the hand-over. The evacuation of the St. Alucia and Caporetto area was without incident of any sort. No shots fired from any weapon. No troops were involved with any civilians. Civilians were friendly and arrangements had been made to transfer barracks at Plezzo to Yugoslav Army detachments but the steady movement of the Yugoslavs and their complete disregard of all prior timing arrangements made it impossible. Brigadier General Gaither, Deputy Commander of the 80th Infantry Division was personally present in Caporetto until 2340 on 15 September, and was the last U.S. soldier to leave Caporetto and the territory ceded to Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav liaison officer was present with him.

**CHARGE 7:** Under the protection of American soldiers, Italian Fascist bands committed numerous crimes against inhabitants.

**ANSWER:** The American authorities know of no Fascist bands who committed crimes against inhabitants. The charge that such crimes were committed "under the protection of American soldiers" is false.

**CHARGE 8:** From above facts it is clear that American authorities and American military units have roughly broken obligation they accepted under Peace Treaty. They have shown their enemy attitude towards our people by brutal attacks, terror and plunder of property. It is no wonder then why our people in Istria are comparing behavior of American soldiers with behavior German Italian armies during war.

**ANSWER:** The American military units turned over treaty line exactly as it was drawn, and maintained all obligations imposed under the treaty; the American authorities met with Yugoslav authorities and attempted to arrange for an orderly turnover in every respect. The U.S. forces committed no acts against Slovene citizens and no plunder of their property. The attitude of the American troops toward the inhabitants of that part of former Zone A which has now come under the domination of the Yugoslav Government has been consistently friendly. There has been no hostility at any time on the part of the Americans. This allegation is untrue, and is a trumped up and malicious charge.

**CHARGE 9:** "Politika" states "most recent news tells of further brutal violations Peace Treaty provisions and cites incident in which American occupation units occupied 300 meters territory near Penetice belonging Yugoslavia." According to "Politika", "Yugoslav commission went to mention populace and protested. American authorities promised to leave at once but instead issued orders to units to take positions on border armed with machine guns and infantry cannon." "In this way" states "Politika", "they violated international agreements and showed they desired to provoke an incident and a disturbance on the border."

**ANSWER:** The American forces turned over the treaty line exactly as prescribed. No violation of Yugoslav territory was made. In all cases where Yugoslavs attempted to force the U.S. troops back away from the treaty line the American troops refused to move, and indicated that their orders were to stand fast. All international agreements were scrupulously adhered to.

**CHARGE 10:** "Politika" adds "American military as well as Italian authorities were also responsible for penetration of Chetnic and Ustashi bands into territory Zone A now belonging to Italy" and concludes

provocative incidents committed by American and Italian military forces and Ustashi quisling bands are a new attempt by war mongering elements to create hot spots and to prepare eventually ground for intervention by foreign interventionists. They mean at this same time of course the breaking of Peace Treaty agreements.

**ANSWER:** No penetration of Chetnick or Ustashi bands into territory of Zone A was made. American and Italian military forces committed no provocative incidents (Bulletin, October 5, 1947, p. 703).

#### 49. RECONSIDERATION REQUESTED IN CASE OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS EXPELLED FROM YUGOSLAVIA

NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE YUGOSLAV ACTING FOREIGN  
MINISTER <sup>58</sup>

[Released to the press November 4, 1947]

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Acting Foreign Minister and has the honor to refer to the Ambassador's conversation with the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon, inquiring as to the grounds for the expulsion from Yugoslavia of Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Brandel, the resident correspondents of New York *Times* and U.P. respectively.

In order that the Department of State may be possessed of all facts in the case and in view of the importance of two great news agencies involved, and attention which this matter is already receiving in the international press, the Embassy would be grateful if the Ministry would continue its investigation into the reasons for the action in question.

Reverting to the statement made by the Ambassador yesterday, the Embassy would again point out that the order of expulsion was delivered orally at an early hour yesterday morning by a man in uniform who called at the hotel where Mr. and Mrs. Brandel reside, and who told them that they must leave the territory of Yugoslavia within 24 hours, a manifest impossibility considering the transportation facilities available. Shortly thereafter the manager of the hotel informed them that he had been ordered to eject them at the end of that 24-hour period. As a result of the Minister's intercession yesterday evening, an extension of the expulsion order has been granted, to permit Mr. and Mrs. Brandel to depart by the first train for Italy, which leaves Belgrade tomorrow morning. Although as of this morning their passports have not been returned to them, and it will still be necessary, on a Sunday, to obtain permits for passage through Trieste and visas for entry into Italy, the Embassy understands that Mr. and Mrs. Brandel are making arrangements to depart by the train specified.

The abrupt character of this expulsion and the extreme immediacy which the Yugoslav authorities have stipulated, are hard to reconcile with the fact that the Acting Minister knew nothing of the incident

<sup>58</sup> Cavendish W. Cannon and Vladimir Velebit, respectively. Printed from telegraphic text. Note delivered on Nov. 2, 1947.

until the Ambassador brought it to his attention yesterday afternoon. The only explanation thus far vouchsafed to Mr. Brandel was to the effect that his reports had not made for better understanding between Yugoslavia and the United States, conveyed to him orally by an official of the Directorate of Information yesterday, and later confirmed by telephone to resident foreign correspondents by the press office. Moreover, Mr. Brandel had had neither forewarning of action contemplated nor opportunity to discuss reports to which objection has been taken.

Last evening the Ambassador was informed that Mr. Brandel was *persona non grata* for reasons that certain reports which he had sent were not in accordance with truth, and that he had offensively criticised actions and personalities of Yugoslav Cabinet ministers. There has been no indication that either of these charges was based on any specific incident of recent date.

The Embassy trusts that the Ministry will appreciate the Embassy's difficulty in trying to convey to its government a report which clearly would entirely fail to explain peremptory expulsion of representatives of two American news services of broad international reputation. Confident that there are elements of which the Ministry has not yet had time to look into, the Embassy would therefore request that the Ministry continue its inquiries in order more specifically to ascertain grounds for complaint, with the view to determining whether, upon reexamination of the case, the correspondents in question may resume their work in Yugoslavia.

The Embassy avails [etc.]  
(Bulletin, November 16, 1947, p. 961.)





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